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Giurisprudenza italiana. 
Sammlung von zivilrechtlichen Entscheidun-
gen des Obersten Gerichtshofes, begriindet 
von Glaser und Unger (Austria). 
Idem, Neue Folge (new series of the court 
reports cited above) (Austria). 
Gray's Massachusetts Reports, vols. 67-82. 
Grotius, Annuaire international. 
Transactions of the Grotius Society. 
Beitrage zur Erlauterung des deutchen Rechts, 
begriindet von Dr. J. A. Gruchot. 
Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung. (See also Hans. 
RGZ. and Hans. RZ.) 
Hanseatische Rechts- und Gerichts-Zeitschrift 
(Germany). 
Hanseatische Rech ts-Zeitschrift. 
Cases temp. Hardwicke, by Ridgway. 
Harvard Law Review. 
Hauptblatt. 
Hurlstone & Coltman, English Exchequer Re-
ports, 4 vols. 
Handelsgesetzbuch (German Commercial 
Code). 
Hill, Reports (New York). 
House of Lords Cases (Clark), I I vols. (Eng-
land). 
Gerechtshof (the Netherlands). 
Howard, United States Supreme Court Re-
ports. 
Howard, New York Practice Reports, 67 vols. 
Hooge Raad (the Netherlands). 
Henry Blackstone's Reports, Common Pleas 
(England). 
Idaho Reports. 
XXX LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Ill. 
Ill. App. 
Ill. L. Rev. 
Ind. 
Ind. App. 
Indisch Tijdsch. 
Inst. Dr. Int. 
Int. Jahrb. Schieds-
gerich tswesen 
Int. Priv. Law 
Introd. Law 
Iowa 
Iowa L. Rev. 
IPRspr. 
Jahrb. DR. 
Jahrb. HE. 
Jahrb. KG. 
Japan C. Com. 
Ann. 
Japan, Int. Priv. 
Law 
J. Bl. 
Jherings Jahrb. 
Johns. Cas. 
Journ. Comp. Leg. 
Journ. Soc. 
Illinois Reports. 
Illinois Appellate Court Reports. 
Illinois Law Review. 
Indiana Reports. 
Indiana Appellate Court Reports. 
Indisch Tijdschrift von het Recht (Batavia). 
Institut de droit international. 
Internationales J ahrbuch fiir Schiedsgerichts-
wesen in Zivil-und Handelssachen, heraus-
gegeben von Dr. Arthur Nussbaum. Berlin, 
1926-. 
International Private Law. 
Introductory Law. 
Iowa Reports. 
Iowa Law Review. 
Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Ge-
biete des internationalen Privatrechts. Beil-
age der Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und 
internationales Privatrecht (Z. ausl. PR.). 
Jahrbuch des Deutschen Rechts. 
J ahrbuch hochstrichterlicher Entscheidungen 
(Austria). 
Jahrbuch fiir Entscheidungen des Kammer-
gerichts (Germany). 
The Commercial Code of Japan Annotated. 
Published by the Codes Translation Com-
mittee, the League of Nations Association of 
Japan. Tokyo, 1931. 
Japanese Law No. 10, of June 21, 1890, con-
cerning the application of laws. 
J uristische Blatter (Austria). 
Jherings J ahrbiicher fiir die Dogmatik des 
biirgerlichen Rechts (Germany). 
Johnson's New York Cases, 3 vols. 
Journal of Comparative Legislation and In-
ternational Law. Formerly Journal of So-
ciety of Comparative Legislation (Eng-
land). 
Journal des societes civiles et commerciales 
( Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris). 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS XXXI 
Jur. Arg. 
Jur. Com. Brux. 
Jurid. Rev. 
Jur. Liege 
Jur. Port Anvers 
JW. 
Kan. 
K.B. 
Kg. 
KG. 
Ky. 
La. 
La. Ann. 
La. App. 
La Ley 
La. L. Rev. 
L. of N. Treaty 
Series 
Law and Cont. 
Probl. 
Law Q. Rev. 
L. c. J. 
Ld. Raym. 
L. Ed. 
Leipz. Z. 
LG. 
L.]. (Ch.) 
L.J. Exch. 
L.J.N.S. 
L.J. (P.C.) 
Ll. L. Rep. 
L.R.A. 
Revista de Jurisprudencia Argentina (Buenos 
Aires). 
Jurisprudence commerciale de Bruxelles. 
Juridical Review (Scotland). 
Jurisprudence de la cour d'appel de Liege. 
Jurisprudence du Port d'Anvers (Belgian 
Court Reports). 
J uristische W ochenschrift (Germany). 
Kansas Reports. 
English Law Reports, King's Bench. 
Kantongerecht (the Netherlands). 
Kammergericht (Germany). 
Kentucky Reports. 
Louisiana Reports. 
Louisiana Annual Reports. 
Louisiana Courts of Appeal Reports. 
La Ley. Revista Juridica Argentina. 
Louisiana Law Review. 
League of Nations Treaty Series. 
Law and Contemporary Problems, Duke U ni-
versity. 
Law Quarterly Review (England). 
Lower Canada Jurist. 
Lord Raymond, English King's Bench Re-
ports, 3 vols. 
Lawyer's Edition, United States Supreme 
Court Reports. 
Leipziger Zeitschrift fiir Deutsches Recht. 
Landesgericht (Austria, Germany). 
Law Journal Reports, Chancery (England). 
Law Journal Reports, New Series, Exche-
quer, 1831- (England). 
The Law Journal, New Series, 1831- (Lon-
don). 
Law Journal Reports, Privy Council (Eng-
land). 
Lloyd's List Law Reports (England). 
Lawyers' Reports, Annotated (United States). 
xxxii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
L.R.C.C.R. 
L.R. Ch. 
L.R.C.P. 
L.R. Eq. 
L.R.P.C. 
L.R.Q.B. 
L.T.R. 
Man. R. 
Maritime Code 
(Belgium) 
Markenschutz und 
Wettbewerb 
Martens, Recueil 
Mart. N.S. (La.) 
Mass. 
Md. 
Md. L. Rev. 
Me. 
Mich. 
Mich. L. Rev. 
Minn. 
Minn. L. Rev. 
Misc. 
Miss. 
Miss. L.J. 
Mitteilungen dt. 
Ges. Volker R. 
English Law Reports Crown Cases Reserved, 
1866-1875· 
English Law Reports, Chancery Appeal Cases, 
1866-1875· 
English Law Reports, Common Pleas, I 866-
I87s, Io vols. 
English Law Reports, Equity, I 866-I 87 5, 20 
vols. 
English Law Reports, Privy Council, Appeal 
Cases, 6 vols. 
English Law Reports, Queen's Bench, 10 vols. 
Law Times Reports (England). 
Manitoba Reports (Canada). 
Les lois de la navigation ·maritime et de la 
navigation interieure of I 92 8, originally en-
acted August 21, 1879 (inserted in the 
Code of Commerce as book II, titles I-X). 
Monatsschrift fiir Marken-, Patent-, und 
W ettbewerbsrecht (Germany). 
Nouveau Recueil general des traites et autres 
actes relatifs aux rapports de droit interna-
tional, publication de l'institut de droit public 
compare et de droit de gens a Berlin. Con-
tinuation du grand Recueil de G. Fr. de 
Martens, founded I 8 I 7. 
Martin, Louisiana Reports, New Series, I 823-
1830. 
Massachusetts Reports. 
Maryland Reports. 
Maryland Law Review. 
Maine Reports. 
Michigan Reports. 
Michigan Law Review. 
Minnesota Reports. 
Minnesota Law Review. 
Miscellaneous Reports (New York). 
Mississippi Reports. 
Mississippi Law Journal. 
Mitteilungen der deutschen Gesellschaft fiir 
Volkerrecht (Berlin). 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xxxiii 
Mixed Arb. Trib. 
Mo. 
Mo. App. 
Modern L. Rev. 
Mo. L. Rev. 
Monitore 
Mont. 
Montreal L.R.S.C. 
Moo. P.C. 
Moo. P .C. Cas. 
(N.S.) 
M.&W. 
National Confer-
ence Handbook 
N.C. 
N.E. 
N.E. (2d) 
Neb. 
Neb. L. Rev. 
N.F. 
N.H. 
N.J. 
N.J. Law 
N.J.Eq. 
N.J.L.J. 
N.J. Misc. 
N.M. 
Nouv. Revue 
N.S. 
N.S.R. 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. 
Missouri Reports. 
Missouri Appellate Reports. 
The Modern Law Review (London). 
Missouri Law Review. 
Monitore dei Tribunali. 
Montana Reports. 
Montreal Law Reports, Superior Court 
(Canada). 
Moore, English Privy Council Reports. 
Moore's Privy Council Cases, New Series, 9 
vols. (England). 
Meeson & Welsby, English Exchequer Re· 
ports, 1 6 vols. 
Handbook of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and Proceedings (United States). 
North Carolina Reports. 
Northeastern Reporter (National Reporter 
System, United States). 
Northeastern Reporter (National Reporter 
System, United States) Second Series. 
Nebraska Reports. 
Nebraska Law Review. 
"Neue Folge" meaning new series, to indicate 
the beginning of new numbering in periodi-
cals, collections of court reports etc. in the 
German language. 
New Hampshire Reports. 
Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie. 
New Jersey Law Reports. 
New Jersey Equity Reports. 
New Jersey Law Journal. 
New Jersey Miscellaneous Reports. 
New Mexico Reports. 
Nouvelle Revue de droit international prive. 
New series, if added to court reports, periodi-
cals, etc. 
Nova Scotia Reports (Canada) • 
xxxiv 
N.W. 
N.Y. 
N.Y.L.J. 
N.Y. Misc. 
N.Y. St. Rep. 
N.Y. Supp. 
N.Y. Supp. (2d) 
Oberapp. Ger. 
0 Direito 
OGH. 
Okla. 
OLG. 
O.L.R. 
O.N.P. 
O.R. 
Ore. 
O.W.N. 
P. 
Pa. 
Pac. 
Pac. (2d) 
Pa. D. & C. 
Paige 
Pand. Belges 
Pand. Fer. 
Pasicrisie 
Pa. St. 
Pa. Super. Ct. 
P.D. 
Peake Add. Cas. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Northwestern Reporter (National Reporter 
System, United States). 
New York Court of Appeals Reports. 
New York Law Journal. 
New York Miscellaneous Reports. 
New York State Reporter. 
New York Supplement Reports (National Re-
porter System, United States). 
New York Supplement Reports (National Re-
porter System, United States) Second 
Series. 
Oberappellationsgericht (Germany). 
0 Direito. Revista Mensal de Legisla<;ao, 
Doutrina e Jurisprudencia (Brazil). 
Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria). 
Oklahoma Reports. 
Oberlandesgericht (Germany and Austria). 
Ontario Law Reports (Canada). 
Ohio Nisi Prius Reports. 
Ontario Reports (Canada). 
Oregon Reports. 
The Ontario Weekly Notes (Canada). 
English Law Reports, Probate Division. 
Pennsylvania Reports. 
Pacific Reporter (National Reporter System, 
United States). 
Pacific Reporter (National Reporter System, 
United States) Second Series. 
Pennsylvania District and County Reports. 
Paige, New York Chancery Reports. 
Pandectes belges. 
Pandectes periodiques. Recueil de jurispru-
dence (Belgium). 
Pasicrisie beige. Recueil general de la juris-
prudence des cours et tribunaux de Belgique. 
Pennsylvania State Reports. 
Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports. 
Probate Division, English Law Reports. 
Peake's Additional Cases, Nisi Prius, 1 vol., 
1795-1812 (England). 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS XXXV 
Pet. S.C. 
P.G.R. 
Phillips 
Poland, Interlocal 
Priv. Law 
Poland, Int. Priv. 
Law 
Praxis 
Preuss. Ges. 
Sam mi. 
Priv. Int. Law 
Q.B. 
Q.B.D. 
Que. K.B. 
Que. Q.B. 
Que. Pr. 
Que. S.C. 
R. 
Rb. 
Recht 
Rec. Somm. 
Recueil 
Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 
Republica Argen-
tina, Segundo 
Congreso Sud-
amencano 
Peter's United States Supreme Court Reports, 
vols. 26 to 41. 
Liechtensteinisches Zivilgesetzbuch, Personen-
und Gesellschaftsrecht. 
Phillips, English Chancery Reports. 
Polish Law of August 2, I 926, on Interlocal 
Private Law. 
Polish Law of August 2, I926, on Interna-
tional Private Law. 
Die Praxis des Bundesgerichts (Switzerland). 
Preussische Gesetzsammlung. 
Private International Law. 
Queen's Bench, English Law Reports, 189I-. 
English Law Reports, Queen's Bench Divi-
sion, I 876-1890. 
, King's Bench Reports (Quebec, Canada). 
Queen's Bench Reports (Quebec, Canada). 
Quebec Practice Reports (Canada). 
Quebec Official Reports, Su~rior Court 
(Canada). 
Rettie, Crawford and Melville, (Fourth Se-
ries) Scotch Session Cases, 2 5 vols. 
Rechtbank (the Netherlands). 
Das Recht, Obersicht iiber Schriftum und 
Rechtsprechung, begriindet I 897 von Dr. 
Hs. W. Soergel, Berlin. (Since I935 Beil-
age zu "Deutsche Justiz" Amtliches Blatt 
der deutschen Rechtspflege, Berlin.) 
Recueil des sommaires de la jurisprudence 
franc;aise. 
Recueil des cours de 1' Academie de droit in-
ternational de la Haye. 
Recueil des decisions des tribunaux arbitraux 
mixtes. 
Segundo Congreso Sudamericano de Derecho 
Internacional Privado, Montevideo 1939-
40, ed. Republica Argentina, Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Buenos Aires 
1940. 
xxxvi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Req. 
Rev. C. Obi. 
Rev. de Jur. 
Rev. Der. Juris. 
Adm. 
Revista del Foro 
Revista de los Trib. 
Revista Der. Jur. y 
Ciencias Soc. 
Revista Der. Priv. 
Revista Dir. 
Revista Dir. Com. 
Revista Gen. Legis!. 
y Jur. 
Revista Jur. 
Revista Sup. Trib. 
Rev. Jur. Bras. 
Rev. Trim. D. Civ. 
Revue 
Revue Crit. 
Revue Dor 
Revue Dr. Int. 
(Bruxelles) 
Revue Inst. Beige 
Revue Int. Dr. 
Marit. 
Chambre des requetes de la cour de cassation 
(France). 
Revised Code of Obligations, Revidiertes Ob-
ligationenrecht (Switzerland). 
Revue de Jurisprudence (Quebec, Canada). 
Revista de Derecho, Jurisprudencia y Ad-
ministraci6n (Uruguay). 
La Revista del Foro. Organo del Colegio de 
Abogada; (Peru). 
Revista de los Tribunales (Peru). 
Revista de Derecho, J urisprudencia y Ciencias 
Sociales (Chile). 
Revista de Derecho Privado (Spain). 
Revista de Direito Civil, Commercial e Cri-
minal (Brazil). 
Revista de Direito Comercial (Brazil). 
Revista General de Legislaci6n y Jurispru-
dencia (Spain). 
Revista Jurfdica. Doutrina-Jurisprudencia-
Legislac;ao (Brazil). 
Revista do Supremo Tribunal (Brazil). 
Revista de J urisprudencia Brasileira (Brazil). 
Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (France). 
Revue de droit international prive. Fondee par 
A. Darras. 
Revue critique de droit international. 
Revue de droit maritime compare, fondee par 
Leopold Dor. Paris, 1923. 
Revue de droit international et de legislation 
comparee. Fondee par Rolin Jaequemyns, 
Asser et Westlake. 
Institut Belge de droit compare, Revue tri-
mestrielle (1924- ). Originally: Re-
vue de l'Institut de droit compare ( 1908-
1914). Suspended 1915-1921. 1922-
I 924: Institut Beige de droit compare, 
Bulletin trimestriel (See Bull. Inst. Beige). 
Revue internationale du droit maritime, Paris, 
188s-1922. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xxxvii 
RG. 
RGBI. 
RGZ. 
Rhein. Arch. 
Rheinische Z. f. 
Zivil- und 
Prozessrecht 
R.I. 
Riv. Dir. Com. 
Rivista 
Rivista Dir. Int. di 
Napoli 
Rivista Dir. Priv. 
Rivista Italiana 
R.L. 
ROHG. 
ROHGE. 
ROLG. 
R.R. 
Rspr. 
Rv. 
Ry. & M. 
s. 
Sachs. Arch. 
S.A.L.R. App. D. 
S.A.L.R. 
Transvaal Prov. 
Div. 
Reichsgericht (Germany). 
Reichsgesetzblatt (Germany). 
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts m Zivil-
sachen (Germany). 
Rheinisches Archiv fiir Zivil- und Strafrecht. 
Rheinische Zeitschrift fiir Zivil- und Prozess-
recht des In- und Auslandes, I908-1925. 
Rhode Island Reports. 
Rivista del diritto commerciale, Milano, I 903-
Rivista di diritto internazionale. 
Rivista di diritto internazionale e di legis-
lazione comparata. 
Rivista di diritto privato. 
Rivista italiana di diritto internazionale pri-
vato e processuale. 
Revue legale (Canada). 
Reichsoberhandelsgericht (Germany). 
Entscheidungen des Reichsoberhandelsgerich-
tes (Germany). 
Die Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte 
auf dem Gebiete des Zivilrechts (Ger-
many). 
Revised Reports (England). 
Die Rechtsprechung. Herausgegeben vom 
V erband osterreichischer Banken und 
Bankiers; redigiert von Bergel, LObel und 
Wahle (Vienna). 
W etboek van Burgerlijke Regtsvordering (the 
Nether lands). 
Ryan & Moody, English Nisi Prius Reports 
(England). 
Sirey, Recueil general des lois et des arrets 
(France). 
Siichsisches Archiv fiir Rechtspflege. 
South African Law Reports, Appellate Div-
ision. 
South African Law Reports, Transvaal Pro-
vincial Division. 
XXXVlll LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
S.C. 
S.C. (H.L.) 
Schweiz. V erein. f. 
Int. R. 
Scot. L.R. 
Scot. L. Rev. 
S.C.R. 
S. Ct. 
S.E. 
Seman. Jud. 
Seuff. Arch. 
Sem. Jud. 
Sett. Cass. 
SJZ. 
So. 
Sol. J. 
SpR. 
S.R. 
Strange 
St. R. & 0. 
Sup. Trib. Fed. 
s.w. 
s.w. (2d) 
South Carolina Reports; Sessions Cases 
(Scotch); Supreme Court Reporter 
(United States). 
Court of Session Cases, House of Lords (Scot-
land). 
Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir Internation-
ales Recht. 
Scottish Law Reporter. 
Scottish Law Review. 
Supreme Court Reports (Canada). 
Supreme Court Reporter (National Re-
porter System, United States) ; Supreme 
Court; Suprema Corte. 
Southeastern Reporter (National Reporter 
System, United States). 
Semanario Judicial de la Federaci6n. Senten-
cias dictadas por la Suprema Corte (Mexi-
co). 
J. A. Seuffert's Archiv fiir Entscheidungen 
der obersten Gerichte in den deutschen 
Staaten. 
La Semaine judiciaire (Switzerland). 
Settimana della Cassazione (Italy). 
Schweizerische Juristen Zeitung. 
Southern Reporter (National Reporter Sys-
tem, United States) . 
Solicitor's Journal (London). 
Spruchrepertorium des Obersten Gericht-
shofes (Austria). 
Liechtensteinisches Zivilgesetzbuch, Sachen-
recht. 
Strange's Reports, English King's Bench, 2 
vols. 
Statutory Rules and Orders (Great Britain). 
Supremo Tribunal Federal (Brazil). 
Southwestern Reporter (National Reporter 
System, United States). 
Southwestern Reporter (National Reporter 
System, United States) Second Series. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Swab. 
Swan. 
Swiss Code Obi. 
sz. 
Tenn. 
Tenn. App. 
Tenn. L. Rev. 
Terr. L. R. 
Tex. 
Tex. Civ. App. 
Tex. L. Rev. 
Themis 
T.L.R. 
T.R. 
T. & R. 
Trib. civ. 
Trib. com. 
Trib. corr. 
Trib. Marit. 
Trib. paix 
Trib. Supr. 
Tul. L. Rev. 
U.C.C.P. 
U.C.Q.B. 
U.L.A. 
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 
U. of Detroit L. J. 
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 
U. of Toronto L. J. 
Swabey, English Admiralty Reports. 
Swanston, English Chancery Reports, 3 vols. 
Das Obligationenrecht, Bundesgesetz betref-
fend die Erganzung des schweizerischen 
Zivilgesetzbuches. March 30, 191 I. 
Sammlung der Entscheidungen des 5ster-
reichischen Obersten Gerichtshofes in Zivil-
und J ustizverwaltungssachen. V eroffent-
licht von seinen Mitgliedern (Austria). 
Tennessee Reports. 
Tennessee Civil Appeals Reports. 
Tennessee Law Review. 
North-West Territories Law Reports (Can-
ada). 
Texas Reports. 
Texas Civil Appeals Reports. 
Texas Law Review. 
9ep.~; (Themis) Weekly Law Journal, 
Athens, I 89o-. 
Times Law Reports (England). 
Term Reports (Durnford & East) (Eng-
land). 
Turner & Russell, English Chancery Re-
ports. 
Tribunal civH (France). 
Tribunal de commerce (France). 
Tribunal correctionnel (France). 
Tribunal maritime, Maritime Tribunal. 
Tribunal de paix (France). 
Tribunal Supremo. 
Tulane Law Review. 
Upper Canada Common Pleas Reports. 
Upper Canada Queen's Bench Reports. 
Uniform Laws, Annotated (United States). 
University of Chicago Law Review. 
University of Detroit Law Journal. 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review and 
American Law Register. 
University of Toronto Law Journal. 
x1 
u.s. 
u.s.c. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
U.S.C.A. 
U.S.C.C.A. 
Utah 
Va. 
Va. L. Rev. 
Vt. 
w. 
Wall. 
Warn. Rspr. 
Wash. 
Wash. & Lee. L. 
Rev. 
Wash. L. Rev. 
W. Bl. 
Wheat. 
Wis. 
W.L.R. 
Wis. L. Rev. 
W.N. 
W.Va. 
Woods 
W.Va. L. Q. 
W.W.R. 
Yale L. J. 
Zab. 
Z. AK. deutsches R. 
United States Reports. 
Code of the Laws of the United States of 
America. 
Code of the Laws of the United States of 
America, Annotated. 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals Re-
ports. 
Utah Reports. 
Virginia Reports. 
Virginia Law Review. 
Vermont Reports. 
Weekblad van het Recht (the Netherlands). 
Wallace, United States Supreme Court Re-
ports, vols. 68-90. 
Die Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts auf 
dem Gebiete des Zivilrechts, herausgegeben 
von 0. W arneyer (Germany). 
Washington State Reports. 
Washington and Lee Law Review. 
Washington Law Review. 
Sir William Blackstone, English King's 
Bench Reports. 
Wheaton, United States Supreme Court Re-
ports, vols. q.-25. 
Wisconsin Reports. 
Western Law Reporter (Canada). 
Wisconsin Law Review. 
English Law Reports, Weekly Notes. 
West Virginia Reports. 
Woods, United States Circuit Court Re-
ports, 4 vols. 
West Virginia Law Quarterly. 
Western Weekly Reports (Canada). 
Yale Law Journal. 
Zabriskie, New Jersey Law Reports, vols. 
21-24. 
Zeitschrift der Akademie fiir deutsches Recht. 
Z. ausl. off. R. 
Z. ausl. PR. 
ZBG. 
ZBJV. 
Zentralblatt 
Z. f. Ostrecht 
Z. f. Volkerrecht 
Z. Handelsr. 
Z. int. R. 
Z. osteurop. R. 
ZPO. 
Z. Schweiz. R. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xli 
Zeitschrift fiir ausliindisches offentliches 
Recht und Volkerrecht. Berlin und Leipzig 
I929-· 
Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und interna-
tionales Privatrecht. Founded by Ernst 
Rabel. 
Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch (Swiss Civil 
Code). 
Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 
(Switzerland). 
Zentralblatt fiir die Juristische Praxis. Con-
tinuation of Geller's Zentralblatt (Austria). 
Zeitschrift fiir Ostrecht. (See also Z.osteurop. 
R.). 
Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht, Breslau, I 907-. 
Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Handelsrecht und 
Konkursrecht, Stuttgart. 
Niemeyer's Zeitschrift fiir internationales 
Recht. 
Zeitschrift fiir asteuropaisches Recht. (In 
I927 merged with Ostrecht into Zeit~ 
schrift fiir Ostrecht. Continued since I 934 
as Zeitschrift fiir osteuropaisches Recht. See 
also Z.f.Ostrecht). 
Zivilprozessordung (Code of Civil Procedure 
of Germany and Austria). 
Zeitschrift fiir schweizerisches Recht. 
PART SIX 
CORPORATIONS AND KINDRED 
ORGANIZATIONS 
In this part, with respect to Latin America, short citations will be 
used for the following articles, all published in the Tulane Law 
Review: 
Grant, Schuster and Harold Smith, "Legal Problems Affecting 
American Corporations Abroad: A Symposium," in 8 Tul. L. Rev. 
(1934) 550· 
Voelkel, "A Comparative Study of the Laws of Latin America 
Governing Foreign Business Corporations," q. id. ( 1940) 42. 
A series of articles on "The Judicial Status of Non~Registered 
Foreign Corporations," regarding the laws of Chile, Argentina and 
Uruguay by Rives in 6 Tul. L. Rev. (1932) 558; Brazil by Knight 
in 7 id. (1933) 210; Mexico by Schuster in 7 id. (1933) 3.p; 
Colombia by Rives in 8 id. (1934) 542; Ecuador by Greaves in 9 id. 
(1935) 409; Nicaragua by Eder in 10 id. (1935) 58; Guatemala 
by Schuster in 12 id. (1937) 74; Panama by Eder in 15 id. (1941) 
52 x; Venezuela by Crawford in I 2 id. (I 9 3 8) 2 I 8 and by Goldstone 
in 17 id. (1943) 575· 
CHAPTER 18 
Types of Organizations, Nationality, 
and Domicil 
THE essential incidents of the activities of any legal entity are controlled by one municipal law, a single ubiquitous personal law, parallel to the statute per-
sonal of individuals. This is recognized in the legislation of 
all countries in the world, despite a contrary theory pro-
pounded by Pillee which has created much doctrinal con-
fusion, and despite a useless theoretical dispute whether a 
corporate entity is susceptible of "status" or of "capacity." 
Even the American conflicts law, which has tended to reduce 
the sphere of the law of domicil as governing the status of 
individuals, gives broad effect to the law of the state in which 
a corporation has been created. 
This law governs existence, capacity, internal structure, 
external legal relations, modifications of the charter and dis-
solution of the legal entity. The importance of this principle 
cannot be overemphasized. 
In the United States this conception is essentially, though 
not to its full extent, implemented by the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution. Thus, state courts 
have been required to follow the constitution, laws, and 
judicial decisions of the corporation's home state in order to 
determine such questions as that of stockholders' liability.2 
1 PILLET, Personnes Morales 46 §§ 341f. 
2 Converse v. Hamilton (1912.) :z.z4 U.S. 243; Selig v. Hamilton (1914) 
234 U. S. 652. CORWIN, "The Full Faith and Credit Clause," 81 U. of Pa. L. 
Rev. (1933) 371, 386 ad n. 65, classifies this case into the formula of Mr. 
Justice Holmes, that relationships ought to be governed by the law under which 
they were formed. But this idea does not explain why the law of the corpora-
tion and not that of the stockholder governs. 
3 
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But the criterion determining this personal law may take 
either of two forms. While, in common law countries and a 
few others, the law of the state of incorporation controls, in 
most civil law countries a corporate entity is subject to the 
law of the state in which it has its permanent central office of 
management (headquarters, domicil, "seat").3 
The details of this contrast will be discussed later. At 
this place we consider, with the help of elementary compara-
tive observations respecting the municipal laws, what organi-
zations are potentially susceptible of having a personal law. 
I. CATEGORIES OF ORGANIZATIONS 
I. Survey 
The Restatement/ in an elaborate chapter on "corpora-
tions," declares "incorporation" to be the process by which 
official representation is substituted for individual action in 
causing liability of members, whether limited or unlimited 
and whether in contract or tort. 5 This description has its origin 
in the theory that a corporation is nothing else than the mem-
bers acting in their capacity as a corporate body.11 Whatever 
the merits of this theory may be (and it may have some virtue 
as an antidote for the noxious fiction theory likewise adopted 
in the Restatement), representation will not serve as an ex-
clusive mark of incorporation because, on the one hand, 
partners also may be represented by administrators, possibly 
widely empowered, and, on the other hand, a membership 
corporation may reserve all important decisions to the gen-
eral meeting of the members. 
3 In English, the expression "seat" has been repeatedly used to translate the 
French siege social, German Geschiiftssitz, and officially in the English text of 
Pan-American documents, particularly so in the Presidential Proclamation of 
August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 1201, 1204, on the juridical personality of foreign 
companies. 
4 As in the first volume, "Restatement" means the Restatement of the Law of 
Conflict of Laws (1934). 
5 Restatement § xs:z comment e. 
8 Restatement § 1 sz comment a. 
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Thus, the concept of "corporation" itself, which the Re-
statement fails to define, remains somewhat obscure. The 
Restatement does, however, make clear that the chapter on 
corporations is limited exclusively to incorporated "associa-
tions of individuals." Hence, the rules therein adduced do 
not apply to foreign states, to what are called in this country 
municipal corporations, nor to civil law foundations. In 
modern theory, the state recognized as a legal person is an 
institution, not a mere association of individuals. In fact, 
although "corporation" in American terminology may denote 
(I) any distinct legal entity, equivalent to "juristic person" 
in the conception of civil law, ordinarily, however, it seems 
either to indicate ( 2) private incorporated associations formed 
by persons, or to refer (3), still more narrowly, to associa-
tions incorporated for business purposes, this being the most 
common usage. The Restatement conceives of a corporation · 
as "any association of individuals," adopting thereby the 
second meaning with the only difference that in speaking 
of individuals the possibility of corporations being members 
of a corporation is overlooked. In the further course of its 
development, however, without saying it, the Restatement 
gives attention almost exclusively to business corporations, 
which in itself is justified. The emphasis on these corporations 
corresponds with their prevalence in legal practice, and the 
gaps thus left uncovered by the Restatement are not difficult 
to fill. 
More serious than the neglect of nonprofit corporations 
and the disregard of public corporations is the silence regard-
ing all associations that are not corporations. The Restatement 
has simply provided a chapter on corporations and a chapter 
on "contracts." In the latter, it has set out a few rules merely 
purporting to fix the place of contracting in contracts con-
cluded among partners (§ 342), or between partners and 
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third parties (§§ 315, 318, 328-331), and a few rules in 
which the powers of partners to act for the partnership are 
identified with the authorization of any other agent (§§ 343-
345). Apparently, the neat old contrast of company and 
partnership is responsible for this arrangement. The in-
numerable mixed forms of association that have developed 
in the last century are ignored. Moreover, the common as-
sumption is perpetuated that a partnership can be adequately 
analyzed in terms of contractual relationship. But partner-
ship, as it exists in England and the United States and in 
commercial use all over the world, is not a societas, as in 
ancient Rome (or in the German Civil Code), based on a 
contract as distinguished from an association and existent 
only in the person of the partners; it has entity aspects, a 
fact that requires recognition in conflicts law. 
To find our way through these doubts, we may be per-
mitted to adjust the usual American terminology to a broad 
classification of the organizations involved under the follow-
ing scheme: 
(a) Legal (or juristic, or moral) persons are entities hav-
ing separate existence as subjects of rights and obligations in 
private law. They include: 
(i) Public legal persons, such as the state itself, and the 
municipal and other public organizations created by the state 
as distinct persons, as well as certain other bodies. 
(ii) Private incorporated associations (corporations in the 
second meaning supra), these being-
1. Business corporations, 
2. Incorporated nonprofit associations, 
3· Co-operative associations. 
(iii) Private foundations, constituting independent units 
after the model pia corpora of the law of Justinian. Charitable 
corporations and charitable trusts may be put in this class. 
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(b) Unincorporated associations/ including-
(i) Nonincorporated nonprofit associations, 
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(ii) Limited partnerships, limited partnership associations, 
joint stock companies, and business trusts, 
(iii) General partnerships. 
(c) Contracts of joint undertaking, that is, contractual ar-
rangements such as joint adventures (societas unius rei), 
contracts of joint tenancy, et cetera. 
Whatever comparisons may be made in this field, the 
basic concept, valid for the legislation of every country and 
every purpose, must be and is that of legal personality. This 
is a very simple concept developed by the Roman jurists and 
adopted everywhere. The essential feature of a legal person 
is that it is a person other than an individual and entirely 
distinct from any individual. An incorporated association is 
"a legal person apart from its members," a notion thoroughly 
familiar to American lawyers. 8 The complete independence 
of the corporate person as a subject of rights and duties in 
respect to third parties, and not any form of representation 
of the members, is the decisive factor. Incorporation is the 
process by which this legal person is brought into being; an 
organization is endowe~ with personality. 
It seems opportune here to mention the most important 
types of business organizations in common use and, as we 
shall have to concentrate mostly on commercial organizations, 
to add a brief survey of the other legal persons. 
2. Private Business Organizations 
The prototype of all corporate bodies in the modern world 
of private business is the regular stock corporation with trans-
ferable shares, the liability of the members being limited to 
7 Terminology following § I par. XIV of the Model Business Corporation 
Act. 
8 STEVENS, Corporations, Ch. I § 1. 
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their contribution to the capital and the members participat-
ing in the profits and surplus according to some fixed pro-
portion. There are varied additional characteristics inherent 
in the different types of stock corporations, represented by 
the usual American shareholder corporation, the English 
public company, the French societe anonyme, and the Ger-
man Aktiengesellschaft, but the indicated elements are the 
features common to all. 11 
Akin to this fundamental type are French and German 
stock corporations with shares en commandite, that is, having 
at least one member with unlimited personal liability for the 
company's debts. 
Furthermore, "private limited companies"10 have sprung 
up in recent decades as younger brothers of the ordinary stock 
company. Based on capital stock quotas rather than on the 
personal liability of the members, these are definitely not 
partnerships in the ordinary sense. But restrictions on the 
transfer of shares and other measures to lessen the dangers 
to the public, make it possible for legislatures to reduce the 
onerous formalities and security requirements that regular 
stock corporations have to bear in Europe and Latin America. 
The model for all these minor forms of stock corporations 
has been the German Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung 
(GmbH.), introduced in 1898 and since then adopted in 
almost all civil law countries with more or less modifications 
(societe a responsibilite limitee, sociedad a responsibilidad 
limitada, et cetera). In England, a modifi.ed form of stock 
company, developed in the legal practice, has been authorized 
by the Companies Acts of 1913 and 1929.11 
9 G. HAMBURGER, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 59 at 6o, u6. Cf. also 
STREICHENBERGER, Sociches anonymes de France et d'Angleterre (Lyon 1933) 
JI. 
10 ScHUSTER, The German Commercial Code (London 191I) 235. 
11 See WRIGHTINGTON, ''Private Companies," xo Am. Bar Asso. Jour. (1924) 
475 who advocated a similar type for this country to unburden private business 
in restricted associations. 
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Where an organization did not satisfy all the conditions 
of incorporation, the traditional theory saw in it nothing but 
some kind of contractual arrangement. The Restatement, as 
indicated, conforms to this tradition. It was also adopted in 
the highly elaborate provisions of the German Civil Code, 
framed toward the end of the last century. These prescribed 
that associations not having obtained juristic personality 
should be treated under the rules on "society," the members 
of which, among other particulars, may not be changed and 
are liable for the debts (BGB. § 54, sent. 2 ). The German 
courts, however, were not long embarrassed by this awkward 
construction; through ingenious interpretations, they arrived 
at conclusions ascribing to various "unincorporated associa-
tions" almost every attribute of incorporated associations. 
This perhaps most outstanding example of law, judge-made 
against the express direction of the legislature, appeared in-
dispensable for the many thousands of groups that otherwise 
would have operated in a dubious legal status. Parallel de-
velopments can be found in the adjudications of all the other 
countries, such as, for instance, the various types of the so-
called de facto corporations. 
There is a rich variety of instances in which corporate and 
partnership elements appear mixed in one combination or 
another. Many doubts and learned discussions have arisen 
concerning the two questions: (I) whether a mercantile 
partnership is an aggregate or a legal unit and ( 2), if this is 
denied as by the dominant theory of the common law or the 
German law, then nevertheless whether a partnership should 
not be assimilated to fully incorporated bodies in certain im-
portant respects or for certain purposes. There have been 
analogous disputes about the nature of business trusts, de 
facto corporations, and other organizations "hybrid in nature, 
savoring of both corporations and partnership.m2 
12 Oklahoma Fullers Earth Co. v. Evans (I 9 3 7) I 79 Okla. 124, 12.5, 64 
Pac. (zd) 899, 901, 
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Among the particular reasons for emphasizing the corpo-
rate elements of these mixed types, is the fact that on the 
existence of such entity aspects may depend a decision whether 
a personal law is to be ascribed to a business organization. 
Then too, significant conflicts problems are produced by the 
diversity of legal conceptions according to which parallel or-
ganizations are differently classifi.ed. For instance, mercan-
tile partnerships are regarded as legal persons in the French 
doctrine, followed in Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, 
Mexico, and most other Latin countries, whereas Anglo-
American, German, Swiss, Dutch, Argentine, and other 
courts prevailingly regard partnerships under their respective 
laws as mere aggregates of individuals. 
Modern theory has paved the way to do justice to every 
one of the many types of combined structure. If doctrinal 
prejudices are avoided, it will become possible to formulate 
the conflicts rule applicable to partially corporated bodies.13 
It is significant that in the legal language of all civil law 
countries one finds a single comprehensive term to embrace 
corporations, partnerships, and all intervening types, such 
as French societes, Spanish sociedades, Italian societa, German 
H andelsgesellschaften. In the documents of the Pan-Ameri-
can Union, sociedad is translated by company, a term recently 
much employed in England and in bilateral treaties in the 
same broad meaning. In this country, the term business as-
sociation reflects the feeling, which appears universal at 
present, that all these types are functionally and analytically 
related. 
3. Public Legal Persons 
States. From Savigny's time, the generally accepted view 
has been that recognition given to a state according to the 
rules of public international law, implies recognition of its 
13 See infra pp. too, 115, 116. 
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capacity in private law matters.14 States thus enjoy full ca-
pacity without any special grant.13 In particular, they may 
bring suits to the extent allowed to all foreigners in general 
and, in principle, may receive donations and legacies as well 
as immovables on the same basis. Their activities, however, 
like those of other foreign persons, may be restricted by the 
locallaw.16 International law does not guarantee states more 
than a right to the usual buildings for diplomatic and con-
sular representation.17 All these propositions18 were decided 
in the careful consideration of two cases: that of Zappa, a 
former Greek national, who appointed the Greek state heir 
to his immovables in Rumania and South Germany; 19 and 
that of the Countess de Plessis-Belliere, who left her estate 
in France to the Holy See.20 · 
Public corporations. By further universal acceptance, rec-
ognition of a state extends ipso jure to all instruments of 
government exercising political powers of the state and en-
dowed by it with separate legal personality, such as provinces 
or municipal corporations. The same is true with respect to 
charitable, educational, and religious corporations, perform-
ing public but nongovernmental functions and established by 
14 FooTE 87; r FIORE§ 303; WErss, 2 Traite 39o; MATOS§ rr9; on the 
Code of Chile, see 3 VICO §§ 40-42. In application to the United States, Story, 
]., in U.S. v. Tingey (r83r) 5 Pet. S.C. IIS; as to the states, Grier, J., in 
Cotton v. U. S. (r8so) II How. 229. 
15 C6digo Bustamante, art. 32; Montevideo Treaty on Civil Law (r889) 
art. 3 ; Argentina : C. C. art. 34; 3 Vi co § 7 I. 
16 2 BAR 67r; 2 WHARTON§ 746 ~;WESTLAKE§ 192; Trib. Montdidier 
(Feb. 4, 1892) legacy to the Pope, see RENAULT, Clunet I893, ur8; App. 
Colmar (Dec. rz, I933) Revue 1935, q8. 
17 See below, p. r65 on the applicability of the French C. C. art. 9IOj p. 
r66 on the capacity to acquire immovables. 
18 German RG. (19I3) 83 RGZ. 367; (I9I8) 92 RGZ. 76. 
19 Case Zappa (I89z), see DESJARDINS, "Des droits en Roumanie d'un Etat 
etranger appele par testament a recueillir la succession d'un de ses sujets," 
Clunet I 893, I009; opinions by RENAULT, WOESTE, and LEJEUNE, Clunet 1893, 
nr8, and of the Faculty of Berlin, 3 Z.int.R. (1893) 275. 
2° Case of Plessis-Belliere (I89o) App. Amiens (Feb. 2I, I893) Clunet 
1893, 384; cf. DuBOIS, "La papaute devant le droit international public et 
prive," Clunet 19 I o, 3 74· 
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the state as legal entities in private law.21 These latter 
"juristic persons of public law," which do not correspond 
with geographical segments of the country, are called in 
France "etablissements publics,"22 and in Germany "offent-
lichrechtliche Stiftungen" or "Anstalten."23 
It follows that the question whether legal personality is 
bestowed upon a governmental unit, is determined by the 
state to which it belongs, and by no means according to the 
lex fori. 24 Accordingly and by way of example, a state uni-
versity not exclusively maintained by the state is not deemed 
to be a public corporation, if its own state denies it this 
nature.25 
Exceptions to the ipso jure recognition of foreign public 
establishments seem, however, to be made in some Latin-
American countries/6 especially in the case of church insti-
tutions. Quite generally speaking, the C6digo Bustamante 
does not assure recognition for foreign administrative or-
ganisms (corporaciones) according to the law "that has 
created or recognized them,m7 but leaves it to the pleasure 
of the "territoriallaw.ms 
21 PILLET, Personnes Morales § 49· This does refer to chambers of com-
merce but not to the so-called foreign chambers of commerce, the first of which 
was in Yokohama in I866, and the second the Belgo-American chamber in 
New York. The French Supreme Court, Cass. (req.) (Nov. 7, I933) Revue 
Crit. I935, I09 held a "foreign chamber" in Paris to be a private association. 
Argentina: C. C. art. 34· 
22 See 7 Repert. 6so No. z. 
23 NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. I40. 
24 7 Repert. 6soff. No. z. 
25 This is the doctrine of internal law developed in this country according to 
BALLANTINE, Corporations 46, 8 I o. 
26 Infra p. I66 n. I98. Rules are missing in e.g., Venezuela, GOLDSTONE, I7 
Tul. L. Rev. (I943) at 587. The C6digo Bustamante, arts. 3I-33 grants un-
conditional recognition only to the states; Treaty of Montevideo on Civil Law 
(I889) art 3; Brazil, C.C. art. 20 refers to private juristic persons only; 
Savigny's antiquated theory of "persons of necessary existence" has complicated 
rather than facilitated the Latin-American doctrines. 
27 This obscure language may induce one to think that State X has to recog-
nize a legal person invalidly created in State Y because its personality has 
been recognized in State Z which is participant in the convention. This, in my 
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4· Foundations and Trusts29 
In the civil law countries, a foundation is a juristic person 
of private law, consisting of assets perpetually bound to 
serve a certain purpose and existing independently of any 
individuals. The administrators of the assets are not owners 
at law as is an Anglo-American trustee or as in the case of a 
gift subject to a charge (donatio sub modo). 
The problem of conflicts law has been thoroughly reviewed 
in the litigation respecting the foundation of Niederfiillbach. 
King Leopold II of Belgium created a private foundation 
with large funds in the city of Coburg, Germany, with the 
governmental authorization of the Duchy of Coburg, but for 
purposes which were to be performed in Belgium. The 
experts were of the unanimous opinion that the validity of 
the foundation depended upon the law of the place where 
the "seat" or central office of administration was to be. The 
country where its activities had to be exercised (Belgium) 
was considered quite as immaterial as were the national law 
of the founder and the place where the deed was executed. 
There was controversy only upon the question whether the 
stipulation of the deed fixing the seat of the foundation in 
Coburg, corresponded with reality or was fictitious.80 
Accordingly, the rule has been generally sustained that the 
creation, organization, capacity, and supervision of founda-
opinion, is not the meaning, nor do these words express adherence to the prin-
ciple of incorporation. The same words were used by the Spanish Civil Code, art. 
37, cf. art. z8, and did not prevent the Spanish doctrine from following the 
ordinary theory of central control. Probably the expression refers to the two 
methods in municipal law of giving birth to legal persons, namely, by special 
charter, the state creating the person, or by autonomy of the parties, on the 
grounds of statutes authorizing the creation. The expression recurs, for instance, 
in Guatemala, c.c. (I933) art. I7, and Honduras, c.c. art. s8. 
28 C6digo Bustamante, art. 33, cf. 32., on which see infra p. 33 n. 1 I. 
29 For comparative municipal law, see Les fondations, Part III of Travaux 
de la Semaine internationale de droit (Paris I937 ). 
30 The seat was assumed to be in Coburg by App. Bruxelles (April z, I9I3) 
S.t9I3·4·9; NEUMEYER, zz Z.int.R. 484 and Revue I9I3, IS; VON LrszT, 2.7 
Z.int.R. us, 12.8; contrarily, CHARLES DE VISSCHER, Revue I9I3, I83, 188. 
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tions are to be governed by the law of the real central office 
of administration. 51 This is a conflicts rule substantially simi-
lar in all respects to that concerning corporations in most 
civil law countries. 
The nearest analogue in common law to the civil law 
foundation is a trust created for charitable uses. If the assets 
of a trust are liable, apart from any liability either of the 
trustees or of the beneficiaries, as, e.g., under an Oklahoma 
statute, the analogy is very close. Since the American conflicts 
rules on trusts differ in regard to immovable and movable 
objects and according as they are created by settlement or 
other transaction inter vivos or by will, this topic is correctly 
treated in connection with property rather than the law of 
persons.32 However, it may be remarked in passing that the 
tendency, indicated in the leading case of Hutchison v. 
Ross33 and in the New York legislation,S4 of referring trusts 
settled with New York trust companies to the law of New 
York coincides with the continental conception. In fact, this 
result would be more correctly reached by localizing a trust 
at the place of its management rather than at the accidental 
situs of the assets or, still worse, by ascribing a wholly ficti-
tious localization to choses in action held in trust. 
5· Associations for Nonprofit Purposes 
Associations incorporated for purposes other than gain 
have, I believe, been included in the Restatement's treatment 
of corporations. They are governed by a personal law, de-
termined practically in the same manner as that of business 
31 German BGB. § So; NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. 143, 146; 
MICHOUD, 2. Personnalite Morale §§ 32.0, 32.1; ARMINJON, Revue I9o2., 434; 
CREMIEU, 8 Repert. 430 No. 19. On the scope see PILLET, Personnes Morales 
§ 300; 2. ARMINJON (ed. 2.) § 178. 
32 C/. Restatement § 2.94· 
3
" (1933) 2.62. N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65, see also supra Vol. 1, 369. 
34 Personal Property Law, art. 2. § ua. 
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corporations. Differences exist, however, in the manner of 
recognition. (Infra Chapter 22.) 
Conclusion. In summary, we see that the recognition of 
public establishments raises certain problems, while founda-
tions and nonprofit associations clearly live under a personal 
law analogous to that of business corporations. 
6. Legal Persons with International Purposes35 
Supranational legal bodies. The Holy See, before regain-
ing temporal power by the Lateran Treaties, the International 
and the European Danube Commissions, and later the League 
of Nations were examples of autonomous organizations with 
undoubted capacity in private law, although not derived 
from one particular state. The United Nations and the Pan-
American Union are now outstanding examples. Capacity is 
based either on multilateral conventions or on general 
recognition. 
Plurinational centralized legal bodies. Such public organi-
zations as the International Postal Union, the World Red 
Cross, the Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works in Bern, the International Health Office in Paris, and 
the International Institute for Agriculture in Rome38 seem 
to be explained as legal persons simultaneously constituted 
in several states. Their private law capacity, however, as a 
rule, flows from the one state charged with the enforcement 
of the underlying multilateral agreement. 
Plurinational decentralized legal bodies. There are many 
hundreds37 of business organizations and nonprofit associa-
tions for humanitarian or scientific purposes-among the 
35 See NoRMANDIN, Du statut juridique des associations internationales (Paris 
192.6). GuTZWILLER, u Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (1933) II6; FER-
RARA, Le persone juridiche, in Tratatto di diritto civile (ed. Vassalli 1938) 
Vol. II 2., 172.. 
88 Cass. Ita!., Sezioni Unite (Plenary) (Feb. z6, 1931) Rivista 1931, 386. 
37 According to the lists annexed to the circulars of the International Chamber 
of Commerce. 
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oldest are the World Evangelical Alliance (I846) and the 
Young Men's Christian Association (I 8 55 )-which carry on 
activities throughout the world or over large territories, but: 
under the present rules have to do without an adequate legal 
unity. They have either to seek separate incorporation in the 
several states or to be content with acquiring personality in 
one state only. Both methods have grave drawbacks. Pluri-
nationality except under special treaties lacks sound rules thus 
far. An organization intended to work internationally is split: 
into national branches, tied to a central office by free will and 
convenience rather than by law. Three great associations of 
this kind, the Institute for International Law, the Interna-
tional Law Association, and the International Chamber of 
Commerce, encouraged by a Belgian statute of October 25, 
I 9 I 9, allowing activity in the country to "scientific" inter-
national associations, 88 have inspired treaty proposals, but 
their efforts failed.39 
Cartels. International cartels and business trusts, too, have 
felt compelled to adjust their structure to the law of one 
state. Where antitrust legislation, as in the United States, 
is not affected, the parties have been able to organize under 
a certain chosen law.40 
But also within the United States, multiple incorporation 
has had a difficult development. 41 According to the theory 
38 Foreign corporations of this type are, thereby, legally recognized (art. 8); 
they must fulfill, however, certain conditions (arts. z and 3) in order to exercise 
their activities in Belgium. See POULLET 2.50. 
89 See Institute of Int. Law, Drafts of 1910, see Revue 191o, 559; of 19:13, 
see 30 Annuaire ( 19:13) 97, 348, 385; Int. Chamber of Commerce, Discussions 
in 192.3 and 191.8, cf. GUTZWILLER, supra n. 35, 153 n. 85; Report Politis, 
Clunet 191.3, 465. All these propositions were inadvisable in fact and were 
disapproved in opinions by the Institute of Foreign and International Private 
Law in Berlin and the Institute for the Unification of Private Law in Rome. 
40 See REINHOLD WOLFF in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 6:u; GEILER, 
u Mitteilungen dt. Ges Volker R. (1933) 196; and in particular GuNTER 
HOFHEINZ, Die Kartellbindung bei internationalen Kartellen (Heidelberg 
1939) 63ff. 
41 See FoLEY, "Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation, and the Conflict of 
Laws," 4z Harv. L. Rev. ( 1929) 516. 
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that a legal person is an artificial creature of the state, as 
many corporations were believed to exist as there were in-
corporating states.42 This obstacle is being gradually over-
come by the courts, but also in this case an entirely satisfactory 
solution frankly recognizing the corporate unity has not yet 
been reached. 
International public corporations for economic purposes.43 
The most recent and important problem in this connection 
concerns governmental institutions functioning like private 
economic enterprises. The idea of clothing an undertaking 
with the power of government but adjusting its daily life to 
the pattern of businesss corporations was resorted to in this 
country when the Tennessee Valley Authority was formed 
and, in the international sphere, by conferring large autonomy 
upon the Bank for International Settlements and, to a certain 
extent, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Admin-
istration. Recently the creation of the International Air Trans-
port Board, the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with 
many other organizations proposed, predicts the rise of an 
international corporate life never before imagined. 
II. THE NATIONALITY oF CoRPORATIONSu 
I. Difference of Purpose from Conflicts Law 
As a matter of strict classification, only conflicts problems 
relative to corporations should be included in the subject of 
42 This theory has been urged by Beale as late as in his treatise, 2. BEALE 902.; 
cf. FUSINATO and ANZILO'l'TI, Rivista 1914, ISI, IS8. 
43 A useful summary is given by W. FRIEDMANN, "International Public 
Corporations," in 6 Modern L. Rev. (December 1943) tSs. On the Bank for 
International Settlements, see Sir JoHN FISCHER WILLIAMS, Am. J. Int. Law 
•93 o, 66s. 
44 The best qualified guides to the literature are the following works: 
YoUNG, "The Nationality of a Juristic Person," :zz Harv. L. Rev. (1908) 1, 
particularly describing the antiquated theories; SCHUSTER, "The Nationality and 
Domicil of Trading Corporations," 2. Grotius Soc. ( 191 7) s 7; ARMINJON, "La 
nationalite des personnes morales," 34 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) ( 1 902.) 3 81 ; 
NEUMEYER, 1 Int. Verwaltungs R. ( 19 I o) I o6, and 12. Z. f. Volkerrecht 
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conflict of laws. However, the Restatemene'5 and many 
treatises on conflicts law include a considerable part of the 
rules of municipal law relating to foreign corporations. The 
inclusion of this subject matter has some advantages; the 
two aspects of corporate activities, national and international, 
are interconne-cted, and the effort to separate them completely 
results in giving a misleading picture. However, there is a 
serious danger of confusion in the usual intermingling of 
conflicts rules with local rules. Once Pillet attempted to 
integrate both sets of rules in a broadly conceived law of 
aliens (condition des hrangers).46 This effort could not be 
more successful than the opposite tendency to extend con-
flicts law. While all aspects of corporate activity do need to 
be seen in relation to one another, the conflicts rules applicable 
to corporate action ought to be distinguished from legal and 
administrative restrictions on the action of foreign corpora-
tions. 
Failure to discern precisely the various purposes of the 
rules regarding foreign corporations has largely contributed 
to another unfortunate controversy, with a literature of fan-
tastic proportions, on the question whether legal persons are 
able to have a nationality, as though there were to be found 
an answer necessarily covering international private law and 
all branches of public law. Although the simple truth of 
the matter has been known for de-cades to a number of 
writers,47 the literature is too voluminous not to weigh 
261; and, to be particularly recommended, NEUMEYER and GuTZWILLER, 
Reports, in z Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (1918) 149; 12 id. (1933) 
129; PILLET, Personnes Morales; MAZEAUD, "De la nationalite des societes," 
Clunet 1928, 30-66; CAUVY, 10 Repert. (1931) 465. 
45 In the long Chapter 6 of the Restatement, choice of law is treated in topic 
1 (with exceptions);§§ x6s, x66, topics 4 and 6. 
46 PILLET, Principes x 68ff.; id., Traite 53 7ff., 334-ff. 
47 See, for instance, BALLANTINE, Corporations § 8; almost all German 
authors; 1 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 458 § 8; C6digo Bustamante separating "na-
tionality" from "capacity"; and the study originally by Gil Borges, sub-
mitted by the Delegation of Peru to the Eighth Pan-American Conference 
(Diario de Sesiones, Lima 1938, 6x8-8). 
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heavily on many minds. Numerous authors and courts per-
sist in using a language which suggests that they still believe 
that a legal person, like an individual, has a nationality for 
all purposes. Others deny that legal persons can have any 
nationality at all. Both sides are right and wrong. A better 
view is the following. 
2. Where Unity of Criterion Desirable 
The conflicts problems of what law governs the existence 
and activities of a corporation, are soluble without any regard 
to the concept of nationality and must be solved separately 
from all municipal rules. Under this aspect, a corporation is 
called foreign when it is considered governed by the law 
of a foreign state. In the United States, corporations created 
in another state and, in Canada, those created in another 
province, are foreign in contrast to corporations ~reated by 
Congress or by the Dominion of Canada through its Secretary 
of State, respectively. 
But when recognition of foreign corporations and, in the 
more frequent cases, when carrying on of business is made 
dependent on reciprocity or on some kind of authorization, 
it may be relevant to state to which particular country a cor-
poration is considered to belong. 
In all these three respects-personal law, recognition, and 
permission to do business-the first two of which pertain to 
conflicts law and the third to administrative law, the criterion 
for ascribing a corporation to a determinate state should 
evidently be identical. This important postulate of conveni-
ence seems to have been widely neglected. 
A fourth application of the same test, once a test is chosen, 
ought to be made in the fortunately rare cases in which con-
flicts rules themselves contain a discrimination between 
nationals and foreigners. For instance, the German rule on 
torts (EG. BGB. art. r 2) declares that a German national 
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cannot be held liable for tort under foreign law to a larger 
extent than under German municipal law. This rule applies 
also to German corporations, and what is a German corpora-
tion is to be inferred from the German conflicts rule pro-
viding that a corporation centered in Germany lives under 
German law. Under the conflicts rules of many countries, 
nationals are entitled to avail themselves of the inheritance 
law of the forum for claiming assets found in the territory, 
despite divergent distributary statutes of the law governing 
the succession upon death. 48 Here the term "national" again 
may include legal persons. 
3. Separate Fields 
Outside of this circle of problems,. there exist innumerable 
rules granting or denying the legal powers of domestic cor-
porations to all foreign-created corporations or other legal 
persons, or to those of certain favored countries. Merely as 
examples, consider the multitudinous and heterogeneous pro-
visions of taxation; the rules of jurisdiction regarding litiga-
tion of foreigners and attachment against them; the rules 
relating to the choice between federal and state courts; pro-
cedural burdens such as the obligation to furnish security 
for costs; 49 the prohibitions on owning or managing objects 
such as immovables, ships, banks, radio stations; on receipt 
of gifts and legacies; the principles of diplomatic protection 
and international arbitration. 
These rules of international, administrative, fiscal, juris-
48 France: Law of July I4, I8I9, art. 2, droit de prilevement. 
Belgium: Law of April 27, I 865. 
The Netherlands: Law No. s6 of April 7. I 869. 
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 25 sent. z. 
Brazil: C. C. of I9I6, lntrod. Law, art. I4, and numerous other Latin-
American codes. 
49 The clause of libre acces in the treaties is not considered as exempting from 
the caution iudicatum solvi, see Swiss BG. (July 12, I934) 6o BGE. I 220 
{construing the Treaty of Commerce of United States-Switzerland, of Nov. zs, 
I8so, Nov. 8, I855). 
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dictional, procedural, and private law, to which those of penal 
law and criminal procedure may be added, are so different in 
purpose that they cannot be construed on the same footing, 
whether they refer expressly to domestic or to foreign juristic 
persons, or to foreigners, citizens, or nationals in general. 
In the correct method, each rule should be interpreted sepa-
rately. 
At present, the word "nationality" is intentionally avoided 
in connection with corporations by some British and United 
States official documents, consistently so by the Institute of 
International Law and several Latin-American statutes.50 On 
the other hand, corporations have had nationality distinctly 
ascribed to them by many statutes, treaties,51 and recent 
drafts, such as that of the Experts of the League of Nations112 
and the C6digo Bustamante.53 
The American umpire in the Mixed Claims Commission 
between the United States and Germany had no doubt in 
describing the Standard Oil Company of New York and two 
other corporations as "American nationals," notwithstanding 
the definition of an American national, which he underlined, 
as "a person wheresoever domiciled owing permanent al-
legiance to the United States of America."54 
That allegiance can properly be owed only by individuals, 
is the main argument used against the nationality of juristic 
50 Annuaire 19z9 II 301, cf. 141, 143ff. 
For a survey on the language of the Latin-American statutes, see BoRGEs, 
Informe 130-133· . 
51 E.g., Peace Treaty of Versailles, art. 54 par. 3 {status of Alsace-Lorraine 
people); Convention on Air Navigation of Paris, Oct. 131 1919, art. 7 par. z. 
Also British Peace Order. On the varying language of the treaties, see TRAVERs, 
33 Recueil (1930) III z8; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 186. 
52 Am. J. Int. Law 19z8, Supp. 171, zo4 arts. 1, z, 4· 
53 Art. I 6. 
5~ Mixed Claims Commission, U. S. and Germany, Administrative Decisions 
and Opinions 66I, compared with the definition in Administrative Decision 
No. I, id. I and I 89, I 93· United States on behalf of Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. 
Germany (Oct. JI, 1939) Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Ger-
many, Opinions and Decisions in the Sabotage Claims JZ 11 3Z4. 
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persons. But, as usual, inexact terminology is innocuous when 
its defects are known. If "nationality" is limited to the pur-
poses of public law and if it is defined as the connection of a 
corporation with another country, there can be no harm in 
the use of the term. Only, it should be clear which purposes 
are involved and which are not. Dangerous generalizations, 
arising in fact from a careless use of the term nationality, 
conspicuously appeared when the so-called theory of control, 
grown up in matters of war seizure and liquidation, invaded 
for a time the field of conflicts law. 55 
However, the traditional doctrine confusing all these pur-
poses has caused Anglo-American lawyers to look usually 
to the state of incorporation56 and civil law lawyers to the 
state of central o:ffice/7 as being the home state of a legal 
person in all respects. This view is incorrect without doubt. 
Nevertheless, it is a fact in itself, and the reasons or pre-
dilections that engendered the two opposite tests of personal 
law may well have presided also over their extension to 
other fields. 
We may take it that incorporation here, and central office 
there, are widely applied criteria with a claim to subsidiary, 
though not normal, application. 
A few illustrations must suffice. Swiss authorities con-
stantly declare companies to be citizens and nationals of the 
country where they are incorporated and have their center.58 
55 InfrQ p. 58. 
56 BORCHARD, ~iplomatic Protection § '1.77; SCHUSTER in '1. Grotius Soc. 
( 1917) 64. 
57 Cf. z STREIT-VALLINDAS 82.; KosTERS 659 n. 6; Italian Council of State 
(May z7, 1918) Oiur. Ital. 1918 III ISo, Rivista 1919-2.0, 391-406 and 
Note, SALVIOLI. 
58 See Federal Council, BBl. 1876 III '1.46; 189z II 811 {diplomatic protec-
tion); RUEGGER in Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir Internationales Recht No. 10 
(1918) (neutrality); BG. {July z2, 1889) 15 BGE. 570, S79; (Feb. 28, 
189s) 20 BGE. 61 and other decisions on the application of treaties on jurisdic-
tion and establishment. For decisions of other federal agencies see SCHNITZER 
(Ed. :z.) z8o n. too, and cf. SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. (1921) 
236, 248. 
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Similarly elsewhere, the test usual in conflicts law has been 
applied to foreign corporations in defining their constitutional 
rights59 or their liability to provide security for costs/0 or 
used as a criterion for jurisdiction61 or as sufficient to establish 
federal jurisdiction because of diversity of "citizenship."62 
Yet, in contrast with the choice of law rule of the forum, 
the center of a corporation may be deemed to be the nominal 
place designated in the charter, 63 or the main place of business, 
or despite adoption of the seat principle, the place of incor-
poration as such. Residence-"or some degree of residence" 
-is a test in England for income tax, liability to be sued, and 
to give security for costs,6' and in the United States for the 
purpose of venue65 or for qualifying a corporation as not 
liable to foreign attachment.66 
59 United States: Muller v. Dows (1876) 94 U. S. 444 (on diversity of 
citizenship); St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. James (1895) 161 U.S. 545· 
France: Cass. (req.) (May u, 1931) and Report Bricout, S. I9JZ.I.57· 
England: Limerick and Waterford R. Co. v. Fraser (1827) 4 Bing. 394; 
Edinburgh & Leith R. Co. v. Dawson (1839) 7 Dowl. P. C. 573; Kilkenny & 
Great S. and W. R. Co. v. Feilden ( 1 8 51) 6 Exch. 79, 8 3, Pollock, C. B. 
60 Austria: OGH., Opinion on § 57 ZPO., see POLLACK, System des osterr. 
Zivilprozessrechts (ed. 2) 177; WALKER 149 n. 29. 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (April 13, 1877) Clunet 1878, 16o; Clunet 1899, 
113; App. Colmar (Oct. 29, 1925) S. 1927.2.33; NIBOYET § 304; id., Revue 
1927, 402. 
Germany (formerly): RG. (Nov. 25, 1895) 36 RGZ. 393· 
The Netherlands: Arnheim (June 28, 19:1.7) W. 117:1.3> N.J. (1928) 438 
(Scottish principal establishment determinative). 
61 Austria: Law of Aug. 1, 1895 (Jurisdictionsnorm) § 75· 
France: (Competence under C.C. arts. 14 and 15) Trib. civ. Nevers (Dec. 
15, 1891) Clunet 1892, 1023, Clunet 1899, 899, Clunet 1913, 1236. 
Germany: ZPO. § 17. 
62 United States: See D. 0. McGovNEY, "A Supreme Court Fiction," 56 
Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 853. 
Argentina: See 3 Vrco 79 § 82. 
63 E.g., Germany: ZPO. § 17 (jurisdiction of courts); BGB. §§ u, 23 
(jurisdiction of administrative authorities). 
Switzerland: BG (Jan. 21, 1927) 53 BGE. I 124, 131, 134 (jurisdiction over 
a corporation at its domicil). 
64 See VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law. Q. Rev. (1933) 337· 
65 Cf. 2 BEALE§ 153·5· 
66 Farnsworth v. Terre Haute R. Co. ( 1859) 29 Mo. 75; HENDERSON 189. 
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Taxation87 may refer to any one of these places or to that 
of doing business. That taxation is reasonably distributed 
according to the various local contacts of an enterprise is, to 
put it mildly, not characteristic of many systems. 
The writers who have advocated one theory for every-
thing are right in deploring the present chaotic experimenta-
tion. Obviously, however, no single theory is adequate for 
the task. 
III. THE LATIN-AMERICAN VIEW 
In South and Central America, a peculiar current of opinion 
obtains, which we ought to notice and try to analyze. This 
trend evidently started in 1876.68 When the British Govern-
ment protested against measures taken in the Argentine 
province of Santa Fe against the Banco de Londres y Rio de 
la Plata en el Rosario, the Argentine Foreign Minister 
Irrigoyen rejected diplomatic intervention on June 23, 1876, 
by answering that the bank was an anonymous company 
(stock corporation by shares), which could not have any 
nationality. In a further note of August 21, he added that 
the entity, distinct from the members, had nothing to do 
with their nationality, while the entity itself was merely a 
capital stock. Obviously, the fiction theory was used, perhaps 
in the form advocated by Brinz that makes the purpose of 
a corporation the subject of right (theory of Zweckvermo-
gen). This denial of nationality to corporations, supported 
in several quarters in South America,'69 was adopted in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1927 by the Committee of American Jurists repre-
67 Taxation at the domicil has been regarded as the "general principle" in 
Europe, see ALLIX, Recueil I937 III 572. The real domicil, not that indicated 
in the Articles of Association is decisive in France (see infra p. 43 f.) and the 
Netherlands, Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. II, I924) W. II334· 
68 See ZEBALLOS, Clunet I 906, 695; ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 38-40. 
69 The doctrine is a part of the general complaints advanced, for instance, by 
SEUAS (Venezuela), II Annuaire (I889-92) 442. See also TRAVERS, Recueil 
I93o III 37· 
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senting seventeen republics, and was repeatedly expressed on 
the occasion of the signatures to the C6digo Bustamante in 
Habata, 1928. The Argentine Delegation signed the treaty 
(which later was not ratified by Argentina) with the reserva-
tion that: 
"It does not approve provisions affecting directly or in-
directly the principle upheld by the civil and commercial 
legislation of the Argentine Republic to the effect that 'juris-
tic persons owe their existence exclusively to the law of the 
State which authorizes them and are therefore neither nation-
al nor foreign; their functions are determined by said law, 
in accordance with the precepts derived from the "domicile" 
which that law acknowledges to such persons.' mo 
And the Delegations of Colombia and Costa Rica observed: 
"Juristic persons cannot have any nationality either under 
scientific principles or in the view of the highest and most 
permanent interests of America. It would have been prefer-
able that in this Code, which we are going to enact, there 
should have been omitted everything which might serve to 
assert that juristic persons, particularly those with capital 
stock, have nationality." 
To satisfy this so-called Argentine doctrine, the Constitu-
tion of Colombia of 1936, for instance, which repealed the 
article of the Constitution of 18 86 requiring reciprocity for 
the recognition of foreign corporations, limited itself to the 
statement in Article I 2:11 
The capacity, the recognition, and generally the regime of 
companies and other juristic persons are determined by 
Colombian law. 
This does not mean that Colombian internal law should 
always be applied; conflicts rules may be established, but 
70 Reservation 4; practically similar, the reservations of the Paraguayan (3) 
and the Dominican Delegations(:~., cf. 3). 
71 Cf. TULlO ENRIQUE TAsc6N, Derecho Constitucional Colombiano (ed. 2., 
1939) comment on art. u. 
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the intention is clear not to recognize as corporations be-
longing to a foreign country those operating within Co-
lombia. ,_ 
Thus, an erroneous legal theory was developed as a justi-
fication for political action. The aim was to defend against 
diplomatic intervention, on the background of unpleasant re-
membrances of foreign complaints, naval demonstrations, and 
claims to arbitrate expropriations and riot damages, before the 
era of the good neighbor policy. 
As a positive support for the rule, it has often been adduced 
that foreigners, whether individuals or legal persons, have 
equal civil rights with nationals, a general Latin-American 
progressive rule, emphasized in nearly all constitutions. The 
argument, of course, tends to imply that a company enjoying 
all privileges of domestic fellow-companies,. has no claim to 
anything more. But, even if equality were not riddled with 
exceptions72 and the conclusion were true, logic would lead to 
the conversion of all corporations into domestic legal per-
sons rather than into persons not belonging to any state. 
As a matter of fact, the stand taken by the Mexican Govern-
ment in 1938 in the case of the Eagle Oil Company, was 
that British intervention was excluded because the legal per-
son was Mexican, whereas the British Government com-
plained of the forced local incorporation of the company.13 
Also, the very frequent legislative acts of Central and 
South American governments barring foreign corporations 
72 See the impressive discussion of the legal reality of the Latin-American 
countries "as to the civil inequality of foreigners" by ZoRRAQUiN BEcu, El 
Problema del Extranjero en la reciente legislaci6n latino-americana (Buenos 
Aires I 943) 93, 95 and ff. 
73 Note of April u, 1938. The British government replied (note of April :u, 
I 9 3 8) that "if a government first can make the operation of foreign interests 
in its territories dependent upon their incorporation under local law and then 
plead such incorporation as the justification for rejecting foreign diplomatic 
intervention," .•• (39 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 67). Se@ also JosEF L. KUNZ, 
The Mexican Expropriations (New York I 940) at 49; and documents cited by 
2 HYDE 908. 
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from business without special authorization, have a tendency 
toward requiring domestication. 74 
These remarks have had the exclusive purpose of con-
ceptual clarification. While a book like the present does not 
deal with political aspects, the universal need of international 
collaboration will have to be stated at the end of this part. 
But the conclusion should be drawn at once that an equitable 
compromise between the interests of invested capital or 
skilled techniques and those of the territorial population, 
cannot be obtained either by artificial theories or by denying 
the existing international connections. Indeed, international 
law, apart from all possibly doubtful problems, permits a 
government to extend diplomatic protection to a corporation 
constituted in its territory, and at least under some circum-
stances, to espouse the cause of nationals who are holders 
of a considerable part of the capital stock or bonds. 75 
Both the Treaties of Montevideo and of Habana have 
distinctly perceived the necessity of connecting public and 
private legal persons with determinate states, and the latter 
has simply called this connection nationality.78 The same is 
true of many Latin-American statutes and constitutions. 
IV. DoMICIL OF CoRPORATIONS 
Another futile controversy based on traditional concepts 
for a long time h~ existed concerning whether and where 
corporations have a domicil. 77 These questions originated in 
74 See infra p. 185. 
7 5 BORCHARD, Diplomatic Protection ( 1 915) 6::.2.; CHARLES DE VISSCHER, 
"La technique de la personnalite juridique en droit international public et prive," 
63 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1936) 4751 484; CHARLES DE VISSCHER, 
"Le deni de justice en droit international," 5:1. Recueil (1933) II 387; z HYDE 
§ 7.79· 
7
'11 C6digo Bustamante, art. 16. 
77 For American law, see the brilliant article by J. F. FRANCIS, "The Domicil 
of a Corporation," 38 Yale L. ]. (1918-z9) 335· For a recent comprehensive, 
though objectionable, treatise, see A. FARNSWORTH, The Residence and Domicil 
of Corporations (1939), reviewed by KAHN-FREUND, Annual Survey of Eng-
lish Law (1939) 374; F. A. MANN, 3 Modern L. Rev. (1940) 174. 
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the same practical grounds as the question regarding nation-
ality. In large part, tax laws, commerce regulations, and 
jurisdictional rules were drafted originally with only indi-
viduals in view. Lawyers had to construe the legislative refer-
ences to domicil with respect to corporations and partner-
ships. Unfortunately, many solutions are unsatisfactory, as 
when corporations are said to have no domicil but only "resi-
dence" or, at common law, are said to have several domicils 
in contrast to physical persons. 
As an outgrowth of the fiction theory, in the United States 
every corporation is declared to be "domiciled" at its prin-
cipal office in the state of incorporation78 and, in the absence 
of an actual office, at a substituted fictitious business place in 
such state. In the words of the Supreme Court: 
"This statement has been often reaffirmed by this court, 
with some change of phrase, but always retaining the idea 
that the legal existence, the home, the domicil, the habitat, 
the residence, the citizenship of the corporation, can only be 
in the state by which it was created, although it may do busi-
ness in other states whose laws permit it.m9 
Hence, a corporation has a necessary domicil by force of 
law in the state where it was incorporated and cannot acquire 
a domicil outside that state. 80 This rule is also settled in 
Canada apart from Quebec.81 In other words, a corporation 
is localized by its creation in a certain state and by this fact 
is domiciled there. 
Obviously, this doctrine would be quite as well expressed 
by omitting any reference to the concept of domicil and by 
78 Restatement § 41 comment a. 
79 Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Pet. S. C. 519; Shaw v. Quincy 
Mining Company (1892.) 145 U. S. 444, 450 citing the case of Bank of 
Augusta with approval. 
80 Restatement § 41 and comment b. Mr. Justice Holmes in Bergner & Engel 
Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus (1898) 172. Mass. 154, 51 N.E. 531; 1 BEALE§ 41.1. 
81 Bank of Nova Scotia v. McKinnon (1892.) 12. C. L. T. (Occasional Notes) 
1 7 8 N. B.; Victoria Machinery Depot Co. v. The Canada ( 191 3 B. C.) 17 
D. L. R. 2.7; 1 JoHNSON 175 n. 2.. 
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simply referring to the state of charter. 82 Moreover, the 
purposes for which this fiction of a domicil has been in-
vented, are mainly taxation and jurisdiction, and, although 
in these matters the state of first incorporation has retained 
some significance, it has not such a prominent role at present 
as to justify an exclusive qualification as center.83 In the 
very last years, first the entire intangible personality, wher-
ever located, and then the entire revenue from securities have 
been deemed susceptible of taxation in the state in which a 
corporation has its principal place of business. The state of 
charter, however, does not seem to be correspondingly 
eliminated. 84 • 
In most civil law countries a corporation is localized for 
conflicts purposes as well as for many others, at its "seat,"85 
i.e., in the place where central control and management is 
exercised. The same definition is unanimously given by 
English writers88 for such matters as taxation and trading 
with the enemy.87 
The English and American opposition to the general atti-
tude of the civil law reverses in curious fashion the contrast 
existing in determining the status of individuals. On the 
Continent, the status of a corporation is subject to the domi-
ciliary test, applied to individuals at common law, which, in 
82 See HENDERSON 190; FosTER, Recueil 1938 III 455· 
83 See FRANCIS, supra n. 77, 352, 353· 
8~Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox (1936) 298 U.S. 193; 35 Mich. L. Rev. 
( 1936) 1032; Chestnut Securities Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission (C.C.A. 
10th 1942) 125 F. (2d) 571, (1942) 316 U. S. 668; Note, HOFFEINS, 41 
Mich. L. Rev. (1942) 559· 
85 See below. 
86 DICEY, Rule 19, 136; FooTE 119; WESTLAKE 368; ScHUSTER, "The Na-
tionality and Domicil of Trading Corporations," 2 Grotius Soc. (1917) 59, 
69; CHESHIRE 197• 
87 By an inadequate argumentation, FARNSWORTH, supra n. 77, first contends 
a priori that domicil must determine the "status" of a corporation (pp. uo, 
2 31) and then impeacbes the dominant opinion of the English writers because 
the usual definition of the domicil (as a central place of control) would give 
the corporation a status impossible in English law {p. 274). The author de-
naturalizes the conception of domicil to no useful purpose at all. 
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reference to corporations, repudiates its own familiar criter-
ion and adopts that of the legal connection; this inversion 
seems to have struck some English lawyers so much that they 
have thought that a "domicil of origin" should be construed 
as in the country of incorporation.88 The C6digo Bustamante 
(art. I 6) mentions a "nationality of origin." These concep-
tions seem to correspond to the doctrine of this country as-
suming a necessary domicil in the state of incorporation. 
•• See recently, FARNSWORTH, supra n. 77, zo9. 
CHAPTER 19 
The Personal Law of Business 
Corporations 
I N LOCALIZING the personal law of legal persons, the two chief rival systems may be termed the incorporation principle, pointing to the law of the state of incorporation 
as such, and the central office principle, which needs explana-
tion. 
I. LAW OF THE STATE OF INCORPORATION 
Anglo-American law. In all common law countries, a cor-
poration lives under the law under which it has been created1 
or "incorporated," the law from which, in Westlake's expres-
sion, it "derives its existence.m The English cases, the oldest 
of which dates from 1 724, have always followed this theory. 3 
The particular historic or rational causes for this rule are 
not known, although it originated upon the current back-
ground of pedantic axioms now antiquated. In any event, 
the rule appears to have been accepted as self-evident. It 
is not astonishing that common law lawyers should think so, 
since even some Continental writers, educated under the op-
posite system, have advocated the Anglo-American principle 
as the logical outgrowth of the act of constituting a corpora-
tion." 
In fact, the proposition that the legal entity of an associa-
tion as a body separate from the members must be based 
1 DICEY 544; I WHARTON 238 § 105a. 
2 WESTLAKE 367. 
3 Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques Van Moses (I724), I Strange 612; 
FOOTE I62 and in Clunet I882, 465 at 473, n. 2. 
4 See infra p. 66 n. 129. 
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upon the law of a particular state, is obvious under any pos-
sible theory. But this is not the point. The problem is 
whether the conflicts rule should be satisfied with the formal 
creation of a corporation in some state. The Anglo-American 
rule is satisfied; the fact of incorporation alone suffices. Thus, 
the English Companies Acts are held inapplicable to com-
panies registered abroad,5 and the personal law of a com-
pany "depends not upon the place at which its center of ad-
ministrative business is situated, but upon the place at which 
it is registered.')'6 And very distinctly the firmly settled 
American rule refuses to take account of the place where the 
activities of an association occur. As the Restatement puts 
it: 
"§ 152. Without regard to the place of the activities of an 
association or to the domicil of its members, incorporation 
may take place in any state . . . 
"§ 154. The fact of incorporation by one state will be 
recognized in every other state." 
This conception ought to be examined in terms of con-
siderations of convenience rather than of logic. 
Other countries. The law of the state of incorporation is 
said to be applied in the Soviet Union.7 It is apparently con-
templated also in the language of the recent legislation of 
Peru (1936) and Brazil (1942), referring to the law of the 
state where the corporation has been "constituted,''8 and in 
a few other Latin-American legislations.9 The corresponding 
5 See YouNG 18::1, 2.05. 
6 YoUNG 2.05 comment on Attorney General v. The Jewish Colonization 
Ass'n (19oo) 2. Q. B. 556, C.A.; [19ol] K. B. 12.3. 
7 Thus, in absence of a proper source, with feeble support in a former in-
struction, MAKARov, 35 Recueil (1931) I 473 at 524ff. and Precis 2.2.5; RAB-
BINOWITSCH, 1 Bl.IPR. 212.; but see also STOUPNITZKY, Revue 1927, 418 at 
442· 
8 Peru:C.C. (I936) Tit.Prel.,art.IXpar. I. 
Brazil: Introd. Law (I942) art. II par. I; cf. IRIGOYEN, Consultas de la 
Comisi6n de Reforma 14 (but see infra p. 35). 
9 Cuba: C. Com. art. 15; C. C. art. 37· 
Guatemala: C. C. (I933) art. 20. 
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text of the Montevideo Treaty on Civil Law10 actually was 
changed in I 940 so as to refer to the law of the domicil of 
the association. 
The C6digo Bustamante (art. 17) refers to this "nation-
ality of origin" of associations, but not to determine the law 
applicable to them (art. 33), including a set of rules inex-
plicable to all commentators.11 
II. LAw OF THE PLACE oF CENTRAL CoNTROL 
1. Countries 
In most civil law countries, the personal law of a private 
law corporation is that of the state in which it has its center 
or "domicil," French "siege social," German "Geschaftssitz" 
(seat). 
This system has been followed by: 
Austria: Ges.m.b.H. Ges. (Act on Limited Partnerships) 
of March 6, 1906, § 107 and common opinion, see 
Walker 147; Ehrenzweig-Krainz § 82 n. 4· 
Belgium: Lois coordonm!es sur les societes commerciales 
(Consolidated Companies Act, 1873) art. 172; revised 
(1935) art. 196; Belgo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., 3 
Recueil des decisions 573· 
Bulgaria: Act of Limited Partnerships, of May 8, 1924, 
art. 127. 
Denmark: S. Ct. (Nov. 8, 1917); (March 8, 1922) see 
6 Repert. 217 No. 29. 
Uruguay perhaps likewise: C. C. (I9I4) Tit. Fin., art. 2394: "where a 
legal person has been recognized as such," as amended November zs, I94I. 
10 Art. 4 par. 1. The official report in Republica Argentina, Congreso Sud-
americano I46 shows some disagreement with this change. 
11 C6digo Bustamante, art. 34 refers the civil capacity of civil, commercial, or 
industrial companies to the respective stipulations of the contract of association. 
Cf. art. I 8 and see the criticism by Gil Borges, reproduced in the motion made 
by the Delegation of Peru, Diario de Sesiones, Octava Conferencia lnternacional 
Americana, Lima, I 9 3 8, 11 8. See, moreover, art. 3 2, which was not contained 
in the draft of De Bustamante, and has been sharply censured in 2 PoNTES DE 
MIRANDA 448. 
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France: Cass. (civ.) (June 20, I87o) S. I870.1.373; Cass. 
(req.) (March 29, I898) S. I90I.I.70· Associations are 
specially discussed by 2 Arminjon § I99· 
Germany: RGZ. Vol. 7, 70; Vol. 83, 367 (a business cor-
poration of Wisconsin); Vol. 88, 54; Vol. 92, 73; Vol. 
I I 7, 2 I 7; Vol. I 59, 46; Aktiengesetz of Jan. 30, I 93 7, 
§ 5·12 
Greece: Decisions up to I934: 2 Streit-Vallindas 79 n. 9; 
for I935-I937, Note in Clunet I938, 6I3. 
Hungary: C. Com. arts. 210, 2 I I; Act on Limited Partner-
ship, § I06 (implicit). 
Italy: Consiglio di Stato (May 27, I9I8) Giur. Ital. I9I8 
III I 53, Note, Salvioli, Rivista I9I9-20, 39I; Cass. 
(July I3, I936) Rivista I938, 225; Diena, 2 Prine. 
290; D'Amelio, Clunet I9I7, I235· 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 232 par. I. 
Montenegro: C.C. art. 787. 
The Netherlands: General opinion based on Rv. art. 4 (2) 
(3); Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 25, I9I6) N.J. (I9I7) 270; 
and others; Medan (Dec. 4, I925) I24, Indisch 
Tijdsch. 242. See also Kosters 659; Mulder I98. 
Contra for lex fori, only one decision, Rb. Amsterdam 
(Dec. I9, I924) W.II346, N.J. (1925) 1065. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 1 No. 3; Interlocal Priv. 
Law, art. 3 No. 3· 
Rumania: C. Com. (1938) art. 353· 
Spain: C. C. art. 28, cf. Trfas de Bes 379· 
Switzerland: C. C. art. 56; BG. (Dec. 8-14, 1904) 31 
BGE. I 418, 466, 473; (April I, 1924) 50 BGE. II 
511, Clunet 1924, 785; (May 23, 1928) 54 BGE. II 
257, 27I; Federal Council, Message of August 20, 
12 Decision in the special case of "Gothaer Gewerkschaften" does not justify 
the objections raised by some writers to the general rule, see MELCHIOR 466; 
RAAPE IH. 
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I 9 I 9 introducing the revised draft of the Code of Ob-
ligations, BBl. I 9 I 9 V 720. 
Turkey: Law of Nov. 30, I330/I9I4, art. I, cf. 7 Repert, 
250 No. I27. 
Yugoslavia: C. Com. (I937) § SOI par. I. 
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 3· 
Egypt: App. Alexandria (Feb. I9, I927) S. I927·4·9· 
Japan: C. C. art. so; C. Com. arts. 44 and 258, on which 
see Chapter I9 at n. 63 (better opinion). 
Argentina: C. C. arts. 6 and 7, cf. art. 34; see 3 Vico § 8I; 
Zeballos, Clunet I906, 604; C. Com. art. 286. 
Brazil: Thus far prevailing opinion, see Carvalho de Men-
donc;a, 4 Trat. Dir. Com. § I5I3, cf. Espinola, 8-C Tra-
tado I 777 § IOO. 
Colombia: C6digo Judicial, art. 272; see Caicedo§ 71. 
Honduras: Foreigners' Law, Decree No. 3I of Feb. 4, 
I 926, art. 4· 
Mexico: "Almost unanimous doctrine," see Caso § I93· 
Venezuela: C. Com. (I9I9) art. 359 (new 334), at least 
with respect to Venezuelan corporations, see Crawford, 
12 Tul. L. Rev. (1938) 219. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law (r889) art. 5; 
on Com. Terr. Law (1940) art. 8 par. r; on Civil Law 
(I 940) art. 4 par. I. 
Also, numerous bilateral treaties assuring the establishment 
of nationals of one contracting state in the territory of the 
other party have adopted the same principle. It is natural that 
civil law countries should do so among each other/3 but rather 
13 For instance: France with Japan (Aug. 19, 1911) art. 4, 105 British 
and Foreign State Papers (1912) 101 at 6o3; with Greece (March 11, 1929) 
art. 2o, par. 1, 95 L. of N. Treaty Series (1929) 401 at 415, 134 British and 
Foreign State Papers (1931) 773 at 781; with Germany (Aug. 17, 1927) 
art. z6, 76 L. of N. Treaty Series (1928) 7 at 24, 12.6 British and Foreign 
State Papers (1927) Part I, 689 at 7oo; with Czechoslovakia (July 2, 1928) 
art. 2.2., 99 L. of N. Treaty Series (1930) 107 at 12.1, 129 British and Foreign 
State Papers (1928) Part II, 305 at 314; with Cuba (Nov. 6, 1929) art. 7, 
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strange that they do not do it in every treaty.14 On the other 
hand, it is remarkable that even the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union in some15 of their treaties, 
especially in recent times, 16 have employed the usual Euro-
pean formula, running for instance in the treaty of the United 
States with Germany as follows: 
"Limited liability and other corporations and associations, 
whether or not for pecuniary profit, which have been or may 
hereafter be organized in accordance with and under the laws, 
par. I 1 II4 L. of N. Treaty Series (I93I) 360 at 363, IJI British and Foreign 
State Papers (I929) Part II, I94 at I97; Germany: see the list of treaties in 
MELCHIOR 476 n. 2. 
14 E.g., Germany with Italy (Oct. JI, 1925) art. 8, par. 11 52 L. of N. 
Treaty Series (1926) 179 at 185 and 311 at 315, 124 British and Foreign 
State Papers (1926) Part II, 629 at 631; Germany with Sweden (May 14, 
1926) art. s, par. 11 51 L. of N. Treaty Series (1926) 99 at 103 and 145 at 
1471 124 British and Foreign State Papers (1926) Part II, 741 at 743· 
Similarly, Swiss treaties up to I 8 92, see SCHNITZER, Handelsr. 81 who thinks 
it was done under the influence of the fiction theory. 
15 Incorporation ("Constitution") alone is mentioned, e.g., in the treaty of 
U.S.S.R. with Iran (Aug. 27, I935) art. 8, par. I, 176 L. of N. Treaty Series 
(1937) 299 at 305; U.S.S.R. with Turkey (March 16, 1931) art. 71 134 
British and Foreign State Papers (1931) 1128 at IIJO. In the treaty United 
States with Greece (Nov. 2I, 1936) art. 1, U.S. Treaty Series No. 930, 183 
L. of N. Treaty Series ( 193 7) 169 at 170, corporations and associations "of the 
United States and of Greece" are mentioned. 
16 United States with Germany (Dec. 8, 1923) art. 12, par. 1, U. S. Treaty 
Series No. 725, 52 L. of N. Treaty Series (1926) 133 at 141; with Hungary 
(June 24, 1925) art. 9, U.S. Treaty Series No. 748, 58 L. of N. Treaty Series 
(I926) III at 117; with Honduras (Dec. 7, 1927) art. 13, par. 1, U. S. 
Treaty Series No. 764, 87 L. of N. Treaty Series (1929) 42I at 430; with 
Austria (June 19, 1928) art. 10, par. 1, U.S. Treaty Series No. 838, II8 L. of 
N. Treaty Series (1931) 241 at zso; with Poland (June 15, 1931) art. u, 
par. 1, U.S. Treaty Series No. 862, 139 L. of N. Treaty Series (1933) 397 at 
4071 Great Britain with Germany (Dec. z, 1924) art. I6, par. I, 43 L. of N. 
Treaty Series (1926) 89 at 98, II9 British and Foreign State Papers (1924) 
369 at 374; South African Union with Germany (Sept. 1, 1928) art. 15, par. 1, 
95 L. of N. Treaty Series (1929) 289 at 297, 128 British and Foreign State 
Papers (1928) Part I, 473 at 478. The German text of both treaties translates 
"established" and "gevestigd" (Dutch) by "errichtet." Thus, the British side 
would accept the continental principle and the German side the British principle; 
but the German translation is incorrect, as 1 FRANKENSTEIN 484 n. 183 shows. 
U.S.S.R. with Italy (Feb. 7, 1924) art. 9, 120 British and Foreign State Papers 
(1924) 659 at 662; with Germany (Oct. 12, I92S) art. 16, par. 1, 53 L. of N. 
Treaty Series (1926) 85 at 97, I22 British and Foreign State Papers (I925) 
707 at 714; with Norway (Dec. 15, 1925) art. s, 47 L. of N. Treaty Series 
(1926) 9 at 15, 122 British and Foreign State Papers (1925) 992 at 994· 
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National, State, or Provincial, of either High Contracting 
Party and maintain a central office within the territories 
thereof ... " 
To the same effect, international arbitrations involving the 
United States, 17 proposals of the Institute of International 
Law (1891, 1929, 1933)/8 of the subcommittee of experts 
for the League of Nations19 ( 1927 ), and treaties for avoiding 
double taxation20 can be cited. Only in the draft of the com-
mittee, reporting to the Diplomatic Conference on the Treat-
ment of Foreigners, in Paris, 1929, has the Anglo-American 
view been maintained by adding to the usual formula that, in 
the case of countries to the laws of which the concept of a seat 
of a company is unknown, the condition established on this 
point will not be applicable. 
Certain subtle divergences among these texts are negli-
gible. They clarify the subject on one point which will be 
examined immediately. None of them has taken the cases of 
renvoi into consideration. (See infra p. so.) 
2. Significance of the Principle 
In fact, corporations usually have their central office in the 
country where they obtain incorporation, but not necessarily 
so, and in the United States often not. A corporation consti-
17 United States with Peru (I869) Affaire Ruden et Cie. (partnership con-
sisting of Mr. Ruden, an American citizen, and Mr. J. P. Escobar, citizen of 
New Granada) see LAPRADELLE-POLITIS, z Recueil des arbitrages inter-
nationaux (I856-I87z) 589. 
United States with Chile ( 19oi), case of Henry Chauncey, societe en com-
mandite in Valparaiso, see MooRE, 3 Digest 8oz. 
18 Annuaire I929 II I47• Meeting in New York, I9Z9, proposed regulation, 
art. 1. 
19 Art. I (Am. J. Int. Law I9z8, Supp. zo4) concerning the "nationality of 
commercial corporations," including the personal law. 
20 The British-Swiss Treaty against double taxation, of October I 7, I 9 3 I, 
art. 3, I3I L. of N. Treaty Series (I933) Z45 considers a company as having 
domicil in the forum, if the management and control of the business is in the 
forum. "Control" has been explained in an exchange of notes (id. z64) to mean 
effective management and the real center. 
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tuted in Delaware with headquarters in Amsterdam will be 
considered subject to Dutch law on the whole European Con-
tinent, and therefore on principle as nonexistent. The true 
point of difference between the two systems is not that under 
the one incorporation is sufficient, and in the other the situ-
ation of the main office would suffice to determine the personal 
law. The statutes do not define the Continental system so 
correctly as do the treaties providing that a corporation must 
be organized or constituted in one of the two countries and 
have its central office (seat, domicil) in the country where it 
is constituted. The requirement of domicil is additional to that 
of incorporation and does not by any means replace it. Hence, 
the Continental rule is no more than a variant of the common 
law rule and could well be adopted in the treaties of any state. 
While this essence of the rule has often been misunder-
stood, especially in the English literature and by German 
writers too, the policy behind the rule also has not always 
been appreciated. The most important viewpoint from which 
to consider the rule is that of a state that does not want an 
organization to establish its principal office in its territory and 
yet derive its existence and legal character21 from a foreign 
state. Thus, in the oldest decision of the German Supreme 
Court on this matter, a company incorporated in the state of 
Washington, United States, for the purpose of exploiting 
Mexican mines, but which was controlled by a board of di-
rectors in Hamburg, Germany, was denied recognition as an 
American legal entity; having failed to fulfill the German 
requirements for incorporation, it was treated as a German 
noncorporate association. 22 When a domestic company transfers 
21 Not only capacity, in contrast to formation and dissolution, as WESTLAKE-
BENTWICH (ed. 6) 368 believe. 
22 RG. (March 31, 1904) DJZ, 1904, sss, cf. infra p. 100. VON STEIGER, 67 
ZBJV. (1931) 307 reports the case of a joint stock company, incorporated in 
Kenya, East Africa, under British law, but administered in Paris, Fnnce. In 
Kenya, there was only a representation and the technical management. This 
corporation would be recognized neither under the French nor any other 
Continental conflicts rule. 
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its domicil to a foreign country, it loses its personality.23 
Whatever the policy of the country may be in regard to capi-
tal interests, cartels, minority and small stockholders, plural 
votes, and the like, organizations established with head-
quarters in the country have to comply. French lawyers 
particularly insist on the necessity of preventing evasion of 
imperative requisites and prescriptions. In contrast to the rec-
ognition of the law of the incorporating state "without regard 
to the place of the activities of an association" (Restatement 
§ 152), the state of the central office is considered the most 
vitally interested. 
Then again, the state where incorporation is obtained, may 
not want its law to be used for organizations intending to 
maintain their real existence abroad. Switzerland once can-
celled the registration of numerous French-controlled com-
panies, incorporated but only nominally established in Gen-
eva.24 Belgian courts proceed likewise.25 
3. Concept of Central Office 
For a time, eminent French authors conceived the most sig-
nificant place for localizing a business corporation to be the 
place at which it discharges its functions, viz., carries on its 
manufacturing, trading, or other activities indicated in the 
charter. Where the main part of such technical work is done 
-the siC ge d' exploitatiotr-there they regarded the corpora-
tion as centered.26 
23 RG. (June 5, 1882.) 7 RGZ. 68. 24 Advices by the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police to the can-
ton of Geneva, see BURCKHARDT, 3 Bundesrecht 1 ou III. 
25 See Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Feb. 2.6, 192.3) Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. 676 
§ 52.02.. 
26 Notably 2. LYON-CAEN et RENAULT §§ u67H·I THALLER, Annalea de 
Droit Commercial, 1890 II 2.57; WEiss, 2. Traite 481. 
To the same effect see the English case Keynsham Blue Lias Lime Co. v. 
Baker (1863) 33 L. J. Exch. 41. 
Contra: See as to France, ARMINJON, 2. Precis§ 188, as to England, YouNG 
1 94· 
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This concept, in fact, is of some relevance for taxation and 
certain other phases of the legal position of corporations. 27 
With respect to conflicts law, however, this theory has been 
generally rejected. Even though the Belgian Companies Law 
has made the "principal establishment" the test, a literal 
interpretation has been long since abandoned. 28 Also, in the 
systems under which the center of exploitation suffices to 
subject a company to the domestic law (infra pp. 46ff.), the 
seat of an organization is identified with its chief executive 
office. 
The office where the central management and control are 
exercised is regarded as the brain of an enterprise. "It is there 
that its personality manifests itself, for it is there that its 
organs operate, directing its operations and controlling 
its policy," thus Young reproduces the Continental concep-
tion.29 The legally important decision on commercial contracts 
is commonly concentrated there. In addition, factories or 
premises may be dispersed in several countries and no main 
working place discernible, whereas every corporation is sup-
posed to have its headquarters at a single place. The law of 
this place, therefore, is unanimously held decisive. so 
However, the place must be ascertained. Normally, stock-
holders and directors hold their regular meetings in the same 
town, where also the head executives have their offices, books 
and archives are kept, transactions with customers are negoti-
27 However, in France jurisdiction for bankruptcy proceedingsis taken at the 
central office of the management, not at that of exploitation (advocated by 
THALLER, Traite elementaire de droit commercial (ed. 7, 1925) § 1738 and 
others, cf. VALENSI, 8 Repert. 328). See on the question Cass. (req.) (July 31, 
1905) 8.1906.1.270; id. (Nov. 26, 19o6) 8.1909.1.393· 
28 Belgium: Consolidated Companies Laws, of 1873, art. 129; of 1935, art. 
197; POULLET §us; Novelles Belges, 3D. Com. 682 § 5248. 29 YouNG 149. 
30 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Nov. 14, 19u) Revue 1913, 178; Trib. 
com. Gent (May 4, 1914) Clunet 1917, 1087; and (Feb. 26, 1923) cited 
by PouLLET § 264. 
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER., 6 Repert. 217 No. 30. 
France: Cass. (civ.) (June 20, 1870) 8.1870.1.373; (March 29, 1898) 
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ated, and the principal business is managed. But these activi-
ties may fail to be assembled. Where the management is 
centered is then considered a question of fact-finding by an 
evaluation of many circumstances. 31 As a last resort in the 
prevailing opinion, the place where the directors usually meet 
is the most important, as their decisions are of direct effect, 32 
while others hold that the general meetings of stockholders 
are more significant, since they instruct the board. 33 Prefer-
ably individual solutions should not be prejudiced by any 
such rigid criteria. They need an examination of symptoms, 
similar to that used in America and England for determining 
the "domicil" or "residence" of a corporation for purposes 
of jurisdiction or taxation. 54 For example, the Cesena Sulphur 
Co. was incorporated in England to exploit sulphur mines in 
Sicily. The managing directors, the main books, the account-
ing and two-thirds of the stockholders were in Italy, but since 
the meetings of the board of directors and the general stock-
D.x899·1.5951 S.x9oi.t.7o, Clunet 1898, 756; (July 6, 1914) Clunet 1916, 
1:z96; (Dec. :z4, 19:z8) Gaz. Pal. 19:Z9.1.IZ4; see also HouPJN et BosVIEUX, 
3 Traite des societes (ed. 6, 1929) § :zu4. 
Germany: BGB. §:z4: "Unless it is otherwise provided, the place where the 
administration of a corporation is carried on is deemed to be its seat." Same for 
foundations BGB. § 8o and for jurisdiction ZPO. § I 7· 
Italy: Cass. (July 31, 1925) Foro Ital. Rep. I9:z5, 313, "Competenza" 
Nos. 377, 378; Cass. (April I7, 1931) Foro Ital. I9JI.x.6o:z. 
Japan: See DE BECKER, Int. Priv. Law 59; but cf. infra p. 48. 
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 14, 1904) 31 BGE. I 418,471. 
31 In opposition to this method, :z ARMIN JON § I 90 objects to conferring 
upon the courts the power of discretionally determining the center of a com-
pany. However, Arminjon's own theory ("Nationalite des personnes morales," 
Revue 19o:z, 381; :z Precis§ 191) is obscure and seems not very different (see 
:z Precis, ed. :z, 483 n. :z). The French doctrine is generally unstable because 
of the endless fear of fraude. 
32 See PERCERou, Note, D.19Io.:z.4I; CuQ, Nationalite des societes ( 19:z1) 
63; LEVEN, De la nationalite des societes (these Paris 1899) s8; HOUPIN et 
BosVIEUX, 3 Traite des societes § :z:zos. 
33 Codigo Bustamante, arts. 18, I 9; .PILLET, Personnes Morales § 94 ; for 
Spain, see TRiAs DEBEs, Estudios 381. For location of a corporation within the 
state, I BEALE 240. 
34 FARNSWORTH, The Residence and Domicil of Corporations (1939) :z48, 
l74· 
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holder meetings took place in London-not because of the 
English incorporation-residence within the meaning of the 
Income Tax Acts was held to be in England.85 
Conscious of the possible divergencies in determining the 
place of central control, the Geneva subcommittee proposals 
of 1929leave the legal definition to the "municipal law under 
which the company was formed and its seat established.m6 
4· Real Existence of the Central Office 
It may happen that the central establishment of an organi-
zation is actually situated in a country other than that desig-
nated by the constitutional documents. The act of incorpora-
tion need not necessarily be void, for this reason alone, under 
the law of either country. But it is common opinion that the 
personal law is conferred upon the organization only by the 
state of the actual chief office: the siege social must be real, 
not fictitious.37 The indication of a central place in the charter 
or by-laws furnishes but prima facie evidence.88 
This is also the distinct doctrine of the German courts and 
leading writers89 in conflicts law, as well as with respect to 
tax liability,40 although in other matters such as jurisdiction 
of courts41 and administrative agencies42 the "seat" nominally 
35 Cesena Sulphur Co. v. Nicholson (1876) 1 Ex. D. 428. 
36 Am. J. Int. Law 19z8, Supp. zo4 art. 3 par. I. 
37 Recognized in all internationat resolutions cited supra sub (b). For the 
prevailing Italian doctrine see V. TEDESCHI, Del domicilio (1936) 350. 
38 Swiss BG. (July :u, I889) IS BGE. 570 No. 79; CosTE-FLoRET, I Revue 
generale de droit commercial (1938) 577 at s86. 
39 RG. (June z9, I9II) 77 RGZ. I9i RGR. Kom. n. 4 before§ ZI; § :u n. 
4i STAUDINGER-RIEZLER, 1 Kommentar § 24; WIELAND, z Handelsr. 79· 
Contra: a small minority of writers who claim 99 RGZ. z I 7 as authority. 
40 Tax Procedure (Reichsabgabenordnung) § sz, see the commentary by 
BECKER, Die Reichsabgabenordnung (ed. 7, I93o) I88 § z. 
The Fiscal Convention between France and Germany, of Nov. 9, 1934, art. 
I 3 adopted the French definition of the "siege" as the place where the legal, 
financial, administrative, and technical management is centered in a permanent 
manner, see MICHEL, Revue Crit. I937, 630. 
41 Germany: ZPO. § I7· 
42 BGB. §§ zz, ZJ, zs. 
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indicated in the articles of incorporation may be determi-
native.48 
The French courts have strangely extended the scope of 
this idea. They, too, naturally disregard a fictitious domicil 
and look to the actual siege social.44 For example, the "Boston 
Blacking and Co.," constituted and established in East Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, operated from 1912 a branch in Mont-
magny, France, but in 1923 converted the branch into a 
French societe anonyme, "Boston Blacking et Cie.," where-
upon the mother corporation ceased to pay taxes imposed on 
foreign business. The courts found nothing factually changed 
in the carrying on of the business and declared the conversion 
to be simulated, i.e., fictitious, the American corporation hav-
ing remained the owner of the business as before. 45 But the 
courts include the case where central office has been "fraudu-
lently" pretended to exist abroad in order to "evade" the 
French law of corporation/6 or in order to create "privileges 
for certain shareholders."41 In such instances, it is immaterial 
whether the organization seriously means to have its seat 
abroad. The "Moulin Rouge Attraction Inc., Ltd." was in-
corporated in London for the purpose of carrying on a famous 
amusement place in Paris. It was established that there was 
nothing in London except rented premises, while the entire 
administration was in Paris and all negotiations for the pro-
motion had been contracted and the capital raised in France. 
The promoters and the first manager were punished for not 
having complied with the formalities required for French 
incorporation.48 In other cases, associations have even been 
43 For particulars, see the commentaries to § 24 of the BGB., and WIELAND, 
1 Handelsr. 172; 2 id. 78 n. ?· 
H Cass. (req.) (Nov. 21, 1889) .Clunet 1889, 8so; for other decisions, see 2 
AR.MINJON § 188; recently Cass. {req.) (July 17, 1935) S.19J6.t.41. 
45 Cass. (civ.) (June 29, 1937) Clunet 1938, 67, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP.§ 105. 
46 Cass. (req.) (Dec. 22, 1896) S.t897.I.84, D. 1897.1.159, Clunet 1897, 
364; Cour Paris (March 27, 1907) Clunet 1907, 768; for other decisions see 
SURVILLE 722 n. 2; LIGEROPOULOS and AULAGNON, 8 Repert. No. 97· 
47 See LEREBOURS-PICEONNIERE 195 § 163. 
48 Trib. corr. Seine (July z, 1912) D.19IJ.2.165, Clunet 1913, 12?3· 
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treated as nonexistent. The courts conducting such investi-
gations inquire into the reasonableness of foreign incorpora-
tion. In the case of a company organized to exploit mines in 
Canada, having its administrative center in France, it was 
held innocuous that the enterprise was incorporated abroad, 
after a certain merger of companies, because this facilitated 
its business. Also the fact that, instead of a company organ-
ized under the laws of a Canadian province, an English type 
was chosen, was approved on account of the interest in pre-
ferring the more common British legislation!9 
In one form or another, the statement that the real, not 
some nominal or artificial, domicil determines the applicable 
law, occurs in many statutes and court decisions. 50 To unify 
the formulation of the Continental principle, the subcommit-
tee draft of the League of Nations for an international treaty 
on commercial companies (1929) provides, in article 3, that 
the contracting parties are free "to regard a seat as fictitious 
and artificial if its connection with the territory ... is fraud-
ulent and intended to evade imperative provisions of the 
applicable law or if the real and effective seat is not situated 
in the country where the company has been formed." Yet the 
concession made thereby to the French doctrine of fraude is 
questionable. While a "simulated" domicil is no domicil at 
49 Trib. com. Lille (May 2.I, I9o8) D.I 9I o.2..4 r. In a similar way, central 
control of a corporation as ground for the imposition of taxes must be "real"; 
a transfer of the "siege social" to a colony is held genuine: Trib. Seine (July 6, 
I935) Revue Crit. I936, 77I, or fictitious: Cass. (req.) (July I7, I93S) Revue 
Crit. I936, 767; Trib. Seine (Dec. 2.2., I938) Revue Crit. I939, 2.69. 
50 E.g., Denmark: see 6 Repert. 2.I7. 
Egypt: Trib. Mixtes, see ARMINJON, Revue I9o8, 772., 865; KEBEDGY, id. 
I9I4, 396; App. Mixte d'Alexandrie, Clunet I930, 767. 
Japan: C. Com. art. 2.58; see comment in I C. Com. of Japan Ann. 4I2.. 
Switzerland: Fed. Council (Jan. zo, I875) BBl. I876 II 2.; Eidgen. Amt 
fiir das Handelsregister (Nov. 4, I92.8) 2.8 SJZ. 32.8, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 7u. 
But Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 2.33 allows holding companies with a purely 
nominal office in the country to receive juristic personality; this is just one of 
the tricks of this code to attract rich foreign holding companies. 
Apparently dissenting, Yugoslavian C. Com. of I937, art. soi par. I, see 
EISNER, I Symmikta Streit (I939) 2.90. 
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all, a "fraudulent seat" that is not simulated is real and 
serious. Whether an association incorporated in a country in 
which its real headquarters but no other activity is located, is 
valid, ought to be decided according to the law of this very 
country, if the principle of central establishment obtains. All 
that the "evaded" country may reasonably do, is to treat the 
corporation as foreign and react appropriately against its 
carrying on business. The French doctrine of fraud, therefore, 
has deserved criticism in theory as well as in practice, because 
it introduces a high degree of insecurity into conflicts law.G1 
In the great majority of countries, the American view is 
shared that "it is no fraud or evasion of the laws of a state 
for its citizens, intending to act only in their own state to 
form themselves into a corporation under the laws of another 
state."G2 
III. ExcEPTIONs 
r. To the Law of Incorporation 
While as a rule, for the purpose of the incorporation prin-
ciple, the place where a corporation is intended to operate 
lacks importance, there are exceptions well deserving notice. 
One is the case. where a state makes it possible for a cor-
poration to be created with the power to do business ex-
clusively outside the state. Such corporations have been held 
devoid of legal existence, because a state cannot "spawn cor-
porations and send them forth into other states to be nurtured 
and do business there," when it will not allow them to operate 
within its own boundaries.53 
51 ARMINJON, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (r9o2) 408 and iJ. 1927, 393; 
BEI1"'ZKE, Jur. Personen 69; and especially TRAVERS, Recueil 1930 III 67, 7o, 
78. VAUGHN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q, Rev. (1933) 348 observe 
moreover: "It is surely paradoxical that a country should impose its nationality 
by way of punishment for fraud." Quite so! But this is not a necessary incident 
of the law of the central office, and the repudiation of the French theory of 
fraud does not "drive" us "back" to the law of incorporation. 
G
2 2 BEALE 775 § 167-4-
~8 Land Grant R. & T. Co. v. Coffey County (r87o) 6 Kan. 149, 153; see 
BALLANTINE, Corporations 854 n. t6; 2 BEALE§ 167-4-
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By analogous reasoning, the privileges of interstate com-
merce have been safeguarded against misuse. A corporation 
chartered in West Virginia but conducting all its contracting 
and manufacturing operations in Illinois where also all its 
property 'was located, was regarded as doing exclusively intra-
state business. 54 
The California courts have occasionally argued that, if a 
corporation does all its business and has all its property in that 
state, domestic law should be applied rather than that of the 
state of creation, and they have assumed the situs of the stock 
of a company to be in the forum for the purposes of an action 
for issue of shares. 55 
In this connection, we may mention also the usury cases in 
which courts have refused to recognize an agreement that the 
law of the corporation's domicil--of the state of incorporation 
--should govern a contract, if its principal place of business 
is in another state. 56 
2. To the Law of the Central Office 
An Italian commercial provision/7 followed by some other 
codes/8 provided that a foreign-created business corporation 
54 Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson (I92.2.) 2.58 U.S. 2.90. 
55 Wait v. Kern River Mining, Milling & Dev. Co. (I909) I 57 Cal. I6, 
Io6 Pac. 98. That in analogous cases some courts are more inclined to take 
jurisdiction on internal affairs of a corporation, contrary to the rule infro 
Chapter 2.0 n. 53, is another fact. 
The American Department of State may refrain from intervening for Ameri-
can-incorporated .companies, if all shareholders and the entire business are in 
the country a~tainst which steps should be taken, see 2. HYDE 903. 
56 Stoddard v. Thomas (I9I5) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 177 (loan by a corporation 
actually doing business in the District of Columbia, the customer being a resi-
dent of Pennsylvania, and the law of Virginia being referred to); Brierley v. 
Commercial Credit Co. (I92.9) 43 F. (zd) 72.4 (promise of credit in Maryland 
to a firm in Pennsylvania, by a firm doing actual business in Baltimore (Md.), 
the law of Delaware being agreed upon); U. S. Building and Loan Ass'n v. 
Lanzarotti (I92.9) 47 Ida. 2.87, 2.74 Pac. 630. 
57 Italy: C. Com. of I88z, art. 2.30 par. 4; VIVANTE, 2. Trattato di diritto 
commerciale § 82.o; DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 34I; FED02ZI 7I; CAVAGLIER.I, 
Dir. Int. Com. 158. 
58 Portugal : C. Com. ( I8 8 5) art. I I o. 
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was subject to Italian law, if both its "seat" and its "principal 
object" were in Italy. This restricted the significance of the 
central office. Italian law seemed not to apply to a foreign 
incorporated business enterprise even though the central ad-
ministration was in Italy, unless the technical activity was 
centered there. On the other hand, a corporation created in 
Italy and having its control center there, was always regarded 
as governed by Italian law, irrespective of the place of manu-
facturing or trading. 
The Argentine Commercial Coqe/9 followed by Hon-
duras,60 probably the Mexican61 laws, and finally the Ru-
manian and Italian amended texts62 declare the internal law 
always applicable, if either the head office (and the general 
Rumania: C. Com. (1887) art. 239. 
On Argentina's provisions framed on the basis of the Portuguese code, see 
next note. 
59 Argentina: C. Com. art. 286; ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. ISH Cam. 2a 
App. Cordoba (Nov. II, 1938) 22 La Ley 126. The restrictive interpretation 
byZEBALLOS, Clunet 1906,613 is overruled. 
For example, the "Societe du Port de Rosario," subject matter of the decision 
of the French Cass. (civ.) (July 9, 1930) D.I93I.I.I4, S.I931.124, would 
certainly be held in Argentina to be a national company. It was created in 
France but deployed all its activity as to works, exploitation, and revenues in 
the Argentine port Rosario, according to a governmental concession. From the 
French point of view, the Court of Cassation stated that the gold clause stipu-
lated in the bonds of the corporation was to be considered as an international 
contract, not subject to the French currency laws, but did not declare the com-
pany to be Argentine, as VOELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940) at 4S n. 13 assumes. 
60 Honduras: C. Com. (1940) art. 286. 
Nicaragua: C. Com. art. 339· 
Paraguay: C. Com. art. z86, all these textually following Argentina. 
Panama: C. C. art. 82.: "associations" having their principal object in Panama 
are subject to the local law as to the form, validity, and registration of their 
acts of association; C. Com. ( 1 916) art. II. 
Venezuela: C. Com. (1919) art. 359 (new 334); PERES, "Sociedades extran-
jeras", zs Revista Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc. (1936) so, thinks that the corre-
sponding article 359 of the former code refers to partnerships only and that 
foreign corporations with their principal establishment in Venezuela are only 
"domiciled" there. 61 See ScHUSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933) at 376, quoting JoRGE VERA 
EsTANOE, 382. 
62 Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 25os. What, furthermore, does the new art. 2509 
C. C. mean? It says: companies constituted in the territory of the state, even 
though the object of their activity is abroad, are subject to Italian law. Are 
they recognized without having their seat in the state, thus adding the principle 
48 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS 
meetings of the shareholders, adds Argentina), or the prin-
cipal establishment, or chief object, is situated in the state. 
Thus, the principle is no longer restrictive when it operates 
in favor of the law of the forum, but it remains so in reference 
to foreign law. 
A similar provision of the Japanese Commercial Code 
(article 258) runs as follows: 
"A company which establishes its principal office in Japan 
or the chief object of which is to engage in commercial busi-
ness in Japan shall, even though formed in a foreign country, 
comply with the same provisions as a company formed in 
Japan."63 
This rule has been explained as intending "to forestall 
any attempt to establish a fictitious permanent establishment 
in a foreign country in order to evade the application of 
Japanese laws."6' 
Also the Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and 
Turkey of 1930 in which the seat principle was adopted has 
been corrected in the final protocol to the effect that foreign 
companies concentrating their principal operations on Turkish 
territory, must obtain "Turkish nationality" in order to do 
so.65 
For minor political reasons, finally, the German Civil Code 
declares an exception to its principles, viz., it permits special 
charters for associations domiciled abroad. 68 This has been 
of incorporation to the other grounds for claiming domestic character? Art. 
zp8, No. z, in fact, requires a stock corporation only to indicate its seat with-
out mentioning that it should be in the state. 
Rumania: C. Com. (1938) art. 354· 
63 Cf. YAMADA, 6 Repert. 540 No. 6r. 
Similarly, Liechtenstein: P. G. R. art. '-33· 
64 I C. Com, of Japan Ann. 4u n. I, see Tokyo District Court (Sept. 10, 
19I8) itl. n. z. 
65 Am.]. Int. Law 1933, Supp. 109 art. 13. 
66 BGB. § '-3: see NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. u9 and in z Mit-
teilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (I 9 I 8) 159; RUNDSTEIN, Report, zz Am. J. Int. 
Law 19z8, Supp. 186. 
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applied to German school, church, and relief organizations. 
It is fully admitted in Germany that this provision pertains 
to the municipal law rather than to conflicts law and that no 
extraterritorial effect is expected. 61 
The same should be assumed in regard to provisions of the 
more recent Italian type which subject foreign-created cor-
porations to all domestic rules for the only reason that their 
center of exploitation is in the country. Such a rule, perhaps 
justifiable in itself, lacks reciprocity. A state that regards a 
corporation as domestic because it has its seat there, should 
not characterize likewise as domestic one whose seat is abroad. 
These pretensions recall the artful combinations of principles 
that are used to extend the domain of territorial law to indi-
viduals. 
While these unprincipled provisions are frequently con-
fused with the imposition of domestic law upon foreign cor-
porations carrying on business in the country, they seem to 
have a deeper and more involved bearing. What conse-
quences the Italian courts68 attach to the modified text of their 
law are not yet known. 
An exception would have to be stated also if the statement 
of a few French writers were actually law, that a corporation 
by its charter may fix its "seat" in a country in which it does 
not have its central administration whenever serious interests 
warrant this choice69 This, however, seems to refer, at most, 
to some phases of administrative law. 
61 RAAPE 129, 132 VI. 
68 Failure to comply with the provisions of the old Commercial Code was 
not considered prejudicing recognition. See Cass. (July IJ, 1936) Giur. 
Ita!. Rep. 1936, 889 Nos. 267-270; Foro Ita!. Rep. 1936, 1751 No. 556; App. 
Milano (May 7, 1937) Giur. ltal. 1938, 870 No. 352; App. Torino (Jan. 7> 
1936) Foro Ital. 1936 I 397· 
60 DEMOGUE, Note in 8.1908.2.177; PERCEROU, Note in D.1910.2.41 and in 
Annales de Droit .Commercial 1926, 5 n. r; 8URVILLE 724; 8oLus, Note, 
8.1933.2.49; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 195. Cf. KESSLER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 
766; GUTZWILLER, 12 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (1933) 182; BEITZKE, 
Jur. Personen 89. 
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IV. RENVOI 
Important modifications, not so much of principle as of its 
results, follow from renvoi. The "Eskimo Pie Co." was in-
corporated in Delaware and, by American standards, rec-
ognized in Kentucky where the main establishment was 
located. For this reason the German Reichsgericht, too, 
recognized the incorporation. 70 We should assume that when-
ever incorporation and main office are situated in different 
states both of which follow the principle of incorporation, the 
legal personality is to be recognized in any country of the 
opposite system, provided that renvoi is not rejected. 
But the converse is true, too. If an anonymous company 
is formed in France with control actually centered in Brazil, 
French and Brazilian courts agree in applying Brazilian law 
to the problems of the existence and capacity of the organi-
zation. Failure to create a company in Brazil causes nullity 
or nonexistence in both countries. There is no reason why an 
American court should insist on qualifying such company as 
a valid French entity. The principle of incorporation furnishes 
the convenient answer, if it is considered that the incorpo-
ration has been ineffective in France and missing in Brazil. 
v. TRANSFER OF CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION 
TO ANOTHER CouNTRY 
1. Law of Central Control 
The most critical aspect of the system based upon the 
central management rather than upon the mere fact of in-
corporation, develops when it is desired to transfer the main 
office from the state of incorporation to another state.11 Such 
70 RG. (June 3, 192.7) 117 RGZ. 2.15; cf. RAAPE 131 § 6. 
11 For literature see WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 2.68; PERROUD, 
Clunet 192.6, 561; HAMEL, 2. Z.ausl.PR. (192.8) 1002; BEITZKE, Jur. Personen 
§ 19; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 88. On the controversy respecting the effects on na-
tionality, see CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 233 and authors cited; C6digo Busta-
mante, art. 20 par. 1. 
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happening logically should destroy the legal entity; at the 
new place a new one would have to be built up. This, however, 
makes necessary winding up of the corporation, difficult legal 
operations and huge losses, taxes, and charges in both coun-
tries, so as to render the undertaking an arduous affair. For 
the purpose of saving all that, may the charter be modified? 
And may an incorporated association do so, without losing its 
capacity or even being automatically dissolved? 
These and kindred questions have been the topic of abun-
dant controversy from the viewpoint of the country from 
which the corporation emigrates. Prevailing French doctrine 
allows the stockholders to decide in an extraordinary general 
meeting by unanimous resolution to transfer the siege social 
abroad, without dissolving the juristic person.72 It is doubtful 
whether a clause in the by-laws, which has become regular 
in France, permitting the board of directors to change the 
seat, is a valid delegation of power,73 particularly if the seat 
should be transferred to a foreign country. To the opposite 
effect, in the dominant German opinion a decision of the 
corporate organs to transfer the seat to a foreign country, 
automatically causes the dissolution and liquidation of the 
corporation.74 In Switzerland75 and elsewhere78 the problem 
is unsolved. 
72 Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 26, I894) S.I895.I.I33, Clunet I895, II71 Cass. (req.) 
(March 29, 1898) D.1899·I·595, S. 190I.1.69, Clunet 1898, 756; Trib. com. 
Seine (May IS, 1925) Revue I926, 271 PERROUD, id. 5671 cf. LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE § I65. CosTE-FLORET, ''Le transfer du siege social," I Revue 
generale de droit commercial (I938) 577, 590, asserts that a two-thirds 
majority suffices. 
73 For nullity, Cour Paris {Nov. 27, I931) Gaz. Pal. 1932..I.I89 and CosTE-
FLORET, id. 59I. 
74 German RG. (Junes, I882) 7 RGZ. 68, 701 RG. (June 29, I92.3) I07 
RGZ. 941 STAUB-PINNER in 2. Staub 787 § 292 n. 201 FLECHTHEIM in 3 Diir-
inger-Hachenburg I 283 § I82 n. 45· Mining corporations by transfer enter into 
liquidation, 88 RGZ. 53· 
Austria: OGH. (Jan. q, I92o) 4 Bull. lnst. Int. (I92.I) 89 n. 743· 
Italy: ANZILOTri 1241 CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com.§ :u. 
75 See STAUFFER, 7 Gmiir art. I4 No. Io61 SIEGWART, in 5 Zurcher Kom-
mentar zum Schweiz. ZGB. Einleitung No. 365. 
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Some countries, on the other hand, into which an existing 
foreign-constituted company wants to move have shown 
readiness to receive it without change of personality. Some 
decrees of Brazil have provided that an anonymous stock 
company which transfers its seat to Brazil and obtains govern-
mental authorization to carry on business is considered a 
national.77 In recent times, this method has been used by 
states seeking to attract large holding companies. Normal 
principles are set aside. Even Swiss legislation, generally a 
model of correctness in international relations, has allowed 
foreign stock corporations to register as Swiss anonymous 
stock companies with central offices there, on special authori-
zation by the Federal Council under greatly facilitated con-
ditions of incorporation.78 The entity petitioning has to prove 
that it is a legally constituted stock company under the law 
of its foreign headquarters.79 This means that it must have 
existed and not have been dissolved at the time of its rein-
corporation and transfer of its domicil, notwithstanding the 
fact that this may cause dissolution in the home state. 
A number of small states went much further, making great 
concessions as respects incorporation fees and current tax-
ation.80 
It would appear that if the personal law of the corporation 
prohibits exportation of the management without dissolution 
and winding up, or requires a unanimous decision or a gov-
ernmental authorization (as Liechtenstein does for its own 
76 E.g., Belgium: Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. No. sz 14 denies the possibility 
of transfer without destroying personality; but most lawyers follow the French 
literature. 
11 Brazil: Cf. BEVILAQUA zz3; CARVALHO DE MENDON~A, 3 Trat. Dir. 
Com. § 6z4 (c). Companies authorized to do business in Brazil may transfer 
their seat to Brazil according to Decree-Law No. z6z7 of Sept. z6, 1940, art. 71. 
78 Swiss Rev. Code of Obligations (final provisions) art. 14 par. 1. Cf. 
SAUSER-HALL, Le transfert des societes anonymes de l'etranger en Suisse 
(1938). 
79 Same code, art. 14 par. z. 80 E.g., Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. z34: the seat may be transferred to Liech-
tenstein, on authorization by the court, without dissolution abroad and without 
bringing business or administration into the country. 
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corporations), consistency demands that these provisions 
should be respected in other countries. Yet, it seems that no-
body cares for such application of the personal law. A com-
pany, thus, may be dead in its former state and continue to 
live in another state, although the same principle of the place 
of central control governs in both states. 
Finally, the occupation of various countries by the enemy 
during the second World War has brought new necessities. 
Noteworthy are the emergency decrees of the governments 
in exile of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg.81 In 
particular the Belgian decree-laws allowed a business company 
to transfer its siege social to a foreign country without losing 
its nationality; they further provided that such transfers may 
be effected by a simple decision of the administrative organ 
of the company, i.e., by a majority vote of a general meeting 
of the stockholders or of the board of administration.82 By 
virtue of the first provision, the personal law of the company 
is upheld and the company is treated by the Belgian courts 
and authorities as a national. This obviates the requirement 
that the central control should be exercised in Belgium. It is 
not demanded that a new place of control be established at 
any place of business abroad. Since, on the other hand, the 
existence of an actual central office is of no importance in the 
United States, a Belgian corporation or partnership having 
taken refuge in this country, without being reincorporated, 
is to be considered a foreign organization, subject to Belgian 
law. Of course, a Belgian corporation whose domicil had been 
moved to New York, by resolution of the board of directors 
in June 1940, was considered entitled to sue in court as a 
resident. 83 
81 The dates are recorded by DoMKE, Trading with the Enemy in World 
War II (1943) 172, cf. id. 345; HANNA, "Nationality and War Claims," 45 
Col. L. Rev. ( 1945) 301, 34'o. 
82 Belgian Decree-Law of February 21 19401 with the other decree-laws re-
pealed by art. 8 of the Decree-Law of February 191 19421 Moniteur Beige 
(London, March 31, 1942) 174, 182. 
83 Chemacid S. A. v. Ferrotar Corporation (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1943) 51 F. 
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Contrary provisions of the charter or by-laws concerning 
the domicil of the company were repealed, as provided also 
in a Swiss emergency decree allowing juristic persons to 
change domicil within the country.8~ The Dutch decree made 
the transfer of domicil from the mother country to another 
country a matter of governmental decision. 85 
2. Law of Incorporation 
Continental writers usually believe that at common law, in 
a system based merely upon incorporation, no difficulty can 
arise if the central office is removed from the country of 
incorporation to another country.86 English authors have 
confirmed this view and seem to rejoice over this proof of 
superiority.87 
Now, it is quite true that, since the place of the head-
quarters is immaterial, it may be transferred at will. The 
Egyptian Delta Land & Investment Company, Limited, in-
corporated in London in I 904, could be from I 907 on "con-
trolled, managed, directed, and carried on entirely in Cairo," 
released from its English liability for income tax88 without 
losing its personality. This cannot be done under the principle 
connecting a juristic person with a state by its place of control, 
and the case certainly contrasts with that of the Tramways 
d' Alexandrie, a stock company incorporated and . domiciled 
Supp. 756; see also Rem hours en Industriebank N. V. v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Boston (D. C. D. Mass.) C. C. H. War Law Service, Statutes, par. 9155, cited 
by HANNA, supra n. 81, at 34Z n. 79· 
84 Swiss Federal Council (Oct. 30, 1939) 55 Eidgeniissische Gesetzsammlung 
(1939) 1301. 
85 Decree of March 4, 1942, Staatblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 
No. Cx6. 
86 See e.g., GEILER, u Mitteilungen dt. Ges. ViilkerR. (1933) x8o. 
87 VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (1933) at 346. 
88 [192.9] A.C.x. Attorney General v. The Jewish Colonization Ass'n (x9oo) 
z Q. B. ss6; [1901] I K. B. IZ3, c. A. per Smith, M. R., at 130! "The fact 
that there was a council of administration which carried on the business of the 
company outside of England does not render the company any less an English 
company and subject to English law." Gasque v. Inland Revenue Commis-
sioners [1940] z K. B. So. 
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in Brussels whose annulment was sought in the Belgian courts 
because more of its management was carried on in Egypt than 
the by-laws justified; the existence of the company was only 
saved by the argument in the lower tribunal that the stock-
holders had not unanimously decided to transfer the siege 
social, and in the court of appeal by the reasoning that the 
facts did not establish such transfer.89 
Where, however, it is desired to change the personal law, 
for instance, in order to escape a feared revolutionary legis-
lation, or to change "nationality," in order to establish the 
right to diplomatic protection or to alter the basis for taxation 
(otherwise than for English income tax in the opinion of 
the House of Lords), Anglo-American conceptions do not 
open any way for maintaining the entity and avoiding wind-
ing up. Since, by the old orthodox idea, a corporation can have 
no legal existence outside the incorporating state, it "has no 
domicil in the jurisdiction which created it, and as a conse-
quence it has not a domicil anywhere else"; 90 "it cannot mi-
grate to another sovereignty."91 In theory, there does not 
even seem to exist any doubt that a corporation is unable to 
change its personal law, or "quasi nationality," without wind-
ing up and new creation, although in practice ingenious ways 
may be found to transfer an undertaking to a newly created 
foreign company.92 The question is entirely different from 
that of change of nationality by a continued corporation in the 
89 Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. 8, 1925) and App. Bruxelles (January 13, 
1928) Jur. Com. Brux. 1928, 28 and 38. 
90 Mr. Justice Holmes in Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus (1898) 
172 Mass. 154, 158, 51 N. E. 531, 532; 1 BEALE 228 § 41.1: "It can never 
acquire any other domicil." 
91 2o C. J. S. 12, Corporations§ 1788 n. 24. 
92 In In re Aramayo Francke Mines, Ltd. [1917] 1 Ch. 451-C. A., 
Clunet 1919, 1 12 6, a mihing company incorporated in England but carrying 
on business in Bolivia, with a majority of Bolivian stockholders, attempted 
to avoid the English war income taxes by a scheme described as follows: a new 
company was created in Geneva, Switzerland, to which the assets and the under-
taking were to be transferred "upon the basis of an exchange of shares of equal 
values and the assumption by the Swiss company of the liabilities and engage-
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case where the territory of its domicil is ceded to or annexed 
by another power.9a 
VI. THEORY oF CoNTROL 
The two dominant theories determining the status of 
corporations agree in disregarding any qualification of the 
directors or members of the association as well as the places 
where the capital funds are sought or supplied.94 For ex-
ample, where all members of a company founded in Chile 
are United States citizens, the company is not regarded a 
citizen for the purposes of federal jurisdiction on the ground 
of diverse citizenship.95 In the words of Mr. Justice Stone: 
"For almost a century, in ascertaining whether there is the 
requisite diversity of citizenship to confer jurisdiction on the 
federal courts, we have looked to the domicile of the corpora-
tion, not that of its individual stockholders, as controlling."96 
Also in England before the first World War, it was a 
commonplace that nationality of a company, whatever it may 
signify, is independent of the nationality of the participants.97 
ments of this company" (i.e., Aramayo), see Cozens-Hardy, M. R., at 473, 
Warrington, L. J., at 475· The opinions were not concerned with any other 
problem than the political danger of the company's coming under Swiss con-
trol during the war. 
FARNSWORTH, The Residence and Domicil of Corporations (1939) 217-222., 
231, 234 contends that a corporation under Anglo-American law can acquire 
a domicil of choice in theory but not in law,-words which do not convey what 
they should. 
93 See MooRE, 3 Digest 804 § 485; TRAVERS, Recueil 1930 III 106; see also 
KAHN-F'REUND in Annual Survey of English Law (I939) 374· 
94 ARMINJON, 2 Precis§§ I 85ff. and most European writers. 
95 See cases in 35 C. J. S. 8I 8 § 2I n. I I. 
96 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. (1933) 288 U.S. 476. And see as to claims 
of American corporations in claims agreements "for an unbroken history of 
one hundred and forty years," the opinion of Professor Edwin M. Borchard 
of March 11, I925, in Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, 
Final Report of H. H. MARTIN ( 1941) 41. 
97 Usually based on Driefontein Cons. Gold Mines v. Janson, Ltd. (I9oo) 
2 Q. B. 339, [I9oi] 2 K. B. 4I9, [I902] A. C. 484; Central India Mining 
Co. v. Societe Coloniale Anversoise [I92o] I K. B 753, 762. 
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The same attitude was emphasized by neutral nations during 
the war of I9I4-I9I8, for instance by the government of 
Brazil when declaring neutrality in 1915.98 
War seizures and restrictions. During the first World War, 
however, English courts, headed by the House of Lords/'9 
defined enemy corporations by a new concept which soon was 
emulated in the war legislation of many belligerent countries, 
and finally was sanctioned in the provisions of the Peace 
Treaties of I 9 I 9 dealing with liquidation of enemy prop-
erty.100 The essential element of the innovation was that a 
corporation was considered to have enemy character, if it was 
"controlled" by enemies, that is, was under the dominating 
or prevailing influence of physical or juristic persons who 
themselves were qualified as enemy aliens. The United 
States stayed distinctly aloof from this encroachment upon 
the traditioi}al theory.101 
Mixed arbitral tribunals. The courts instituted in conform-
ity with the Peace Treaties had to apply the aforementioned 
provisions based on the new control theory. They had, more-
over, to deal judicially with prewar debts submitted to 
98 Brazil: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Circular No. 1 of Feb. zz, 1915; 
cf. CARVALHo DE MENDON~A, 4 Trat. Dir. Com.§§ 1513-I4. 
99 Continental Tyre Co. v. Daimler [19I6] z A. C. 307, in matters of 
trading with the enemy. The notions established in the decision were in reality 
new. The Hamborn [1919] z A. C. 993 (extending the rule to a Dutch com-
pany and liability to condemnation in prize). See PARRY, "The Trading with 
the Enemy Act and the Definition of an Enemy," 4 Modern L. Rev. ( 1941) 
I 6I, I 67; MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLD¥, "Der Kriegsbegriff des Englischen 
Rechts," 8 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht 35 7; cf. GARNER, 1 Inter-
national Law and the World War (1920) 217. It was much noticed, moreover, 
that the Lords spoke of the concept of enemy, and not of that of nationality, 
see VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (1933) 338. 
100 Treaties of Versailles (with Germany) art. 2 9 7 (b) ; of St. Germain 
(with Austria) art. 249 (b); of Neuilly (with Bulgaria) art. I 77; of Trianon 
(with Hungary) art. 232 (b). Cf. R. FucHs, "Die Grundsiitze des Versailler 
Vertrages iiber die Liquidation und Beschlagnahme deutschen Privatvermogens 
im Auslande (I 92 7) in 6 LESKE-LOEWENFELD II 90. 
101 The Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. I 411, § 2; in introducing the 
Bill to Congress, the Attorney General of the United States said, "We have 
specifically abstained in the bill from attempting to go behind the corporate 
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clearing proceedings, of which each allied or associated power 
could avail itself. Since England, France, and Italy each 
elected this procedure in relation to Germany, prewar debts 
and claims between English, French, and Italian nationals, 
on the one hand, and German nationals, on the other, had to 
be entered into the clearing (Versailles Treaty, article 296). 
Moreover, prewar contracts between nationals of countries 
which had been enemies formed the object of a special juris-
diction of the mixed arbitral tribunals (Versailles Treaty, 
article 304). 
With the usual confusion of problems, the attempt was 
made to transfer the criterion of control to the application of 
these two articles. It was a point of great practical importance. 
Incidentally to the procedure of clearing, Germany was liable 
as guarantor for prewar debts of a German company on a 
fixed high exchange rate. It was contended that the guaranty 
extended to an English incorporated company controlled by 
Germans and liquidated by England. After an initial period 
of divided opinions, 102 the various mixed arbitral tribunals 
commonly acknowledged that, under the peace provisions 
not expressly resorting to the device of control, nationality was 
to be construed in accordance with the familiar devices of in-
character." Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller (I925) 266 U.S. 457; Hamburg-
American Line Terminal and Navigation Co. v. United States (I928) 277 U.S. 
I 3 8. Mr. Justice Reynolds stated that Congress definitely adopted the policy of 
disregarding stock ownership as a test of enemy character and permitted prop-
erty of domestic corporations to be dealt with as non-enemy (at I4o); Fritz 
Schulz Jr. Co. v. Raimes & Co. (I9I7) Ioo N. Y. Misc. 697, I66 N. Y. 
Supp. 567. 
On the sharp rejection of the control theory in Switzerland see SAUSER HALL, 
so Bull. Soc. Legisl. Comp. (I92I) 237 n. 4· 
102 The Franco-German Mixed Arb. Trib. went to the most advanced applica-
tions of the "control" theory in the much discussed decisions, Societe du 
Chemin de Fer de Damas-Hamah v. Cie. du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad (Aug. 
3I, I92I) I Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 4oi, Clunet 1923, 595; Soc. An. du 
Charbonnage Frederic-Henri v. Etat Allemand (Sept. 3o, I 92 I) 1 Recueil 
trib. arb. mixtes 422, Clunet I 92 3, 6oo; and other cases. See VAUGHAN WIL-
LIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (I933) 340. 
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corporation or head office, without regard to the nationality 
of the shareholders or directors. 103 
Postwar controversy in France. The excitement stirred up 
by this dispute and the memory of the war emergency law in 
France, resulted in a tendency to adopt control as the general 
criterion of "nationality," including for the purposes of choice 
of law. A corporation should, in every respect, be ascribed to 
the country whose nationals exercise preponderant influence 
on the business administration.104 Niboyet, the leader of this 
movement, proposed an appropriate system.105 When a com-
mittee of bondholders of a Rumanian corporation, in order 
tC? sue the corporation in France, formed an association in 
Paris in accordance with the French law of 1901 on associa-
tions, the Tribunal de la Seine held that the association could 
not sue, because the members were not Frenchmen. This de-
cision is recognized as absurd.106 
103 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Chamberlain & Hookham v. Solar 
Zahlerwerke G. m. b. H. (Dec. u, 1921) x Recueil trib. arb. rnixtes 722; 
Gebr. Adt. A. G. v. Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc. Ltd. (Nov. 30, 1927) 7 
Recueil trib. arb. rnixtes 473· Anglo-Bulgarian Mixed Arb. Trib., Dawson & 
Son v. Balkanische Handels- & Industrie-A. G. (October xo, 1923) 3 Recueil 
trib. arb. mixtes 534; Anglo-Hungarian Mixed Arb. Trib., Investment Regis-
try, Ltd. v. United Ternes and Sornogy County Local Railways, Ltd. (Feb. 241 
1925) 5 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 48-all adopting the double criterion of 
constitution plus seat; the British agent in the second case even urged the Ger-
man seat, while the German agent stressed the center of economic activities. 
Similarly, Germano-Belge Mixed Arb. Trib., Soc. de Transports Fluviaux en 
Orient v. Soc. Imperiale Ottornane du Chernin de Fer de Bagdad (Dec. xo, 
1929) 9 Recueil trib. arb. rnixtes 664, Annual Digest 1929-301 2.48 case I5J. 
Belgo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., La Suedoise Grammont v. Roller (October x6, 
I 92 3) 3 Recueil trib. arb. rnixtes 5 70. Italo-Gerrnan Mixed Arb. Trib., 
Fratelli Giulini v. Etat Allemand (April 29, 1924) 4 Recueil trib arb. rnixtes 
506: for other cases see VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, supra n. 99, 
341, FELLER, 2 Z.ausl.off.R. (1931) II 55· 
104 App. Colmar (Oct. 291 1925) S.1927.2.33 (on cautio iudicatum so/vi) 
and (Feb. 28, 1923) Revue juridique d'Alsace et de Lorraine 1923, 438 (on 
valorization) concerned matters of foreigners' condition, but were styled and 
cited i.n a general way. 
105 NIBOYET in many utterances, see especially Manuel No. 304 and Revue 
Crit. 1934, I 14. 
106 Trib. Seine (April 30, 1932) S.I9J2.2.I74 (as of April 2o, 1932) Gaz. 
Pal. 1932.2.217; see criticism by STEFANI and ANDRIOLI, z (Jiur. Cornp. 
DIP. (1933) 22 No. xo. 
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Once more, the administrative authorities and the courts 
returned to the previous views.107 As early as 1926, the 
French Minister of Justice stated that it was "now generally 
assumed that the nationality of a company is determined by 
the place of its true and effective center, viz., the place where 
its administration is actually managed and centralized.mos 
The bilateral international treaties of establishment were 
reassumed on the old footing. 
These discussions, nevertheless, were not forgotten. With 
the new war approaching, French measures of precaution 
against foreign-domiciled corporations extended to a wide 
range of foreign-controlled organizations domiciled in France. 
Conflicts law was directly affected by a French decree of 
April 12, 1939, declaring that foreign associations with non-
profit purposes required recognition by decree, and that the 
term, foreign, includes "groups presenting the characteristics 
of an association that have their siege social abroad, or groups 
having their center in France, are in fact directed by for-
eigners, or have either foreign managers or at least twenty-
five per cent foreign members.m09 
With this exception, it can be stated that in the field of 
conflicts law the control theory was completely rejected by 
all countries. As a matter of fact, the theory has proved time 
and again impracticable and unjust in reference to subsidiary 
corporations and otherwise.110 Even its discriminatory appli-
cation against enemy property has inspired many crude solu-
107 Cass. (req.) {May 12, 1931) 8.1932.1.57, D.1936.r.121; cf. Revue Crit. 
1934, 109; 1938, 340. Cass. (req.) {Jan. 9, 1940) Nouv. Revue 1940, 202: 
given under public law, a partnership (being a legal person in France) con-
stituted and having its seat in France is of "French nationality," irrespective of 
the nationality of its members. 
108 Answer by the Garde du Sceaux, Journal Official of February 5, 1926, see 
Clunet 1926, 534· 
109 See 'SAVATIER, "Sur la condition des personnes morales en DIP. dans les 
divers decrets-lois fran~ais de 1939", Revue Crit. 1939,418. 
110 See SAUSER-HALL, Les Traites de Paix et les droits des neutres ( 1924) 
11 7; R. FucHs, op. cit. supra, n. 1 oo and cited authors. See also VAUGHAN 
WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (1933) 347: "It is inconceivable 
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tions, as for instance in the case of companies incorporated and 
administered in neutral countries, which were forcibly liqui-
dated in an Allied country to the detriment of the neutral 
members.111 The virtual agreement reached between the wars 
in all formerly belligerent countries, is remarkable. During 
the present conflagration, of course, practically all belligerent 
countries have enlarged the concept of enemy for the purpose 
of trading with the enemy prohibitions, freezing and seques-
tration of enemy assets, and in this connection have combined 
all three theories of incorporation, seat, and control so that 
each one of these criteria stigmatizes a corporation as enemy.11~ 
In economic warfare, the economic connections cannot be dis-
regarded. 
Likewise, although not fitted for determining the personal 
law, the theory of control could reasonably be employed so 
as to entitle only French-dominated companies to enjoy 
compensation for war damages in France.113 It was a sign of 
continued confusion that this decision was hailed by the advo-
cates of the control theory as a "turning point" in the devel-
opment of the concept of foreign incorporation.114 
Questionable, however, were decisions of the French Court 
of Cassation denying protection to so-called "commercial 
property," i.e., the rights arising out of a long-time lease of 
business premises under the Law of June 30, 1926, to French 
firms controlled by the American corporations, Remington 
and Singer.115 
that one country should have the right to create a person which is to be a 
national of another country." 
111 See against this encroachment the decision of the Swiss Federal Court 
(April I, I 924) so BGE. II 51; Note, SAUSER-HALL, Clunet I 924, 785; Note,, 
NJBOYET, S.I925.I.ZZ5. 
112 For the various methods used, see DoMKE, Trading with the Enemy in 
World War II (I943) I20-I44. 
113 Cass. (civ.) (July 25, I933) D.I936.I.128; and again Cass. (civ.) (May 
29, 1937) Clunet 1938, 89. 
114 DE GALLAIX, Nouv. Revue 1936, 485, 498; and in International Law 
Association, Report 39th Conference I 9 3 6 (I 9 3 7) 6 5. 
115 App. Rennes (June I6, 1930) D.I931.2.9, Annual Digest I9Jo, 25I 
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Finally, although diplomatic protection, with discretionary 
consideration of all elements, may be granted to nationals 
interested in a corporation, 116 intervention on behalf of a corpo-
ration as being controlled by nationals is opposed by a strong 
opinion.111 
In conclusion, the criterion of control is entirely incon-
venient for determining the personal law, although it may 
be suitable for discriminating in exceptional administrative 
measures against certain groups of companies. But to advocate 
this test generally for all purposes excepting conflicts law, as 
the Peruvian Delegation has proposed to the Pan-American 
Union,118 is a very doubtful generalization. 
VII. RATIONALE 
The characteristic of the Anglo-American principle has 
appeared to consist in the recognition of the law of any state 
of incorporation, whereas the opposing principle recognizes 
the law only of that state where a corporation has been created 
and is domiciled in fact. The conceptual difference between 
the two systems would be somewhat lessened if the dogma 
that the domicil is necessarily in the state of incorporation, 
were to be taken seriously in Anglo-American law. Although 
this idea has never been employed in selecting the personal 
law, it does concern private international law that, by another 
traditional rule, meetings of the members of a corporation 
can be held only in the state of incorporation, a rule adopted 
No. I 53 (half concealing the name of the mother company which is, however, 
the Singer Manufacturing Co. of Elizabeth Port, N. J.); Cass. (req.) (May 12, 
I93I) S.I9J2.I.57, D.I9J6.I.I2.I. NIBOYET, 2 Traite 377 § 837 approves 
the latter decision. 
116 See BoRCHARD, Annuaire I 9 3 I, I 297-3 I 3; DE VISSCHER in Revue Dr. 
Int. (Bruxelles) (I936) 481. 
117 Cf. as to Latin America, supra pp. 24-27. 
118 Octava Conferencia, Lima I9J8, Diario de Sesiones, Projecto at p. 6I8 
arts. 3-5. The motion was developed upon the Commission of Jurists, see id. 
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in the Restatement (§ 163), "unless otherwise provided by 
the law of the state of incorporation." The New York Anno-
tations to the Restatement recall the former rigid Ormsby 
Rule, 119 whereby neither shareholders nor directors were 
allowed to make binding acts outside of the jurisdiction. It 
would be no great step from this to a rule prescribing that 
unless the "seat" is situated within the state, incorpora-
tion is refused. This is a natural feature of the continental 
system,120 but would easily be reconciled with the Anglo-
American principles. 
However, the contrast of principles is felt in three practical 
differences: 
(a) In the first instance, the common law principle leaves 
the promotors of a corporation free to choose any country 
for creating the legal person, and any other country for con-
trolling the administration. The opinions evidently are radi-
cally divided on the desirability of this freedom, which is 
refused in the Continental system. Before the first World 
War, English business used the corporation law of the Isle 
of Guernsey, which use was regarded so improper that it was 
abolished by a clause of the Companies Act of 1929/21 In 
this country Delaware for a time became a Mecca for corpo-
rations, more recently sharing its popularity with New York, 
New Jersey, and certain other states. Delaware is still famous 
for the elaborate care with which the law is currently kept in 
line with newly occurring needs, and for the special experi-
ence of the judiciary. Boards of directors in Delaware com-
panies find their interest in efficient management better safe-
119 Ormsby v. Vt. Copper Min. Co. (I 874) 56 N. Y. 62.J. See also Stabler 
v. ElDora Oil Co. (1915) 2.7 Cal. App. 516, 150 Pac •. 643; HENDERSON 189. 
120 E.g., Germany: Aktiengesetz, Jan. 3o, 193 71 § 5· 
Switzerland: See SCHNITZER, Handelsr. So. 
Venezuela: C. Com. arts. 2.091 2.19-22.01 as interpreted by CRAWFORD, 12. Tul. 
L. Rev. (1938) 2.12.. 
121 Companies Act, 192.91 s. 353 subjects those companies to English law. 
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guarded from interference by small groups of outsiders, 
which does not necessarily mean undue disregard of various 
minority interests. The opinions of the experts, however, are 
strongly divided. There are a good many lawyers in this 
country who think that a corporation should be created at the 
place of its principal activity and not be entitled to seek out a 
law thought more favorable with regard to powers, liabilities, 
audits, or publicity. Also, in states having modern corporation 
laws, such as Michigan, the opinion prevails that foreign 
incorporation for domestic enterprises should be sought only 
if special reasons make it advisable, such as exceptional needs 
not satisfied by certain provisions on preferred stock. Con-
siderations of taxation seem no longer to exercise a controlling 
influence on the choice of the charter state. As mentioned 
above, the tendency is even stronger to recognize a rival 
claim of the state of the actual management to control all 
intangibles and revenues.122 The traditional principle, thus, 
is weakened, and its competition with other ideas promotes 
confusion. . 
No such doubts exist with regard to the competition of 
Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, and Panama in offering 
lowest bids for holding companies. They, indeed, provoke 
the thought of "corporation Renos." 
(b) Second, the Continental principle makes it very diffi-
cult to transfer a corporation as an existing legal person to 
another country. Since this weakness can easily be remedied 
by legislation, the point is insufficient for a decisive criticism. 
It is entirely impossible, on the other hand, to change the 
personal law of a company incorporated in England or in the 
United States. 
(c) Third, the principle of incorporation causes puzzling 
problems in the case where an association is incorporating in 
several states. The original doctrine concerning the effect of 
122 Supra Chapter 18 p. 29. 
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multiple incorporation was loaded with inconveniences,123 
((defying the common understanding of the business 
world."124 Some improvement was effected by recognizing 
that the legal person created and re-created is the same; the 
corresponding conclusions were reached, for instance, that the 
creation of shares is governed by the law of the first incorpo-
ration.125 But a more radical reform would be desirable, and 
in fact Henderson has urged that the law of the state of in-
corporation where the headquarters are situated be adopted 
for all manifestations of an identical corporation.126 
This suggestion, fostering a link between the two prin-
ciples, would seem highl¥ significant. But thus far, the inter-
national situation is quite similar to that in regard to the 
two great principles respecting status. Such eminent experts 
as Young in England and Henderson in the United States 
have regretted the common law principle as it stands; 127 more 
recently the following words were exchanged in a meeting 
of the International Law Association: 
ccMr. Wyndham A. Bewes: The nationality of a company 
registered in England is a fiction invented by English law, 
the nationality itself to start with being a related fiction. If 
you want to go to the realities of things, the existence of a 
living company, you have to go to where that company is ad-
ministered. I think our law is wrong and I should like to see 
it changed. 
ccMr. President: I thank Mr. Wyndham Bewes. It is one 
of the very rare occasions upon which I have heard an eminent 
English lawyer say that the law of England is wrong.m28 
Nevertheless, a minority of Continental writers advocate 
123 FOLEY, "Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation and the Conflict of Laws," 
4Z Harv. L. Rev. (19z9) 516. 124 HENDERSON I 9 3> cf. 69. 
125 Restatement §§ zo3, zos. 
126 HENDERSON 191 ff. 127 YOUNG 161 1 167, zo7; HENDERSON ibid. 128 International Law Association, Report of the 39th Conference 1936 
(1937) ss. 
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just the Anglo-American principle! 129 The majority of law-
yers on both sides seem perfectly satisfied with the wisdom 
of their respective principles.130 
Again, international attempts at unification131 have failed. 132 
This was also the fate of the notable draft of a uniform state 
law concerning foreign corporations (I 9 34) .133 
The simple measure suggested above of prescribing in the 
local requirements for incorporation, that the central office 
should be in the state, would leave the conflicts law intact and 
could be followed by those states which have no ambition to 
create corporations for foreign consumption. There should be 
no doubt in theory that this is the soundest solution. Likewise 
in theory, it would seem obvious that the Continental con-
flicts principle is the true equivalent to the common law 
principle with respect to individuals, and that this domiciliary 
rule has as much to recommend it for corporations as it has 
for individuals. In a federation, the nation-wide activities of 
a private legal person should be supervised and guaranteed 
by a federal organ. This is true for intrastate as well as 
for interstate activity, but, as things stand, the states are 
thoroughly disinclined to cede one of their last important 
powers, and the corporations cannot afford to have their 
129 France: PILLET, Personnes Morales§ 137; WEISS, 2 Traite 392. 
Germany: 1 FRANKENSTEIN 459; GEILER in I 2 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. 
Volker R. (1933) 179 and in Diiringer-Hachenburg 51; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 
185; ScHWANDT in Landesreferate, Sonderheft, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 206. 
Italy: ANZILOTTI, 6 Rivista (1912) 109, 113. 
Switzerland: VON STEIGER, ZBJV. 1931, 306 (but without such criticism 
in his address, Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir internationales Recht No. 27, 
p. 28). 
130 See the characteristic opposition of views, on the one hand, of D'AMELIO, 
Clunet 1917, 1227, and on the other, of VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 
49 Law Q. Rev. (1933) 343, 347, 348 who accuse the "seat" principle of 
"inconceivable" pretension and "glaring inconsistencies." 
131 See Report, RuNDSTEIN, Am. J. Int. Law 1928, Supp. 187; LEPAULLE, 
De la condition des societes etrangeres aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique (1923) 74· 
132 The Sixth Hague Conference (1928) found no time for the problem. 
133 Uniform Foreign Corporation Act, in Handbook of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ( 1 934) 286. 
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vast bureaucratic duties increased by additional federal im-
positions. Thus, in this country, the main problem lies in 
other considerations, the most important of which is con-
cerned with the right of doing business, which will be dis-
cussed at a later place in this book. 
CHAPTER 20 
The Scope of the Personal Law 
of Corporations 
THE personal law governs all matters relating to a corporation's existence, its functions as defined by its constitution, its organization, liabilities, and termina-
tion, as well as connected matters.1 It accompanies the legal 
entity from birth to death. 
1. Existence and Legal Character 
The personal law determines whether there is a corpora-
tion. The forum will rely on this law for affirmation or 
negation of its existence. 2 A perfected incorporation-in any 
state, or in the state of central control-is recognized irrespec-
tive of facts that would be considered omissions or defects 
in the process of incorporation and causes for dissolution 
under the domestic law of the forum. 3 Conversely, an associa-
tion not enjoying legal personality in the place of attempted 
1 Formulations to the same effect: RG. (May 27, 1910) 73 RGZ. 366, 367 
(capacity of having and exercising rights, constitution, administration, contract 
of association and its modifications); Codigo Bustamante, art. 248 (constitu-
tion, function, and responsibility of the organs) . 
2 Restatement§ 155 (1) and (z) implicitly. 
England: Henriques v. General Privileged Dutch Co. (1728) Ld. Raym. 
1532, 1535; The National Bank of St. Charles v. De Bernales (1825) 1 C. & P. 
569. 
United States: First Title and Securities Co. v. U. S. Gypsum Co. (1931) 
zx1 Iowa 1019,233 N. W. 137. 
Examples: 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. z9, 1896) Pasicrisie 1896.2.365. 
France:Trib. civ. Seine (July z, 1896) Clunet 18991 575· 
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (May 7, 19oo) W. 7488; Rb. Rotterdam 
(June 51 1913) W. 9549; Rb. Amsterdam (May 29, 1914) W. 9683, and 6ee 
KosTERS 67 5· 
3 Restatement § 155 comment b. 
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creation, is not considered anywhere an incorporated body! 
Illustration. The Committee of Underwriters of Hamburg 
brought an action in Paris. The French Supreme Court held 
that the plaintiff, a legal person under the law of Hamburg, 
and not a stock corporation/ was able to sue. 6 
The requirements for validity of corporations established 
in the state where a corporation is alleged to have been 
created, must be fulfilled. It may be that an act of the 
legislative or executive branch of the government is necessary 
(Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland), as was universally 
required in former times. 7 Ordinarily, however, general 
statutes establish the conditions under which an association 
may gain personality by creation through private persons 
for private purposes. The provisions vary with respect to 
every particular of the formalities, such as the documents 
embodying the declaration of the promoters (articles, certifi-
cate or memorandum of association or incorporation, or 
charter and by-laws, in Europe ordinarily one document, 
the "statute") and the records and advertisements necessary 
for public association. There is also diversity on the minimum 
number of members needed, the subscriptions or payments 
to be made, the verification of noncash contributions, and 
similar matters. The law of incorporation controls which 
provisions are conditions precedent and which mandatory, 
and which kind of invalidity follows an omission or mistake.8 
This law must be wholly satisfied. 9 
4 Restatement § 155 comment b; Dickey v. Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. 
(1915) 119 Ark. u, 173 S. W. 398; Sinnott v. Hanan (1915) z14 N.Y. 454, 
108 N. E. 858. 
5 Otherwise the court would have denied recognition on the ground discussed 
infra, Chapter u, pp. 130-I40. 
6 Cass. (civ.) (July u, I 893) Clunet I 893, uo4. 
7 App. Colmar (March 31, 19o8) Clunet I91o, 613 (authorization required 
in Luxemburg). 
8 England: In re The Imperial Anglo-German Bank (I87z) z6 L. T. N. S. 
229; cf. YOUNG 178 n. 4· 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (April 3, I933) Belg. Jud. I9Z4 c. I46o. 
9 Restatement § 155 ( z). 
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Whether agreements by which the promoters engage 
themselves to bring a corporation into existence form an 
integral part of the proceedings needed for incorporation, is 
determined by the personal law. If they are not so considered, 
the law of contract governs.10 Assuredly contracts concluded 
between the promoters and the members of a finance or 
guarantee syndicate or agreements between these persons and 
the bankers are not covered by the personal law .11 
While the validity of the creating act is thus subjected to 
the law of the incorporating state, it has been objected that, 
unless it is validly constituted, a legal person cannot have 
a personal law; to determine under this personal law whether 
the constitution is valid, would mean a vicious circle.12 But 
it is simply reasonable that the same law should govern the 
acts by which an association assumes personality, acquires 
capacity and an organization, as well as the discharge of its 
functions. The overworked argument of a circulus inex-
tricabilis is once more deceptive. · 
Objections on the ground of public policy to technical 
particulars of the foreign requirements for incorporation 
are very seldom raised. Examples may be found in jurisdic-
tions where one-man companies are abhorred.13 
In connection with this conception, it is an important and 
universally settled rule that the subscribers (in the broadest 
meaning) to the stock of a company are liable according to 
the personal law of the corporation.14 To support this rule, 
10 RG. (March 4, 1930) IPRspr. I9JI No. II (Vorgrundungsvertrag), 
Swiss BG., 35 BGE. II 2JI, 36 id. II 387. 
11 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 464 n. I§ I8I. 
12 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) § I8J. 
13 Belgium: Cass. (Jan. 5, I9II) Revue pratique des societes (I9ll) I85; 
Revue pratique du notariat ( I9II) 2 79 (a company cannot exist with only one 
member). 
The Netherlands: Kg. Amsterdam (May 5 and u, I9I6) W. 9978 and 
IOOOJ. 
14 United States: Crofoot v. Thatcher (I899) I9 Utah 212, 57 Pac. I7I; 
Trent Import Co. v. Wheelwright (I9I2) u8 Md. 249, 84 Atl. 543 
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it is usually argued in Europe that the subscribers tacitly 
submit themselves to the law governing the future corpo-
ration.15 This argument, in fact, covers also those subscrip-
tions which are not an essential prerequisite of the constitution. 
In the United States, the same result, i.e., that the action 
against the subscribers is determined by the law of the state 
of incorporation, is reached by the construction that the sub-
scriber's offer is deemed to have been accepted by the corpo-
ration as soon as formed.16 
For the formalities of the contract of association, if the 
contract is executed in a state other than where its commercial 
domicil is to be, i.e., where incorporation is to be sought, the 
revised text of the Treaty of Montevideo refers to the law 
of the place of contracting.17 But this is true only to the extent 
to which the law of the state of incorporation refers to the 
local law by the rule locus regit actum. 
2. Capacity (Powers) 
The main idea involved m this topic IS simple enough 
to be recorded at this juncture: 
(illegal stock subscription); May v. Roberts (1930) 133 Ore. 643, 286 Pac. 
546, 549; Collins v. Morgan Grain Co. (1926) 16 F. (2d) 253, 255· 
Austria: OGH. (Dec. 29, 1930) 12 SZ. 956 No. 315, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 
972 (Swiss law determines principal, interest, and time limitation). 
France: Trib. com. Seine (May II, 1887) Clunet 1889,670 (Belgian law); 
Trib. com. Seine (June 25, 1891) Clunet 1893, 893 (Luxemburg law); Cour 
Paris (Aug. 4, 1893) Clunet 1893, 1226 (the buyer of a foreign share cannot 
invoke the French provision that shares must amount at least to 500 francs); 
Trib. com. Seine (March 17, 1896) Clunet 1897, 1043 (Belgian law deter-
mining prescription for the subscriber). 
Germany: OLG. Miinchen (July 17, 1928) IPRspr. 1929 No. 23 (Eng-lish 
law). 
The Netherlands: Kg. Amsterdam (Dec. II, 1916) N. ]. (1917) 8. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 15, 1915) 41 BGE. II 588 (Swiss law on rescission. 
based, however, on a special argument). 15 Bclgium: Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. 31, 1907) .Clunet 1908, 1231. 
France: Trib. com. Seine (June 17, 1907) Clunet 1908, 170. 
Germany: Common opinion, see KESSLER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 768 No. 1. 16 Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey (1876) II6 Mass. 47I; for other cases 
see WARREN, Cases on Corporations (I 928) I 75· 17 Draft of Treaty on Commercial Terrestial Law (I94o) art. 26 § 2, cf. 
art. 7· 
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A corporation, if recognized, enjoys the powers conferred 
upon it by its charter or by the legislation of the incorporating 
state. This latter, the "general law" of the corporation, can-
not be disregarded, unless it intends to amplify or diminish 
the powers of corporations or a class of them only within the 
territory of the state. Exceptions may be raised to the powers 
of a foreign corporation on the grounds of public policy, but 
this should not be done without the strongest reasons. 
The principle includes the ability of a corporation to have 
rights and liabilities and to be heir or legatee/8 as well as 
the capacity to exercise rights (capacity of enjoyment). 
If consistency be observed, the personal law of the state 
of incorporation governs the name or firm of the entity.19 
Thus the German Reichsgericht protected an abbreviated 
name "K watta" under Dutch law (according to the Paris 
Treaty for the Protection of Commercial Property of 18 8 3), 20 
and the name "Eskimo Pie Co.," following the law of 
Delaware. 21 
In the European opinion, there is no doubt that the scope 
of this personal law embraces the right to sue and to be a 
party to a law suit. 22 This is also one of the oldest rules of 
18 See, for instance, Cour Paris (June :u, 1935) Clunet 1936, 884; Trib. 
com. Seine (Nov. 14, 1936) Clunet 1938, 307; Revue Crit. 1938, 57: Austrian 
law for existence and capacity to be a legatee of the Society for Assistance to 
Frenchmen in Austria. 
19 France: App. Douai (Nov. 18, 1904) D.1905.:i.I75; Cass. (req.) (Dec. 
26, 1905) D.19o6.1.252. 
Argentina: Cam. Fed. de la Cap. (June 16, 1944) 34 La Ley 1024. 
20 RG. (Sept. 26, 1924) 109 RGZ. 213. 
21 RG. (June 2, 1911) 117 RGZ. 217. 
22 France: Cour Paris (July 2o, 1936) Clunet 1937, p6 with the instruc-
tive distinction that the foreign corporation may sue by virtue of its capacity 
under article 1 5 of the Civil Code, but that jurisdiction is given only within the 
limits defined by French Code of Civ. Proc., art. 59· 
Germany: STEIN-JONAS, ZPO. §50 (ed. 1934) VI. 
Italy: Former C. Com. (1882) arts. 230-232 have been considered to cover 
the whole field of capacity to be a party and, by the prevailing opinion, even 
where a foreign business corporation has failed to comply with the conditions 
for doing business in the Kingdom. See below pp. 142, 143, 147· 
The Netherlands: Doctrine firmly settled by H.R. (March 23, 1866) W. 
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England, going back to the cases of 1724 and 1825,23 and 
certainly is the true rule in this country, despite Beale's 
assertion that the whole problem of who may sue and be 
sued is procedural. 24 
In contrast to the capacity to be a party, the competence 
of certain individuals to appear in court on behalf of a 
corporation which is a party, may be influenced by the pro-
cedural law of the forum. This problem cannot be expounded 
here. American courts seem accustomed to follow consistently 
the lex fori. 
What law determines the status of a corporation as a 
merchant, important under most civil law legislations? Opin-
ions are divided. The personal law is applied by logical 
consequence in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzer-
land, 25 and has been prescribed in an elaborate manner in 
2781; see also Hof den Bosch (May 26, I89I) W. 6I29 (corporation in 
liquidation); KosTERS 689; Rb. Dordrecht, (Jan. u, I927) W. 11625, 
37 Z.int.R. ( 1927) 447, I VAN HASSELT 327 (expressly declaring that reciproc-
ity is not required for recognition); Rb. Haag (March 27, I936) W. I937> 665 
(company constituted in Bern, Switzerland); Hof den Bosch (Feb. 9, I937) 
W. 1 9 3 7, 9 9 2. There is, however, a great controversy a,bout foreign (French, 
Belgian) provisions denying the right of a corporation to appear in its own 
name; the majority of decisions regard these provisions procedural and therefore 
not applicable in the Dutch forum, see VAN HASSELT 3· 
Scotland: Edinburgh and Glasgow Bank v. Ewan (I8p) I4 Ct. Se$5. (2nd. 
ser.) 547· 
Sweden: MALMAR, 7 Repert. I4I No. I49· 
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. I6, I9o9) 35 BGE. II 458, App. Ziirich (May 2, 
1 9 3 8) 3 8 Bl.f.Ziirch.Rspr. ( I9 3 9) I 90 n. 8 5: "capacity of being sued for 
attachment is a branch of the capacity of being a party, and this is a branch 
of the capacity of having rights," concerning a "curatorium of administration 
for the estate of the late princes, H-0, etc." 
23 Right to sue: Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques (I724) I Strange 6I2, 
aff'd (1728) 2 Ld. Raym. I5J2, (I73o) id. I5J5; The National Bank of St. 
Charles v. De Bernales (I825) I C. & P. 569, Ry. & M. I90· 
Liability to be sued: Newby v. Van Oppen and The Colt's Patent Firearms 
Mfg. Co. (1872) 7 Q. B. 293. 
24 3 BEALE § 588.I and 2. See infra pp. I42, I43. I47· 
25 Germany: ZPO. § I7. 
Italy: App. Roma (March 3, 1932) Foro Ita!. I932 I II73; Cass. (April29, 
1933) Foro Ita!. I933 I 116o; Cass. Roma (March 24, I938) Giur. Ita!. 
I938 I, I, 65I (an Italian company for dealing with rural land in Argentina 
is commercial and therefore subject to bankruptcy, though its activity is not 
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the C6digo Bustamante.u French courts and writers, however, 
advocate the law of the forum. 27 
By an exception universally adopted, the capacity of a 
corporation to commit tort is governed by the law of the 
place of the alleged tortious act, if the forum does not insist 
on its own policy.28 
More detailed attention will be given below (Chapter 22) 
to the problems arising when contracts exceeding the powers 
either of the corporation or its representatives, are concluded 
on behalf of a foreign corporation. 
3· Internal Organization 
The problems regarding the organization of the internal 
life of the corporate body29 include in the first place acquisi-
tion and termination of membership.30 In a fraternal benefit 
considered commercial under Argentine C. Com. art. 8. This decision is correct 
without regard to "qualification according to lex fori," as claimed by a note 
in Clunet 1939, 185. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Almelo (Oct. 301 1901) W. 7736. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 2; Inter local Priv. Law, art. 4 (center of 
enterprise) . 
Switzerland: VON STEIGER, 67 ZBJV. (1931) 313; cf. CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. 
Com. (1936) 16o-173· 
26 C6digo Bustamante, art. 248. See also 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT II 950 
§ 1127. 
27 ARMINJON, 2 Precis (ed. 1) 384 § 179. 
Similarly, NussBAUM, D. IPR. 190, 194. 
Mexico: Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles ( 1 9 34) art. 4· 
Institute of International Law, 35 Annuaire ( 1929) II 1 64-167 seems to com-
bine.both principles in a singular way. 
28 Restatement § 166 comment b. 
France: Cass. (crim.) (Aug. 8, 1873) Clunet 1875, 22; Trib. corr. Seine 
(March 13, 1903) Clunet 1903, 831; id. (July 27, 1910) Clunet 1911, 234. 
Germany: OLG. Niirnberg (Jan. 4, 1934) IPRspr. 1934 No. 26; RAAPE 137; 
NussBAUM, D. IPR. 191 (n. 6) § 42; in other opinions: 2 ZITELMANN 129; 
SCHNITZER, Handelsr. 115; but Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 235 (3) requires 
the minimum liability established by the law of the forum. 
29 Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard (1883) 109 U.S. 527. 
30 Restatement § 1 8 2. 
England: Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co. (1917) 242 U.S. 394 as construed 
by CHEATHAM, Cases 81 5. 
France: Cour Paris (May u, 1881) Clunet 1882, 317; Trib. com. Seine 
(May 28, 1896) Clunet 18961 874. 
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organization, the charter and by-laws determine also who 
is eligible to be a beneficiary.31 
Certificates. Membership may depend on the holding of 
a certificate. Whether it does, and to what extent-whether 
for instance actual or potential membership rights are con-
ferred upon any holder of a share certificate-is determined 
by the law of the state of incorporation. If this state is one 
in which the conception of the common law prevails, shares 
are not transferable except by registration on the company's 
books, and any certificates of stock issued have merely evi-
dentiary value. This system has been maintained in many 
existing American and Canadian statutes on stock transfer, 
although these allow the companies incorporated in the state 
to issue certificates that are indorsable in blank and transfer-: 
able by delivery. Acquisition of the certificate as a tangible 
thing (under the law applicable thereto) confers ownership 
in the corporeal certificate and in addition conveys title to the 
share of stock as between assignor and assignee, 32 but mem-
bership is acquired only by subsequent registration. Under 
English law, however, and according to the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act (adopted or substantially equalled in forty 
states), registered certificates, indorsed in blank or accom-
panied by separate instrument of transfer or assignment; 
bill of sale, et cetera, embody the rights of the certificate 
owner to demand registration as the owner of membership 
upon the books of the corporation. "Title to a certificate and 
to the share represented thereby can be transferred only by 
delivery of the instrument.ms The share, hence, may be said 
Germany: RG. (May 25, I928) JW. I928, 20I3; RG. (March 10, I934) 
88 Seuff. Arch. (I 934) I 93, IPRspr. I 934 No. 11. 
Switzerland: BG. (July 9, I9I3) 39 BGE. II 426. 
31 See 2 BEALE I 2 r 2 n. r. 
32 Williams v. Colonial Bank (r888) 38 Ch. D. 388; GooDRICH§§ rs6-I59 
n. 173. 
33 Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § 1, 6 U. L. A. (I 922). 
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to be materially, although not formally, merged with the 
certificate. Finally, the prevailing Continental type reaches 
the same goal by the complete merger of share and certificate 
in bearer shares. 34 
It follows that the certificate in all cases is transferred 
according to the law governing tangible things, viz., as is 
often asserted, by the law of the situs, but more precisely, 
by the law of tne place where the certificate is delivered. 35 
In contrast thereto, the personal law of the corporation deter-
mines, whether consent of other members, or that of the 
corporation, or whether recording in the books, is required 
to entitle the transferee to the rights of a shareholder as 
against the corporation, its other members, the state, and 
other third independent parties, to relieve the transferor 
from liability to the corporation, and related questions. For 
example, if the ownership of the certificate, embodying a 
share of an English private limited company, according to 
Swiss law is validly transferred to a Swiss bank, the rights 
of the acquirer are nevertheless subject to the transfer restric-
tions of English law.36 
In an analogous way, in case of inheritance, the last per-
sonal law of the deceased will decide to whom the assets 
devolve, but whether one who thus acquires shares holds 
an effective title in relation to the corporation, is exclusively 
determined by the law of charter.37 
Seizures. The application of the law of the corporation 
to the transfer of shares includes seizures of all kinds.38 In 
34 I BEALE§ I04.I; German RG. (March 101 1934) IPRspr. 1934 No. II. 
Another opinion seems to be expressed by M. WOLFF, IPR. 71 IV 2.. 
85 United States: Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel 
Corp. (192.5) 2.67 U.S. 2.2.; See Note, 15 Cal. L. Rev. (192.7) 145, 149, 150. 
36 See VON STEIGER, 67 ZBJV. (1931) 32.0. 
37 The comment b to Restatement § I 82. is probably in accord. 
38 RABEL, "Situs Problems in Enemy Property Measures," I I Law and Cont. 
Prob. ( 1945) II 8, I 33· As an illustration, see: 
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the main, this has been recognized in all those cases where 
shares or certificates have been confiscated. In particular, the 
Alien Property Custodians in this country,39 in Canada/0 
and in South Africa41 have been upheld when they vested 
in themselves enemy registered shares by mere notification 
to the central office of the company, despite circulation of 
the respective certificates in neutral countries, because the 
company law involved was based on the common law princi-
ple. On the other hand, the perceptive analysis of the 
principles underlying the Uniform Stock Transfer Act as 
adopted in New Jersey, by Judge Learned Hand, and in the 
Supreme Court of the United States, by Mr. Justice Holmes, 
recognized seizure by the English Public Trustee, of stock 
of the United States Steel Corporation, indorsed in blank 
and deposited in a bank in London for the account of German 
banks. 42 The holding of such a certificate rather than the 
registration upon the books of the corporation procures mem-
bership. This, the Disconto-Gesellschaft case, should have 
authority for courts everywhere. By its recognition of the 
mobilization of the membership embodied in the certificate, 
the decision relates the problem to the use of financial markets 
and the importance of commercial reliance, the very con-
siderations that originated the institution of certificates to 
bearer. One question only has been intentionally left open 
by this and other cases: whether the public policy of the 
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Sept. u, 1922.) W. 10960: certificates 
representing German shares in an English corporation were in England and on 
seizure by the English trustee of enemy property transferred on the books. The 
Dutch court recognized the seizure according to the applicable English law. 
39 Miller v. Kaliwerke Aschersleben Aktiengesellschaft (C. C. A. zd 1922) 
283 Fed. 746; United Cigarette Machine Co. v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. 
(C. C. A. 2d 1926) 12 F. (zd) 634. 
40 Spitz v. Secretary of State of Canada [1939] 2 D. L. R. 546, Exch. C. 
41 Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co. v. Custodian of Enemy Property 
(1923) S. A. L. R. App. D. 576. 
42 Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp (1925) 267 U. S. 22. 
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state of incorporation overriding its own stock transfer law, 
may abridge the rights of bona fide holders of true bearer 
shares. Such an extension of war measures has not been 
excluded. However, thus far, no unequivocal case in which 
bona fide neutral acquirers of bearer shares have been di-
vested, has occurred here or in England. 
A similar classification is due to the rights and liabilities 
pertaining to the members.43 The Restatement enumerates 
as subject to the law of incorporation: 
The right of a shareholder to participate in the adminis-
tration of the affairs of the corporation, in the division of 
profits and in the distribution of assets on dissolution and his 
rights on the issuance of new shares ( § I 8 3); the right to 
vote, to receive dividends, etc. (comment a, ibid.) ; the right 
to object to corporate activities (comment b, ibid.). 
The question whether the trustee (for the purpose of vot-
ing) will be allowed to vote the shares ( § I 84). 
The existence and extent of the liability of a shareholder 
for assessments or contribution to the corporation for the pay-
ment of debts of the corporation ( § I 8 5). 
For illustration, a certificate issued by the National City 
Bank of New York on "our American share" giving title 
to shares of a European corporation, is governed, as regards 
validity and content, by New York law, and with respect 
43 United States: Hudson River Pulp Co. v. Warner (r9oo) 99 Fed. 187, 
39 U.S. C. C. A. 452; O'Brien v. Chicago R. Co. (r868) 53 Barb. (N.Y.) 568, 
36 How. Pr. 24 (spurious stock); Ernst v. Elmira Municipal Improvement Co. 
(1898) 24 N.Y. Misc. 583, 54 N.Y. Supp. 116 (right against unlawful issue 
of preferred stock); Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American etc. Co. (1903) 
189 u.s. 221. 
England: Spiller v. Turner ( 1897) r Ch. D. 911, cf. YouNG 186. 
Canada: Pickles v. China Mutual Ins. Co.; China Mutual Ins. Co. v. Smith 
(1913) 47 S. C. R. 429, 10 D. L. R. (1913) 323, conf'ng, 46 N. S. R. 7, 
3D. L. R. 766 (Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 1912.). 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Jan. IJ, 1928) Jur. Com. Brux. 1928, 42 (pre-
ferred stock of a Belgian company is not valorized, according to Belgian 
law). 
Switzerland: BG. (April r, 1924) so BGE. II 57, 58. 
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to the deposit of the original European shares by the proper 
law applicable thereto; but in all other respects the law of 
the incorporating state controls.44 
Members are subject to assessments made in conformity 
to the charter, by-laws, and statutory provisions of the law 
of incorporation, "although they are not made parties to 
the proceeding for levying it."45 
The same law of incorporation determines how directors 
are nominated and what position they hold; how and at what 
place the directors or committees shall meet; 46 all questions 
of internal management; 47 the method of distribution of 
profits and appropriation of earned surplus to reserves; 
accounting; whether a corporation is permitted to acquire 
its own stock, 48 et cetera. 
Matters of internal organization, however, are not only 
reserved to the law of the charter, but regularly also to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the state of incorporation. 
Jurisdiction. "The English court will not interfere in the 
internal disputes of foreign corporations with domestic issues 
as between the members"49-a maxim not consistently re-
spected. 50 In the United States, it has been declared that, 
in the absence of an office for the transfer of shares, a foreign 
corporation may not be sued for the issuance, transfer, or 
44 See FLECHTHEIM, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 118. 
45 Mr. Chief Justice Stone in Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express Inc. (1941) 
314 U.S. 201, 207; Warner v. Delbridge & Cameron (1896) 110 Mich. 590, 
6 8 N. W. 2 8 3 : "Every person who deals with it (the foreign corporation) 
everywhere and particularly one who becomes a member of the corporation, 
is bound to take notice of the provisions which had been made in its charter, 
and subjects himself to such laws of the government of its situs as affect the 
powers and obligations of the corporation." 
46 Restatement § 164. 
41 San Remo Copper Min. Co. v. Moneuse (1912) 149 App. Div. (N.Y.) 
26, 133 N.Y. Supp. 509, reversed (1911) 132 N.Y. Supp. 570. 
48 Tolman v. New Mexico & Dakota Mica Co. (1885) 4 Dak. 4, 22 N. W. 
505. 
49 Sudlow v. Dutch Rhenish R. Co. (1855) 21 Beav. 43, per Romilly. 
50 DICEY, Rule 139, n. d seems to indicate less consistency than in the 
American courts. 
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cancellation of shares; 51 generally, courts exercise discretion 
in assuming jurisdiction; it is a question of policy and 
convenience, not of right.52 It is thought, however, that 
considerations of convenience, efficiency, and justice point 
to the court of the domicil of the corporation for settlement 
of the issues presented. 53 Analogous rules existing elsewhere 
are in part even stricter and more comprehensive. 54 
4· External Relations 
The personal law of the corporation controls the rights 
and liabilities of the corporation and of the members toward 
third persons, such as creditors and debtors.55 In particular, 
it covers the powers of the corporation56 and the liability of 
promoters, directors, advisory board, 57 and shareholders. 58 
51 Restatement§§ I92, I93; cf. Hopkins v. Great Western Fuse Co. (I94I) 
343 Pa. 438, 22 Atl. (2d) 7I7; Sternfeld v. Toxaway Tanning Co. (I942) 
290 N.Y. 294.49 N. E. (2d) I4S. 
52 Restatement, Scope Note to Topic 5, 279; Notes, I8 A. L. R. I376, 1383; 
32 A. L. R. 1353, I355; 29 Col. L. Rev. (I929) 968; 27 Mich. L. Rev. 
(I929) 336. 
53 See Notes, 33 Col. L. Rev. (I933) 492; 89 A. L. R. 736; I7 Bost. U. L. 
Rev. (I937) 878. An exception has been mentioned supra Chapter I9 n. 53· 
54 E.g., Belgium: Law on Competence, of March 25, I876, art. 44 gives ex-
clusive jurisdiction to the court at the place of the principal establishment, over 
disputes between the administrators and members. The constitutional documents 
may change this rule however. See Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. 349 § 22I7. 
France: C. Civ. Proc., art. 59, see comment by GLASSON, TISSIER et MoREL, 
2 Traite theorique et pratique de procedure civile (ed. 3, I926) § 36o. 
Germany: ZPO. § 22, HGB. §§ 272 par. 2, 309, 325; Genossenschaftsgesetz 
§ 5 I, Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung Gesetz § 7 5. 
55 Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard (I883) Io9 U. S. 527; a person 
dealing with a foreign corporation submits himself to the regulation of the 
foreign state discharging the corporation from liability. 
56 See discussion infra pp. I5 7ff. 
57 Restatement § I 8 7. 
58 Restatement §§ I87, I9o, cf. Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner 
(C. C. S.D. Tex. I9o8) I63 Fed. 6os. On the special subject of limitation of 
the liability of stockholders, see the notes in II3 A. L. R. po and I43 A. L. R. 
I442. 
England: General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou ( I843) II M. & W 877; 
Bateman v. Service (P. C. I88I) 6 App. Cas. 386, per Sir R. Couch, 388. 
Canada: Allen v. Standard Trust Co. (I92o) 57 D. L. R. I05 (Man. App.); 
for other cases see 3 JoHNSON 453· 
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For instance, where a British incorporated limited company 
carried on business in California, in which state the constitu-
tion and the civil code of the time declared the shareholders 
of a corporation liable for the debts of the corporation, the 
English Court of Appeals correctly denied the action. 59 
Liability of stockholders in the United States. In this 
country, however, the problem has been singularly confused. 
The provisions of California just mentioned established 
proportionate liability of stockholders to be applied also to 
stockholders of foreign corporations,S0 a unique and ex-
travagant rule that fortunately was repealed in 1931.61 But 
the not so infrequent provisions imposing some subsidiary 
liability upon shareholders, such as in particular on those of 
banking, guaranty, investment, insurance, or similar corpo-
rations62 have been extended to the members of organizations 
of other states under qualified circumstances interesting to 
note. 
(i) While the Supreme Court of the United States in 
several cases has compelled state courts to give effect to the 
statutory liability of members under the law of organization/3 
it once approved a judgment declaring a stockholder subject 
to the liability statute of the state whose resident he is. 64 
Against this emphasis on the power of the domiciliary state, 
it should be noted with all due respect that the accidental 
59 Risdon I. & L. Works v. Furness [I9o6] I K. B. 49· 
6° Cal. Constitution, former § 3, art. XII; C. C., former § 322. 
61 Cal. Stat. (I9JI) p. 444; C. C.§§ 322-325a; cf. BALLANTINE, Cal. Corp. 
Law, 4 § 3: "This form of liability was unique and operated as a deterrent to 
the investment of capital here." 
62 E.g., see Kentucky: Rev. Stat. (I946) § 271.I8o (2) (insurance); Maine: 
Rev. Stat. (I 944) c. 49 § I I 7; Ill. Constitution, art. I I § 6. 
63 Converse v. Hamilton (I9I2) 224 U. S. 243; Supreme Council of the 
Royal Arcanum v. Green (I9I5) 237 U. S. S3I; New York Life Ins. Co. v .. 
Dodge (I9I8) 246 U.S. 357· Accordingly, Groesbeck v. Beaupre (I94o) 307 
Ill. App. 215, 30 N. E. (2d) 53 I· 
64 Pinney v. Nelson (I 9 o I ) I 8 3 U. S. I 44 ; followed by Restatement § I 9 I 
comment a. 
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domicil of an individual should not interfere with the struc-
ture of a capital organization recognized under our basic 
principles for common interest. Otherwise, local liability 
rules ought to be applied also when they are more favorable 
to the stockholder than the rules governing the corporation. 
In fact, when a citizen of New Jersey was sued on his 
individual additional liability as a stockholder of a banking 
corporation of Florida, the New Jersey court dismissed the 
action with reference to a local statute. 65 A na!ve annotation 
tried to justify this decision constitutionally by the argument 
that the claim was not based on a judgment but on a statutory 
liability.66 These seem to be isolated aberrations. 
(ii) Although the stockholder was not a resident and 
the corporation was f~reign, he was held subject to the 
liability statute of the state where the corporation concluded 
a contract. The courts assumed an agreement of the stock-
holder with the third party whereby he was deemed to have 
submitted to the statute of the place of contracting, either 
when the charter of the corporation expressly authorized 
doing business in that state or even when the charter failed 
to specify the states in which business may be conducted. 67 
These fictitious constructions were aptly refuted in the case 
of Thomas v. Matthiessen68 by the Federal Courts of New 
York, Judge Ward of the Circuit Court of Appeals declaring 
that under the theories rejected "corporate stock is liable to 
become in this country an uncertain and even dangerous 
65 Cochrane v. Morris (I93I) ION.]. Misc. 82, I57 Atl. 6p. 
66 57 N.J. L. J. (I934) 26I. 
67 See the California cases cited in Restatement California Annotations § I 9 I. 
Other cases and argumentations on the same lines in Notes, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 
(I9Io) 37, I2 Col. L. Rev. (I9I2) 450, 27 Harv. L. Rev. (I9I4) 575· This 
strange argument has been shared by YouNG and by STEVENS 729 n. I 82. 
The Restatement § I9I, trying to reduce the scope of the local law, still 
applies it when "(h) the shareholder has personally taken part in doing the 
act or causing it to be done, or (c) has notice that the corporation was formed 
to do business there." 
68 (C. C. D. N.Y. I9o9) I7o Fed. 362; (I9II) I92 Fed. 495· 
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asset." The Supreme Court, however, although approving 
of this reasoning, found factually that the New York stock-
holders of a New York corporation had agreed to liability 
under the law of Arizona, because by the charter the corpo-
ration was specially organized to do business in Arizona 
and California. 69 
We may in fact, as explained before, set aside the case 
where a business organization is intended to operate ex-
clusively, or at least principally, in a state other than that 
of incorporation; this, however, should be done, if at all, 
only under some theory of evasion that is to be based, not on 
the behavior or domicil of any particular stockholder, but 
on the contrast between the corporate purposes and the selec-
tion of the state in which to incorporate. In Peck v. N oee, the 
corporation was organized to do business in California only, 
and its organizers and officers were California residentS.10 
In this case, probably with stronger facts than in that of 
Thomas v. Matthiessen, the local law might have had a 
claim. 71 All other arguments against the exclusive application 
of the law of the charter are evidently induced by mistaken 
application of the conflicts rule that a principal is bound to 
the construction given to his authority by the law of the 
state where the agent acts upon it. In our case, no such 
construction can alter the fact that the stockholders have 
agreed only to a charter limiting their liability to their share 
in the stock, and hence have given approval to business carried 
on in whatever place, only at the risk of the corporation and 
not otherwise. To reason as though individual stockholders or 
all stockholders by allowing business abroad have waived the 
limitation of their liability, is gratuitous. 
On the other hand, the exclusive application of the law 
69 (1913) 2J2 u.s. 221. 
70 Peck v. Noee (r9o8) 154 Cal. 351,97 Pac. 865. 
71 Cf. STUMBERG 340. 
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of the charter is entirely desirable in the interest of certainty 
and equity, even if more reliable expressions for exception 
could be found than in the helpless formulation of the Re-
statement (supra note 67). 
Border line problems. Special attention will be given later 
to the authority of the principal representatives of a corpo-
ration contracting with third persons. There is no doubt, 
however, on principle that the personal law of the entity 
controls.72 Only the border line between this and other con-
flicts rules causes some difficulties. In particular, the territorial 
law of the country where a foreign corporation does business 
is likely to claim consideration of its own rules. Application 
of the law governing the contract may further complicate 
the problem. Young in his excellent monograph, trying to 
find a just delimitation, proposed that only those rules and 
enactments which relate to the permanent character and con-
stitution of a juristic person, or to the relations of its mem-
bers inter se and toward the juristic person itself, should 
be regarded as part of its personal law having extraterritorial 
effect; no enactment made to protect the interests of third 
parties should be included. 73 This is not a suitable proposition, 
because the law of the incorporating state, too, generally has 
rules protecting third parties which ought to be applied and 
because the local law is also entitled to regulate business 
72 United States: 2 BEALE 758 § I65.1. 
England: Banco de Bilbao v. Antonio Rey y Zardoya, K. B. ( 19 3 7), "not 
published" in England, Clunet 1938, 6o2; aff'd, 2 All E. R. [I938] 253-C. A.: 
revocation of powers of employees under Spanish Constitution and C. Com. 
art. 21. 
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (Sept. 2, I9o8) I07 0 Direito 2I5. 
France: App. Douai (April 28, I 897) D.1899.2.I 95· 
Germany: KG. (March 8, I929) IPRspr. I929 No. 21. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (Jan. 12, I933) W. 12626; charter of Belgian 
comptoir determines agent's power to conclude a cartel with Dutch and German 
companies. 
73 YouNG I 8 5. If he says: "A state cannot exercise its legislative powers over 
the subjects of other states, even to protect them," he adds a new "cannot" to 
those well criticized by himself. 
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conducted in its territory in respects not concerning the in-
terest of third parties but the public interest. 
5. Modification and End 
The law of the state of incorporation determines: 
Alteration of the charter or by-laws, e.g., increase or de-
crease of the capital stock; 74 annulment of the charter; 75 
its expiration by lapse of time; 76 dissolutiont whether volun-
tary or forced, 78 its method and cause; 79 in states recognizing 
the extraterritorial effect of foreign adjudications in bank-
ruptcy,So the effect of such adjudication on the existence and 
representation of the corporation; 81 and its continuation after 
a certificate of dissolution for purposes of winding up or 
actions of debt. 82 
74 Austria: OGH. (Dec. 29, 1930) 12 Amtl. S. No. 315· 
France: Trib. com. Seine (Junes, 1875) Clunet 1876, 363. 
Germany: RG. (May 27, 1910) 76 RGZ. 366, 20 Z.int.R. 408 (Dutch law 
applied, art. 289 par. 3 of the German HGB. declared inapplicable). 
75 See supra ns. 2ff. 
76 Sturges v. Vanderbilt (1878) 73 N.Y. 384. 
77 United States: Relfe v. Rundle (r88o) 103 U.S. 222: right of appointed 
state official against shareholder; approved for England by Dicey. 
England: Ban que Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow 
[1923] 2 K. B. 682 at 69r. 
France: App. Chambery (Dec. I, 1866) S.I867.2.I82; App. Paris (June IS, 
I937) Clunet 1937, 812 (jurisdiction denied). 
Germany: RG. (May 20, 1930) 129 RGZ. 98; OLG. Frankfurt (Nov. I, 
1907) r6 ROLG. 10o; OLG. Kiiln (June 2o, 1913) Rhein. Arch. II9. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 22, 19Io) W. 9IS9; (Jan. 26, 
1923) W. I 1054; Rb. Maastricht (June 25, I93I) W. 12366 (powers of 
liquidators). 
Switzerland: 51 BGE. II 264, 14 Praxis 371; Bern, ZBJV. (1907) 555· 
78 Belgo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Bender Eregli v. Stinnes, 5 Recueil trib. 
arb. mixtes 7 5 r. 
79 Sinnott v. Hanan (I913) 156 App. Div. (N.Y.) 323, I4I N.Y. Supp. 
sos. 
80 See NADELMANN, "The Recognition of American Arrangements Abroad," 
90 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1942) 78o, 789. 
81 England: (As to movables) principle of Solomon v. Ross ( r 764) I H. 
Bl. IJ I (n); see CHESHIRE 478. 
82 Restatement § IS8 comment c; O'Reilly, Skelly & Fogarty Co. v. Greene 
(1896) 40 N. Y. Supp. 36o, aff'd, 4I N. Y. Supp. 1056; Sinnott v. Hanan 
(19I5) 2I4 N.Y. 454, Io8 N. E. 858. 
Germany: OLG. Frankfurt (Feb. 2I, I933) IPRspr. I933 No. 4, applying 
§ ros n. 8 of the New York Stock Corporation Law. 
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If the state of incorporation does not provide for a suit 
in the corporate name after dissolution, an American rule 
provides that where the corporation was doing business or 
had property in another state, it may be kept alive by the 
statutes of this latter state for the purpose of suing or being 
sued, and that the effect on the winding up of the business 
or on the property existing in that state will be recognized 
in third states.83 This rule deserves universal application, 
although on the Continent statutes on dissolution generally 
do prescribe continuation for the purpose and duration of 
winding up, if the formal dissolution is not deferred until 
this moment. Thus, where an English company had been 
dissolved without satisfying the claim of a certain creditor 
who sued for payment out of German immovables recorded in 
the land register in the name of the company, the German 
court found it impossible directly to apply the English rules; 
it considered the company as continuing for the purpose of 
the suit. 84 The fiction, of course, does not refer to any business 
done after the dissolution.85 No such statute was available 
in the case of Soviet nationalization, which will be mentioned 
below; hence, the House of Lords had to decide whether a 
dissolved Russian company could sue for debt in England, 
which was granted by the narrow margin of three votes 
against two. 86 
As a jurisdictional effect, it is generally held that the court 
of the corporation's domicil has exclusive power to dissolve 
83 Restatement § Is 8 comment d; Rodgers v. The Adriatic Fire Ins. Co. 
(I89s) I48 N.Y. 34, 42 N. E. SIS, SI6; People v. Mercantile Credit Co. 
(I9oi) 6s App. Div. (N.Y.) 3o6, 309, 72 N.Y. Supp. 8s8. 
84 Cour Paris (July 6, I93S) Clunet I936, 9I6. This was disregarded in 
Gibbs and Sons v. La Societe Industrielle et Commerciale des Metaux (I89o) 
2S Q. B. D. 399, criticized by YouNG I 8 I. 
85 OLG. Frankfurt (Nov. I, I 907) I 6 ROLG. I oo. The Reichsgericht de-
clared that no such proceeding would be granted in the mere interest of the 
shareholders, RG. (May zo, I930) 129 RGZ. 98, 107, See German HGB. 
§ 302. 
86 Russian & English Bank v. Baring Bros. & Co., Ltd. [I936] A. C. 40s. 
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as well as to annul the legal person. 87 Perfectly distinguish-
able is the jurisdiction exercised in any state where business 
is carried on to wind up dissolved foreign corporations or 
partnerships.88 In England, a technical doubt whether wind-
ing up may follow dissolution in an order contrary to com-
mon law, was resolved by an express provision of the Com-
panies Law.89 
When in 1901 France dissolved all religious congregations 
that had not obtained authorization, the Fathers of Chartreux 
were correctly recognized in Switzerland as an association 
because they had transferred their domicil and recreated 
their legal form in other countries. 90 The Freres des ecoles 
chrhiennes should have been recognized also in France, 
insofar as they had mother houses in other countries. 91 The 
dissolved French congregations themselves could not be 
recognized in any country except on the ground of public 
policy; this seems not to have occurred. Also, the dissolution 
of the Bank of Ethiopia by the Italian Government has been 
recognized elsewhere. 92 
Soviet nationalization. On a large scale, the problems of 
87 United States: Restatement New York Annotations§ 157 n. 2; 2 BEALE 
74-2 § I 5 7.z; Barclay v. Talman (I 842) 4 Edw. Ch. 128. 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 8, I912) Revue I9I2, 402, cf. 2 ARMINJON 
(ed. I) § I 8 3· Contra: PILLET, Personnes Morales§ I 72· 
Belgium: Trib. Liege (July 23, r89I) Clunet I893, u43; cf. 3 RoLIN 
§§ 1264, 1284. 
88 England: In re Comm. Bank of South Australia (I886) 33 Ch. D. 173, 
1 74· 
United States: Lowe v. Pressed Metal Co. (I9I6) 9I Conn. 9I, 99 Atl. I. 
89 WESTLAKE § 132; DICEY 326; In re Comm. Bank of India (I 8 68) 6 Eq. 
517; In re Matheson Bros. Ltd. (1884) 27 Ch. D. 225; In re Mercantile 
Bank of Australia ( 1892) 2 Ch. D. :z.o4. See Companies Act, I929, § 338 
( r) : this rule requires only a "place of business," not an "established place 
of business" in England, Cohen, J., In re Tovarishestvo Manufactur Liudvig-
Rabenek [I944] I Ch. 404,408. 
90 Switzerland: 32 BGE. I 157; 39 BGE. II 65I. 
91 See PILLET, Personnes Morales § 293 against a decision of Trib. corr. 
Seine. 
92 Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori [I937] Ch. 
D. 513, 3 All E. R. 8, Clunet 1938, Io5. 
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dissolution and winding up have been discussed in the many 
cases arising out of the Soviet Decree of December 14, 1917, 
pronouncing the nationalization of Russian companies.93 The 
first impulse everywhere was to deny the Soviet Decree 
recognition. This was done by some courts on the ground 
that the Soviet Union had not received recognition by the 
government of the forum. 94 But in this country, Cardozo, 
J., in the New York Court of Appeals refuted this specious 
argument at a time when the American Government had not 
yet recognized the Soviet Government de jure.95 This accords 
with the decisions of the Federal Tribunal of Switzerland, 
which had not recognized the Soviets until I 946.96 Recognition 
of a government has nothing to do with the existence of a 
private person. Other courts held that the Soviet provisions 
were not really meant to dissolve the corporation97 or to ex-
tend beyond Russian frontiers 98-both inexact assumptions.99 
93 CONNICK, 34 Yale L. J. (192.5) 499, NEBOLSINE, "The Recovery of 
the Foreign Assets of Nationalized Russian Corporations," 39 Yale L. J. (1930) 
I I 30. 
94 United States: Fred S. Tames & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (App. Div. 
N. Y. I92.4) 2.03 N. Y. Supp. zJz, I46 N. E. 369; Joint Stock Co. of 
Volgakama etc. v. National City Bank (App. Div. N. Y. I924) 2o6 N. Y. 
Supp. 476. 
England: Russian Bank of Foreign Trade v. Excess Ins. Co. [I9I9] K. B. 
39, 35 T. L. R. 42. The Eastern Carrying Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Benefits Life & 
Prop. Ins. Co., Ltd. (I9I9) 35 T. L. R. 2.92.. 
95 Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank of New York (I924) 239 N. Y. I 58, I65, 
I45 N. E. 9I7, 9I8; Note, CONNICK, 34 Yale L. J. (I925) 499; cf. Lehman, 
J., opinion in Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (I934) 266 N.Y. 
7I, I09. 
96 Switzerland: so BGE. II Sit; 51 id. II 263; 55 id. I 289, Clunet I93o, 
1164. 
97 England: House of Lords in Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. 
Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse [192.5] A. C. II2; 40 T. L. R. 837, the 
first case after the British recognition of the Soviet Government; followed by 
numerous others, see WoRTLEY, I4 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I933) 4, 5· 
Germany: KG. (March 3I, I925) JW. I92.5, IJoo, Clunet I925, I057· 
98 England: Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Sedgwick, Collins & Co. 
[I927] A. C. 95; The Jupiter [I92.7] P. zso, 253; Woronin, Luetscheg & 
Cheshire v. Frederick Huth & Co. (K. B. I92.8) Clunet I92.8, 756, 758. 
99 MAKAROV, Precis 2.I9; opinion of Schoendorf stated by the KG. (Oct. 2.5, 
I927) JW. I92.8, 1232., IPRspr. I928 No. I4. 
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Most appealing was the frank statement that the confiscatory 
character of the decrees offended the public policy of the 
forum. 100 Numerous French judgments up to 1928 declared 
more precisely that, while the title validly passed within Rus-
sia, it was contrary to French public policy, that by socializa-
tion the legal existence of the enterprises should be destroyed 
within France.101 This opinion was shared by the New York 
courts and expressed as late as 1 9 3 4.102 On this basis, the 
capacity of the nationalized corporation to appear in court 
was affirmed, 103 provided that directors suing in the name 
of the corporation showed authorization from its stock-
holders:104 
The matter has become obsolete, however, in this country, 
inasmuch as the Soviet Government on the occasion of its 
recognition de jure by the so-called Litvinoff agreement, has 
assigned to the United States Government any claims it may 
have had to property within the territory of the United 
States. 105 The Court of Appeals of New York nevertheless 
10° France: Trib. com. Marseilles (April 23, I925) Clunet I925, 39I; App. 
Bordeaux (Jan. 2, I928) and Cour Paris (June I3, I928) S.I928.2.I6I; cf. 
NIBOYET, Clunet 1929, II5; App. Aix (Dec. 23, I925) Clunet I926, 667. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Haag (March 9> 1933) W. u589, VAN HASSELT 335· 
The former director was considered representative in view of the impossibility 
of holding a general meeting of shareholders. 
In Germany, this opinion could not be maintained, in view of the Treaty 
of Rapallo of April I 6, I 9zz, art. 2, whereby Germany recognized the Soviet 
legislation, see RG. (May 2o, I930) IZ9 RGZ. 98. 101 Trib. com. Seine (Jan. 16, 1922) Clunet 1923, 539; (April 26, I9zz) 
Clunet 1923, 933; (March 23, I925) Clunet 1927, 3SZ; (April n, 1926) 
Clunet I 927, 35 7; Trib. com. Seine (Oct. I, I 926) Clunet I927, 359· 102 Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (I933) 262 N.Y. zzo, 
186 N. E. 679, Note, 33 Col. L. Rev. (I933) 75o; Vladikavkazsky R. Co. v. 
New York Trust Co. (I934) 263 N. Y. 369, I89 N. E. 456, Note, 34 Col. 
L. Rev. (1934) 962. See the survey by Lehman,]., opinion in Dougherty v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Society (I934) 266 N.Y. 7I at 106. 103 James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (I925) 239 N.Y. 248, I46 N. E. 
369; Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (1925) 2II App. Div. 132, 207 
N.Y. Supp. 574· 104 Banque Internationale v. Nat'l City Bank of New York (I929) I33 N.Y. 
Misc. sz7, 233 N.Y. Supp. 255· 105 See 28 Am. J. Int. Law (I934) Supp. Io; State of Russia v. Nat'l City 
Bank of New York (I934) 69 F. (:zd) 44· 
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• 
held a local branch of a Czarist Russian insurance company 
existent, the strong state control over insurance business 
warranting a distinct personality of the branch despite the 
disappearance of the mother company.106 But the Supreme 
Court of the United States has overruled this construction 
and all other objections to the extraterritorial effect of the 
Soviet confiscatory decrees.107 The theory of the Court, which 
identifies governmental recognition of the Soviet Govern-
ment with binding recognition of the nationalization decrees, 
is a regrettable deviation from well-settled principles of 
international law.108 
In Europe, where litigation was more frequent, all objec-
tions finally vanished; the personal law has won full victory. 
The power of a state to establish a legal person susceptible 
of being recognized everywhere implies a power to terminate 
it with extraterritorial effect. Hence, the courts accepted 
the proposition that the Russian corporations had ended.109 
106 Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co. (1939) 28o 
N.Y. 286,20 N. E. (zd) 758, aff'd (1940) 309 U.S. 62.4. 
107 U.S. v. Pink (1942) 315 U.S. 2.03. 
108 BoRCHARD, "Extra-territorial Confiscations," 36 Am. J. Int. Law ( r 942.) 
275. JESSUP, "The Litvinov Assignment and the Pink Case," id. z8z, 2.85; Note, 
51 Yale L. J. (1942) 848; LAUTERPACHT, Annual Digest 1938-1942. (1942) 
141, rso. 
109 England: Lazard Bros. & Co. v. Midland Bank, Ltd. [1932] r K. B. 6r7, 
aff'd, House of Lords [1933] A. C. 2.89, Clunet 1934, 159; In re Russian 
Bank for Foreign Trade [1933] r Ch. 745, Clunet 1934, 445· 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (July I r, r 936) Revue Crit. I 937, r 2. r. 
France: Cour Paris (June 13, I92.8) Revue 192.9, 93; and (July 2.2., 1929) 
Clunet I929, I095 expressly reversing its stand of May 17, I92.7, Clunet 192.8, 
131. Cass. (req.) {July 2.9, 1929) D. H. 192.9, 457, Clunet 1930, 68o Revue 
1931, 342.; Trib. com. Seine {Jan. 20, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 117; Trib. 
com. Seine {Jan. r5, I934) Revue Crit. I935, 468 and Cour Paris {July r5, 
1935) Revue Crit. 1936, 158 (bank accounts necessarily stopped at the date 
of nationalization). 
Germany: KG. (Oct. 25, 1927) JW. 1928, 12.32., IPRspr. 1928 No. 14, 
and especially RG. (May 20, 1930) 129 RGZ. 98, JW. I93r, 141, IPRspr. 
I93o No. 9; RG. {July n, I934) JW. 1934, 2845, IPRspr. 1934 No. n, 
Clunet I935, r64; 6 Giur. Comp. DIP.§ 245· 
Poland: S. Ct. (Dec. 4, I929) Clunet 1931, 770. 
Switzerland: Despite nonrecognition of the Soviet Government, see supra 
n. 96. 
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What then happens to the assets left by a former Russian 
corporation in another country? Unanimously, the courts 
hold that the confiscatory effect of the Soviet legislation 
cannot reach assets situated abroad. One reason adduced is 
that such confiscation violates a stringent policy of the 
forum.110 A more convincing argument regards the character 
of the fiscal privilege claimed by the Soviet Government 
as necessarily limited to the territory under its sovereignty.111 
While there is some old divergence of opinion about the legal 
character of a right of inheritance that a state ascribes to itself, 
the Soviet State had evidently exercised the right of a state 
to occupy ownerless property (bona 'Vacantia), a right inter-
nationally confined to assets within the territory of the state. 
Whatever the intention of the Soviet Government may have 
been, another state is entitled, on its own soil, to deal with 
the assets according to its own conceptions. 
Generally, on the request of a national creditor or stock-
holder, an administrator was appointed by a competent 
court.112 Business managed by local agents of the defunct 
corporations was liquidated.113 In New York, branches of 
Russian insurance companies have been liquidated under the 
Insurance Law.114 
Are shareholders, however, able to join in a suit to continue 
110 Swiss BG. (July 13, 1925) 51 BGE. II 259, 264; App. Paris (June 13, 
1928) Clunet 1929, 119. See also MAKAROV, Precis 220. 
111 Hamilton v. Accessory Transit Co. (N. Y. I 857) 26 Barb. 46; The 
Jupiter [I927] P. In, 250. 
112 France: Cour Paris (Oct. 3 I, I 9 35) Clunet I 9 3 6, 3 3 7. 
Germany: BGB. § I9I3. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 26, I929) 55 BGE. I 289, Clunet I93o, II64. 
For England, recommended by WoRTLEY, 14 Brit. Year Book Int. Law 
(I933) 8; Latvia, Laws of April I7, I925 and Sept. I6, I927, and Poland, De-
cree-Law of March 22, I928, cf. Polish S. Ct. (Dec. 4, I929) Clunet I93I, 770 
expressly prescribed liquidation, while Esthonia, Decree of Oct. 27, I92o pro-
vided for compulsory domestication of branches of Russian stock corporations. 
113 Great Britain: Companies Act, I929, § 338 (2). 
114 Matter of People (Russian Reinsurance Co.) (I93I) 255 N. Y. 4I5 
I75 N. E. II4. 
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the former corporation? While this was held impossible in 
Germany, 115 the device of a de facto company has been used 
in France and Belgium,116 if there were common assets to be 
administered in the country.117 Officers of the former company 
may be considered administrators.118 The nationalized corpo-
ration is liable to be sued for the debts of the old firm at 
least those to creditors who are nationals of the forum.119 
Again, when uncertain situations are apt to arise, winding up 
or bankruptcy (liquidation judiciare) may be ordered at any 
moment at the request of shareholders or creditors, respec-
tively.120 In this case, any theory of universality being ex-
cluded by the disappearance of the Russian legal entity, 
every country conducts separate proceedings, although a 
receiver may be appointed at a place where refugee directors 
and shareholders control the business de facto. 121 
115 RG. (May 2o, 193o), 129 RGZ. 98. 
116 App. Bruxelles (July II, 1938) 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 273 No. 10934. 
117 In absence of such property, jurisdiction has been denied; see Cour Paris 
(June 15, 1937) Clunet 1937, 812.. 
118 Trib. com. Seine (June 17, 1934) Clunet 1935, 117. 119 Cour Paris (March 29, 1938) Deutsche Bank v. Ass'n des Porteurs etc., 
Clunet 1938, 1017; id. (April n, 1938) Deutsche Bank v. Banque Inter-
nationale de Petrograd, Nouv. Revue 1938,617. 12° France: See the decisions of Trib. com. Seine of 1 9 34 to x 9 3 6, reported in 
Clunet 1935, 125; RevueCrit. 1935,491; 1937,117. 
Belgium: Trib. com. Liege (March 25, 1938) 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 
273 No. 10933: the company continues to function in Belgium but must be 
dissolved at the request of any stockholder to satisfy first the non-Russian 
creditors, and after them the non-Russian shareholders. Difficulties arising from 
the territorial limits of liquidators appointed in France are illustrated in 
App. Bruxelles (July II, 1938) summarized in 41 Bull. lnst. Int. (1939) 
273 No. 10934. 121 App. Bruxelles (July 11, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, :21. 
CHAPTER 21 
Unincorporated Business Organizations 
I. METHOD oF LEGAL CoNsTRUCTION 
I. The Old Antithesis 
CLINGING to the inherited simple contrast between corporation and partnership, the literature for too long a time was lost in speculation over the nature 
of unincorporated organizations. The most significant dispute 
concerned the ordinary mercantile partnership which very 
clearly does not fit into the categories either of juristic persons 
or of mere contracts of societas. A deep cleavage among the 
European scholars was reflected in the split between the 
French doctrine, followed widely in Latin countries and 
influential in Louisiana/ which acknowledges mercantile2 
collective societies as juristic persons, and the German theory 
accepted in many other countries, which denies that an 
1 Louisiana courts, more definitely than any others, have pronounced that 
a partnership is a civil person: Smith v. McMicken (I848) 3 La. Ann. 3I9, 
322; Succession of Pilcher (I887) 39 La. Ann. 362, I So. 929; Newman v. 
Eldridge (I9o2) I07 La. 3I5, 3I So. 688; Stothart v. William T. Hardie 
& Co. (I903) IIO La. 696,34 So. 740. Particularly informative with respect 
to the liability of commercial partnerships domiciled in Louisiana is Liverpool, 
Brazil & River Platte Navigation Co. v. Agar & Lelong (C. C. E. D. La. I882) 
I4 Fed. 6I5. Of course there were limitations to this theory, see Drews v. 
Williams (I898) so La. Ann. 579, 23 So. 897. Although Louisiana did not 
adopt the Uniform Partnership Act, the old sweeping definitions appear to have 
vanished. 
2 The French doctrine distinguishes commercial (which are deemed to be 
recognized as juristic persons by C. C. art. 529) and civil societies (whose nature 
was in controversy) but the distinction has become of minor importance, since 
the courts have gradually recognized the legal personality also of the "civil" 
societies, and the Law of August I, I893, art. 68 has subjected civil societies 
clothed in the form of commercial companies to the commercial laws. See 
PLANIOL et RIPERT (et LEPARGNEUR), II Traite Pratique 248 § 989. These 
enlargements have not been followed in all countries adhering to the French 
type. 
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offene Handelsgesellschaft is a legal unit. An analogous 
debate divided American authors when the Uniform Partner-
ship Act was drafted. On the one hand, the draft was attacked 
on the ground that it made concessions to the legal unit 
theory but did not acknowledge it completely,3 and, on the 
other hand, it was claimed that the draft, while purporting 
to adopt the aggregate theory, had in reality diluted it.4 As 
late as 1929, Warren even resented the language of the 
Uniform Act which spoke of the partnership as "it" and as 
having assets! 5 
The Uniform Act, however, embodying the best practical 
solution conforming to universal business conceptions/ has 
victoriously demonstrated that the dilemma was futile. The 
result of the act coincides with the conclusion reached in 
Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Argentina, and other 
countries. The aggregate theory is the basis and certain 
features of a corporation are avoided, but there is a name 
or firm; assets, creditors, and debtors of the partnership 
exist in a marked sense; enforcement of claims and bank-
ruptcy are assured; and in an increasing number of jurisdic-
tions the partnership may be sued and even may sue, although 
methods and effects may slightly vary.7 
3 CRANE, "The Uniform Partnership Act, a Criticism," 28 Harv. L. Rev. 
(I9I5) 762. See contra WM. DRAPER LEWIS, "The Uniform Partnership Act, 
a Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism," 29 Harv. L. Rev. (I9r6) I58, I59i again 
CRANE, "The Uniform Partnership Act and Legal Persons," id. 838. 
4 WARREN, Corporate Advantages 29, 293. In my opinion, this unfortunate 
work of an eminent author has been properly censured by MAGILL, 30 Col. L. 
Rev. (I929) I44 and WHIPPLE, 39 Yale L. J. (I930) I44, but it seems still 
to exercise some influence. 
5 WARREN, Corporate Advantages 295· 
6 See 7 Uniform Laws Annotated, and WRIGHTINGTON, The Law of Unin-
corporated Associations (I 9 I 6) 144. The Act, in I 944, was in force in twenty-
four states including the most industrial regions. 
7 Austria: Allg. HGB. art. I I r. 
Germany: HGB. § 124 par. I. 
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. § 697. 
Poland: C. Com. (I934) §Sr. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 55 9· 
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In theoretical formulation of the common result, the 
partnership is regarded not as an independent person, but 
as a unit at every moment identical with the partners for the 
time being; the partners in their specific conjunction and not 
the general partners separately are the owners of the assets 
and, potentially, parties to lawsuits.8 
Similar controversies have involved joint stock corpora-
tions, limited partnerships, and business trusts, despite their 
high content of corporate elements. 
2. Gradation of Corporate Character 
The European literature at long last has perceived the 
multifarious gradations established by modern inventiveness 
between the extremes of a mere contract of associates and a 
complete legal person. 9 Indeed, it is a statement of sober 
truth that a partnership is not a corporation. That the French 
societe en nom collectif is generally termed a legal person, 
has been criticized by the author of the French standard work 
on juristic personality, because this type, too, is far from 
embodying all features of a regular corporation.10 But nothing 
is gained on the other hand by ignoring in juristic construction 
all those indicia of corporateness that make even ordinary 
partnerships appear legal bodies to businessmen. The dispute 
should find an end in Judge Learned Hand's suggestion 
that the entity of the firm should be constantly recognized 
and enforced in accordance with business usages and under-
8 See LEWIS, 29 Harv. L. Rev. (I9I5) I 58, and the "constant view of the 
Reichsgericht," as expressed in 46 RGZ. 4I; 65 id. 2I, 229; 86 id. 70; WIE-
LAND, I Handelsr. 4:w n. 61, 621-628; STAUB-PINNER in I Staub§ I05 n. 8. 
MUGEL, Offene Handelsgesellschaft, in 5 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch at 466 
has correctly argued that there is no reason why the capacity of partnerships of 
being a party to a lawsuit should not be construed analogously to its other 
capacities. 
9 Final clarification was due in the first place to CARL WIELAND, I Handelsr. 
(1921) 396-434· 
10 MICHOUD, I Personnalite Morale §§ 68 and 72, 2 id. 328 n. r; see also 
LEHMANN, 74 Z. Handelsr. (r913) 465. 
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standing; "like the concept of a corporation, it is for many 
purposes a device of the utmost value in claritring ideas 
and in making easy the solution of legal relations."11 · 
In this country, as a matter of fact, judges and draftsmen 
perceived the truth earlier than in Europe. More than any-
thing else the doctrine of de facto corporations demonstrated 
that corporate functions can be exercised without a formally 
independent personality. The doctrine of "disregarding 
corporate nature" to obviate abuses was a complement thereto. 
The continuous necessity of comparing the different institu-
tions of the states was educational in preventing overestima-
tion of the corporation label. "It is difficult to find what 
peculiar powers or privileges can only be possessed by corpo-
rations or associations which must be regarded as incorporated 
or personified.m2 Indeed, entirely separate capacity is the 
only essential attribute of a corporation. A common name, 
common funds or ownership of property, continuity of ex-
istence unaffected by changes in the membership, transferable 
shares, concentration of power in the management, limited 
liability of members, capacity to sue and be sued, capacity 
to be declared bankrupt-these and other features of an 
ordinary stock company may be more or less broadly com-
bined in the structure of unincorporated bodies. 
3. Purposes of Construction 
It is a familiar and good method to analyze the corporate 
elements in a foreign type of association for the purpose 
of applying the corresponding domestic rules on corporations. 
Such associations may be assimilated to domestic business 
corporations from certain points of view and differentiated 
11 In re Samuels & Lesser (D. C. S.D. New York 1913) 207 Fed. 195, 198. 
An excellent comparison between corporation and partnership with respect 
to their changeable attributes is given in FLETCHER, 1 7 Cyc. Corp. § 20. 
12 BALLANTINE, Corporations I I § 4; to exactly the same effect, STEVENS, 
Corporations § 5. 
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from others.13 American courts are particularly well prepared 
to inquire into the composition of an organization without 
being influenced either by dogmatic preconceptions or mere 
names of institutions. For instance, in a famous American 
leading case, the Liverpool Insurance Company, an English 
joint stock corporation, was subjected to taxation in Massachu-
setts as a foreign corporation. The Supreme Court of the 
United States approved the constitutionality of this discrimi-
nation.14 It is a confusion, unfortunately still significant of a 
part of the literature, that the Liverpool case has been con-
trasted with such cases as Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel 
Co. v. Jones,16 in which a Pennsylvania limited partnership 
was declared not to be a corporation, although it is a well-
known type of a near-corporation, definitely nearer to the 
full-fledged type than an English joint stock corporation.116 
The explanation is very simple and by no means a secret. 
The case dealt with access to the federal courts on the 
ground of diverse citizenship, and there is a strong tendency 
to limit this privilege as much as can be done consistently 
with the earlier admission of corporations. 
How the courts employ this approach, may be exemplified 
by the treatment of common law trusts created under un-
equivocal laws and with ample corporate advantages in 
Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. Such 
trust "is neither in fact nor in law a corporation.m7 Never-
theless, because of the many attributes of a corporation 
possessed by this organization, it has been broughes under 
13 WIELAND, I Handelsr. 430: "Only concepts of relations enable us to under-
stand a total thing composed of parts." 
14 (187o) 10 Wall. 566. 
15 ( 1900) I 7 7 U. S. 449, cf. ( 1904) 19 3 U. S. 5 32. 
16 This mistake of WARREN, Corporate Advantages 519, 520, seems to be not 
yet eradicated. 
17 Burgoyne v. James (S. Ct. N. Y. 1935) xs6 Misc. 859, 282 N. Y. 
Supp. r8. 
18 See Note, 34 Col. L. Rev. (I934) 1555. 
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such statutes as Blue Sky laws/9 corporation tax laws/0 and 
bankruptcy statutes.21 It is quite consistent with the method 
of evaluating the 'impact of corporate features on a given 
problem, that the courts may doubt whether a statute requir-
ing foreign corporations to obtain permission to do business, 
apply to such foreign business trusts as are validly constituted 
under their home laws. Filing has been declared unnecessary 
in Missouri, Montana, and New York/2 but is required in 
Kansas, Michigan, and Washington.28 The more liberal solu-
tion seems to be influenced by the idea that a common law 
trust is created by the mere volition of the organizers in the 
declaration of trust rather than as a creature of a statute. Of 
more persuasive force than this approach which stems from 
the time of the fiction theory, is the argument that, in the 
provisions on licensing, the New York legislature intention-
ally seems to have assimilated business trusts to partnerships 
rather than to corporations. 24 The contrary solution, not 
merely intended for fiscal interests, may well be justified 
by the consideration that persons dealing in the state with 
the trustees of a foreign business enterprise are at least as 
19 Reilly v. Clyne (I925) 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35; cf. DUXBURY, "Busi-
ness Trusts and Blue Sky Laws," 8 Minn. L. Rev. (I924) 465. 
20 Tide Water Pipe Co. v. State Board of Assessors (I895) 57 N.J. 
Law 516, 3 I Atl. 220 (partnership association of Pennsylvania). 
21 In reAssociated Trust (D. C. D. Mass. I9I4) 222 Fed. IOI2. 
22 Missouri: Manufacturers' Finance Trust v. Collins (I933) 227 Mo. App. 
I 120, 58 S. W. (2d) I004. 
Montana: Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consolidated (I 93 7) I 04 
Mont. p8, 67 Pac. (2d) 8Ir. 
New York: Burgoyne v. James (S. Ct. I935) I56 Misc. 859, 282 N.Y. 
Supp. I 8. 
23 Kansas: Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins (1920) I07 Kan. 153, I90 Pac. 
6or; Harris v. U.S. Mexico Oil Co. (1922) rro Kan. 532, 204 Pac. 754· 
Michigan: Mich. Trust Co. v. Herpolsheimer (I932) 256 Mich. 589; 
cf. next note. 
Washington: State v. Paine (r926) I37 Wash. 566, 243 Pac. 2, aff'd, 137 
Wash. 572, 247 Pac. 476. 
24 Both arguments have been used by Shientag, J., in Burgoyne v. James, 
supra n. 22, at I 3, I 8. 
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 99 
much endangered as when dealing with foreign corporations. 
It fits this situation well that the United States Supreme 
Court does not interfere with the freedom of states to treat 
a foreign trust either way. With its approval, a business trust 
of Massachusetts, whose trustees and shareholders were ex-
empted from personal liability, after investigation of its 
structure, was declared clothed with the ordinary functions 
and attributes of a corporation and in Michigan subject to 
the laws relating to foreign corporations doing business in 
the state.25 
We shall meet more examples hereafter. Although con-
clusions reached may not always have been satisfactory, yet 
the method is clear and unimpeachable. Occasions for the 
courts to apply their method of putting the problem continue, 
since statutes and judge-made rules for the most part are still 
conceived as if corporations and partnerships were in con-
tradictory opposition. The treatment of mixed types still 
depends on a delicate balancing in accordance with the in-
tentions underlying every one of the different statutory or 
other rules. Also, the sparse texts directly referring to un-
incorporated organizations have presented some problems 
of construction. At any rate, the courts recognize that their 
task is to construe and adjust unspecified statutes that do 
not squarely regulate the foreign hybrid organizations. 
In this connection, attention may be drawn to the Uniform 
Foreign Corporations Act, § r, which has proposed a broad 
assimilation for the purpose of filing for doing business: 
" 'Corporations' includes a corporation and all associations, 
organizations, trusts, and joint stock companies having sub-
stantially the powers or privileges of corporations not pos-
sessed by individuals or partnerships, under whatever term 
or designation they may be elsewhere defined and known." 
25 Hemphill v. Orloff (19z8) :t77 U.S. 537> sso. 
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II. PERSONAL LAW 
If, then, the courts have developed an assured method 
of analyzing the mixed nature of business trusts, joint stock 
corporations, partnerships of diverse kinds, labor unions, and 
clubs, for the purpose of Blue Sky laws, federal revenue, 
state taxation, and licensing statutes, is the same approach 
not proper for the purpose of ascertaining the applicable 
law? 
It seems only logical to assume that all organizations enjoy 
a personal law at least to the extent that corporate attributes 
attach to them. 
r. Civil Law Doctrine 
Need for a personal law. This problem has not been 
exhaustively discussed in any country and not at all in this 
country. European writers have, however, perceived that a 
personal, ubiquitous law is as necessary to foreign unincorpo-
rated organizations, including partnerships, as to veritable 
corporations. The status of any association ought to be deter-
mined consistently and permanently.26 A careful Italian 
decision declares that "the need of a unitary regulation of 
commercial associations (societa) in their international re-
lations requires respect for their original constitution.m7 
An alternative solution would be to allow each court to 
determine under its domestic law the legal effects of a foreign 
association. Sometimes writers and courts have been inclined 
to apply the famous "characterization according to the lex 
fori," to determine whether a foreign association should be 
regarded as a legal person. But this is not a tenable propo-
sition. As the Restatement well states in its conflicts rule 
26 BAR in I EHRENBERG'S Handb. 345; CARL WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. 
R. (N. F.) (I924) 279; HAYMANN in 75 Jherings Jahrb. 412. 
27 App. Roma (March 8, I9J2) Giur. Ital. I932 I 2, 225, 227, Foro Ital. 
I9J2 I I I73> af/'d, Cass. (April 29, 1933) Foro Ital. Mass. I933, JI9· 
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on corporations :28 "Whether an association has been incorpo-
rated is determined by the law of the state in which an attempt 
to incorporate has been made.'' This implies that an associa-
tion, considered a corporation in the state of charter, is con-
sidered just that everywhere. Furthermore: "The effects 
of an unsuccessful attempt to incorporate are governed by 
the law of the state in which the attempt was made." This29 
implies that a de facto corporation resulting from a defect 
in the process of incorporation in the state of the charter, is 
so recognized. 30 Is it possible in consistency to treat other 
unincorporated associations by a conflicting criterion? If it 
is understood, after all discussions, that the difference separat-
ing corporations, joint stock companies, and partnerships is 
only gradual, how can the recognition of foreign-created 
associations stop with corporations? A third solution has been 
advocated by a few writers who persist in the error of not 
distinguishing the problems of personal law and nationality, 
especially enemy nationality;31 they would determine the 
personal law of an association according to the citizenship 
of its members, a senseless and often impractical approach. 
Laws and treaties. The general European doctrine attrib-
utes to associations and partnerships, irrespective of legal per-
sonality, a personal law, determined by the same criterion 
as in the case of corporations, i.e., in England, the place of 
creation, and on the Continent, the "seat" or central office.32 
This rule is expressed in recent enactments such as the Polish 
28 Restatement § ISS· 
29 Or subsec. 3 of§ ISS and special note to§ ISS drawing the same conclu-
sion. 
80 United States: See annotation, 73 A. L. R. uoz; 23 Am. Jur. 67 § 56. 
Belgium: App. Gent (April 2I, I876) Clunet I876, 305. 
France: ARMINJON, Revue I9o8, 772, 82.5. 
Italy: App. Roma (March 8, I932) supra n. 2.7. 
31 FEDOZZI, Gli enti collettivi nel diritto internazionale privato (I 897) 
2.43; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 2.70. A similar old decision of the Swiss Fed. 
Trib. (Nov. II, I 892.) Clunet I 893, 640 is obsolete. 
32 England: General Steam Navigation Co. v. Gui!lou (1843) II M. & W. 
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statute on international private law, which extends its scope 
to "juristic persons as well as all societies and associations,ma 
the Code of Liechtenstein/4 the C6digo Bustamante35 and 
the new draft of the Montevideo Treaties.36 Of particular 
significance are the provisions of international draft pro-
posals37 and bilateral treaties, such as the following: 
"The expression 'companies of the High Contracting 
Parties' shall, for the purposes of this Treaty, be interpreted in 
877; Bank of Australasia v. Harding (I8so) 9 C. B. 66I, cf. z BEALE 894 
n. 3· 
Austria: WALKER I49· 
Belgium: PoULLET § Z09, 3eme regie: foreign associations put by their 
national law in an intermediate status between the total absence of any juristic 
individuality and the civil personification in proper sense will enjoy in Belgium 
the particular status assigned them by their national legislation. 
Germany: ROHG. (February I7, I87I) z ROHGE. 36; LEWALD §§ 53, 
6 5; and see the commentaries to Handelsgesetzbuch § I o6. 
Italy: Bosco I73 (though not very clear). 
The Netherlands: See I VAN HASSELT 3I5ff. including in "handelsvereenig-
ing" the "non-juristic persons." 
Switzerland: VON STEIGER, Die Handelsgesellschaften im internationalen 
Privatrecht, 67 ZBJV. (I93I) at 3u. 
33 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. I No. 3· 
34 Liechtenstein: P. G. R. arts. 676, 677. 
35 Codigo Bustamante, art. Z49· 
36 Treaty on Civil Law, art. 4 par. 4 (sociedades civiles); on Commercial 
Law, art. 8 (sociedades mercantiles). The actual text of I 8 8 9 limits itself to 
juristic persons which concept in Argentina and Paraguay excludes partner-
ships, cf. ARGANA, Report on the Commercial Draft of I 940, in Republica 
Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano zzs. 37 Institute of International Law, Draft I 929, art. 5, Annuaire I 929 II I 39, 
I6z. Draft of Experts, League of Nations, art. 8, cf. Report RUNDSTEIN, Am. 
J. Int. Law I928, Supp. I89, I9I. 
Ambiguous: Draft of the Geneva Sub-committee on the treatment of for-
eigners, Revue I930, 236, z4z, art. I6 § I: "Les societes par actions et autres 
societes commerciales, y compris les societes industrielles, les societes financieres, 
les compagnies assurant les communications et les compagnies de transport, 
ayant leur siege ... " The draftsmen may have believed a partnership or a 
joint stock company necessarily to be a juristic person. 
On the other hand, the treaties of the United States, e.g., with Poland (June 
IS, I93I) art. II, U. S. Treaty Series No. 86z, I39 L. of N. Treaty Series 
(I933) 397 at 407, mentioning "limited liability and other corporations 
and associations," seem to refer exclusively to juristic persons, as also the original 
German version of art. u, Treaty U. S.-Germany (Dec. 8, I923) U.S. Treaty 
Series No. 7z5, 52 L. of N. Treaty Series (I9z6) I33 at I4I understands 
the analogous passage. 
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the case of either High Contracting Party as relating to the 
limited liability and other companies and associations (part-
nerships) formed for the purpose of commerce, finance, in-
dustry, transport or any other busine~s, and carrying on busi-
ness in the territories of that Party, provided that they have 
been truly constituted in accordance with the laws in force 
therein, etc." Treaty between Great Britain and Turkey, of 
March I, I9J0/8 article 2. 
"Limited liability and other companies, partnerships and 
associations formed for the purpose of commerce, insurance, 
finance, industry, transport or any other business and es-
tablished in the territories of either Party shall, provided that 
they have been duly constituted in accordance with the laws 
in force in such territories, be entitled, in the territories of the 
other, to exercise their rights and appear in the courts either as 
plaintiffs or defendants, subject to the laws of such other 
Party." Treaty between Great Britain and Germany, of Dec. 
2, I 924/9 article I 6, paragraph I. 
Evidently to the same effect the formula included in article 
IO, paragraph I, of the Treaty between Egypt and Turkey, 
of April 7, I937/0 enumerates: joint stock companies, in-
cluding industrial, insurance, and transport companies which 
have their headquarters (siege) in the territory, et cetera. 
Conflict with domestic classification. The principle is obvi-
ous in the case where a partnership is considered an entity 
short of legal personality in the countries both of creation 
38 Great Britain-Turkey (March 11 1930) 108 L. of N. Treaty Series (1930) 
407 at 4Io, I32 British and Foreign State Papers (1930) 342.. 
39 Great Britain-Hungary (July 23, 1926) art. 10 par. I; 67 L. of N. 
Treaty Series (I927) 183 at 189, 12.3 British and Foreign State Papers (1926) 
Part I 5 I 7 at 5 20 (partnerships and associations). 
Great Britain-Germany (Dec. 21 1924) art. 16 par. 11 43 L. of N. Treaty 
Series (I926) 89 at 98, II9 British and Foreign State Papers (1924) 369 
at 374, RGBI. 1925 II 777· Similarly, the German treaty with South Africa 
(Sept. 1, 1928) art. 15, 95 L. of N. Treaty Series (192.9) 289 at 297, 128 
British and Foreign State Papers (1928) Part I, 473 at 478; Finland, RGBI. 
I926 II 557; Italy, RGBI. 1929 II 15; etc. 
40 191 L. of N. Treaty Series (1938) 95· 
Germany: OLG. Kassel (July 30, 1909) Leipz.Z. 1909, 954 (Swiss partner-
ship); OLG. Augsburg (Nov. 6, 1917) 30 ROLG. 105 (Swiss limited partner-
ship). 
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and of recognition. An American partnership is in fact recog-
nized in Germany with exactly the same degree of personality 
and the same extent of personal liability of the partners as 
in the state of creatioD.41 
The personal law applies likewise to a foreign partnership 
that is not a legal person under its original law, also when 
a similar domestic partnership is construed as a corporation. 
For example, a partnership of the United States is to be 
treated in Mexico as of the same nature it has in the United 
States, different from Mexican partnerships which are corpo-
rations. A German partnership or association without legal 
personality, an American partnership, or a de facto corpo-
ration should enjoy abroad its personal law, neither more nor 
less than at home, particularly with respect to standing in 
court. In the French courts, this thesis has been accepted42 
against opposition erroneously characterizing as procedural 
the French rule that only legal persons may appear in 
court!3 Exactly the same problem exists in this country and 
will be discussed shortly. 
The converse case of a partnership with the status of a 
corporation in the state of its creation is covered by the 
conflicts rule on corporations. The personal law prevails 
over a different local characterization, although eager fol-
lowers of the lex fori theory have opposed this result.44 Thus, 
41 Germany: RG. (Nov. 25, I895) 36 RGZ. 393 (English partnership); 
OLG. Kiel (March 2I, I902) 12. Z.int.R. 469 (Swedish cooperative); OLG. 
Hamburg (June 6, I9o4) I4 Z.int.R. I63 (American partnership), I66, aff'd, 
RG. (Oct. 7, I904) I5 id. 293. 
42 App. Douai (Dec. I, I88o) Clunet I882, 3I7; Cour Paris (June 6, I9IZ) 
Clunet I9I4, I278 (English partnership). 
43 See MICHOUD, 2 Personnalite Morale 328 n. I, 345 n. I; 2 ARMINJON 
(ed. 2) 538; as against 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ I 12.6. 
44 RIGAuo, Io Repert. 229 Nos. I9, !U, 22 and in some respects MELCHIOR 
138; SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legisl. Comp. (I92I) 2.47. NusSBAuM, D. 
IPR. I 90, deciding according to the usual theory of characterization under the 
lex fori. Also BEITZKE, Jur. Personen 62, I I 7 advocates the law of the forum, 
with wrong reference to the decision of the German Supreme Finance Court, 
IPRspr. 1931, Nos. I 5 and 16, actually confirming the conflicts rule. 
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if a French "societe en nom collectif" claims in a German 
court the rights of a legal person as enjoyed in France, it 
is immaterial that common German opinion denies legal 
personality to an "offene Handelsgesellschaft"; the legal 
entity is recognized in conformity with French law/5 A 
partnership constituted by two British subjects in Czarist 
Russia was a legal person under the local law; therefore 
the liability of the partners to a German creditor was declared 
dependent on the Russian law by the Anglo-German Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal.46 Likewise, the Belgian law of October 25, 
I 9 I 9 (article 8) allows foreign scientific associations to "ex-
ercise in Belgium ... the rights resulting from their national 
law." The Swiss authorities recognized German private lim-
ited companies (Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung) at 
a time when Switzerland had not yet introduced this type/7 
and now grant full acknowledgement to English stock com-
panies, corporations sole and business trusts, all unknown 
to Swiss internal law.48 
The following case of the Italian Supreme Court gives 
another confirmation: 
Illustration: Nizard v. Finanza.49 Two brothers Nizard, 
intending to form a partnership, established a firm in France 
but omitted the prescribed publications. The resulting ir-
regular or de facto partnership is considered a merely con-
tractual relationship in France/0 while it would be an effective 
corporation in ltaly.51 After the death of one of the brothers, 
taxes were levied on certain assets situated in Italy and 
45 Germany: LEWALD 48; GEILER, u Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. 
(1833) 186; M. WoLFF, IPR. 69 n. 1 and Priv. Int. Law 306. 
46 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Voith Maschinenfabrik und Giesserei v. 
Thornton & Geiler, 8 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 300. 
47 Swiss Dept. of Justice (Nov. zs, 1898); Decision of the Federal Council 
(June 16, 19oz) BBl. 190z IV 4-z. 
48 SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legisl. Comp. (19Z1) z46. 
49 Italy: Cass. (April z9, 1933) Foro Ital. 1933 I n6o. 
5° France: Cass. (req.) (Feb. 8, 193z) Clunet 193z, 961. 
51 Italy: Cass. (Dec. zz, 1931) Foro Ital. 193Z I 7161 936. 
xo6 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS 
brought into the societe. The legality of such taxation was 
dependent, in the opinion of the courts, on the question 
whether the assets were owned by the brothers in joint 
tenancy or by the firm. The courts correctly resorted to the 
personal law of the association and found it to be that of the 
central office and principal place of business in France rather 
than the law of the situs or the national law of the partners. 
A learned French commentator on this case reveals his 
perplexity, that the association has not been characterized 
according to the lex fori as required in conflicts problems, but 
consoles himself with thinking that the decision of the court 
could be supported by reference to the law of aliens rather 
than conflicts law. 52 Yet, the ascertainment of the personal 
law of foreign organizations is by no means a problem of 
((condition des hrangers" but a part of regular conflicts law. 
In a case where in the name of an intended stock corpo-
ration, during the period of preparation for its incorporation, 
contracts were concluded with third parties, the German 
Reichsgericht has applied the personal law of the future 
corporation, since the main office was to be established in 
Germany. Under this law, namely, the German law, the 
promoters were considered to be an unincorporated associa-
tion, and the agents were personally liable. 53 It would have 
been more correct to ascribe to the promoting syndicate its 
own personal law, with probably the same result. The princi-
ple ought to be the same as where a limited company was 
intended, with the central office being established in Bombay, 
India, but because not registered there, considered a partner-
ship according to Anglo-Indian law.54 
An exception made by the Belgian Supreme Court was 
not a happy one. The court really did not doubt that the 
52 MAURY, Note in 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 23. 
53 RG. (October 29, 1938) JW. 1939, IIO. 
54 OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 21, 1932) Hans.GZ. 1932, B 266 No. 73, IPRspr. 
1932 No. 14. 
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capacity of the Societe des Droits d'Auteurs et Compositeurs 
de Musique (sACEM) of Paris was subject to French law 
but thought that article 1832 of the Civil Code, common to 
France and Belgium, should receive the Belgian interpreta-
tion rather than the French so as to deny legal personality to 
a sooiete civile. 55 A strange view. The law presiding over the 
creation of an association should be exactly applied without 
interference of the municipal law, whether it grants more or 
less autonomy. The mistake is instructive. Also common law 
courts have not hesitated at times to apply their own special 
construction to an association organized in another state under 
common law; we shall encounter immediately such a de-
CisiOn. 
2. American Law 
(a) Quasi corporations. Apart from general partnerships, 
it seems to me that, although no unequivocal commitment 
to a formulated rule can be ascertained, practically the law 
under which a limited partnership, a business trust, or a joint 
stock corporation has been organized, clearly forms the law 
determining the extent of its corporate advantages. The 
above-mentioned examinations . of business trust relations 
have led to the clear conclusion that New Y ark courts have 
"fully recognized the status of a business trust" as reflected 
in the decisions of the Massachusetts courts. 56 A Michigan 
limited partnership association was thoroughly analyzed by 
the Supreme Court of California, which found that under 
the Michigan statute, the association had so many corporate 
powers that it should be deemed a foreign corporation at 
least for the purpose of the power to hold and convey real 
55 Cass. Beige (November 12, 1935) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. No. 131. Contra: 
lLLCH, ibid. 
56 Burgoyne v. James (1935) 156 Misc. 859,282 N. Y.Supp. 18; Textile 
Properties v. Whittall Ass. (r934) 157 Misc. 108, 282 N.Y. Supp. 17. 
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property in the firm name, 57 a power which was denied to 
partnerships by California law. Where a limited partnership 
was organized in Cuba under Spanish law to the effect that 
a special partner was not personally liable with his separate 
assets for firm debts, the New York Court of Appeals applied 
Spanish law, although the contract sued upon was made in 
New Y ark on behalf of the firm. 58 This decision has been 
incidentally approved in the Restatement59 and has several 
parallels.<so It was not even mentioned that the Cuban or-
ganization, which must have been a comandita simple, would 
be construed as a legal person in Cuba itself. The case, there-
fore, has a broad scope. In a later case, a New York unin-
corporated stock company was found to be a legal entity 
"for most, if not all practical purposes, capable in law of 
acting and assuming legal obligations quite independent of 
the shareholders," a "quasi-corporate entity," very unlike an 
ordinary copartnership.61 As a result, capacity for issuing 
negotiable bonds was recognized. In Kansas, it has been held 
that a common law trust domiciled in Oklahoma has legal 
capacity to acquire a royalty interest in lands located in the 
state, in assimilation to corporations endowed with this 
power under the state constitution.062 The status of an organi-
zation called "The Farmers Association of North Mississippi" 
was analyzed according to the law of the state of Mississippi 
where the members resided, and held not to constitute a 
partnership. 63 
57 Hill-Davis Co., Ltd. v. Atwell (I9J2.) 2I5 Cal. 444, IO Pac. (2d) 463. 
58 King v. Sarria (I877) 69 N.Y. 24,25 Am. Rep. 128. 
59 Restatement § 343 comment c. 
60 Barrows v. Downs (I87o) 9 R.I. 446, II Am. Rep. 283: in a contract 
"considered as made in New York" by the general partner of a Havana partner-
ship, his authority to bind special partners is "regulated by the law of Cuba"; 
Lawrence v. Batcheller (I88I) IJI Mass. 504, 509: "all persons doing busi-
ness with limited partnerships are presumed to take notice of the laws of the 
State in which they are formed." See moreover cases infra ns. 82-86. 
61 Hibbs v. Brown (I9o7) I9o N.Y. I67, 82 N. E. 1108. 
62 Fitch v. United Royalty Co. (1936) I43 Kan. 486, 55 Pac. (2d) 409. 
63 Price v. Independent Oil Co. (I933) I68 Miss. 292, ISO So. 52 I, 
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It is true that some decisions seem to indicate opposite 
tendencies. But they belong to two classes of special con-
siderations. 
One class seems to be represented by only one case. An 
attempt had been made to form a business trust in Texas, the 
members contracting that no stockholder should be personally 
liable. By the law of Texas, the stipulation was invalid, and 
a partnership resulted with personal liability of the mem-
bers. The plaintiff brought an action in Iowa on a note issued 
by the "trustees" of the association, against an Iowa resident 
who had bought stock in the organization. The Iowa Supreme 
Court surprisingly dismissed the action on the ground that 
public policy required the application of Iowa law under 
which the organization is considered an unincorporated joint 
stock association.lfl4 The decision has been criticized on several 
grounds.65 It commits inversely the mistake made in the 
California provisions which held a shareholder personally 
liable under California law, contrary to the law of the char-
ter. 66 These applications of the lex fori vary the personal law 
without any possible justification. 
As this case seems to suggest, the controversies about the 
nature of a common law trust have somewhat confused the 
issue. In contrast to the courts of Massachusetts, other juris-
dictions such as Kansas and Texas have considered that cor-
porate advantages such as limited liability of stockholders or 
the concentration of the power of management should not be 
attributed to an organization otherwise than by statute or by 
a distinct agreement in the individual contracts made by the 
trustees with third persons. Writers once correctly relied on 
the conflicting considerations for the support of their own 
respective opinions, so long as the law was fluid. But when a 
64 Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Anderson (1933) :u6 Iowa 988, 
250 N. w. ZI4. 
65 Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1934) sz6. 
66 Supra p. 81. 
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doctrine has become stabilized by the court practice or statute, 
it is a part of the general law of the state.67 Massachusetts 
law on the one hand, Texas law on the other, ought to be 
recognized exactly as they are. There is no occasion for Iowa 
or California to supply its own theory. That the established 
judge-made law of Massachusetts, for instance, should not 
have been able to work out a trust susceptible of being rec-
ognized in Kansas, whereas its subsequently enacted statute 
should be given effect, is one of those apparently immortal 
dogmas loved by some writers and too unreasonable to be 
really adopted by any court. 
Of another character, however, are cases in which it was 
stressed that the association had acted under the color of a 
corporation. A limited partnership of Pennsylvania filed an 
application for doing business in New York, referring to 
its "corporate seal" and indicating an agent for service of 
process. The New York court, without entering into an ex-
amination as to what was the true status of the party under 
the law of creation, upheld the service upon the New York 
agent authorized by the application mentioned. The plaintiff 
otherwise "would have been misled." This is an interesting 
exception to be connected with territorial protection of third 
persons.68 
A similar idea has been expressed in a California case. 69 An 
organization, having vainly attempted to incorporate else-
where, conducted business in the state "in garb of a corpora-
tion inducing the transaction involved in the instant litiga-
tion." It was considered estopped to deny the legality of its 
organization, and treated as a de facto corporation under the 
67 Also in the field of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, primarily not in ques-
tion here, the traditional doctrine that judicial decisions are not a part of the 
public acts protected by the clause seems to vanish; see MoRGAN, "Choice of 
Law Governing Proof," 58 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) 153, 167 and n. 31. 
68 Wolski v. Booth & Flinn, Ltd. (1916) 93 Misc. 651, 157 N.Y. Supp. Z94· 
69 Charles Ehrlich & Co. v. J. Ellis Slater Co. (1920) 183 Cal. 709, 192 
Pac. 526. 
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laws of California. On the other hand, the Iowa Supreme 
Court permitted an Illinois de facto corporation to sue on the 
ground that a domestic de facto corporation could do so, 70 
instead of inquiring into the law of Illinois,71 the state of 
creation, as is normally/2 although not always, done.73 
Such cases remind us of the reverse side of recognition. 
Reciprocal application of the personal law may cause some 
concern where misrepresentation is to be feared. But this is 
a general consideration needing separate and comprehensive 
discussion in the future. 
(b) Partnerships. The question is considerably more dif-
ficult with respect to partnerships, because the approach 
implicitly accepted in the Restatement seems generally to be 
in the mind of lawyers. It is this: partnership means the part-
ners; whenever a contract is made on their behalf, the or-
dinary rules of agency apply and, since the power of an agent 
to make his principal liable is said to depend on the law of 
the place where the contract with the third party is made, it 
is this law which governs the external situation of a partner-
ship. In a few old decisions, the law of the place where a 
partner contracts with a third party, clearly has been extended 
to the problem of liability of other partners. 74 Some authors, 
in fact, take it for granted that a partnership is devoid of a 
personallaw.75 Can it be, however, that one partner A, con-
tracting in some jurisdiction on behalf of the partnership or 
7° First Title & Securities Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (1931) 211 Iowa 1019, 
233 N. W. 137. 
71 Note, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 634, 635. 
72 Thus in Illinois: Hudson v. Green Hill Seminary (1885) 113 Ill. 618 
(Indiana de facto corporation) ; Concord Apartment House Co. v. Alaska 
Refrigerator Co. (1898) 78 Ill. App. 682. 
73 See Restatement New York Annotations §155. 
74 Restatement § 1 34 No. 1; Baldwin v. Gray (La. 1826) 4 Mart. N. S. 192, 
16 Am. Dec. 169; Ferguson v. Flower (La. 1826) 4 Mart. N. S. 312; Bank 
of Topeka v. Eaton (1899) 95 Fed. 355; Alexandria A. & Ft. S. R. Co. v. 
Johnson (1900) 61 Kan. 417, 59 Pac. 1063. 
75 See, for instance, CRANE, "Conflict of Laws under Partnership Acts," 66 
U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1918) 310, 314; also DICEY, Rule 140. 
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even of partners A, B, C, may make partner C liable beyond 
the rules under which the partnership has been organized, 
without any cause other than the local law regulating domestic 
organizations? The confusion wrought is evident. The extent 
of a power of attorney, under certain conditions (to be dis-
cussed in the next volume), is governed by the law of the 
place where the agent acts. This rule may affect an obliga-
tion of the partnership. But what effect such an obligation has 
on the liability of the various persons, inherent in the partner-
ship, with their own assets is determinable by another law, 
governing in reality the structure of the organization. 
Indeed, it has been said that the liability of partners is 
determined by the state of the domicil or origin of the partner-
ship. 711 The cases speak of the place of origin, 77 the place 
where the partners are domiciled, 78 or where they carry on 
their business.79 None of these cases, it is true, clearly recog-
nizes a constitutive law of the partnership. They rather argue, 
more or less distinctly, on the basis of the conflicts rules con-
cerning contracts. Likewise, the Restatement calls for the 
law of the place where the partnership agreement is made to 
determine the liability of a special limited partner.80 
Yet we have mentioned before a case involving Cuban 
special partners, decided in New York under Cuban limited 
partnership law. Also, this choice of law allegedly rested on 
the fact that the partnership agreement was made and per-
formable in Cuba. Nevertheless, the court compared the prob-
76 Thus BURDICK, Law of Partnership (ed. 3, I9I7) I4 on the ground of 
Easton v. George Wostenholm & Son (C. C. A. 9th I905) I37 Fed. 524· 
77 Cameron v. Orleans & Jefferson R. Co., Ltd. (I902) Io8 La. 83, Ioi, 
32 So. 208, 215. 
78 Wilson v. Todhunter ( 19 I 8) I 3 7 Ark. So, 207 S. W. 2 2I; Barker v. 
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ( I9I 7) 228 Mass. 42I, 426, II7 N. E. 894, 896. 
79 Barker v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (I9I7) 228 Mass. 42I, 426, I I 7 
N. E. 894 at 896; First National Bank of Waverley v. Hall (I892) I50 Pa. 
466, 24 Atl. 665. 
80 § 343 comment c; 2 BEALE II94 § 345· 1. 
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lem with the formation of a marriage relation and the acquisi-
tion of property in a foreign country. The difference from an 
ordinary obligatory contract was obviously felt. 
All the analogies above discussed make the conclusion 
inevitable that partnerships also may have a personal law. 
3· Contacts 
(a) Law of the seat. In civil law countries referring to the 
law of the state of the "seat" as applicable to corporations, 
it is the dominant opinion that the seat principle governs also 
all other private associations.81 Commercial partnerships are 
included, since they have necessarily a head office, at which 
they have to register. Noncommercial societies are included 
if they have a seat. 82 
The nationality and domicil of the partners, therefore, 
are immaterial. A partnership domiciled abroad is foreign, 
even though all partners be subjects of the forum, and is 
domestic, even though all be foreigners. 
(b) American quasi corporations. In American cases, 
equally, it is not rare to find applied the law of the state 
where an associated body has been organized. The cases 
'speak of "a common law trust domiciled in Oklahoma,"83 or 
"determined by the law of Massachusetts where it is lo-
cated,"84 "created in Massachusetts,"85 "a limited partnership 
organized under the Act of Pennsylvania,"86 et cetera. It 
81 WIELAND, I Handelsr. § 5 I n. I 8, and 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (I 92.4) 
2.78, 2.79 n. I39; E. HEYMANN, 75 }herings Jahrb. (I92.5) 4I3; LEWALD, 
7 Repert. 3 r 9; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 2.06; RuNDSTEIN, "Report on Draft of 
Experts," art. 8, Am. J. Int. Law 192.8, Supp. 189, 191; FRAGISTAS (Greece), 
IO Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 638. Contra: for the state of constitution, Inst. Dr. Int., 
Proposals, art. 5, see Annuaire 192.911 302.. 82 GEILER in r Diiringer-Hachenburg 49 contends that, even if they have no 
seat, the law under which the organization is made would apply. 83 Fitch v. United Royalty Co. (1936) 143 Kan. 486, 55 Pac. (zd) 409. 84 In reAssociated Trust (D. C. D. Mass. 1914) 2.2.2. Fed. rou, ror3. 85 Bartley v. Andrews (192.3) 2.02. N.Y. Supp. 2.2.7, zo8 App. Div. 702.. 86 Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones (r9oo) I77 U.S. 449· 
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seems that the places of organizing and of domicil are not 
distinguished in determining the applicable law; this would 
be analogous to the treatment of incorporated bodies, where 
the domicil is legally deemed to be in the state of incorpora-
tion. 
(c) American general partnerships. The question is of 
more serious significance with respect to partnerships. Since 
these have not yet been recognized in the United States as 
bearers of personal law, the courts have been uneasy in de-
fining the law governing their structure.87 Almost never has 
the problem been squarely posited. The cases generally sup-
pose a partnership carried on in the same state as that in 
which it was constituted. 58 One case only is known in which a 
partnership was formed in one state, Pennsylvania, and car-
ried on in another, New York; the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania regarded the partnership as governed by the law 
of New York.89 And this was on the ground that New York 
was the place of performance. 90 
This situation calls for clarification. Partnerships may 
have to be construed under foreign laws. Within the United 
States, many states have adopted the Uniform Partnership 
Act and many have not. What organizations are those made 
"under the Act?m1 In this case, any pretension that only 
statutory law can bestow corporate attributes would be beside 
the point; there is a statute. 
81 See supra p. I I 2. 
88 King v. Sarria (I877) 69 N. Y. 24, 25 Am. Rep. 128; In re Hoyne 
(I922) 277 Fed. 668; Cutler v. Thomas (I852) 25 Vt. 73; Wilson v. Tod-
hunter (I9I8) 137 Ark. 8o, 207 S. W. 2.2I, cf. 47 C. ]. 7I7, Partnership 
§ I I 7• 
89 First National Bank of Waverly v. Hall (1892) 150 Pa. 466, 24 Atl. 
665, cf. supra n. 79· 
90 2 BEALE 1192 observes that the result would have been the same under 
the lex loci contractus. 
91 C/. In re Hoyne (1922) 277 Fed. 668: whether a partnership was validly 
made was determined under the Illinois Act, since the contract was executed 
and the business conducted in Chicago. 
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What is in issue is the question, which contact should 
prevail in case of divided local attachments: the place where 
the contract of partnership is "consummated" or "launched," 
or the place where the carrying on of business is centered, 
the domiciliary seat. The Continental doctrine leans on the 
latter contact, and it may be said in its favor in the absence 
of registration that third persons have a much better oppor-
tunity to know the location of the actual headquarters than 
the place where a contract was once made. Common law 
habits, contented with mere incorporation and not ascribing 
importance to the principal management, are not concerned 
with unincorporated organizations. On the other hand, dif-
ficulties in ascertaining the main business place may occur in 
some rare cases or irregular companies/2 but not frequently 
in any group of organizations. That a partnership cannot 
have a domicil,93 is an empty assertion. Of course, ordinary 
partnerships in this country, as contrasted with limited part-
nerships, need not necessarily have any fixed business place 
and have no duty of registration, which was one of the chief 
reasons for excluding their construction as legal persons. 94 But 
in practice there will be found few partnerships showing no 
central office in their letterheads, and a great many of con-
siderable, if not gigantic, proportions whose business is com-
parable to that of big corporations. 
III. ScoPE OF PERSONAL LAw 
r. General Aspects 
It is not difficult to define the domain of the personal law 
of quasi-corporations, whose distinctive elements are so pre-
valent in most de facto corporations, in the limited partner-
92 NAVARRINI, Note, Foro ltal. 1927 I 585. 
93 This assertion of the Restatement § 41 comment d has been challenged by 
Restatement New York Annotations 23. 
94 LEWIS, 29 Harv. L. Rev. (1915) rs8 at 167. 
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ships of Pennsylvania or Michigan, and in the common law 
trusts of Massachusetts or New York. The border line runs 
exactly where the contractual features replace the corporate. 
The question, for instance, whether a special partner in a 
limited partnership, as an ordinary creditor, may request 
satisfaction out of the partnership funds for loans or goods 
sold, in competition with strangers, is closely connected with 
the structure of the organization,95 and hence, it ought to be 
covered by the law governing such organization. But if an 
unincorporated joint stock company is constituted in such a 
way that it discontinues in case an associate dies or is adjudged 
a bankrupt, and company debts are incurred after the death 
of an associate, the legal problems arising should be referred 
to the ordinary law of contracts; whether an associate paying 
the debt has recourse for reimbursement from the executor, 
may be determined by the law governing the preliminary 
agreement or the contract of association, not by that of the 
place of the company domicil. 
The subject seems not to have found any attention thus 
far and would deserve a special study. 
2. Partnership 
The Continental doctrine extends its principle to all in-
cidents of organization of mercantile partnerships. The law 
of the place where a partnership has its head office, therefore 
determines in particular the constitution of the partnership, 
so as to render defects in its creation under the personal law 
open to attack everywhere; 96 the distinction between property 
of the partnership and separate property of the partners; 97 
powers of the partnership98 including its capacity for being 
95 Cf. WARREN, Corporate Advantages 319, 323. 
96 DIENA, 1 Dir. Com. Int. z87. 
97 App. Roma (March 8, 1932) supra p. 100 n. 27. 
98 36 RGZ. 354; OLG. Kassel, Leipz. Z. 1911, 616 n. z; KoHLER, 74 Z. 
Handelsr. 459· 
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a party to a law suit; 99 transfer and seizure of the rights of 
partners/00 the authority of partners to obligate the partner-
ship; 101 the liability of partners to third parties102 and whether 
such liability is limited, joint, or joint and several. 
The last application, concerning the conditions of the 
partners' liability, is consistently followed by the courts of 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and other countries and 
has been clearly adopted also in the English leading case of 
General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou/03 The court in 
this case, however, distinguished two questions: ( 1) one 
substantive, whether French law governing the partnership 
imposed upon the defendant joint liability or no liability, 
to which question the court was ready to apply the French 
answer; and ( 2) one procedural, whether in the French 
courts the defendant would have to be sued jointly with the 
other shareholders of the company, which mode of procedure 
was declared to be inapplicable in an English court. This 
distinction was applied to objectionable use in this and partic-
ularly in a later case.104 In the latter, the court declared bad 
99 See infra p. 119. 
100 On the French sequestration of the trade mark "Chartreuse" after dissolu-
tion of the Congregation of Chartreux, see citations by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 
2o8 n. r. 
101 ROHG. (Feb. 17, 1871) 26 Seuff. Arch. No. 101 (speaking indis-
criminately of foreign-constituted general partnerships). 
102 Germany: AG. Celie (May 31, 1876) 31 Seuff. Arch. No. 303 (debt 
of a partnership in Lima, Peruvian law applied to the liability of a partner 
domiciled in Germany); RG. (Jan. :z, 192.0) Hans. RZ. 192.0, ~14 No. 35, 
affirming OLG. Hamburg (May 2.7, 1919) id. 192.o, 87 No. 9: partners 
domiciled in Bremen, of a partnership domiciled in Texas, are liable to third 
parties, having contracted with the firm, only in accordance with the law 
of Texas. This was distinguished from the German law governing the contract 
itself. For other decisions see LEWALD 54§ 65. 
French-Hungarian Mixed Arb. Trib. (Feb. 2.7, 192.9) Rothstein et Cie. v. 
Appel, 9 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 105 (Austrian creditor of a French partner-
ship). French-Bulgarian Mixed Arb. Trib. (July 8, 192.9) Melian v. Diloff 
Freres, 9 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 2.87 (French creditor of a Rumanian partner-
ship). In both cases it was emphasized that in addition to the firm, each partner 
was liable jointly and severally. 
103 (1843) 11M. & W. 877; cf. CHESHIRE 649; and see supra n. 8. 
104 Bullock v. Caird (r875) ro Q. B. 2.76 apparently approved by LINDLEY, 
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the plea of the defendant partner of a firm domiciled in Scot-
land that the firm was distinct from the members and that a 
judgment against the firm was a condition precedent to indi-
vidual liability. But the character of a Scotch partnership as a 
distinct person was notorious and since has been confirmed by 
the Partnership Act of 1 8 90.105 This should have been recog-
nized in England with all its attendant effects on marshalling 
the liabilities of company and members. The privilege of 
being sued only after the principal debtor has been sued and 
his assets exhausted (beneficium excussionis) is an incident 
to liability of partners, as German courts confirm/06 notwith-
standing the opposed English view.107 
The law of the seat has been said also to include the reci-
procal rights of the partners, with the proviso that this may 
be changed by the intention of the parties.108 But the Reichs-
gericht in a case of two German-domiciled partners carrying 
on business in Portugal, had no hesitation in assuming that 
application of German law was intended by the parties.109 On 
the other hand, by a distinct mistake in a draft of the Institute 
of International Law, all incidents, including conditions of 
constitution, relations among associates and toward third 
parties, dissolution and liquidation, have been lumped to-
gether and subjected to the law of the seat by presumptive 
intention of the parties.110 It should be contended, instead, 
Partnership ( ed. I o, I 9 3 5) 2. 55 ( o), 7 r 8 (I) ; 3 BEALE § 58 8, 2, but see the 
criticism by YouNG 179; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 243 § 224. 
105 § 4 ( 2 ). 
106 0LG. Dresden (Feb. z, 19I6) 38 Sachs. Arch. 94; LEWALD 54; STEIN-
JONAS, ZPO. § so VI. 
107 In re Doetsch, Matheson v. Ludwig ( r896) 2 Ch. D. 8 3 6; cf. Partnership 
Act, r89o, § 91 LINDLEY, Partnership (ed. ro, I935) 255 (o), 7I8 (r). 
108 Germany: RG. (January 30, I889) 2.3 RGZ. 31; Bay. ObLG. (May 26, 
I902) 3 Bay. ObLGZ. 446; LG. Karlsruhe (March II, I909) I9 Z.int.R. 
525 1 Clunet I9I01 12.56; RG. (May 22, 19II) Leipz.Z. I9II, 6r6; FICKER, 
4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 470; GEILER in I Diiringer-Hachenburg 49· 
109 RG. (February 27, I931) Hans.RGZ. I93I B 2.95 No. ros. Perfectly 
in accord, Bay. ObLG. (November 5, 1921) 27 Bay. ObLGZ. r87 No. 71 
(partnership in Russia). 
110 New York Meeting, Annuaire 1929 II 302, art. 5· As the discussion at 
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that the personal law is independent of intentions of the 
parties but does not cover the internal relations of associates 
in any kind of partnership, because they are not characterized 
by corporate features. They are entirely subjected to con-
tractual conflicts rules, and it is only casually that the appli-
cable law often coincides with that of the center of the busi-
ness,m or, for that matter, the place where the business 
started. 
The American partnership cases, due to their general at-
titude, cannot offer a direct contribution to this problem. 
3· The Right to Be a Party 
Following the principle of the personal law and at the 
same time conceiving the right to be a plaintiff or defendant 
as substantive, the Continental doctrine states that the law 
of the principal business place determines this right. The pre-
vailing theoretical approach is the same as in construing 
rights and duties of partnerships in general; the members 
in their particular joint relationship are the parties.112 Ac-
cordingly, the members of an Engli~h partnership may sue 
under the name of their firm on the Continent, 118 because they 
may do so according to English procedure, although in the 
English conception the proceeding is more closely connected 
with the individuals than on the Continent. By the same 
t63ff. shows, there was no real agreement; in addition, the enlarged role of 
party autonomy clashed in the proposal itself with the prejudice against party 
autonomy. 
111 To this effect, probably Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Samson v. 
Heilbrun (June 27, I 929) 9 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 36: a partnership con-
sisting of an English and a German national, dissolved by art. 299 (a) of the 
Treaty of Versailles, is subjected to Scottish Law with respect to the relations 
between the partners resulting from a dissolution not followed by agreement 
or winding up procedure. 
112 See WIELAND, I Handelsr. 420 and n. 61. 
113 France: App. Douai (Dec. I, I88o) Clunet I882, 3I7. 
Germany: RG. (November 25, I895) 36 RGZ. 393· 
The Netherlands: Rb. Roermond (May 3, I934) N. J. (I935) 253. See 
II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 2IS No. 93 (contra: No. 92 ibid.) 
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token, a New York partnership has been held in Germany 
incapable of being a party.114 
In the United States, however, the problem presents 
peculiar difficulties. The reasons are various, including the 
doctrines that, at common law as contrasted with statute, 
only legal entities may sue and be sued; that statutory author-
izations to associations lacking personality are of procedural 
character; and that common law courts refuse representative 
actions in such situations. 1'15 
These arguments imply that the state of creation has not 
elevated these types to the rank of corporations in the mean-
ing of the forum, although they are perfectly capable of suing 
at home. The courts embark on a thorough analysis of the 
status of the unincorporated associations according to the law 
of the state where they have been organized, but the decision 
finally depends on whether the specific mixture of corporate 
and noncorporate elements justifies classifying the association 
as a corporation in the sense of the forum. 
Such reasoning evidently is grounded in traditional con-
ceptions. It should be noticed, however, that the application 
of these conceptions to foreign associations obscures their 
legal structure and causes a great deal of unnecessary delay 
and di:fficulty,11~ even though in some cases careful lawyers 
may avoid these problems by adjusting matters to special 
devices of the local procedure. The entire argument amounts 
to a requirement that other states should not equip organiza-
tions in a manner different from the forum. The very investi-
gation into attributes other than the right to sue, in order 
to ascertain the right to sue, shows how inadequately the 
problem is handled. Joint stock companies established under 
114 OLG. Hamburg (June 14, 1904) 9 ROLG. 25. 
115 STURGES, "Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions," 33 Yale 
L. J. (1924) 383-405. 
116 See STURGES (supra n. 115) at 404. 
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the statutes of New York, Pennsylvania, or Michigan are 
"difficult to distinguish" from corporations.111 Why must 
they be distinguished at any cost, for the purpose of denying 
them the very right to sue that they have in their home 
stater 
Of course, the real theoretical trouble lies in the dogma 
that the right to be a party is procedural. As in many other 
respects, the development of American law requires a definite 
departure from the overextended scope of procedural law. 
In the meantime, we may draw some comfort from a recent 
concurring vote of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure have expressly dealt with unin-
corporated associations, but they did it under a congressional 
authority confi.ned to procedural matters. Therefore, it is the 
official view of the United States Supreme Court that, as 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter declares, suability of trade unions is 
"in essence and principle a procedural matter." The federal 
rule allows a trade union to be sued in its common name if 
the local law allows this, a question possibly resolved by the 
local procedural law. "But if such a procedural matter may 
be cast in the form of a substantive issue for the determination 
of status, it would at least in this case, be a question of the 
substantive law of the District [the local law of the case at 
bar] and not raise any substantive issue of federallaw."118 In 
other words, the law of a state may treat the problem as sub-
stantive, an incident of the personal law; this will be enough 
for the federal court to recognize suability on its allegedly 
procedural level. 
It seems to follow that American courts, irrespective of 
their own characterization, ought to apply the personal law 
of foreign countries, including suability as an incident, and 
consistency requires that this liberalism should extend to the 
117 BALLANTINE 15. 
118 Bushy v. Electric Utilities Employees Union (1944) 65 S. Ct. 143. 
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laws of sister states, endowing associations or partnerships 
with the substantive right to sue or be sued. 
Occasionally, it has been noted that New York courts may 
be liberal in entertaining suits against unincorporated associa-
tions, because they have a special procedure provided by their 
statutes.119 It should be replied that any procedure good for 
citing a corporation is good to use against any nonincor-
porated group which has articles of organization implying 
its suability under the applicable law. 
Finally, if an action at law can be instituted against a 
corporation, there is no reason other than the mere weight 
of a tradition cancelled by economic necessity, to prevent a 
similar action against any organization endowed with the 
capacity of being sued by its personal law. 
IV. QuAsi NATIONALITY oF PARTNERSHIPs 
How to apply the various rules affecting foreigners to un-
incorporated associations, particularly partnerships, again 
depends on the infinitely differentiated purposes of these 
rules.120 Neither can partnerships be simply assimilated in all 
respects to corporations, although they enjoy many benefits 
of the latter and are now often included in the treaties pro-
tecting business organizations, nor are they entirely incapable 
of being treated as entities. 
There is no fixed rule including all matters such as security 
for costs, jurisdiction, taxation, and the like, valid for all 
countries.121 
On the other hand, nationality of partnerships in the 
119 Note, 34 Col. L. Rev. (1934) 1555, 1556. 
12° French Cass. (civ.) (July zs, 1933) Gaz. Pal. 1933·2.502 states that 
although a partnership is invested with the attributes of a legal unit in France, 
such concept cannot be transferred without qualification to the domain of public 
law, and in particular a partnership composed of foreigners may not claim 
compensation for war damage according to the principles of private law. Other 
decisions had decided the particular issue to the contrary, especially Cass. (req.) 
(July 17, 1930) Revue 1931, 128. 
121 For instance, Austria: Law on Jurisdiction (Jurisdictionmorm) § 75 (ad-
ministrative seat), cf. WALKER 149. 
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meaning of the peace treaties of I 9 I 9 dealing with the clear-
ing of prewar debts should not have been denied. The Anglo-
German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal held for dogmatic reasons 
that an English or German partnership was not an English 
or German national in the meaning of the Treaty provisions 
concerning prewar debts. Hence, the nationality of the single 
partners was decisive for their participation in claims and 
debts, upon the application of the clearing and valorization 
rules.122 This theory was wrongly deduced from the over-
estimated fact that partnerships are not legal persons in 
every and all respects, in disregard of the essential corporate 
attributes they undoubtedly have and of the various purposes 
for which they have always been considered connected with 
the several countries. In fact, the view of the Tribunal was 
entirely impractical.123 
Belgium: Cass. (Nov. 5, I9o6) Clunet I907, 8o8 (center of operation, for 
tax purposes). 
France: 2 ARMINJON ( ed. 2) 49I § I94· 
Germany: Nationality has been ascribed to partnerships for the purposes of 
restricting the provisions of the HGB. to domestic partnerships, RG. (Feb. II, 
I896) 36 RGZ. I72, I77; RG. in Leipz.Z. I9II, 6r6; the duty of advancing 
security for the costs of a lawsuit, OLG. Hamburg, DJZ. 1900, 444; STEIN-
JoNAS, r ZPO. (ed. 5, I934) § rro I II c. (36 RGZ. 393, 396 is obsolete), 
cf. STAUB-PINNER in I Staub 647 § ro5 n. 45, for general jurisdiction (13 
OLG. 73). Cf. WIELAND, r Handelsr. 419 n. 57, 6r7-I9 § r8. On the other 
hand, a Venezuelan partnership is recognized as a juristic person, but the 
German partners are treated for tax purposes as the members of a German 
partnership. Reichsfinanzhof (Feb. u, I93o) 27 Entsch. (of this court) 73, 
and JW. 193I, r6o with critical note by RHEINSTROM. 
Italy: Cass. (April 29, 1933) Foro ltal. Mass. 1933 IV 3I9: a French 
"irregular company" treated for taxation as not being a unity according to 
French law. 
Switzerland: ScHNITZER, Handelsr. I59· 
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam {June 24, 1914) W. 19I5, 9719, 3 (a 
unit for jurisdiction); Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. I9, 1924) W. II346 (a French 
partnership of an English and a French national has to give security for costs 
in respect to the English partner only, although it is held to be a legal unit in 
the French doctrine). 
122 Fisher & Co. v. Biehn and Max (March 22, 1922) 3 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes u, JW. 1922, ll6I; Hardt Co. v. Stern (March 23, I923) 3 Recueil 
trib. arb. mixtes u, 2 Friedensrecht 72. 
123 RABEL, JW. I922, rr62; HERM. lsAY, 3 Abhandlungen zum Friedens-
recht (1923) 25; id., Private Rechte und Interessen im Friedensvertrag (ed. 3, 
1923) 57; R. FucHs, 3 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (I922) 24 and in 6 
LESKE-LOEWENFELD II roo; STAUB-PINNER in I Staub § Io5 n. 9a. 
CHAPTER 22 
Recognition 
I. THEORIES OF RECOGNITION1 
I N the nineteenth century two rival schools of thought dominated the treatment of foreign corporations in pri-
vate law. Young, in his admirable study of 1912, called 
them the restrictive and the liberal theories. Perhaps they 
may be better described as the theories of the territorial and 
the extraterritorial or international effect of incorporation. 
Scarcely noticed in the literature, before the present war a 
third current gained influence, having nationalism as its dis-
tinctive impulse. 
I. The Territorial Theory 
At one time, the idea generally prevailed that every state 
had to decide arbitrarily what foreign corporations should 
have legal personality within its own territory. This doctrine 
limited the functions of legal persons by geographical bounda-
nes. 
In the famous words of Judge Taney: 
"A company can have no legal existence out of the bounda-
ries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only 
in the contemplation of the law, and by force of the law, and 
where that law ceases to operate and is no longer obligatory 
the company can have no existence. It must dwell in the place 
of its creation and cannot migrate to another sovereignty."2 
And Field, J., declared: 
"The Company being the mere creature of local law, can 
1 For a survey in this country, see MACHEN, "Corporate Personality," 2.4 
Harv. L. Rev. (19II) 2.53, 347· 
2 Bank of Augusta v. Earle ( 1839) I 3 Pet. s. c. 519 at 588. 
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have no existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty which 
created it."3 
This doctrine has taken root in American thought, Pro-
fessor James reminds me, as a result of the colonial English 
companies. Nevertheless the doctrine sounds strange, when 
constantly repeated4 in the courts of the United States, the 
country of the Bill of Rights, for it comes directly from 
governmental absolutism and has been engendered by three 
factors: 
First, the tradition of police states required that legal 
personality be conferred upon an association only by grant of 
the sovereign. The prince, the state, created the legal entity. 
This system of concession, authorization, charter (in the 
original meaning), goes back to Julius Caesar and Augustus 
who made the essential functions of corporations ( coire, con-
'l)OCI!lri, cogi) dependent on permission by the Emperor or the 
Senate. 5 The purpose was political precaution against sub-
versive factions, and the system has remained a weapon of 
suspicious and jealous rulers. 
Second, discrimination against foreign corporations was 
nourished by the fear not only of political disturbance but 
also of foreign economic forces menacing domestic organiza-
tions by competition. Laurent, the principal European pro-
tagonist of this doctrine, was hostile to certain types of associa-
tions. 
Third, Savigny and his followers constructed on this 
background the doctrine of the artificial nature of corpora-
tions: Any personality not produced by nature had to be con-
ferred by the lawmaking power and hence was imaginary, 
fictitious, a mere creature of the law. 
3 Paul v. Virginia (I868) 8 Wall. I68. 
4 Even BALLANTINE, Corporations 843 makes no exception. 
5 MITTEIS, Romisches Privatrecht (I9o8) 399; RABEL, "Grundziige des 
romischen Privatrechts" in HOLTZENDORFF-KOHLER, I Enzyklopadie der 
Rechtswissenschaft 428; ScHNORR VON CAROLSFELD, Geschichte der juristischen 
Person en (I 9 33). 
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In a final conclusion from this apparently solid complex 
of ideas, a corporation was thought necessarily to be re-
stricted to the boundaries of the state and inexistent outside 
of it. 
Such territorialism was defended in Europe by Mancini, 
Laurent and his contemporaries, and in a late isolated stand, 
r9o8, by Andre Weiss.6 In this country, Taney's and Field's 
dicta were made the basis of the Restatement in I934/ al-
though each part of the doctrine has been thoroughly re-
futed8 and entirely discarded by common opinion throughout 
the world. To maintain the doomed theory in the face of 
modern conditions, diverse auxiliary theories were invented, 
such as the "theory of comity" whereby the state permits 
foreign corporations to function in its territory, although not 
bound to do so, and the agents' theory which pretends that a 
foreign corporation despite inexistence in the state neverthe-
less acts and contracts through agents, that the legal person 
dwells outside but its agents reside inside. These makeshift 
constructions also were long since destroyed by the criticism 
of scholars. 9 The real American law has nothing to do with 
them.10 
6 LAURENT, 4 Principes 232, 285 § 119; 4 LAURENT 256, 293 §§ 130, 154; 
RoLIN, I Principes § 27, 2 id. § 8o6. For decisions in various countries, see 
KoSTERS 67I n. 1. 
1 2 BEALE § I66.I: "The association can exist as a corporation only where 
that law prevails which makes it such, that is, within the territorial limits of 
the state of its charter; for the law of a country has no extra-territorial opera-
tion." DUDLEY FIELD § 545· 
8 YouNG 4I and in 23 Law Q. Rev. (I9o7) I5I, 29o; HENDERSON I63. 
Fortunately, these truths have been remembered more recently: Note in 79 U. of 
Pa. L. Rev. (I93I) I119, IIJ5-II38; LATTY, "International Standing in 
Court of Foreign Corporations," 29 Mich. L. Rev. (I93o) 28. 
European leaders: I BAR § I 04; LAINE, Clunet I893, 273; PILLET, Per-
sonnes Morales I7-57; id., Principes §§ 73, 74; id., I Traite 336; MICHOUD, 
2 Personnalite Morale§§ 232ff.; 2LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ I093; I FIORE 
§ 319; FEDOZZI, Gli enti collettivi nel diritto internazionale privata ( I897) 
I97-2I6 and II diritto processuale civile internazionale (I9o5) I85-2I2; Lo 
MoNAco, Filangieri I885, I, 379· 
For more literature see KosTERS 672; GUTZWILLER I627; CHARLES DE 
VISSCHER, Revue I9I3 at I93· 
9 YOUNG 48; HENDERSON 36-49; see I BAR 302; PILLET in Melanges, 
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Nevertheless, these ghosts from metaphysical spheres re-
appear in the Restatement and survive in the language of 
the courts. More dangerous, a few derivatives are popular 
such as the following: "A corporation cannot perform out-
side of the state by which it was created, acts which are strictly 
corporate acts."11 In particular, meetings of stockholders in 
matters of formal organization can be held only in the state 
of incorporation.12 Authority to an agent must be given in 
this same state.13 A state has the right to "exclude" foreign 
corporations from doing business, or to impose conditions on 
them for doing business, at its pleasure.14 Foreign corpora-
tions cannot have more rights than domestic corporations.15 
What life or value there is left in these sayings, we shall 
have to discover. 
2. The International Theory 
The system developed in the epoch of liberalism brings 
corporations into a position analogous to that of individuals. 
Created by the competent state, they need no particular rec-
ognition at all in other states. This theory has the background 
of an even older history than that of the territorial theory. 
Research in medieval law has discovered that before the time 
of the princes who claimed sovereignty like Roman Caesars, 
corporations were freely formed by the association of mem-
bers. Also the collegia and sodalitates of the Roman Re-
public were autonomous creations. Moreover, Germanic as 
well as Roman legal history has taught that the conception 
of a corporation as a merely artificial being is utterly wrong. 
Antoine Pillet (I929) 500; RIGAUD, IO Repert. :zz6 No. II. 
10 See Note, 79 V. of Pa. L. Rev. (I93I) II19, II38. 
11 Reichwald v. Com. Hotel Co. (I883) Io6 Ill. 439· 
12 Restatement § I 6 3; BEALE, 5 Col. L. Rev. ( 1 90 5) 2 55. Outmoded, see 
STEVENS, Corporations 482. 
13 2 BEALE 768 par. 2. 
14 Restatement§§ I67, 168. On the reality of things, see HOLT, 89 U. of Pa. 
L. Rev. (1941) 453· 
15 See infra pp. I49ff. 
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For a time, the scholars of old Germanic law18 even popu-
larized the idea that in complete antagonism to the allegedly 
"Roman" fictitious legal person, the medieval associations 
were living bodies, vigorously working in all public spheres 
and of more economic, social, and political significance than 
their individual members. This Germanistic approach left 
lasting improvements in domestic laws, as for instance in 
giving the principal representatives of corporations the role 
of "organs" that embody the will of the corporate "body" 
and are able to obligate the entity by contract and in tort.17 
But this theory also has been abandoned by better advised 
scholars. From the historical point of view, the concept of the 
"universitas," designed by the Roman jurists after the pattern 
of the autonomous city (polis), has formed the eternal 
model of an entity distinct from its members in its relations 
to the outside world. The internal relation between a private 
corporation and its members with respect to their participa-
tion in the common assets and debts varied even in the 
ancient world. Thus, the antithesis of a "Roman" soulless 
fictitious person and a Germanic living organism was highly 
distorted. From the theoretical angle, present writers like to 
say that individuals also take their legal status from the law, 
hence there is no innate ground why organizations should 
be discriminated against. In addition, the normal method of 
bestowing personality upon associations is no longer granted 
by special act but statutory determination of conditions pre-
cedent-in Europe called "normative conditions"-by com-
plying with which private persons may create legal bodies. 
While trade and industry have multiplied their associa-
tions and gained for them wide international admission, the 
mightiest impulse, of course, has come from the immense 
16 In the first place, Orro GIERKE, Die Genossenschaftstheorie und die 
Deutsche Rechtsprechung (I 8 8 7) 5, 604. 
17 See German BGB. § 3 I; Swiss C. C. art. 55: the will of a juristic person 
is expressed through its organs (not "organisms" as ScHICK translates). 
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growth of capitalism. Industrialization favored and needed 
concentration of means. Exchange of raw materials, in-
dustrial products, and skilled enterprise opened countries 
to corporate ventures. In the height of the capitalistic era, 
few nations wanted to hide behind Judge Taney's doctrine, 
certainly not the United States. 
It is of extraordinary interest that the liberal system was 
declared in England as early as I 724 by leading cases which 
still have authority.18 Foreign companies have ever since 
been accorded recognition as respects their personality, as 
well as full freedom to do business in Great Britain. The 
Canadian courts are well aware, despite their many contrary 
statutes, that "at common law, a foreign corporation may 
carry on business in a jurisdiction other than its own without 
having special authority to do so.m9 · 
Elsewhere, this system was adopted in the course of the 
nineteenth century. The commission of German states, which 
drafted the General Commercial Code of I 862, found it 
so obvious that the civil existence of foreign companies must 
be recognized that no provision to this effect was considered 
necessary.20 But the right to do business was distinguished. 
Unconditional recognition, at least in this meaning, has re-
mained the nearly unchallenged principle for commercial 
associations in most of Europe, and has been defended with 
respect to all juristic persons by most of the literature. 21 Only 
the French Republic has insisted in principle, despite the 
French writers, on certain restrictions established under 
Napoleon III, against foreign stock corporations. 
18 Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques Van Moses (172.4) I Strange 612.; 
Henriques v. General Privileged Dutch Co. (172.8) z Ld. Raym. 1532., 92. Eng. 
Re. 494• 
19 C. P. R. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (189o) 17 S. C. R. 151; 
Ontario Wind Engine & Pump Co. v. Eldred (Sask. 1912.) z W. W. R. 6o, 
z D. L. R. 2.70. 
20 Protokolle 371, 42.. Sitzung (quoted by WALKER zoz). 
21 See also ARCANA, Report in Republica Argentina, Segundo Congreso 
Sudamericano 2.2.3. 
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3· Reactionary Trends 
Developments between the two world wars have demon-
strated once more that the problem of recognition of foreign 
corporations is more intimately connected with economic 
and political considerations than with abstract speculation. 
From the beginning, the Soviet Union has been slow to rec-
ognize foreign legal persons. The National Socialist Law on 
Stock Corporations of 1937 abolished free admittance of 
foreign business associations to the carrying on of business/2 
and the comment by a national socialist author revives Lau-
rent's theory.23 French and Latin-American laws and litera-
ture have shown much of the same spirit, perhaps not so 
much aiming at restoring the territorial nature of incorpora-
tion, as endeavoring to strengthen the examination, super-
vision, and governmental domination of foreign enterprises. 
Regulations to enforce control over the activities of immigrant 
business go hand in hand with measures to close certain 
branches to all foreigners and to enforce the practice of cer-
tain quotas of nationals on boards of directors and member-
ship lists. 
Nevertheless, except for Russia, the principle of uncon-
ditional recognition has not lost its prevailing role. Notwith-
standing conscious and unconscious exceptions, it may be 
asserted that this principle prevails at this moment through-
out the world. Language in both Americas sounding as if 
recognition depended on authorization, often is not to be 
taken literally. Even so, the picture is complicated, and the 
practical effect of recognition is reduced or menaced by re-
strictions of many kinds. 
It is convenient, therefore, to define first the concept of 
recognition according to actual laws. 
22 See infra p. I 8 3· 
23 BEITZKE, Jur. Personen 7, 49, criticized by RAAPE, 5 Z. AK. Deutsches R. 
(1938) 715· 
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4· Concept of Recognition 
If the liberal theory were carried through without excep-
tion, there would be no need for a notion other than that of 
the personal law, since under this theory any foreign cor-
poration created by the personal law exists within the forum. 
The need arises only because in certain countries or for cer-
tain types of legal persons the personal law acquired abroad 
is not held sufficient to support the existence of a corporation 
within the forum. There is no evidence that any jurisdiction 
would disregard the existence of a juristic person in the state 
where it has been validly constituted according to the law 
regarded as competent at the forum. 
Recognition, consequently, signifies that the authorities 
of a state affirm a foreign-created legal person as existent 
for all purposes, applying the law considered to be the per-
sonal law. 
Recognition does not mean the creation of a new person, 
as would be the logical implication of the theory whereby a 
corporation "can exist only in the country which makes it 
such" and "the consent of another state cannot alter the 
matter.m4 Under the influence of such imaginations, ( r) rec-
ognition of an existing legal entity, ( 2) reincorporation, i.e., 
the constitution of a new personality, and finally, (3) "do-
mestication," which lies in between, were easily confused. 25 
By an effect felt up to our days, we still hear the contention 
that recognition is dependent on a sort of naturalization. But 
a sharp distinction is important. A compulsory requirement 
of the latter character has correctly been called an unjusti-
fiable trespass on the foreign competent law.26 
24 2 BEALE § I66.I. 
25 I FIORE § po. On the distinction of "domestication" from the mere pur-
suit of business, see 2 BEALE § I5 3·7· The German Reichsgericht (July II, 
1934-) JW. I934, 2845, Clunet 1935, 164, IPRspr. I934- No. I2 observed this 
distinction with respect to an English certificate of registration. 
26 CHARLES DE VISSCHER, Revue 1913 at 194,195 and n. l. 
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Of course, there is no rule of present international law obli-
gating a state to recognize foreign-created juristic persons. 27 
There exists, however, theoretical agreement on the desira-
bility of mutual liberality, expressed in numerous drafts to 
multipartite treaties.28 
On the other hand, recognition does not necessarily include, 
and in the great majority of countries does not include, 
permission to have a place of business or an agent, or to do 
business in the country. Moreover, various restrictions are 
imposed. This, of course, deprives recognition of much of its 
practical value. Yet recognition involves legal personality 
only, not permission to engage in commercial or other activi-
ties. 29 These two categories, although correctly contrasted, 
have been inadequately termed by some Anglo-American 
writers "civil capacity" and "functional capacity.mo With 
more clarity, commentators on the recently repealed Italian 
Commercial Code state that the poorly drafted sections there-
in, regulating the business of foreign mercantile organizations, 
do not really "create the prerequisites of their legal consti-
tution" but instead "presuppose their legal constitution under 
the foreign law.m1 
What prerogatives usually flow from recognition as such 
will have to be discussed more closely after a survey of the 
systems adopted in the present legislations. 
II. CoNDITIONs FOR RECOGNITION 
I. Unconditional Recognition 
Under the system attaching international effect to the 
27 1 BAR 302; NIEMEYER, "Les societes de commerce,'' Recueil I 924 III 
40 n. I. 
28 See art. 6 of the Draft on the Treatment of Foreigners, 1929, Revue I9Jo, 
238; VERDROss, 37 Recueil (I93I) III 405. 
29 PILLET, Personnes Morales § I 3· 
30 YouNG, 23 Law Q. Rev. (1907) 162; LATTY, 29 Mich. L. Rev. (I931) 
34; ScHUSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (I933) 345, 362 n. 86; 8 id. 570. 
31 Note, Rivista I912, 509. 
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creation of a corporation, recognition in the practically re-
stricted meaning, just defined, is obtained ipso jure, without 
the need of any step, such as filing for registration, paying of 
fees, or applying for a decree. 
(a) For all organizations. This system, applied to all 
corporations and other associations, is actually in force in 
England/2 and the United States/3 as well as Brazil/4 
Greece,35 the Netherlands/6 Spain/7 Switzerland/8 and 
certain other countries.39 It has also been adopted in the 
Montevideo Treaties40 and in the C6digo Bustamante.41 
The statutory Argentine rule is in controversy but the best 
authorities indicate a system exactly parallel to that of the 
United States, requiring authorization only for the carrying 
on of business.42 In Italy, the principle was for a long time 
32 See supra n. I 8. A condition is that the government of the country of 
creation is recognized by the British Government, see 5 HALSBURY's Laws of 
England (I932) 86o. 
33 Restatement §§ I pff. speaks of all incorporated associations, but as to un-
incorporated bodies see supra pp. I08 n. 59, I I2 n. 8o. 
34 Brazil: This theory has been prevailing in the opinion of the leading writ-
ers, see CARVALHO DE MENDON<;A, 4 Trat. Dir. Com. § 1510, EsPINOLA, 6 
Tratado 557, and clearly adopted in Introd. Law (I942) art. u, cf. EsPINOLA, 
8-C Tratado 1 77 5. 
35 Greece: App. Athens (I937) No. 209I, 49 Themis 406, Clunet 1938, 
900; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS § 23; C. C. (I940) art. 10 (the draft had required 
royal authorization). 
36 The Netherlands: H. R. (March 23, I866) W. 278I; KosTERS 672. 
37 Spain: Arg. C. C. art. 28, cf. 27; C. Com. art. I5, cf. 21 last par.; see 
TRiAs DE BEs 376 § 324. This includes associations, excepting certain classes 
such as religious orders, since the Law of Associations of June 30, I887 does not 
distinguish domestic from foreign associations. 
38 Switzerland: BG. (July u, I934) 6o BGE. I 225; SCHNITZER, Handelsr. 
8r. 
39 Austria: The Imperial Decree of Nov. 29, I865 concerning "the admission 
of foreign stock corporations and stock companies with limited partners to 
carrying on business in Austria" has been explained in the prevailing opinion 
as not referring to recognition, see WALKER 202. This construction was main-
tained in Czechoslovakia, see LAUFKE, 7 Repert. I86 Nos. 58, 59· 
For the group of codes following the Spanish model, see Chapter 23 n. 3 r. 
40 Supra P· 35· 
41 C6digo Bustamante, art. 33· 
42 Argentina: C. Com. arts. 285-287; ZEBALLos, Clunet I 906, 6o4-6I 8; 
MAcHADo, I Cod. Civ. Arg. 74; I WEiss-ZEBALLos 4I4; RIVAROLA, I45 
Revista Gen. Legis!. y Jur. (Madrid I924) 533, 539· More recently, opinions 
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affirmed by the writers and rejected by the courts.43 Finally, 
the Supreme Court adhered to it in 1930 and 1931,44 and so 
apparently does the new Civil Code. 45 
In Belgium, unconditional recognition has been granted 
by statute to foreign "commercial companies" only, but is 
extended to all legal persons, public and private, by liberal 
writers and by some courts/6 although other authorities con-
tinue to deny capacity, particularly to foreign nonprofit 
associations when they bring actions.47 
on the interpretation of C. C. arts. 33, 34, as against art. 45 were sharply 
divided between ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 34 and 3 VICO § 83. The old 
liberal doctrine defended by Vico seems to remain victorious. See App. Buenos 
Aires (April 2o, 1934) 46 Jur. Arg. 183, 187; ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. 
Priv. 83; Note, Clunet 1938, 838. Art. 45 of C. C., thus, is understood to apply 
to authorization for business only. Law No. 8867, of February 6, 1912 is 
understood to mean that this authorization is not needed in case of reciprocity. 
However, the practice is called "peu libirale" in Clunet, loc. cit. 
Paraguay: The liberal theory is adopted by BAEZ 47· 
43 FEDOZZI 71; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 241; UDINA, Elementi § 79, 
referring to C. C. (r865) arts. 2 and 3; C. Com. (r882) art. 230. 
44 Cass. (March 11, 1930) Rivista Dir. Priv. 1931, II, 161. Note, SERENI 
in 8 Annuario Dir. Comp. III II; summary, I Annual Digest (I931-I932) 278 
No. 146. Cass. (July 27, 193r) Giur. Ital. 1932 I, r, r62, Rivista 1931, 183. 
45 Disp. Prel. (1938) art. 6; id. (1942) art. r6 par. 2, states that the rule 
of par. r, on principle granting foreign individuals the civil rights of nationals, 
applies also to foreign legal persons. The final draft (art. 9) expressed the 
principle that they enjoy the same capacity as national juristic persons but not 
more than in the foreign country. The Minister of Justice held it more prudent 
to say expressly that juristic persons are treated like foreign individuals in order 
not to revive a former controversy. (Relazione SaLMI, 1938, § 7). Evidently, 
in this line of thought, the law of aliens and recognition of the personal law 
are identified. Soberly considered, however, the actual text limits itself to a 
somewhat problematic provision regarding merely the law of aliens. Hence, it 
is understandable that AZZARITI-MARTINEZ, r Diritto civile italiano secondo 
i1 nuovo codice ( 1940) 3 71, raises the question whether foreign legal persons 
may be considered existing and may exercise their civil rights in Italy without 
being "recognized" by the Italian State. In his own opinion, recognition is 
granted without a formal act. 
46 Consolidated Companies Act 1935, art. 196, corresponding to art. 128 of 
the original text of 1873 and art. 171 of 1913. See POULLET,§§ 2oo-2o3; Cass. 
(April 12, I888) Pasicrisie r888.1.r86. 
47 Belgium: Cour Bruxelles (May 4, 1932) Clunet 1933, r84 (a French 
association of cheese manufacturers); Cass. (Nov. 12, 1935) 3 Giur. Comp. 
DIP. No. r 3 I (action by the French association of authors and composers, 
with strange arguments, see supra, Chapter 21, n. 5 I). 
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(b) For trading associations. In a second system, the 
principle applies only to trading corporations and other 
commercial organizations, having a stable central place 
abroad. Also some followers of the territorial theory, making 
an exception, consent to this result for the sake of advanced 
international commerce.48 Nonprofit associations encounter 
more distrust. 
Thus, in Germany foreign business corporations and part-
nerships have been recognized ipso jure from an early time49 
in what may be qualified as customary law. The same rule 
obtains, e.g., in the Netherlands/0 Rumania/1 Yugoslaviat 
J apan/3 and in the influential Civil Code of Chile 5 4 whose 
example has been followed in numerous special Latin-Ameri-
can laws on stock corporations. 55 
In France, an analogous customary ·rule has been strongly 
curtailed by an exceptional legislation concerning capital 
stock corporations, so as to limit unconditional recognition to 
business organizations on a personal basis: copartnership and 
partnership en commandite.56 
Whether the Soviet Russian law recognizes in any way 
48 ROLIN, 1 Principes 167 § 28, conveniently recalled by LAITY, 29 Mich. 
L. Rev. (1931) 33· 
49 ROHG. (April 28, I87I) zz ROHGE. I47; and the constant decisions of 
the Reichsgericht from 7 RGZ. 70. See 83 RGZ. 367. 
50 The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Junes, I9I3) W. 9549· 
51 Rumania: C. Com. (I887) art. 237. 
52 Yugoslavia: C. Com. (I937) § 502 par. I. 53 Japan: C. Com. art. 255. Although the Japanese Civil Code, art. 36 (I) 
speaks exclusively of commercial companies, art. 255 of the Commercial Code 
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court (April I7, I905) I C. Com. of 
Japan Ann. 406 case r65, as not distinguishing whether a foreign company is 
a juristic person or not. 
54 See 3 VICO 40. 
55 See especially Honduras: C. C. art. 57, cf. BIJON, 6 Repert. 443 No. 35; 
C. Com. (I 940) art. I o. 
Mexico: C. C. (I928) art. 2736, see SCHUSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933) 
348; Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles (I 934) art. 250. 
Venezuela: C. Com. (I9I9) arts. 359 (new 334) ff.; see GOLDSTONE, 17 
Tul. L. Rev. (I943) 587; and now C. C. (I942) arts. I9, 30, I65I. 
56 See 2 WEISS, Traite 484; 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 9I4 § I093· 
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foreign business organizations, as has been asserted, cannot 
be ascertained. 57 
(c) For non pro fit corporations. Prevailing though some-
what uncertain French doctrine58 traditionally has regarded 
foreign associations with purposes other than profit as ipso 
jure existent, irrespective of reciprocity. Nor were exceptions 
of public policy raised even when a foreign domiciled reli-
gious congregation, whose French department had been dis-
solved in I90I, brought actions in France.59 However, among 
others, the question remained unsettled whether foreign asso-
ciations could do more than the modest acts permitted to 
French associations not enjoying a declaration of "public util-
ity." At present, these doubts are ended; a decree prior to the 
war of 1939, which may be of temporary character, required 
governmental authorization as a condition of recognition. 60 
A German statutory provision, too, declares that associ-
ations pursuing noneconomic purposes need a decree of 
recognition, 61 but the Reichsgericht has recently confirmed the 
doctrine that such a decree is unnecessary except to validate 
a contract concluded in Germany and also governed by Ger-
man private law.62 Apart from this case, such an association 
57 MAKARov, Precis 229 apparently thinks that the special authorization 
required by the laws of the USSR regards only the doing of business, but that 
unrecognized foreign corporations may sue in Russia, upon claims arising 
abroad, only under reciprocity. 
58 See the opinions (very divergent on many points) of PILLET, Personnes 
Morales § 269; HEMARD, Theorie des ntillites §§ 335-351; LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE § 169; NIBOYET § 319 and contra, 2 Traite 345 § 816. 
59 Aix (Feb. 27, 1913) aff'd, Cass. (req.) (Nov. 24, 1914) D. I9I6.I.I93i 
NEUMEYER, 1 Int. Verwaltungs R. 136 and authors cited; 2 ARMINJON § 
199. Similarly, e.g., Italy: App. Milano (Jan. 17, 1928) Clunet 1928, 1287. 
6° France: Decree of April12, 1939, see supra Chapter 19 n. 109. 
61 EG. BGB. art. 1 o; a decree as envisaged in this section has very seldom 
been requested. Only one case is known where an authorization was granted, 
that of the German-Austrian Alpinist Association when it moved headquarters 
temporarily to Innsbruck, Austria. 
62 RG. (Oct. 29, 1938) 159 RGZ. 33 at 47, implicitly indorsing the opinion 
of WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 225; Th. KIPP in BGB. Handausgabe 
FisCHER-HENLE-TITZE (1932) note to EG. BGB. art. Io; RAAPE 1611 
M. WoLFF, IPR. 71 n. 13. · 
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is treated like a German association without legal personality, 
its agents acting in the country are personally liable, 63 and the 
entity may also be sued.64 
There are, on the other hand, laws recognizing foreign 
corporations of public interest more readily than commercial 
companies. 65 
(d) Foundations. With respect to foundations, whether 
public or private, the contrast of theories has been solved by 
a definite victory of the "liberal" doctrine. Even in France, 
the rule has been adopted that no authorization is needed 
for recognition of the legal existence and capacity of a private 
foundation in accordance with the law of its foreign "seat."66 
Of course, activities in pursuance of the constitutional docu-
ments are subject to particularly anxious control under the 
territoriallaw.67 
(3) Partnerships. While partnerships are recognized un-
conditionally in many countries along with corporate business 
associations, they are also treated in the same manner in 
countries where barriers against stock corporations or against 
nonprofit associations have been established/8 with the pos-
sible exception of a few Latin-American countries.69 Partner-
ships have never been subject to authorization, nor has 
63 BGB. § 54 par. z; EG. BGB. art. I o sent. 2. 
64 In analogy to ZPO. § so sent. z, § 735· 
65 See for instance Chile: Corte Suprema (August Io, I936) 33 Rev. Dei'. 
Jur. y Ciencias Soc. II, 1, 449, 452., 470 recognizing the Junta Provincial de 
Beneficencia de Sevilla, Spain, according to Spanish law, as testamentary heir 
of Chilean immovables; the court emphasizes that the Chilean legislature has 
not established the requirements as for lucrative corporations. 
66 NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. § IJ; PILLET, Personnes Morales 
§ 306; CHARLES DE VISSCHER, Revue I913, at I9I; CRfMIEU, 8 Repert. 
437 No. 52; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § I69. 
67 CHARLES DE VISSCHER, id. at 2.06. 
68 Hence even in France a Colombian partnership could obtain without for-
malities a judgment and, therefore, in Belgium an exequatur, Trib. Antwerp 
(June 2.7, I936) Jur. Port Anvers 1937, 56. 
69 For Brazil see infra Chapter 23, p. I84 n. 54· 
Mexico: C. C. art. 2736 speaks of authorization necessary for "the foreign 
associations and companies of civil character." 
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territoriality been claimed to affect their creation. The 
doctrine regarding partnerships has been helped by the usual 
exaggerated emphasis on their personal basis, but substan-
tially it must have been important that economic dangers 
from partnerships were not so feared as from big corpora-
tions. 
Only one question has disturbed the simplicity of this 
matter. As the distinction between mercantile and nontrading 
or civil associations may be decisive, which law determines the 
mercantile character? Is it the law of the forum/ 0 the personal 
law (of the "seat" or creation),71 or either of them? 72 The 
Belgian solution accepting the last answer/3 is the best; if an 
association serves commercial, industrial or financial purposes, 
as defined at the forum, it should be recognized even though 
it may be considered nontrading at home. 
2. Special Conditions for Recognition 
(a) Authorization in case of reciprocity-France.14 When 
in the I 8 so's under the spell of Laurent's territorial theory 
Belgian courts suddenly declared French stock companies 
( socihes anonymes), which played a large part in Belgian 
economics, to be "inexistent" in Belgium and denied them 
the right to sue, the French government protested. Finally, 
the two countries reciprocally recognized each other's govern-
mental charters creating stock corporations. The French Law 
of May 30, 1857, sanctioning this agreement, permitted the 
French government to extend by decree the rights conferred 
70 Lex fori: I LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 2 I I and 2 id. § I 12.7; ARMINJON, 
Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I927) 368; NussBAUM, D. IPR. I9o. 
71 Personal law: AssER-RIVIER, Elements I90; STREIT, Z.int.R. (I 896) 32 I; 
PILLET, Personnes Morales§§ I82, I92, 230; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. I72. 
Undecided: Institute of Int. Law, Draft I929, art. 6, Annuaire I929 II 302. 
72 See DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 293, 296. 
73 PouLLET § 2 I 3, and cases cited. To the same effect, Yugoslavia, C. Com. 
(I937) § soo par. 2. 
74 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT §§ 909ff. 
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upon the Belgian companies to those of other countries. In 
I867, France, following the model of England, replaced the 
method of special decrees creating individual corporations 
by that of general statutes under which private persons 
may create corporations, and Belgium (I 8 73), as well as 
most other countries, followed suit. Nevertheless, France 
maintained the system of stating by decree that a certain 
foreign country observes reciprocity with France, and that 
therefore stock corporations created in that country are to be 
recognized. These decrees have reached a great number. 75 In 
addition, many bipartite treaties grant mutual recognition 
of corporations and are regarded as equivalent to decrees 
stating reciprocity. Such treaties have been concluded among 
others, with Great Britain, on April 30, I862, and Canada, 
on December 15, 1922, while a decree was rendered with 
respect to the United States on August 6, I 8 82. The list of 
nations so involved is long but not exhaustive. 76 
The French system has been imitated in some other coun-
tries, in Greece in particular.77 In Belgium78 and Italy/9 it 
was soon abandoned. A devastating criticism was expressed 
by the greatest French writer on commercial law, Charles 
Lyon-Caen,S0 but has not been of any avail. 
The position of an unauthorized foreign stock corporation 
in France has been developed without consistency. A 
corporation has no capacity to contract and may not sue 
third parties but, if sued, is not allowed to defend on the 
75 On controversies concerning the right of the most favored nation, see :z. 
LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 1102. 
76 See the list given by NIBOYET 37I n. 3· 
77 See CARABIBER, 6 Repert. 4 I 4 Nos. 42-44; MARIDAKIS, I I Z.ausl.PR. 
(I 93 7) I I 9· But the present Code is liberal, see supra n. 35. 
78 Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act, of May I 8, I 873, art. 128. 
79 Italy: C. Com. (I88:z.) art. 230. 
80 Reports of I888 and I89I to the Institute of Int. Law, I I Annuaire 
(x889-I89I) at x6o. Also NIBOYET, in this case, advocates the liberal principle 
of recognizing foreign legal persons not doing business in the country, see 
:z. Traite (I938) :z.8:z. § 77o, 34I § 813. 
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ground of its own irregularity,S1 because domestic creditors 
should be protected. The incoherence of this system is in-
creased by the consideration that the entity may function as a 
de facto corporation under domestic law and in such quality 
can engage in contracts and maintain branches, as well as be 
subject to bankruptcy proceedings.82 
Other countries. Reciprocity has been required as the only 
condition of recognition in Hungary83 and Czechoslovakia.84 
In Latin-American states, reciprocity has been a popular 
requisite,85 but increasingly it has been found incompatible 
with the principle that foreigners and foreign juristic persons 
are assimilated to nationals. For this reason, Colombia can-
celled the requisite of reciprocity in its Constitution of 1936.86 
(b) Special authorization. It follows from the restricted 
domain of unconditional recognition already mentioned that 
all foreign nonprofit corporations need special authorization 
for being able to avail themselves of their existence in Bel-
gium, France, Germany (with modifications), the Nether-
lands, Rumania, Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia, Chile and most 
other Latin-American countries, and Japan. 
Also, private and public foundations need authorization 
in some countries, and business corporations which are not of 
a certain type may possibly need it in some jurisdictions. 
In a few Latin-American countries, finally, it is claimed 
that the personality of a foreign corporation is recognized 
only when it is authorized by the government, and some 
authors take this pretension seriously.87 In these jurisdictions 
81 HEMARD, Theorie des nullites §§ 342-345; 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 
§ I I 04; THALLER, Traite § 7 7 I. 
82 PILLET, I Traite § 740. 
83 DE MAGYAR!, Clunet I92.4, 595; anonymous, 6 Repert. 456 Nos. IS 
his, I 9· 
84 On the basis of§ 33 of the Allg. BGB., see LAUFKE, 7 Repert. I87 No. 6:z.. 
85 Reciprocity is still required in other respects in Argentina, see infra p. 1 79· 
86 See TULlO ENRIQUE TAsc6N, Derecho Constitucional Colombiano (ed. z, 
I939) 6o; cf. with respect to individuals, CAICEDO 12.3 § 81. 
87 See Chapter 2.3 ns. 48ff.; and see as an example of certain laws, Honduras, 
Law of Foreigners of r 926, art. 4: foreign juristic persons enjoy the rights 
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nonauthorized companies seem not to be allowed the mini-
mum of rights which recognition usually confers.88 Moreover, 
there are countries where either authorization of the existence, 
or the registration at an office, is said to be essential for the 
recognition of any legal person. We shall encounter such 
theories, mostly of a doubtful nature, with respect to several 
Latin-American jurisdictions. Also, the Chinese authorities, 
using their peculiar technique, have declared that "it is not 
known" how a foreign juristic person having no business place 
in China could be registered, and therefore that it is "difficult 
to recognize its personality."89 
3· Treaties 
The problem was much discussed for a time whether the 
clause usual in bilateral treaties that the "subjects" of either 
contracting power should enjoy treatment of the most favored 
nation in matters of commerce, applied to the recognition of 
the personality of corporations. 90 Therefore, treaties of amity 
or commerce have included provisions expressly assuring the 
reciprocal recognition of corporations and, sometimes, also 
of associations. But the significance of these clauses is now 
limited to countries denying recognition in the absence of a 
treaty, factual reciprocity, or special authorization.91 
Among the other provisions, the clauses allowing isolated 
acts of business or minor activities, and access to courts, con-
cern our present subject but scarcely alter the existing situa-
tion. 
granted them by the laws of the country of their domicil provided that they 
have been recognized by the Executive Power. 
88 See infra ns. IOI, I:u. 
89 2 Interpretations du Yuan Judiciaire en matiere civile (Le Droit Chinois 
Moderne, No. 35· I940) I6 § 387, Interpr. No. 1471 of April 3, 1925. 
90 See for the affirmative view, WEISs, 2 Traite 505 (with many references). 
Contra: 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 924 § 1102; PILLET, Personnes Morales 
I 8 3, I 84 § 12.4. 
91 On C6digo Bustamante, art. p, see ScHUSTER, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934) 
571 n. 14. 
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III. EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION 
1. Full Effect 
In a few countries outstanding for their broad views and 
cosmopolitan mentality, such as Great Britain, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, and Greece, recognition is traditionally 
granted to any organization in the world legally created in the 
state of its central office or, in the British case, in any state. 
This recognition means in principle no less than the permis-
sion to exercise the purposes of the charter. It is fair to state 
that, although France reserves its general authorization of 
foreign stock companies, this authorization, if given to the 
companies of a certain country, includes the right of doing 
business within the country. The principle is not inconsistent 
with regulations such as the prescription of registration. 
But this standard is not reached in most countries. 
2. Minimal Effect 
In view of the manifold impositions and restrictions to 
which in the majority of the territorial laws the activities of 
foreign associations are subject, it is convenient to ask, What 
position results from the mere fact of authorization, inde-
pendently of any other requisite? 
There are two such rights guaranteed and generally ac-
corded in the international treaties. One is the capacity to be 
a party to a suit, and the other the capacity to engage in 
"isolated acts." Not without justification the first category 
sometimes appears absorbed by the second, but it has to be 
considered here separately in accordance with the more 
common usage. 
(a) Capacity to be a party.92 Capacity to sue and to be sued 
as a party to litigation in court has been regarded as a "natural 
92 Cf. LAITY, "International Standing in Court of Foreign Corporations," 
29 Mich. L. Rev. (1930) 28. 
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right" of a corporation/3 or as a means of realizing its rights,94 
and as "indispensable to protect the personal status."95 The 
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the power 
of a foreign corporation to bring proper suit in a state tribunal 
is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.96 We may take it 
as the by far prevailing view that foreign corporations are 
considered capable of being a party not only in jurisdictions 
where they are entitled to carry on business of a permanent 
character, but also in those where they would need to comply 
with some impositions if they were to do "business" but in 
fact do not carry on any such business. 97 The situation is differ-
ent, when a foreign corporation should have complied with 
statutory requirements and in violation thereof has done 
93 2 KENT 2 84; STORY § 56 5; LINDLEY, On Companies I 22 I g; WALKER 
158. 
94 YOUNG 89. 
95 THOMPSON § 7977· 
96 Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp. (192.2.) 
2.62 U.S. 544; Note, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) at 1135-II38. 
97 England: WESTLAKE§ 306; YOUNG 179· 
United States: Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler (x814) 
2 Gall. 105; Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux (x8o9) 5 Cranch 6x, 78; HENDERSON 
39-42· 
Canada: Creamette Co. v. Famous Foods, Ltd. (1933) Ex. C. R. zoo (action 
for infringement of trade mark). 
Argentina: C. C. arts. 35, 44, C. Com. art. 2.85. 
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (Sept. z, 1932.) 2.4 Arch. Jud. 394 (action by 
Delaware corporation to cancel defendant's commercial name). The cases 
are digested by RoDRIGO OcrAVIO, Dicionario Nos. 12.59 to 1269 and reviewed 
by KNIGHT, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933) 2.10. Cf. CARVALHO DE MENDON<;A, 4 
Trat. Dir. Com. 2 77; ESPINOLA, 6 Tratado 56 7 No. 6 and 8-C id. 1 77 5. 
Chile: In one opinion, see HERRERA REYES, Sociedades An6nimas (I 9 35) 
2.71 § 2.99· 
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2.17 No. z8. 
The Netherlands: C. Civ. Proc. arts. 12.71 768; Rb. Amsterdam (March I71 
1899) W. 7351, and (May.7, 19oo) W. 74oo, Clunet 1903, 92.5. 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 109. 
Rumania: Cass. (June 8, 1937) No. 142.8, Clunet 19381 961. 
Sweden: MALMAR, 7 Repert. 14I No. 149· 
Switzerland: BG. (July u, I934) 6o BGE. I 2.2.01 2.2.6: corporation of New 
York; recognition exists ipso jure and implies the faculty of standing in court. 
Turkey: Law of Nov. 30, IJ30/x9I41 art. 12.. 
Venezuela: Corte Federal y de Casaci6n (Aug. 41 1934) Lahoud v. Colgate 
Palmolive Peet Co. (1937) Gaceta Oficial II4.079, cf. CRAWFORD, 12. Tul. 
L. Rev. (I938) 2.2.2.. 
144 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS 
business in the state, but in many jurisdictions full capacity 
is granted even in this case. 98 
Capacity for suing and being sued is so much the most 
important incident of recognition and so frequently causes 
international preoccupation, that provisions for securing it 
appear in all bipartite and multipartite treaties or drafts in-
volving business associations. 
Exceptions to this principle, however, discernible in nu-
merous instances, deserve examination. 
Sometimes an alleged exception is caused by confusion be-
98 United States: Cooke, J., in Alpena Portland Cement Co. v. Jenkins and 
Reynolds Co. (I9Io) 244 Ill. 354, 9I N. E. 48o; McKee v. Stewart Land & 
Live Stock Co. (I925) 28 Ariz. 5II, 238 Pac. p6; Mandel v. Swan Land&. 
Cattle Co. (I895) I54 Ill. I77, 40 N. E. 462. 
Canada: Alberta: Companies Act, s. I 49 (I) as construed in Lampson, 
Fraser & Huth, Inc. v. Simpson [I942] 3 W. W. R. 238 (Alta.); 
British Columbia: Charles H. Lilly Co. v. Johnston Fisheries Co. (I 909) I o 
W. L. R. 2: "The ordinary common law right to sue was not taken away or 
interfered with by the (Brit. Col. Companies) Act" ( s. I 4 3). Northwest 
Trading Co. v. Northwest Trading Co. [C. A. I92o] I W. W. R. 353, af!'d 
[I92o] 3 W. W. R. 729 (action to compel defendant to change its name); 
Ontario: Howe Machine Co. v. Walker (I877) 35 U. C. Q. B. 37 (C. A.); 
Quebec: Ontario Marble Works, Ltd. v. Lepage Marble Works, Ltd. (I 924) 
3I Que. Pr. 2I7; 
Saskatchewan: Bondholders Security Corp. v. Manville [I933] 3 W. W. R. 1, 
[1933] 4 D. L. R. 699 (Sask. C. A.). 
Austria: (Stock companies not having been permitted business): OGH (Oct. 
10, 1888) 26 GIU. No. 12389; (June 22, 1932) I4 SZ. 425 No. tJZ; WALKER 
204 n. I 1. 
Belgium: Cass. Beige (Oct. 6, 1904) Pasicrisie I904.1.362: French mutual 
insurance company in absence of the publications prescribed by art. 1 98 of 
Consolidated Companies Act; App. Bruxelles (Feb. 8, I924) Revue Inst. 
Beige I925, 232; see also Trib. Com. Liege (June 28, 1937) 5 Giur. Comp. 
DIP. (I939) IO § 8. Formerly Cass. (March 7, 1895) Clunet I895, 876 
had held the contrary opinion, but was criticized. 
Brazil: The question seems not to have been decided, although the decisions 
referred to in the preceding note (see in particular Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 6, 
I925) 83 Revista Dir. 326, EsPINOLA, 1 Pandectas Brasileiras, pt. 2, 28o) 
regularly held that foreign business corporations have personality "inde-
pendently of governmental authorization." 
Chile: In one opinion, see HERRERA REYES, Sociedades An6nimas (I 9 35) 
271 § 299· 
Italy: App. Torino (Jan. 7, 1936) Rivetta v. Rendley, Foro Ital. I936 
I 397 citing ample precedents, 
Rumania: See NEGULESCO, Clunet 1910, 55· 
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tween recogmt10n and permission to do business, as only 
recently in the Yugoslavian Commercial Code.99 
In other cases, a corporation has been declared nonexistent, 
simply because it did not have a business place or do business 
in the state and therefore omitted registration or filing for 
license. Isolated language to this effect in the United States 
has been noticed abroad100 but must be considered inexact. 
However, such a deviation from the general behavior of 
courts has been observed in a few Latin-American jurisdic-
tions, particularly on the part of the Mexican Federal Tribu-
nal.101 Such restriction has been the object of a declaration on 
juridicial personality of foreign companies, opened for signa-
ture by the Pan-American Union on June 25, 1936, recently 
ratified by the United States, Chile, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela.102 It 
declares: 
"Companies103 constituted in accordance with the laws of 
one of the Contracting States, and which have their seats in its 
territory, shall be able to exercise in the territories of the 
other Contracting States, notwithstanding that they do not 
have a permanent establishment, branch or agency in such 
99 Yugoslavia: C. Com. § 503, criticized by EISNER, I Symmikta Streit at 
293· 100 LOEB, Clunet I 922, 3 I 9, and BE11"ZKE, Jur. Personen I 64 have cited 
Texas Rev. Stat. I9I I, I3I8 (corresponding to art. I536 Rev. Stat. I925); 
Chapman v. Hallwood Cash Register Co. (App. Texas I9o3) 73 S. W. 969, 
but in this case the corporation had an office in Dallas, Texas, and carried on 
business. 101 Mexico: See cases expertly commented by ScHuSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 
(1933) J4I, 374, 8 id. 563 and more recently the decision in Amparo Molina 
(1935) 403 Seman. Jud. (1935) IJt2; VoELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940) 
52, 66. 
Furthermore, "personality" is denied in: 
Bolivia: Law of Nov. 13, r886, art. 4· 
Panama: Law No. 32, of Feb. 26, 1927, art. 91. 102 Proclamation of the President of the United States, 55 Statutes at Large 
1201; the text of the Pan-American declaration has also been published in 
Hudson, 7 Int. Legislation 355 No. 445· 103 Spanish sociedades, see supra p. r o. Chile, in its "understanding" in 
signing, speaks of sociedades mercantiles. 
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territories, any commercial activity which is not contrary 
to the laws of such States and to enter all appearances in the 
courts as planti:ffs or defendants, provided they comply with 
the laws of the country in question." 
The word "notwithstanding" directly refers to the mentioned 
case, namely, where the corporation has no business ties with 
the country, although its solution would seem a commonplace. 
Finally, it occurs frequently within and without the United 
States that a foreign corporation is not permitted to bring an 
action, as one of the penalties for noncompliance with the 
statutory requirements for doing intrastate business.104 This 
is comparable to the refusal by French courts of the right of 
suit to foreign corporations not recognized through decree 
or treaty, a refusal strongly disapproved in the French litera-
ture.1011 
In connection with the Pan-American resolution mentioned 
above, the United States has declared its "understanding" 
that the companies "shall be permitted to sue or defend suits 
of any kind without the requirement of registration or do-
mestication." Certainly what was meant was "authorization" 
rather than "domestication" in the proper sense. Does the 
declaration mean that the resolution extends to the case of 
unauthorized business? This, in fact, was the significance of 
an analogous resolution by the Institute of International Law 
as early as r 8 9 !.106 But another "understanding" of the 
Chilean Delegation points to the contrary conception, and 
many states of this country deny the right to sue to non-
complying corporations. 
Also the recommendations of the Council of the League 
of Nations of I923107 demanded the faculty to appear as 
plaintiff or defendant only for such persons, firms and 
104 See infra Chapter 2.3, pp. 2.o3ff. 105 See PILLET, 2. Traite §§ 745, 746. 106 II Annuaire (I889-I892.) I7I arts. I and III. 107 League of Nations Document, C. 3 6. M. 2. I; I 92.9 II No. 7· 
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companies as are permitted to be established, but the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, in its proposals to the Uni-
versal Economic Conference in Geneva, 1927, desired to 
secure the right of standing in court for all companies. 
None of these statements refers to the other half of the 
so-called capacity to sue and to be sued, viz., the capacity to 
perform procedural acts. The distinction is more important 
than in the case of individuals, because even in countries 
applying the personal law to the procedural competence of 
physical persons, organizations usually are subject to the local 
law of procedure. This is particularly remarkable in the case 
of noncorporate associations. 
Illustration: An English partnership is capable, under the 
English court rules, of being a party and, therefore, has the 
right to sue in a German court. The plaintiff partnership 
failed to send in particulars for registration under the English 
Registration of Business Names Act, 1916, and thus lost 
enforcement of its rights arising out of any contract.108 But 
this regards only the procedural disability of the firm; "the 
capacity of being a party according to English law engenders 
procedural capacity in Germany even though it is missing 
under English law." LG. Berlin (December 13, 1929), 
IPRspr. 1930 No. 20. . 
(b) Single acts. Regulations requiring foreign corporations 
to register or to obtain a license generally apply only if the 
business to be carried on reaches some degree of permanence, 
allowing "single" or "isolated" acts unconditionally.109 The 
boundaries of the permitted zone vary a little, but ordinarily 
activities such as taking orders from customers by letter, or 
by traveling agents/10 acquiring/11 holding,112 or administer-
108 LINDLEY, Partnership .(ed. 10) I 59· 
109 Cf. Restatement § r 6 7 comment. 
Argentina: C. Com. art. z85. 
El Salvador: C. Com. art. Z99· 
For other Latin-American countries, see VOELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940) 
at 47 ns. zr, zz; 55 n. sz. 
110 United States: This frequent assumption follows the English distinction 
148 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS 
ing113 property, and other simple exercises of the corporate 
capacity, are included. 
In the United States, no comprehensive definition of doing 
business exists, but approximate agreement obtains on certain 
definite rules or principles which are "suggestive and illustra-
tive rather than definitive," as the draftsmen of the Uniform 
Foreign Corporations Act have stated. Their tentative defini-
tion: 
"The term 'doing business' means the transaction by a 
foreign corporation of some part of its business substantial 
and ,continuous in character and not merely casual or oc-
casional," 
has been supplemented by an enumeration of permitted activi-
ties of a rather liberal extent.114 
On the other hand, there are certain outstanding cases in 
made for purposes of jurisdiction and taxation in La Bourgogne [1899] P. 1; 
[1899] A. C. 431; The Holstein (1936) 155 L. T. R. 466. See, for example, 
West Pub. Co. v. Superior Court of San Francisco (Cal. 1942) 128 Pac. 
(2d) 777: "mere solicitation of business, advertising or demonstrating products, 
listing of names of the company in the telephone directory or the company 
having its name on the door of an office or presence of a company official on 
personal business .... " 
Canada: Alberta: Foreign Companies Act, 3 Rev. Stat. 1922, 2019 s. 4 
(3): "The taking orders by travellers for goods, wares or merchandise to be 
subsequently imported into Alberta to fill such orders, or the buying or selling 
of such goods, wares or merchandise by correspondence if the company has no 
resident agent or representative and no warehouse office or place of business in 
Alberta . . . shall not be deemed to be carrying on business under the 
meaning of this Act." 'Similarly, British Columbia: Rev. Stat. 1936, c. 42, s. 
178, and Nova Scotia: Rev. Stat. 1923, c. 173, s. 30. But the Alberta provision 
was narrowed: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. I 942, c. 240, s. I 3 3 (b). Ex-
tremely narrow, Manitoba: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1940, c. 36, s. 452. 
Austria: OGH. (May 3o, I899) Amtl. S. No. 88, Io Z.int.R. 76; (Feb. 5, 
I929) Rspr. 1929, 49 No. 70, cited by WALKER 204 n. 12. 
Brazil: Sup. Trib. (May 25, I927) 87 Revista Dir. 88 (sale of goods by 
an American business corporation not authorized to do business). 
Rumania: Cass. (June 8, 1937) No. 1428; Clunet 1938, 961. 
111 E.g., taking valid title to property in stock; after resale the buyer has 
a good title: Crockin v. Boston Store of Fort Myers (Fla. 1940) 188 So. 
853· 
112 Austria: High Administrative Court (June 30, 1936) 65 J. Bl. 505. 
113 YoUNG 91, citing 4 LAURENT§ 137• 
114 National Conference, Handbook 1934, 287, 304 with a valuable table 
of cases. 
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which neither the constitutional freedom of interstate and 
foreign commerce nor the usual statutory faculty of doing 
single acts may be relied on. Thus, intrastate business is 
assumed to exist if a warehouse is maintained in the state, 
from which goods are shipped to customers in the state; 115 or 
if a foreign corporation sells and, through its agent in the 
state, installs machinery/"6 constructs highways,117 supplies 
concrete pipe for a sewer job,118 or installs fixtures. 119 But a 
transaction made by an agent in the state is likely not to be 
regarded as doing business, if the authority of the agent is 
limited to soliciting and transmitting applicationS.120 
In the Latin-American countries, the main criterion, as 
will be seen, is the carrying on of a branch or agency in the 
territory.121 Bolivia, however, is said to deny even the mini-
mum of tolerance to any nonregistered foreign company.122 
J. Is the Extent of Recognition Determined by Domestic 
Law? 
All particular solutions described above evince the simple 
principle that the foreign personal law, if recognized, is 
applied exactly as it is established by the state of creation. The 
smooth operation of this principle is, however, jeopardized 
by frequent broad references to the concepts and measures of 
115 Where the goods are shipped from another state, the corporation is 
recognized as engaged in interstate commerce, see Caldwell v. North Carolina 
(1903) 187 U.S. 6u. 
116 2 BEALE 843 § 179.15. 
117 Amos D. Bridge's Sons, Inc. v. State of New York (1921) 188 App. Div. 
soo, aff'd, 23I N.Y. 532. 
118 Loomis v. People's Construction Co. (1914) 21 I Fed. 453· 
119 George M. Muller Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank of Dothan (1912.) 
q6 Ala. 22.9, 57 So. 762.. 
120 Union Trust Co. of Md. v. Rodeman (1936) 220 Wis. 453, 264 N. W. 
so8 at 5 12.. 
121 See infra Chapter 2.3, I. Guatemala: C. Com. (1942) art. 416 shares 
in this view. In addition, the C. C. (I933) art. zs, continuing former pro-
visions, establishes a series of duties for foreign companies and associations 
"habitually" carrying on business in the Republic. 
122 Bolivia: Law of Nov. q, I886, art. 4; ARAOZ, I Nuevo Digesto de 
Legislacion Boliviana (1929) 24; VOELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940) at 56. 
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the law of the forum. Constitutions, statutes, and courts are 
prone to declare that a foreign juristic person cannot have 
more rights than domestic persons have. 
In Europe this is an opinion of long standing, followed by 
some eminent writers.123 Michaud, the author of the French 
standard work, regards it as a "principle generally ~ccepted 
that foreign corporations ought not to enjoy treatment more 
favorable than the French corporations," which principle, in 
fact, "constitutes an exception to the personal law."124 If 
German courts, in recognizing the existence and capacity of a 
foreign business association, describe its status as similar to 
that of a German stock corporation or a limited partnership,125 
they try only to make the personality of the enterprise clear. 
In one case, however, a banking corporation of Tennessee was 
refused recognition because it did not seem to conform to any 
legal type of association at the forum-a decision without 
authority.126 Of English courts, it is only known that, not 
accustomed to regard the monarchical state of England as a 
person, they would not allow the King of Spain to sue as 
personifying the Spanish fiscus,121 but required that he should 
act as a royal corporation sole, like the Crown of England128 
or as a trustee for his subjects, or on his own behal£.129 But 
this intolerance pertained to the overextended procedural 
concepts of British judges.130 
123 MAMELOK 76; AssER-RIVIER, Elements 202; YouNG 92, 94; PouLLET 
in Clunet I904, 828 and in Manuel 254 § 2I7. See also PILLET, Personnes 
Morales 91 § 66. 
124 MICHOUD, 2 Personnalite Morale 352 § 329. 
125 See for instance, RG. (Dec. I6, I9I3) 83 RGZ. 367; RG. (June 3, 
I927) II7 RGZ. 2I5 at 217; RG. (Oct. 29, I938) I59 RGZ. 33 at 46. 
126 OLG. Hamburg (June 23, I 903) I4 Z.int.R. 64, criticized by BEITZKE, 
J ur. Personen 6o n. I 6. 
127 United States v. Wagner (1867) 2 L. R. Ch. 582 per Cairns, J.; cf. 
YoUNG r8o. 
128 King of Spain v. Hullett & Widder (r833) 7 Bli. N. S. 359, r Cl. & F. 
333· 129 Hullett v. King of Spain (r828) 2 Bli. N. S. 31,28 R. R. 56. 
130 YoUNG 299. Contrary to this spirit, C. M. SCHMITTHOFF, Textbook of 
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Drafts of the Swiss Civil Code adopted the said doctrine 
and granted corporations and establishments having foreign 
headquarters civil personality only within the limits de-
termined by Swiss law.131 This idea was criticized and omitted 
in the final text, but it has been incorporated in the Civil Code 
of Liechtenstein132 and the Commercial Code of Yugoslavia. 
The latter recognizes the capacity of foreign companies to no 
greater extent than is granted to domestic companies of a 
similar or kindred type, serving similar or kindred purposes. 
Foreign types unknown to the internal law are subjected to 
the provisions involving the next related domestic type.133 If 
the foreign type cannot be fitted into any of the domestic 
categories, it is treated like an ordinary stock corporation. 134 
The recent Civil Code of Peru135 joins this group, stating 
that "the capacity of foreign juristic persons cannot be con-
trary to the public policy nor more extensive than that granted 
to nationals," and, while the Latin-American statutes follow-
ing the Spanish model regularly set forth the principle that 
(recognized) foreign corporations enjoy the same private 
rights as national individuals, 136 certain ones, such as the 
Constitution of Venezuela of 1936 (art. 37), add that they 
have in no case greater rights than nationals. The tentative 
drafts of the Restatement (Nos. r-3, § 171) declared that: 
"No power given to a foreign corporation by the law of 
the state of incorporation can give it a right to do any act 
which a corporation as such is not permitted to do by the 
law of the state in which the act is done." 
the English Conflict of Laws (London I945) 33I tries to apply Dicey's 
proposition that a foreign status unknown to the English law is not recognized. 
131 Preliminary Draft (I9oo) art. 70; Draft of March 3, I905, art. I748. 
See criticism by SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legisl. Comp. (I92I) 246. 
132 Liechtenstein: P. G. R. art. 2 3 5 par. 3· 
133 Yugoslavian C. Com. of I937, § 502 par. 2, cf. EISNER, I Symmikta 
Streit (I939) 292. The Japanese C. Com. art. 255 is similar. 
134 Yugoslavia: C. Com.§ soo pars. 3, 4· 
135 Peru: C. C. (I936) Tit. Prel. art. IX par. 2. 
136 Spain: C. Com. art. I 5, see TRiAs DEBEs 68. 
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The final text has cancelled this statement, but comment b 
of § 165 says that: 
"A state usually restricts the activities of a foreign corpo-
ration to the same extent to which it restricts the activities 
of a domestic corporation." 
In fact, most American jurisdictions have a clause in their 
constitutions or statutes enouncing one of the following ver-
sions of the same idea:137 
(a) Any foreign corporation shall have the same rights 
and privileges as are enjoyed by domestic corporations of the 
same or similar character,138 or 
No foreign corporation shall have any greater rights or 
privileges than those enjoyed by domestic corporations of a 
similar character. 139 
(b) No foreign corporation shall be allowed to transact 
business in the state on more favorable conditions than are 
prescribed by local law for similar domestic corporations.140 
(c) No foreign corporation may carry on any business 
which a domestic corporation is prohibited from doing,141 or 
The exercise of which is either prohibited to domestic 
corporations or against the public policy of the state,142 or 
137 A survey as of the year I92.3 was made by the French writer LEPAULLE, 
Condition des societes etrangeres I6I, I64. 
138 Arizona: Code (I939) § s3-8o4. 
Idaho: Code (I932.) § 2.9-so8. 
Louisiana: General Statutes ( I9 3 9) § 12.46. 
South Carolina: Code (I942.) § 7764. 
Texas: Revised Civil Statutes (I92.S) art. I~32.. 
139 Montana: Constitution (I 8 8 9) art. XV li II. 
Oregon: C. C. (Compiled Laws Ann.) (I940) § 77-3I8. 
140 Arizona: Constitution (I912.) art. XIV§ S· 
California: Constitution (I879) art. XII§ IS· 
Kentucky: Constitution (I89I) § 2.02.. 
Utah: Constitution (I89S) art. XII§ 6. 
Washington: Constitution (I889) art. 12. § 7· 
141 Maine: Revised Statutes (I944) c. 49 §us. 
Maryland: Annotated Code (I939) art. 2.3 § u8. 
Ohio: Code (I938) § 86zs-I6. 
Oklahoma: Constitution ( I907) art. IX § 44· 
Virginia: Constitution (I9o2.) § I63. 
142 Georgia: Code (I933) § 2.2.-IS03· 
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Foreign corporations must be organized for a purpose 
for which local corporations may be organized.148 
(d) Many states have some slight variations, such as 
combining the "same rights and privileges" clause with the 
clause that a foreign corporation cannot transact business for-
bidden to a domestic corporation, 144 or 
(e) Foreign corporations are subject to all liabilities, 
restrictions, and duties imposed on like domestic corporations 
and have no other or greater powers.146 
The emphasis in these statutes is on the penalties and 
restrictions rather than the powers and privileges. 
What do all these rules mean? Do they affect the recog-
nition of the foreign-created personality? 
It would seem so in a few instances. Among European 
cases, there are some that have already been considered and 
refuted, such as the Dutch decision rejecting the legal person-
ality of a French partnership because the law of the forum 
knew only partnerships without full personality; 146 the court 
failed to see that as the party was not a Dutch partnership, 
Dutch law could not apply. The Appellate Court of Brussels 
recognized a Dutch association for nonprofit purposes only 
since a Belgian law shortly before had introduced similar as-
sociations; 147 this was not a convincing reason, as was noted, 
since the same court denied legal existence in Belgium to a 
French trade union, 148 although the analogous "professional 
syndicates" had been instituted in Belgium.149 
143 Kansas: Statutes (1935) § 17-503. 
144 Illinois: Bus. Corp. Act (1933) § 157-103. 
Michigan: General Corporation Act (1931) § 94· 
Missouri: Revised Statutes (1939) §sop .. 
New Mexico: Statutes (1941) §§ 54-801, 54-804. 
145 Arkansas: Pope's Digest (1937) c. 37 § 2249. 
Colorado: Statutes (1935) c. 41 § 110. 
Indiana: Annotated Statutes (1933) § 25-302. 
Iowa: Code (1946) § 494.14. 
Mississippi: Code (1942) tit. 21 § 5341. 
146 Rh. Amsterdam (Dec. 19, 1924) 13 Bull. Inst. Int. (1925) 279 § 4225. 
147 App. Bruxelles (June 9, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.2.157. 
148 App. Bruxelles (May 4, 1932) 1932.2.221. 
149 DUBOIS-CLAVIER, Clunet 1933, 199. 
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Because in Illinois domestic banks were forbidden to hold 
stock in another bank corporation, the Supreme Court of 
Illinois held that a foreign bank corporation licensed to do 
business was not authorized to purchase bank stock, purchase 
and transfer of the stock being "ultra vires and void.m50 The 
Court thus directly denied the corporate powers acquired in 
another state. But, if ordinarily the theory of special powers 
and the doctrine of illegality should be clearly separated/51 
this is doubly needed where a legal prohibition is territorially 
limited. The true solution was simply to extend the policy 
of Illinois, viz., that no bank should hold stock in another 
bank, to the branch of a foreign bank. On the same line, it was 
declared public policy in Illinois that no corporation, whether 
domestic or foreign, should engage in the business of buying 
and selling real estate, although the statute seemed not to 
envisage foreign corporations.152 Unincorporated associations, 
whether domestic or foreign, have been held excluded from 
writing insurance in Idaho.153 A foreign corporation, author-
ized in Michigan to do telegraph business was not granted 
a concession for other, viz., telephone, business "for which 
a domestic corporation could be formed," but the court saw 
clearly that what the statute intended was to prohibit one 
corporation from engaging in both kinds of business, and this 
policy was decisive.154 
The obvious conclusion may be verified by counterproof. 
Although in Illinois a corporation cannot be organized to do 
different classes of insurance business, there is no implied 
prohibition for a New York corporation155 to do such multi-
150Golden v. Cervenka (1917) 278 Ill. 409 at 440, II6 N. E. 273 at 286. 
151 CARPENTER, "Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires be Discarded?" 33 Yale 
L. J. (1924) 49, 68. 
152 Evans v. McKinney (1923) 308 Ill. roo, 139 N. E. 99· See for real 
estate brokerage, Warren v. Interstate Realty Co. (1914) 192 Ill. App. 438. 
153 Intermountain Lloyds v. Diefendorf (193 I) 5 I Ida. 304, 5 Pac. (2d) 730. 
154 Amer. Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Secretary of State (1909) 159 
Mich. r 95, r2 3 N. w. 5 6&. 155 People v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. (1894) 153 Ill. 25, 38 N. E. 752· 
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form business in Illinois. Frequently, objections against the 
purpose or the structure of a foreign corporation divergent 
from domestic legislation, have been raised but rejected. A 
corporation organized in another state solely for religious, 
missionary, educational, and charitable purposes was held 
capable of acquiring and holding land in California without 
complying with certain provisions of the California Civil 
Code. 156 A Kansas corporation having its capital stock divided 
into shares of no fixed nominal par value, was recognized in 
Missouri, 157 and a Delaware corporation, having a mixed 
stock structure, was admitted in California/58 despite diverg-
ent domestic legislation. The New York courts have per-
mitted an insolvent foreign corporation to make an assign-
ment to creditors, prohibited to New York corporations/59 
and so forth. 
The reasonable intention of legislatures and courts is to 
segregate within the territorial enacted law a portion embody-
ing imperative public policy to be applied to all corporations, 
whether foreign or domestic, doing business in the state. The 
intention is not, however, to restrict recognition otherwise 
than by the well-known provisions concerning the doing of 
business. Only on this basis can the sanction of violations be 
adequately determined. 
Great help in avoiding harmful applications of the existent 
incautious provisions has come from the popular statement 
that the failure of a state to provide domestic corporations 
with the same powers, or to authorize them to be formed for 
156 General Conference etc. v. Berkey (1909) 156 Cal. 466, 105 Pac. 411. 
157 State ex rel. Standard Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan (1920) 282 Mo. 261, 
22 I s. W. 728, 732. 
158 Commonwealth Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan (1926) 198 Cal. 618, 246 
Pac. 796. The Constitution of Washington does not warrant exclusion of a 
foreign corporation because it is permitted to issue common stock of different 
classes not allow,ed domestic corporations, Fibreboard Products v. Hinkle 
(1928) 147 Wash. 10. 
159 Vanderpoel v. Gorman (1894) 140 N.Y. 563, 35 N. E. 9J2· 
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the same purposes, is not presumed to exclude a foreign corpo-
ration from exercising activities according to its charter.160 
These observations suffice for the limited purpose of the 
present inquiry, which is not concerned with the delicate 
question how far public policy goes or should go. Evidently 
all doctrines and provisions forcing all foreign organizations 
into a domestic mould, are ill-framed and would be quite 
dangerous but for the good sense of judges throughout the 
world. To ban or degrade foreign types of associations would 
entirely deform the principle that the law of the charter 
governs. The progress of international intercourse which has 
engineered the "liberal" theory of recognition, in turn, de-
pends upon a liberal concept of recognition. Moreover, the 
parties who organize an enterprise must choose its juristic 
shape and adjust its structure in accordance with the types 
offered by the local law and are unable to comply with every 
idea of legislators in all parts of the globe. They should not, 
in fairness, have to give thought to any law except that of 
creation, except perhaps that designed to govern the principal 
place of business. 
The retrogression would be worse, if these clauses under 
consideration should mean that domestic corporations would 
be protected against competition161 by other means than 
taxation and licensing for business. This would largely ex-
ceed the scope of the famous reciprocity or "retaliatory" 
clauses. 
If the problem, instead, is confined to its proper domain, 
internal law will be held to affect the original nature of a 
foreign organization only on the ground of a vital public 
policy, important enough to overcome the needs of trade or 
H10 Stevens v. Pratt (1882) 101 Ill. 2o6, Stump v. Sturm (1918) 254 Fed. 
535; 2 BEALE§ 167.33; FLETCHER, 17 Cyc. Corp.§ 8334 n. 45 and cases 
supra ns. 151-153. 
161 This is the interpretation by LEPAULLE, supra n. I 3 7, ·1 64 who is appre-
hensive of the sphere of discretion left to the administrative agencies. 
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spiritual and cultural interchange. The theory of comity 
should at last lose its grip. 
There is, however, a reverse side of the thesis that "foreign 
juristic persons enjoy the same private rights as those of the 
same class" formed at the forum. De Becker believed it was· 
"the awkward result" of the Japanese rule, formulated in 
these terms, that foreign corporations may enjoy in Japan 
rights which they cannot enjoy at home.162 This is not the 
meaning, of course. But it has likewise been observed in this 
country that the domestic law of the state where activities are 
exercised, increases the powers of a foreign corporation in 
such matters as usury, taking land by devise, making pref-
erential payments, and eminent domain.163 Thus, the well-
settled rule that a state never concedes permission to a foreign 
corporation to go beyond its charter164 would be overridden. 
However, all such results may be explained, each one sep-
arately, in other ways. Regrettably, this matter exceeds the 
scope of this treatise. 
IV. THE PowERs OF THE CoRPORATION AND oF ITS AGENTS 
There is no disagreement on the principle that the capacity 
of a corporation and the authority of its principal representa-
tives are primarily determined by its personal law. 
I. Powers of Corporation 
Powers denied to a corporation by the law of incorporation 
are denied it in any country.165 American courts say, "Comity 
does not add powers but only recognizes existing ones." Con-
162 DE BECKER, Int. Priv. Law 62. 
163 Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1225. 
164 See next note. 
165 Relfe v. Rundle (t88o) 103 U.S. 222,2251 2 BEALE§ 165.1; PILLET, 
Personnes Morales 105; RAAPE 136; TRiAs DE BEs 386. For instance, a foreign 
company in liquidation has the limited capacity of the law of charter: App. 
Athens (1929) Clunet 1931, 494· 
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flicts, however, are immediately presented by the funda-
mentally different conceptions of common and civil law in 
construing corporate powers. 
In modern civil law, capacity to have rights and powers, 
pertains to juristic persons in the same full extent as to indi-
viduals, excepting natural abilities such as capacity to marry 
and to make a will, but including name, honor, and credit.166 
For the benefit of third persons dealing with corporations, 
the laws usually freeze this full capacity into a "formal," i.e., 
an absolutely fixed sum of faculties, independent of the 
purposes of incorporation and restrictions imposed through 
charter or by-laws. Even though a juristic person ought not 
to make certain transactions according to the constitutional 
documents and resolutions of stockholder meetings, it can 
yet do them with legal effect. Any transaction with third 
persons, therefore, is valid, at least if there is no fraudulent 
collusion between the agents and the third parties. 
At common law, a juristic person has no more than the 
special capacity conferred upon it by the act of creation in view 
of its particular purposes. Whenever a corporation enters into 
a transaction beyond the prescribed radius of its activity, it 
acts "ultra vires," without power, and the act in principle is 
legally inexistent as nobody's act. An English judge believed 
this view self-evident and "not a mere canon of English 
municipal law but a great and broad principle which must be 
taken as part of any system of jurisprudence.m67 He allowed 
a minority of stockholders in a Turkish railway corporation 
to sue the directors with the demand to restrain them from 
making payments ensuing from a majority vote in a general 
meeting, the vote being "ultra vires of the majority." The 
court thus not only interfered with the internal affairs of a 
166 UDINA, Elementi No. So. 
Quebec: C. C. art. 352, 358, 17; cf. 2 JOHNSON 177. 
167 Pickering v. Stephenson (r872) 14 L. R. Eq. 32.2.. 
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foreign corporation but applied an imagined Turkish law 
similar to the English. 
The French Conseil d'Etat has developed a somewhat 
comparable doctrine of "specialty" (principe de specialite) 
limiting the powers of public administrative boards that have 
legal personality, in accordance with their specific purposes. 
But this doctrine is intended to foster good administration and 
by no means to serve as a rule of private law or as a restriction 
on capacity/68 
This contrast must be realized in applying the conflicts rule. 
It follows that American or English courts should recognize 
the formal, general powers of Belgian, Brazilian, French, and 
other civil law corporations, and that courts in civil law 
countries should note the limited, special powers of American 
and British corporations. The latter effect is actually well 
known in Europe. 163 
All theories of special powers, however, involve manifest 
dangers to third persons who act in good faith, and the more 
so in extraterritorial operation. The basic principle of the 
personal law in itself rightly disregards whether third persons 
do or do not know the extent of corporate capacity. The 
Supreme Court of the United States once arrived at this 
result by the presumption or fiction that "every person who 
deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself 
to such laws of the foreign government affecting the powers 
and obligations of the corporation with which he voluntarily 
contracts as that government authorizes."170 But the concealed 
limitation to the avires'' inherent in the common law doctrine 
of special powers, has caused inconveniences more acutely 
felt in the United States than in England, because of the close 
168 See RIGAUD, 1o Repert. 271 No. 151. 
169 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 6, 1893) Clunet 1894, 916 (English memo-
randum of association) ; approved in France by PILLET, Personnes Morales 
§ 166; in Germany by M. WOLFF, IPR. 72 and others; in Switzerland by 
STEIGER, 67 ZBJV. (1931) 317. 
17
° Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard (1883) 109 U.S. 527. 
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co-existence of so many states which are the common territory 
of so many business corporations. Judicial inventiveness has 
developed an abundance of remedies tempering the result and 
particularly effective in case a corporation acts outside of its 
charter state.171 Thus, the courts presume that a particular 
contract entered into by a corporation is within its powers. 
More important, many prohibitions are construed as applying 
to corporate action only in the state of incorporation, e.g., 
statutory prohibitions against taking lands by will or general 
assignment.172 Such limitations present a hard task of interpre-
tation, and no smooth formula has been found to designate 
generally which parts of the charter, the by-laws, or the 
general law "migrate with the corporation."173 More adequate 
relief is furnished by skillful drafting of charters and by-laws 
covering every reasonably expected activity. Moreover, de-
spite omission of required formalities or transgression of pre-
scribed purposes, contracts are held valid on the ground of 
assumed "general powers" of the corporation for the benefit 
of other parties who act in good faith. In addition, fully 
executed contracts are safe, and those executed by one party 
are protected in most jurisdictions through the estoppel 
doctrine.174 What remains prevailingly unenforceable after 
all, are only executory ultra vires contracts, and in some juris-
171 Restatement§ I 56 comment c; id. § I65 comment a; 2. BEALE 758 § I65. 
The purpose of protecting third persons must be borne in mind. E.g., as the 
Nevada Act of March 2.4, I909 (Statutes of Nevada, I9o8/I9o9, p. 2.5I), 
gave priority to certain claims against an insolvent banking corporation, the 
Ninth Circ. Ct. of Appeals in Washington-Alaska Bank v. Dexter etc. Bank 
(I92.o) 2.63 Fed. 304 said that "depositors and others who dealt with the bank 
were not required to search the statute of Nevada to ascertain what their rights 
were. They were entitled to rely upon the laws of the territory where the bank 
was engaged in business." 
172 2. BEALE 757-762.; Restatement§ I65 comment a; Note in 40 Col. L. 
Rev. ( 1940) I 2. I I- 12. I 5. Provisions against lending money in excess of a fixed 
rate are likewise interpreted as territorial, but this regards illegal and not ultra 
vires transactions. 
173 Cf. Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. (I94o) l2.I8. 
174 For a recent case of denial that defense by estoppel is barred by estoppel 
see Pattison v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n (I935) 360 Ill. 616, 196 N. E. 882. 
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dictions also those executed on one side, still with exceptions. 
Where incorporation has been obtained in several states, the 
corporation is not allowed to plead lack of power, if it posses-
ses it in any one of these states.115 Presumptions are in favor 
of general and unlimited capacity, although it is not presumed 
that a foreign corporation of a particular type or class has 
power not necessarily or usually possessed by corporations of 
the kind in question.116 There are even other ways to evade 
the ultra vires theory.177 
Well meaning and widely opportune though all these de-
velopments are, the "harsh and inflexible" doctrine of special 
capacities has not been improved but broken; it survives in 
incoherent fragments, involving differences in the various 
courts as well as "confusion, uncertainty and injustice.m78 
Under these circumstances radical reforms have been 
widely sought and in some states achieved in fact, partly on 
the suggestion of the Uniform Business Corporation Act by 
exempting most classes of cases from the doctrine; partly, as 
in California, on the more adequate conception that corpora-
tions have general powers although the actual authority of 
the directors may remain bound to the specified purposes.179 
For all these reasons, a conflicts rule is needed even within 
this country. It has been held in a single case by the Missouri 
175 Mackay v. New York etc. R. Co. (1909) 82 Conn. 73, 72 Atl. 583. 
176 14a C. ]. § 3943· 177 See 2 BEALE 762; KESSLER, 5 Z.ausl.PR (1931) 538. 
178 CARPENTER, "Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?" 33 
Yale L. ]. (1923) 49-68; STEVENs, "Ultra Vires," 4 Cin. L. Rev. (1930) 
419, 439· 179 California: C. C.§ 345, as amended by Stat. 1931, 18o2; see the impor-
tant comment by BALLANTINE, "Drafting a Modern Corporation Law," 19 
Cal. L. Rev. (1931) 465, 473· 
Illinois: Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1934) c. 32 § 157.8, as amended June 30, 
1945· 
Michigan: 15 Stat. Ann. (1935) § 21.11, Gen. Corp. Act, Publ. Acts 1935, 
No. 194 § 11 par. 1. 
Ohio: Gen. C. (1938) § 8623-8. 
Pennsylvania: Stat. (Purdon 1936) tit. 15 § 2852-302. On the powers of 
banks see Note, 15 Cin. L. Rev. (1941) 105. 
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Supreme Court that the law of the place of contracting rather 
than that of the place of performance determines whether or 
not a corporation, when sued on a contract, is precluded from 
setting up the defense of ultra vires.180 The law of the state 
of incorporation was disregarded.181 This solution has been 
generalized in the Restatemene82 in the highly enigmatic 
rule that "the effect of an act directed to be done by a foreign 
corporation is governed by the law of the state where it is 
done." If we give the rule the most reasonable construction, 
the compass of the powers of a corporation is determined by 
the law of the incorporating state, but the effect of an act 
beyond such powers is determined by the local law. The 
Missouri Court, however, reached its result quite as the 
former Italian Commercial Code did/83 by simply applying 
the law of the place of contracting to the capacity of legal 
persons, although the personal law governs their existence. 
The systems generally subjecting capacity to the personal 
law, necessarily have to use other methods. The case was not 
foreseen in the older provisions under which individuals in-
competent by their personal laws, nevertheless are bound by 
contracts concluded with third persons in the forum. A few 
German and Swiss authors, opposed by others, however, have 
advocated analogous application of these provisions to corpo-
rations, so that an ultra vires contract made by an American 
corporation in Germany would be as valid as one concluded 
by a German corporation with full powers.184 This analogy 
180 Illinois Fuel Co. v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co. (1928) 3I9 Mo. 899, 8 S. W. 
(2d) 834, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 640. 
181 GOODRICH 268 § I05; cf. 2 BEALE 12I5 n. 9· 
182 Restatement § I 66. 
183 DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 3I3; id., 2 Prine. 287, 293; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. 
Int. Com. 249. 
184 WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. 225; KESSLER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 769; 
NussBAUM, D. IPR. I9I n. 6; RuHLAND, 45 Recueil (I933) III 446; M. 
WoLFF, IPR. 72 n. I 6; BEITZKE, J ur. Personen I I 8. 
Contra: NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. I76; I FRANKENSTEIN 486; 
VON STEIGER, 67 ZBJV. 253; SCHNITZER, Handelsr. rr5; RAAPE I37• 
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has been embodied in the recent codifications of Poland, 
Liechtenstein, Yugoslavia/85 and perhaps Italy.186 
This rule also refers capacity to the law of the place of 
contracting, but only if this place is within the forum. In 
addition, the outcome differs essentially from the American, 
since the theory of ultra vires is abolished rather than miti-
gated for the purpose of recognition. It might be objected to 
this radical result that foreign juristic persons are more easily 
recognizable than foreign individuals and that persons deal-
ing with any corporation may well be required to do their 
best in inquiring into its nature and purposes.187 However, 
international commerce is interested in eliminating such costly 
and delaying duties. Foreign courts may be excused when 
they avoid both the unmitigated English and the entangled 
American doctrines. 
This has been strikingly confirmed by the Californian 
reform of I 9 3 I. The defense of ultra vires has been abrogated 
also in case of foreign corporations: 
"This section shall extend to contracts and conveyances made 
by foreign corporations in this state by foreign corporations." 
(Cal. Code § 345, last paragraph) 
Similarly, the General Corporations Act of Michigan of 
I935, on the basis of the Uniform Business Act, excludes the 
plea of ultra vires made by a foreign corporation against a 
person not being a director, officer, or shareholder and not 
having an actual knowledge of the ultra vires character of 
the act.188 
185 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 3· 
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. art. 2 35 par. 6. 
Yugoslavia: C. Com. § 502 par. 2, cf. criticism by EISNER, x Symmikta 
Streit 292. 
1 ~6 Disp. Prel. ( 1942) art. 17 par. 2, speaking of aliens, does not seem to refer 
to both paragraphs of art. x6, but may be nevertheless so interpreted. 
187 People v. Wiersema State Bank (1935) 361 Ill. 75, 197 N. E. 537 at 
the end; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) Sto. 
188 I5 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1935) § 21.1 I, Gen. Corp. Act, Publ. Acts I935> 
No. I94 § I I par. 2. 
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Consistently with the suggestions made in other parts of 
this work, the plea of ultra vires ought to be governed by the 
law that governs the contract. 
2. Legal Restrictions on the Capacity of Corporations 
It is natural that the capacity of corporations may be re-
stricted, on one hand, by general statutes of the state of in-
corporation and, on the other, by the law governing the par-
ticular case-which formula is more exact than to refer to the 
"territorial" law or that where ''an act of the corporation is 
done." A corporation may, for instance, take a legacy, only if it 
has capacity under the laws both of the charter and of succes-
sion.189 Still other legislations may claim consideration, such 
as that of the situs or that of the place of contracting, if dif-
ferent from the former two. 
Two widespread examples of prohibitory provisions are 
to be mentioned. 
(a) Acquisitions by gift or will. The traditional mortmain 
legislation of the I 8th and I 9th centuries was inspired by the 
twofold consideration that a donor to church funds may de-
prive his family of their just inheritance, and that the con-
tinuous accumulation of wealth may dangerously increase the 
secular might of the Church. In more recent times, reasons 
of national economy have prevailed in fostering a policy to 
prevent any long-lived juristic person from retaining posses-
sions needed for the general welfare. Land in particular has 
been regarded as an inestimable asset, limited in quantity, 
which ought not to be monopolized by holders who usually 
do not alienate their acquisitions. 
In numerous countries, legal persons may not acquire 
property by gift or other benevolence unless authorization 
is obtained, if the value exceeds a certain amount or some-
189 2 BEALE 971, 1036. That this rule underlies also English and German law 
is shown by BRESLAUER, Private International Law of Succession (1937) 99· 
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times irrespective of the value.190 Since such a provision may 
be a part of the law of charter, or of the law governing the 
donation, bequest, or devise, or of the lex situs,191 the task 
of a court in selecting the applicable law may be difficult. 
In France, it has been held that a foreign corporation claiming 
any acquisition in France by donation or legacy ought to show 
authorization according to its personallaw192 and, in addition, 
French authorization, if it is not profit-seeking and a French 
family is affected, article 910 of the French Civil Code 
not being intended to protect a foreign family. 193 In the 
United States, it is generally held, in agreement with the 
prevailing rule elsewhere, that acquisitions by devise or be-
quest require the consent of both the charter state and that 
determining succession upon death, that is, the state of situs 
for immovables, or that of the last domicil for movables.194 
Statutes protecting the family of the donor against in-
considerate disinheritance, may leave doubts respecting the 
law determining the family's composition. In New York, 
it has been convincingly argued195 that it is the family con-
190 England: Corporations Cons. Act, 19:1.91 § 14; Mortmain and Charitable 
UsesAct, 1888. 
Belgium and France: C. C. art. 910 concerning associations, not stock corpo-
rations, see Cass. (Nov. z9 1 1897) D.1898.1.108; (Oct. z9, 1894) 
D.I896.I.I45· 
Italy: C. C. (194:1.) art. 17. 
Spain: C. C. arts. 746, 748. 
Portugal: C. C. art. 1781. 
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 86; cf. Prussia: Ausfiihrungsgesetz, art. 6; some 
Swiss cantons, etc. 
The Netherlands: Arts. 947 and 1717 of the Dutch BW., treated by KosTERS 
682, have been repealed by Law of Nov. z9, 19351 par. z. 
191 Cf. PILLET, Personnes Morales 90; LEWALD, Questions 68; 1 FRANKEN-
STEIN 486; WALKER 16o; POULLET :1.55 § :u8; RAAPE 638; BEITZKE1 Jur. 
Personen 151 § 1 6. 
192 Paris (June 2.1, 1935) D.1936.z.17. 
193 Tri. civ. Seine (Nov. 14, 1936) Clunet 1938, 307; contra: Note, Clunet 
1938, 309· 
194 Christian Union v. Yount (1879) 101 U. S. 352.. FLETCHER, 17 Cyc. 
Corp.§§ 8377, 8378. 
195 Chamberlain v. Chamberlain (1871) 43 N.Y. 42.4, 433; BRESLAUER, 
"Conflict of Laws in Restrictions on Freedom of Taxation," z7 Iowa L. Rev. 
(1941) 42.5, 433 (adding distinctions). 
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ceived according to the law of the testator's domicil, that 
is envisaged by the statute forbidding "any person having 
a husband, wife, child, or parent, to devise or bequeath to 
any benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious or 
missionary society, association or corporation ... more than 
one half of his or her share. . . .77196 
(b) Taking of land. Acquisition of land by corporations197 
and, particularly in many Latin-American countries, acquisi-
tion by foreign states or public corporations, 198 is not only 
prohibited to corporations not licensed for doing business 
in numerous states, but also is subject to special authorization, 
without regard to consideration or value. Such restrictions 
arise from mortmain policy, mistrust of foreigners in general, 
or protection of certain districts for military reasons. Only 
in the last two cases should the nationality of the members 
be of importance. 
With respect to the mortmain provisions commonly used 
196 Then N.Y. Laws (r86o) c. 360 § r, now Decedent Estate Law,§ 17. 
197 United States: Carroll v. East St. Louis {I873) 67 Ill. 568, r6 Am. Rep. 
632; Nebraska, Rev. Stat. (I943) §§ 76-402, 76-404, 76-4o6, 76-407; Wash-
ington, Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932) § 3862-II. For some older statutes, see 
FLETCHER, I7 Cyc. Corp.§ 8353 n. 38. 
Belgium: POULLET § 218. 
Germany: See EG. BGB. art. 88 and commentaries. 
Spain: Law of June 3 o, r 8 8 7 against religious corporations. 
For the Latin-American laws, see H. ZoRRAQUiN BEcu, El Problema del 
Extranjero en la reciente legislaci6n latina-americana (Buenos Aires r 943) 
ro I H.; for the official interpretation of the Mexican Constitution, art. 2 7, see 
WHELEss, Compendium of the Laws of Mexico (I938) 564ff. 
On the doubtful law regarding nonregistered foreign companies in Argen-
tina, Chile and other countries, see VoELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (I940) at 62 
n. 73· 
198 Argentina: By analogy to Brazil, 2. Vrco § 85. 
Brazil: In trod. C. C. art. 20; now Introd. Law ( 1942.) art. I I §§ z, 3 
(on the history of this legislation see EsPINOLA, 6 Tratado No. IOI). 
Guatemala: Decree No. 2369, of May 9, I940; Law on Foreigners of 1936, 
arts. zo, 2. I. 
Mexico: Constitution (I 9 r 7) art. 27 fr. II (restrictions on religious associa-
tions, charitable and educational institutions) ; cf. Note, SCHUSTER, 7 Tul. L. 
Rev. (1933) 347· 
Venezuela: Ley de Minas, of July 17, 192.5, art. 30. 
See for Europe, FEDOZZI 4 7. 
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in the United States, the Restatemene99 asserts that ordinarily 
statutes relating to usury, receiving land by devise, and 
assigning and transferring property, are interpreted as purely 
local in their application and do not restrict the acquisitions of 
a corporation in other states. Thus, even a statute of the 
charter state preventing corporations from taking land by 
will, is not applied to taking land in another state. 200 There 
. h . h 201 1s contrary aut onty, owever. 
3· Authority of Agents 
One of the expedients for remedying the untenable theory 
of territoriality was the fantastic idea that although a foreign 
corporation cannot "exist" in the state, it can act therein 
through agents. 202 This theory was taken seriously enough to 
require that the authorization of an agent, being a corporate 
act, must take place within the state of incorporation, and 
that the corporation must be organized and the agent be 
appointed prior to his acting.203 These not even clever aber-
rations204 are unknown to other countries and alien to the 
law practice of this country. Corporations are daily acting 
through individuals without regard to geographical frontiers 
and, where they act, they must exist. 
Another distinction instead is essential. It is well known205 
199 Restatement § 165 comment a; 2 BEALE 762 § 165.3· 200 White v. Howard (1871) 38 Conn. 342. 
England: Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King (I92I) 37 T. L. R. 4361 
445· 
Ontario: McDiarmid v. Hughes (I888) I6 0. R. 570 has held that 
a Quebec corporation is subject exclusively to the local law as to taking land. 
201 Kerr. v. Dougherty (188o) 79 N.Y. 327; Metropolitan Bank v. Godfrey 
(I 86o) 2 3 Ill. 53 I; other instances are cited by 2 BEALE 762, and see LoREN-
ZEN, 6 Repert. 369 No, 463; GOODRICH§ I62 n. 32; HARPER and TAINTOR1 
Cases 927 n. 5· 202 Bank of Augusta v. Earle (I839) I3 Pet. S.C. 519, 588-589; Ex parte 
Schollenberger (1877) 96 U.S. 369, at 377· 203 2 BEALE 768 § 166.3. 
204 YOUNG 49· 205 FLETCHER, 2 Cyc. Corp. § 266. For the doctrine of OTTO GIERKE, see 
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that there are two classes of individuals serving as repre-
sentatives of corporations. One is formed by the principal 
officers, called directors in the British companies laws and 
termed "organs" of the corporate body in modern codes, 
following a result of Gierke's theory of "real personality.mos 
The other class is composed of ordinary employees. The 
offices administered by the first group are created by the 
fundamental documents and form an integral part of the 
organization. These officers express the will and execute 
the potential powers of the legal entity. All other individuals 
acting in the name of a legal person do so by virtue of 
contractual relationship only, as "mere agents" or "em-
ployees." 
This classification is of significance also in conflicts law. 
With respect to simple agents, either of a corporation or 
of a partnership, no special conflicts rule is needed in addition 
to the general rules concerning agents appointed by private 
declarations. The most important of these latter rules predi-
cates that the extent of an agent's authority is determined 
by the law of the place where the agent acts upon his au-
thority.207 
If the principal establishes a permanent place of business 
in a foreign state, the law of this place has an even more 
decisive claim to define the authority of the agents negotiating 
at these places. 
The powers of a corporation's principal functionaries, 
however, are rooted in its constitution and are comparable 
his summary in 1 Deutsches Privatrecht (1895) 466, 469ff.; and in English, 
R. HuEBNER, A History of Germanic Private Law (transl. Philbrick) 
140ff. This theory has been adopted in France; see MICHOUD, 1 Personnalite 
Morale§§ so-64 bis; z id. §§ 187,189. 206 
"Organs" or "constitutionally authorized representatives" as a term has 
been used in the German BGB. § 3 I, Swiss C. C. art. 55, etc. 207 See for first information, Restatement § 345; and as to English and com-
parative law, RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 8o9, 818; BRESLAUER, 50 Jurid. 
Rev. (1938) z8z, 308. 
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to the powers of the legal person itself. Such power is defined 
for all individuals holding th~ same position and brought 
to public knowledge through the articles of incorporation 
or by-laws. Wherever a state of charter prescribes recording 
of corporations in a register, it requires the individual 
names of the officers to be included. Even in the absence 
of such legal precaution, it has been firmly maintained that 
a party dealing with the main officers of a foreign corporation 
should inform himself about the extent of their allotted 
powers. "Dealings with these companies are not like dealings 
with other partnerships, and . . . the parties dealing with 
them are bound to read the statute and the deed of settle-
ment,." though they need not do more. 208 This has been 
the true consideration underlying the common law doctrine 
regarding acts of directors exceeding their authority. It was 
the same as that embodied in the solid doctrine of Continental 
conflicts law, that the personal law of a corporation deter-
mines whether a director's contract is binding on the entity. 
In this opinion, a third party dealing with an "organ" of 
a foreign corporation is charged with notice of the existence 
and extent of this representative's constitutional power. 209 
For example, in the interest of all third parties, German 
law gives the board of directors of a German Aktiengesell-
schaft a legally defined all-inclusive authority of the broadest 
scope, charter restrictions upon their authority being regarded 
as mere instructions without external effect. 210 In a German 
208 Royal British Bank v. Turquand (1856) 6 E. & B. 327; In re Hampshire 
Land Co. (1896) 2 Ch. D. 743· 
209 See in general, 2 ZITELMANN 207; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 81o; 
AssER and STREIT, Annuaire 1929 I 700. 
Germany: ROHG. (Feb. 17, 1871) 2 ROHGE. 36; RAAPE, D. IPR. 119, 
275· 
The Netherlands: Rb. Haag (March 9, 1933) W. 12589; Rb. Maastricht 
(June 25, 1931) W. 12366 (authority of liquidators). 
210 HGB. § 235; Aktiengesetz § 74; Gesetz betreffend Gesellschaften mit 
beschriinkter Haftung, of April 20, 1892, § 3 7, 2. 
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nonprofit corporation,211 on the contrary, limitations on 
the authority of directors, if publicly registered, restrict the 
director's power to bind the entity. Under French law, 
widely followed, administrators have exactly the authority 
corresponding to the functions assigned to them by the 
charter or, in the case of silence or insufficiency of the latter's 
provisions, the normal scope of the enterprise.212 Under the 
conflicts rule referring to the personal law of the corporation, 
all these domestic rules also govern abroad. Incidentally, 
it may be noted that an increasing number of German writers 
have borrowed from the theory of special powers the idea 
that a corporation should not be bound by the act of a di-
rector, exceeding the purposes of the corporation and recog-
nizable as such by a third party.213 This corresponds with 
the result envisaged in this country by those scholars who 
propose to grant corporations simply general powers, whereas 
agents would remain limited by the powers and purposes 
of corporation214 and incapable of performing corporate acts 
beyond this line. The formation of conflicts rules would 
be strongly aided by such converging developments of the 
actually contrasting municipal systems. 
In the American discussions of conflicts law, the particular 
position of the directors seems never to have been contem-
plated. The Restatement states that "the effect of an act 
directed to be done by a foreign corporation" is governed 
by the law of the state "where it is done" (§ 166), and 
211 BGB. §§ 30,26 par. 2 (r). 
212 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 819. In the Law of March 7, 1925, on 
Private Companies with Limited Liability, art. 24, however, the German model, 
supra n. 2 r o, has been followed. 
213 ORTMANN, Allgemeiner Teil des BGB. 99; VON TuHR, I Allgemeiner 
Teil des Deutschen Biirgerlichen Rechts 527; I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ § 82 
sub I. 
Objections or doubts: PLANCK-KNOKE, I Kommentar § 26 n. 4; Mii"LLER-
ERZBACH, Wohin fiihrt die Interessenjurisprudenz 96; and others. 
214 BALLANTINE, Corporations 249 § 70. 
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the comment expressly applies this rule to the case where 
"an agent of a corporation makes an agreement on behalf 
of the corporation which he was directed to make"; "the 
law of the state where the agreement is made determines 
whether the corporation is bound thereby .... " While the 
only added harmless example has no bearing on the question, 
the provisions of the Restatement seem to result in the rule 
that the authority of the board of directors, president, and 
other officers is governed by the law of the state where the 
contract with the third party is "made." 
To understand the origin of this doctrine is easier than 
to approve of it. So long as the constitutional documents 
were the exclusively determinative expression of the au-
thority of directors, fairly consonant interpretation of their 
provisions could be expected in all common law courts. With 
uniform substantive law, no conflicts rule is needed. The 
situation, however, has changed somewhat, even among the 
sister states of the Union, as a result of statutory modifica-
tions of the formerly uniform rule, as well as through varia-
tions in court practice. For example, the old rule that the 
president of a corporation has no privileged power except one 
conferred expressly by the charter or by-laws, has been sub-
stantially modified in many jurisdictions, but not in all, and 
the alterations are different enough to create an "Alabama 
rule," an "Arizona rule," an "Arkansas rule," and so forth. 
Should a Chicago court in the case of a New York corporation 
contracting in Illinois follow its own "Illinois rule"? While 
in interstate cases this difficulty may often be evaded by 
assuming the contract to have been made at the office of 
the officer representing the corporation, the problem presents 
itself unequivocally where a corporation of the German 
type enters into transactions by means of one of its directors 
at a place in the United States. Should the president of such 
a corporation be regarded as unauthorized, for the only 
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reason that a similar officer would be without authority under 
the Arkansas or Illinois rule? Of course, he should not. An 
American court would correctly argue that the general 
statutes giving the director absolute powers are to be read 
into the charter. But this means that the rules of the Re-
statement are sadly incomplete. The authority of a principal 
officer is determined by the law of the charter. Exceptions 
to the effect that authorization may also be derived from the 
law of the place where the officer acts, have to be carefully 
considered in connection with agency rules in general. 
CHAPTER 23 
Doing Business 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Regulation of Foreign Corporations 
W HILE the state has no authority to impose a burden upon interstate commerce by taxation or otherwise, nevertheless it has authority to provide 
by legislation the terms and conditions upon which a foreign 
corporation may engage in intrastate business within its terri-
torial limits, or avail itself of the benefits of its laws and the 
aid and protection of its courts in the enforcement of contracts 
relating to such business.m 
This present American doctrine stands independently of 
its derivation from the antiquated doctrine of "comity," 
whereby a state may arbitrarily admit or "exclude" the corpo-
rations of sister states, although this connection is still all 
too vividly in the mind of many legislators and courts. In 
principle, every state may impose conditions on the exercise 
of activities in the state.2 States are expected to hold these 
conditions within reasonable limits but are not constitutionally 
bound to do so in the case of intrastate commerce. 
In this form, the principle is of universal significance.3 
However, the laws of the world display a variety of policies 
ranging from the utmost liberalism to prohibitive exactions. 
On the other hand, there is a common idea, more or less 
instinctively felt, that the territorial state is entitled to 
subject foreign organizations to visitation and regulation 
1 Phillips Co. v. Everett (1919) z6z Fed. 341 at 343, citing Baltic Mining 
Co. v. Massachusetts (1913) 231 U.S. 68, often quoted in cases. 
2 See FLETCHER, I 7 Cyc. Corp. § 8 3oz. 
3 Cf. NEUMEYER, z Int. Verwaltungs R. (19zz) 139· 
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only when the latter have a definite contact with the terri-
tory, and that the state's interference may increase pro-
portionately to the degree in which the foreign undertaking 
merges in the life of the population. 
Usually, the minimum contact required for controlling 
a foreign corporation is either the fact of its reiterated "carry-
ing on of business" in the country or its establishment of a 
"place of business" or of an agency, terms distinguishable 
as will be shown but overlapping to some extent. Thus, 
filing for a license "to do business" in the United States 
includes the indication of a principal place of business within 
the state.4 Further, in Latin-American countries when trading 
within the national territory requires authorization,5 usually 
a local representative must be appointed. 8 Agencies in most 
cases are probably supposed to be fixed at some place. 
The case of a company having its principal establishment 
of manufacture or trade in the state, although it is incorpo-
rated and domiciled in another jurisdiction, is regarded in 
several systems mentioned earlier as requiring an outright 
exception to the principle of personal law.7 Other cases in 
which intensified control, possibly reaching complete com-
pulsory "domestication," is justifiable, are presented by the 
outstanding public interest involved in such purposes as 
banking, financing, insurance, communication, transportation, 
and other public utilities. 
Normally, however, impositions on the business of foreign 
corporations should never go all the way to veritable "do-
mestication" or reincorporation. 
4 Restatement§ 169 comment c No. 3, and illustrations to§ I67 Nos. 4 and 
II, 
5 E.g., Bolivia: Decree of March zs, I887, art. 5· 
6 E.g., Bolivia: Law of Nov. 13, I886, art. 4; Decree of March 2.5, I887, 
art. 2.. 
Guatemala: C. C. (I933) art. 2.5, cf. 23 in the case of "habitual business." 
7 Italy, Colombia, Nicaragua, Japan and others, see supra pp. 46-48. 
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2. Concept of Doing Business 
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The concept of carrying on business, as contrasted with 
isolated acts, is discussed in the United States in regard to 
three distinctive purposes: qualifying for license statutes-
which alone is in question here-jurisdiction, and taxation. 8 
Definitions are at some variance but agree in the essential 
point that a series of acts within the constitutional frame-
work of the corporation must be performed or at least 
initiated.9 In the definition by the Uniform Foreign Corpo-
rations Act (§ 2, I), sanctioned by the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1934 but not yet adopted in any state, 
" ... the term 'doing business' means the transaction by a 
foreign corporation of some part of its business substantial 
and continuous in character and not merely casual or oc-
casional." 
"Doing business" may or may not be regulated in the 
statutes of this country with the inclusion of charitable 
corporations. 
The English definition for the purposes of jurisdiction, 
is simpler. In the words of Lord Herschell, "there is a 
broad distinction between trading with a country and carrying 
on a trade within a country.mo An English lawyer has ob-
served that statutes in the United States do not so limit their 
field, "because the courts of the various states have employed 
every pretext to assume jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
8 See Restatement, New York Annotations § I 67 and CHEATHAM, Cases I I I 3, 
urging with ISAACS, 2.5 Col. L. Rev. (I92.5) I02.4, that the courts should 
watch better than they usually did the different significances of the phrase 
"doing business." 
9 This seems to be also the gist of the definition in comment a to Restate-
ment § I 67: "Doing business is doing a series of similar acts for the purpose of 
thereby realizing pecuniary benefit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or 
doing a single act for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating 
a series of such acts." 
10 Grainger v. Gough [I 896] A. C. 32.5 at 335; La Bourgogne [I 899] 
P. I; [I899] A. C. 43I; cf. Saccharin Corp. v. Chemische Fabrik etc. Akt. 
[I 9 I I] 2. K. B. 5 I 6. 
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rations.''11 However this may be as to jurisdiction, American 
policy in regulating foreign corporate business is in fact 
less broad-minded than the English, although much more 
so than that of most other nations. 
More closely approaching the English than the American 
concepts are the expressions "carrying on business" or a 
"trade" in Germany ( Geschaftsbetrieb, Gewerbebetrieb ), 
"direct exploitation of the object of the charter" in France, 
and "functioning" in Brazil, "trading (girar)" in Bolivia, 
et cetera, terms likewise conceived for the purpose of required 
governmental authorization. Business carried on with the 
country in the absence of any establishment within it, in 
theory, does not require a license in these countries. 
3· Categories of Business Places 
In Great Britain, registration is obligatory for foreign 
companies having "established a place of business" in the 
kingdom. This is a comprehensive term/2 but it requires the 
company to have some "local habitation of its own." The 
term "succursale" of French and many other laws, although 
often used in the narrower meaning of "branch," is prevail-
ingly understood to include all places of business where trans-
actions occur, even though the business may be directed in all 
respects by the principal establishment. A careful Belgian 
definition declares a "succursale" to be "any dependent estab-
lishment (office, bureau, agency, etc.), any accessory center of 
commercial life, set up in a stable and regular course at a fixed 
place, where a manager resides and permanently represents 
11 FARNSWORTH, 20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (I938) I83. 
12 British Companies Act, I 929 ( 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 2 3) soo, Part XI, s. 344; 
the above mentioned definition was given tentatively by the Lord President 
in the Scotch case, Lord Advocate v. Huron and Erie Loan & Savings Co. 
(Feb. 28, I911) (I911) S. C. 6u, 6I6; accord Cohen, J., in Tovarishestvo 
Manufactur Liudvig-Rabenek [I944] I Ch. 4041 408. 
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the firm or legal person with authority to engage its liability 
in contracts.m3 
Another much narrower significance of "branch" (Zweig-
niederlassung) obtains in German, Austrian, and Swiss ad-
ministrative rules. There, a branch office presupposes a 
permanent establishment with separate organization and as-
sets accountable, having the power to conclude transactions 
independently, although subject to instructions by the central 
management/~ Sometimes it is required that the business 
carried on be of the same kind as that of the head establish-
ment, but on a smaller scale.15 Hence impositions on branch 
offices in these countries do not extend to "agencies" or 
"representatives." 
A ware of this proper sense of branch, the broad French 
scope of succursale is reached in Spanish, Portuguese, and 
Latin-American provisions by accumulating terms such as 
"branches, agencies, and representatives of foreign corpo-
rations." The meaning is explained by the Colombian laws 
that speak of "enterprise of a permanent character,m6 and 
the new Italian text, "secondary seat with permanent 
agency.m7 In fact, in Latin America, any permanent es-
tablishment regularly needs registration, if not authorization. 
"Agents" in the language of commercial relations, as 
distinguished from "representatives," have been described 
as persons securing business and referring offers to the con-
stituent company, and this meaning has been attributed to 
18 App. Bruxelles (June 6, 1929) Revue pratique des sociches I929, No. 2972, 
cited in Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. No. s26I; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Feb. I, 
1938) Jur. Com. Brux. I938, 6I. 
14 Germany: I4 ROHGE. 40I, I7 id. 3I3; 38 RGZ. 263, so id. 429. 
Austria: OGH. in Adl. Clem. I8oo, id. 2804. 
Switzerland: s6 BGE. I 364; 6I BGE. I 303. 
15 Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 10, I924) so BGE. II so7, Sio, cf. WIELAND, 
43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 242. 
16 Colombia: Legislative Decree No.2 of I9o6, art. I; Law No. s8 of I9JI 1 
art. 2.2.; Executive Decree No. 6s of I94I, art. I. 
17 Italy: C. C. (I942) art. 2506. 
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"agents" as used in the Latin-American laws.18 The various 
legislations may be divided on this point. However, the 
multifarious duties connected with permanent establish-
ments, seem to have no bearing on independent brokers or 
distributors, intermediaries between an enterprise and its 
customers. Nor do they apply to merchants dealing with a 
foreign corporation on their own account and possibly work-
ing for several principals. Thus, these rules refer exclusively 
to physical or juristic persons that enter into transactions, 
or at least negotiate, on behalf of foreign corporations. This, 
at least, is their natural construction and should be presumed, 
if the contrary is not clearly intended.19 
Similarly, the personal law of the foreign corporation 
has no application to subsidiaries or affiliates (French filiales, 
German Tochtergesellschaften) i.e., autonomous corporations 
or partnerships of any form, created under the territorial 
law, though economically dependent and often politically 
assimilated, to foreign, particularly enemy, organizations. 
It follows incidentally that among the four main methods 
open to business management for operating in a foreign 
country, two do not enter into discussion in the following 
survey, namely, carrying on foreign activities by an inde-
pendent distributor and by a juridically independent foreign 
subsidiary. We have to deal only with the two other pro-
cedures of submitting the entire corporation abroad to reg-
istration and other duties, or of having this done by a domestic-
created subsidiary, organized for the purpose of business 
in the country. 20 Big American corporations most frequently 
use the latter method. 
18 See Regimen Jurldico 32., 98. 
19 Cf. NEUMEYER, 2. Int. Verwaltungs R. 143, 139 n. 5· 
2° For all four ways and their advantages and disadvantages, see the excellent 
symposium, "Legal Problems Affecting American Corporations Doing Busi-
ness Abroad" (i.e., in Latin America) in 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934) sso. 
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II. SURVEY OF SYSTEMS 
I. Unconditional Admittance 
179 
Few countries accord freedom of trade to foreign-created 
legal persons without authorization either for recognition 
or for permitting the doing of business. England, however, 
has upheld its old liberal principle/1 as have also Switzer-
land22 and the Netherlands/3 joined in 1873 by Belgium.24 
Also Yugoslavia25 and, in this hemisphere, Argentina, Para-
guay/6 the Dominican Republic/7 El Salvador/8 and Vene-
zuela29 have based their rules on this system, although the 
first two countries require reciprocity of treatment. Hence, 
the Swiss and Argentine governments have been able to 
21 England: Companies Act, I929 (I9 & 20 Geo. 5., c. 23) 5oo, Part XI, 
s. 343, "Companies incorporated outside of Great Britain carrying on business 
within Great Britain." 22 Switzerland: No impositions have been provided either by the Federation, 
BG. (July 22, I887) Clunet I893, 240, or by the Cantons, see WIELAND, 43 
Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) zz 5; 'SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legisl. Camp. ( I921) 
zz8 at 237; BG. (July u, I934) 6o BGE. I 225. 
Hungary: Classified similarly by DE MAGYARY, Clunet I924, 596. 
23 The Netherlands: MoLENGRAAFF, "De la condition des societes etrangeres 
dans les pays bas," in Clunet I888, 6I9 at 623 (regretting this liberal attitude); 
KosTERS 686-688. 
24 Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act, of May I8, I87J, arts. 128-qo; 
text of I935> arts. I96-I99· 
25 Yugoslavia: C. Com. § 503 par. I; EISNER, I Symmikta Streit 293· 26 Argentina and Paraguay: C. Com. art. 287, as modified and interpreted in 
Argentina by Argentinian Law No. 8867, of Feb. 6, I912, art. I, also applied 
to a (Czechoslovakian) limited liability partnership, Cam. Com. de la Cap. 
(Feb. u, I926) I9 Jur. Arg. 78. Provisions concerning the required documen-
tation are contained in the Decree of April 27, I923, creating the "lnspeccfon 
General de J usticia," art. 7. That no other conditions than these exist, has 
been stated by Cam. Com. de la Cap. en plena (Sept. I 8, I 940) 22 La Ley 53 7; 
C. Com. art. 287 is modified thereby, see Cam Com. de la Cap. 2a (May s, 
I939) I4 La Ley 708. Hence, Argentina is not really devoted to the theory of 
authorization, not to speak of the compulsion to nationalization. On the liberal 
background see ZEBALLos, Clunet I9o6, 6o4, 6II. 
21 Dominican Republic: Sup. Corte de J usticia (Nov. I4, I 9 3 6) 3 I 6 B. J. 
(I936) 6oo. 
28 El Salvador: C. Com. art. 299. 29 Venezuela: C. Com. (I9I9) art. 359 (new 334), 36I (new 336), na-
tionalization being only optional; art. 3 6I, "pueden adquirir la nacionalidad 
venezolana." 
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declare, without concluding a treaty, that stock companies 
of one country after due registration can reciprocally carry 
on business by agents in the other country.30 But, registration 
and publication are additional requisites, and in such countries 
as Yugoslavia and Venezuela, formalities may impose grave 
restrictions on the freedom granted in principle. 
2. Business Without a Permanent Place 
Italy, Portugal, and Rumania, as well as modern Turkey, 
apparently allow not merely isolated acts, but all transactions 
short of establishing an agency in the country to be concluded 
by a foreign company.31 
3· Business Under Domestic Law 
The Spanish Commercial Code of I 8 8 5 unconditionally 
permits all business carried on either from outside or within 
the country, but, if permanent centers, agencies, or branches 
are established, all transactions made in the country are 
subject to the provisions of the Code. This system was 
initially followed in Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nica-
ragua, and Peru.32 It is, in reality, an inadequate way of 
meeting the problem, revealing its dangerous elements when, 
nevertheless, requirements for doing business have been 
30 BURCKHARD, 3 Bundesrecht 10~3, V. 
31 Italy: C. Com. (r882) art. 23o; C. C. (I942) art. :zso6; cf. CAVAGL!ERI, 
Dir. Int. Com. 275. 
Portugal: C. Com. arts I o9, cf. 11 x. 
Rumania: C. Com. (I9J8) arts. 356, 357· 
Turkey: Law of Nov. 30, I330/I9I4, art. u, see SALEM, 7 Repert. 250 
No. I 35· 
32 Spain: C. Com. (I 885) art. IS; cf. 2.1. 
Colombia: C. Com. art. I9. 
Cuba: c. Com. art. rs; Constitution (I940) arts. I9, 272.· 
Honduras: C. Com. (1940) arts. ro, 2.86. 
Mexico: Formerly C. Com. art. 15; now Ley General de Sociedades Mer-
cantiles, of July :z8, 1934, art. 250; but see for the obstruction to this article 
by the courts, supra p. 145 n. IOI, the literature cited. 
Nicaragua: C. Com. arts. 8 and ro. 
Peru: C. Com. art. 15 ; Constitution ( r 9 3 3) art. I 7. 
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added,33 or, on the other hand, the sweeping subjection to 
domestic law has been extended still further. 34 
4· Qualifying for Authorization 
The continuously alleged power of the states of the 
United States to "exclude" nondomestic corporations from 
business is deemed to be restricted by certain provisions in 
the Federal Constitution: the Commerce Clause, the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions, the Equal Protection and the 
Due Process Clauses/5 and also the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. 36 If a regulation does not violate the Constitution, 
its wisdom and equity cannot be challenged. 37 But statutes 
do not really exclude even alien corporations from business; 
they only require "licensing," dependent on objective and 
generally qualifying conditions. 38 
A main characteristic of this system, too obvious even 
to be noticed by American lawyers but a striking phenomenon 
for Europeans/9 lies in the fact that the state statutes specify 
the conditions for licensing closely enough to make super-
vision by the courts possible and decisive. That half of the 
state statutes speak in imperative terms ("shall grant") while 
the other provisions are permissive, practically makes no 
difference. When the conditions provided by law are satisfied, 
authorization is automatically granted. 40 Whether also non-
33 To illustrate, Colombia: Law No. 58 of I93I, art. :u speaks of request 
for "permit" by the newly created Superintendencia de Sociedades An6nimas, 
and Decree No. I984 of I939> art. 4 emphasizes this request for a permit 
(called "special" in art. 3) . 
Mexico: C. C. arts. 2736-2738 and Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, 
art. 25I contain only prescriptions of formalities, but the restrictions on foreign 
corporations carrying on business have been considerably increased. 
34 Peru: Infra n. 130. 
85 Restatement§§ I69-I78; FLETCHER, I7 Cyc. Corp. VI B, 227, §§ 8386 ff. 
36 HoLT, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I94I) 452. 
37 State ex rel. Tri-State Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Holm (I 924) I 6o 
Minn. 378, 200 N. W. 296. 
38 HoLT, id. 478. 
39 See LEPAULLE, Condition des societes etrangeres (I923) I74ff., 233ff. 
40 Answer to a questionaire, sent out by Mr. Lepaulle, see id. I 79· 
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profit-seeking corporations need authorization is not well 
settled in all states; many states seem to "exempt such corpo-
rations from regulation altogether or else provide for some 
special method of regulation."41 An express exemption from 
the duty of registration is provided in some provinces of 
Canada.42 
Licensing is not believed to raise difficulties in any state, 
with the only exception that Illinois and New York require 
that the name be not susceptible of confusion with those of 
domestic corporations, these amounting in New York to some 
so,ooo. This is a problem f?r companies of other states with 
an established firm name. 
In most Latin-American countries, governmental author-
ization is required for establishing an "agency" or "repre-
sentation." Only occasionally, as in Colombia and Nicaragua, 
the text of the statutes makes it clear that the permit for 
establishing a permanent place of business is certain to be 
granted on the filing of a request and fulfillment of the legal 
conditions.43 But the writer is enabled by a statement of Dr. 
Phanor Eder, based on his experience, to note that in at 
least half of the Latin-American republics governmental 
authorization is always granted, if the constitutional docu-
ments of the corporation do not contain stipulations contrary 
to the basic principles of the domestic law. 
41 Policy in this respect is presumed by the draftsmen of the Uniform Foreign 
Corporations Act, National Conference, Handbook 1934, 306. 
For duty to comply, State ex rel. Griffith v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan 
(I925) II7 Kan. 564, 232 Pac. 254; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Common-
wealth (1924) 138 Va. soo, u2 S. E. 122; General Conference v. Berkey 
(1909) 156 Cal. 466, 105. Pac. 411. Contra: Eaton v. Woman's Home Mis-
sionary Society (I9I4) 264 III. 88, 105 N. E. 746. See Note, 37 A. L. R. 1283. 
42 Ontario: Extra Provincial Corporations Act, Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 252 s. 2, 
class 6. 
Saskatchewan: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. I 940, c. I I 3 s. 1 8 9· 
Discretionary exemption in Alberta: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. I 9421 c. 
240 s. 134 (J). 
British Columbia: Companies Act, 1929, c. 42 s. 179 (5). 
43 Colombia: Acto Legislativo Constitucional No. I of 19 3 6, art. 6; C. Com. 
art. 19 read with Law No. 58 of 1931, art. 22 and Executive Decree No. 65 
of 1941. 
Nicaragua: C. Com. (1916) art. 10. 
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The text of the Hungarian Commercial Code follows the 
same principle. 44 
5. Discretionary Grant of Authorization 
The liberality of the licensing system in this country is 
perceived when contrasted with other legislations. 
In various German states, foreign industrial and com-
mercial enterprises have always required trade author-
ization by the state authorities supervtsmg industry 
and trade, except where treaties accord reciprocity.45 
These disadvantages were inspired by suspicions of foreign 
law more than foreign capital. The recent German Corpo-
ration Law of 1937 superimposes the necessity of govern-
mental approbation/6 which may be refused without giving 
reasons, and may be freely revoked.47 This is a trend back-
ward to the system prevailing in Austria and some Eastern 
European legislations, which have simply provided that every 
foreign business corporation shall be subject to discretionary 
permission for doing business. 48 
Most statutes of the Latin-American countries requiring 
governmental authorization for the establishment of a perma-
nent business place are drafted in terms that possibly reserve 
to the governments full power of granting or refusing. What 
44 Hungary: C. Com. arts. z1o-z17. 
45 Reichsgewerbeordnung § rz in combination with Prussian Law of June z9, 
1914 (carrying on a nonambulatory business). 
Bavaria: Law of February 6, 1868, art. z (carrying on business). 
Saxony: Ordinance of Nov. 1o, 1899, § 5· 
Wiirtemberg: Executory Law to the BGB., art. z8z. Cf. NEUMEYER, z Int. 
Verwaltungs R. 14zff. 
46 Aktiengesetz (1937) § z9z (stock companies); Einfiihrungsgesetz to this 
law, § z7 (limited partnerships, profit associations and co-operatives). On the 
state agencies on which the authorization depends, see BEITZKE, Clunet 1937, 
100Z, 
47 BEITZKE, Jur. Personen 166. 
48 Austria: Imperial Order of Nov. z9, 1865, and Law of March z9, 1873, 
still valid in Czechoslovakia. 
Poland: Law of March zz, 19z8, No. 383, on stock companies, art. 4 par. 
6; Order of Dec. zo, 1 9z8, No. 919; on a more recent similar provision re-
garding limited private companies, see rz Z.ausl.PR. (1939) 867. 
Rumania: C. Com. of 1887, arts. z38, Z44; C. Com. of Nov. 10, 1938, 
branches and agencies may not be established unless reciprocity is guaranteed 
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is the "public policy" to which corporate contracts and 
documents ought not to be contrary in Mexico? 49 Precise 
terms have been used for this purpose in the older Brazilian 
prescription that foreign stock corporations and nonprofit 
associations should file their charters and by-laws for "ap-
probation," in order to enable them to function in Brazil 
(funcionar no Brasil). 50 The actual provisions are that all 
organizations pursuing purposes of collective interest, as 
companies and foundations, follow the laws of the state 
where they have been established but may not have branches, 
agencies, or establishments before their constitutive acts have 
been approved by the Brazilian Government. 51 In a decree 
of I 8 9 I, it was prescribed that the government shall ascertain 
"whether the company has a proper purpose and whether it 
is to the advantage of the public; whether its creation is 
opportune and its success probable; ... whether the capital 
is adequate for the company purposes; . . . whether the 
provisions relating to administration, accounting, dividends, 
reserve funds, operations, and obligations, protect the in-
terests of the shareholders and of the public."52 A recent 
regulation more briefly provides that the Federal Govern-
ment, in authorizing a stock corporation may establish "the 
conditions that it shall deem convenient for the protection 
of the national interests."53 It is controversial whether part-
nerships lacking corporative articles of association, as they 
are based only on a contract, are free from this burden.54 
In Chile, the President of the Republic examines whether 
(art. 355); in the case of joint stock companies and limited partnerships only 
after authorization by the government (art. 356). 
49 Mexico: Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles (I934) art. 25I, fr. II. 
50 Brazil: C. C. art. zo §I, as amended by Decree No. 3725, of Jan. IS, 
I9I9; Decree No. 434, of July 4, I89I, art. 47· 
51 Brazil: Introductory Law (I942) art. II § I; Decree-Law No. 2627 
(sohre as sociedades por a~oes) of Sept. z6, 1940, art. 64. 
52 Brazil: Decree No. 434, of July 4, I89I, art. 52. 
53 Decree-Law No. 2627, of Sept. z6, I940, art. 65 § I. 
54 BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. I 6z-I 64; on the full controversy see EsPINOLA, 
6 Tratado 547· 
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the interests of the stockholders and of third persons are 
protected, 55 and a granted authorization may be revoked if 
the President "for any reason" estimates that a stock company 
does not offer the guarantees required for authorization.56 
6. Domestication 
Domestication is a procedure whereby a corporation loses 
its foreign character and becomes a domestic corporation. 
Although none of the above-described methods should be 
characterized as requiring the conversion of a foreign corpo-
ration into a domestic one, certain additional requirements, 
which are to be mentioned below, may greatly contribute 
to efface the distinction between authorization and domestica-
tion. Is it true, however, that some, if not most, of the 
Latin-American states demand a veritable "nationalization" 
as a condition precedent to permitting the carrying on of 
business? There is a theory to this effect advocated by a few 
Latin-American authors57 and apparently supported by the 
language of some statutes. Thus, Bolivia prescribes that 
the company should solicit "its legal constitution"58 at the 
Ministry of Industry; Brazil that it should submit its own 
constitutional document for "approbation"; 59 and the Mexi-
can Supreme Court insists on the idea that inscription in the 
register is indispensable for giving a foreign company "life 
in Mexico," such existence including the right to sue; 60 so 
55 Chile: C. Com. art. 468; Decree No. 1521, of May 3, 1938, arts. 47-49; 
Decree-Law No. 251, of May zz, 193I, arts. uoff.; cf. on the requirements, 
HERRERA REYEs, Sociedades an6nimas (Santiago 1935) 272 § 300. 
56 Chile: Decree-Law No. 251, of May 22, I93I, art. u6, while the former 
Regulation No. 3030, of December 22, I 92o, art. 48 required an "important" 
reason. 
57 Most outspoken, GIL BoRGES, Informe I, reproduced also by the Peruvian 
motion to the Eighth Pan-American Conference, Diario 6 I 6. 
58 Bolivia: Decree of March 25, 1887, art. 5· 
59 Brazil: C. C. art. 20. 
60 See cases of Ampara Zardain and Amparo Palmolive, as discussed by 
SCHUSTER, "The Judicial Status of Non-Registered Foreign Corporations in 
Latin America-Mexico," 7 Tul. L. Rev. (I933) HI at 356ff., ns. 8o, 83, 
86; 8 id. 563 and supra Chapter 22 p. I45 n. I 01. 
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also the Civil Code of Peru requires foreign juristic persons 
to register "in order to enjoy personality."61 Although these 
expressions have an unfortunate connection with the prob-
lems both of standing in court by foreign corporations and 
of their subjection to domestic laws,S2 reasonably they cannot 
mean the production of a new juristic personality by com-
pliance with statutes prescribing authorization of doing busi-
ness or registration. 63 
The opposite theory would involve the queer proposition64 
that a foreign corporation is recognized as a person so long 
as it has not established an agency in the country but loses 
its existence by establishing an agency, whether without 
authorization, or even after obtaining an authorization, since 
that would be granting a new personality. It would, then, 
seem more consistent to abandon formally the idea of recog-
nition ipso jure and all the hopes that it once embodied. 
Domestication, as facultative and optional rather than the 
exclusive way to obtain permission for doing business, is 
much less harmful and may sometimes be a perfectly con-
venient method. American concerns have been advised to 
create subsidiaries in this country, specially designed for 
reincorporation in determined foreign countries.65 
Within the United States domestication is almost obsolete 
and seems to exist only in Georgia. 66 
61 Peru: C. C. (1936) art. 1058. Similarly, Bolivia: Law of Nov. q, 1886, 
art. 4· To the same effect, as it seems, Panama: C. Com. arts. 296, 378; cf. 
EDER, IS Tul. L. Rev. (I94I) 528,532. 
62 See supra p. 145; infra pp. 216-217 and 199-201. 
63 See 2 RESTREPO-HERNANDEZ 92 § II9I; "La incorporacion no produce 
una nueva persona jurldica." 
64 There was an older Italian opinion of this kind, developed by FIORE, and 
refuted by DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 245; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 26I, 
262. 
65 See the instructive information by CRAWFORD, It Tul. L. Rev. (I936) 59· 
68 Georgia: Code (I936) § 22-I6oi; cf. C. C. H., State Tax Guide Service 
1214 § 20.021. On the quite different domestication for the purpose of taxa-
tion, see WUNSCHEL, "Taxation-Business Situs of Credits-Domestication of 
Foreign Corporations," 4I W.Va. L. Q. (I935) 412. 
DOING BUSINESS 
7· Reciprocity 
Reciprocity as a condition for license appears in a few 
European countries,S7 and underlies the "retaliatory" statutes 
in the United States putting foreign corporations-especially 
insurance companies-under the same restrictions and bur-
dens as are imposed by the state of incorporation upon corpo-
rations of the enacting state, thus discriminating in favor 
of domestic corporations. 68 Such provisions, recognized as 
constitutional/9 are more frequently applied to taxation but 
have also been used to deny the benefit of the rule that the 
corporation may maintain a suit after belated licensing.70 
III. THE PosiTION OF PERMANENT EsTABLISHMENTS IN 
CoNFLICTs LAw 
I. Principle 
It is a general doctrine that branch offices, whether in the 
narrower or broader meaning of the word, have a double 
nature influencing their treatment in conflicts law. 
On the one hand, an establishment forms an organic part 
of the entire enterprise and, therefore, participates in the 
personal law of the main organization. To the extent that 
nationality is ascribed to the legal body, the branch office 
shares in this. 71 
67 Austria: All g. BGB. § 3 3 (formal, not material, reciprocity, requiring that 
Austrians be treated like the citizens, not like the foreigners in Austria); Law 
on Limited Partnerships (Ges.m.b. H. Gesetz) § 108. 
Bulgaria: C. Com. art. 227 No.7· 
Denmark: Stock Corporation Law, of Sept. 29, 1917, § 42; Companies 
Law No. 123, of April15, 1930, § 74· 
France: Regulation concerning Insurance Companies, of Dec. 30, 1938, art. 
143 par. I (according to NIBOYET, 3 Traite 237 n. I). 
Poland: Decree of Feb. 7, 19I9, art. 7· 
Rumania: C. Com. (I938) art. 355· 
68 See FLETCHER, I 7 Cyc. Corp. 456 § 846I n. 35· 
69 FLETCHER, I7 Cyc. Corp. 270 § 8399. 
70 Wolf v. Lancaster (I9o3) 70 N.J. Law 2oi, 56 At!. I72; treated as a 
general rule by 2 BEALE 856 n. 3· 
71 Germany: RG. (May 2, I924) Io8 RGZ. 265. 
Hungary: S. Ct. (April3o, I93o) Clunet 193I, 1243. 
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On the other hand, a branch joins in the life of the country 
where it is established and, for this reason, to a large extent 
must obey the territoriallaw.72 For the purpose of this law, 
it is often considered "domiciled" in the country of its lo-
cation.73 Transactions between the corporation and its branch 
are of significance at least in tax and administrative law.74 
2. Scope of the Personal Law 
The personal law will regularly govern the internal or-
ganization of a branch office, as for instance the distribution 
of powers and the administrative relations between the central 
and the branch offices.75 
It determines traditionally the name or "firm" of the 
branch, although convenient additions to the name may be 
locally prescribed to show the kind of association or the 
fact that the central management is foreign and where it 
is situated. 76 Laws are divided on the question whether the 
foreign-acquired name is to be protected when it is apt to 
create confusion with a local corporation established before 
the branch but after the foreign corporate name was made 
known abroad. 77 In a few jurisdictions, however, these rules 
12 Belgium-France, Convention concerning Conditions of Residence (Oct. 6, 
I927) art. 7, 69 L. of N. Treaty Series (I927) 49 at 53, IZ7 British and 
Foreign State Papers (I927) Part II 98 at 99· 
73 See, for instance, Brazil, C. C. art. 3 5 pars. 3 and 4, as construed by 
ESPINOLA, 8-C Tratado I4o6, I781. 
Nicaragua: C. C. art. 34 par. 2. 
Venezuela: C. Com. arts. 359 (new 334), 360 (new 335). 
74 Recognized in Cuba, Trib. Supr., decisions cited in 3 Jurisprudencia del 
Trib. Supr. (I944) No. 2165. 
75 WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 27I; Swiss Fed. Trib. (April I, 
I924) so BGE. II 5I, 57 (with a point against French war measures) see supra 
Chapter I 9, p. 6I n. I I 1. 
16 Switzerland: Rev. C. Obl., art. 952, last par.; Law of Dec. I8, I936, 
Eidgenossische Gesetzammlung 1937, No. IJ. 
Germany: HGB. § zo; Ges.m. b. H. Gesetz § 4; Genossenschaftgesetz § 3 
par. I ; Aktiengesetz § 4· 
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. § 1044 par. 1. 
Poland: Stock Companies Order, of December zo, I928, § 6. 
77 Cf. German HGB. § I8 par. 2; 42 Jahrb. KG. I6o; Liechtenstein: P. G. R. 
§ 1044 par. 3· 
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are set aside, the territorial rules claiming completely to 
determine the branch name. 78 
The personal law determines also the liability of the main 
organization for obligations entered into by the branch, 79 
as well as the termination of the branch through dissolution 
of the main body. 80 
That organization and internal government of the main 
enterprise in deciding such incidents as the issue and purchase 
by a corporation of shares of stock, modification of capital, 
negotiability of share certificates issued out of the state, 
are beyond the territorial legal domain, may be considered 
as generally admitted. 81 
Consistent Continental opinion holds in all these respects 
the same principle to be applicable to branches of unincorpo-
rated organizations.82 The importance of the individual 
members for the structure of a partnership is appreciated. 
Nevertheless the corporate attributes of a copartnership also 
exercise their influence. 
3· Territorial Law Governing According to General Conflicts 
Rules 
Natural circumstances justify conflicts rules referring to 
the territorial laws in the following respects: 
(a) In every case of a branch office or other permanent 
representation of any foreign principal, it is universally agreed 
that the authority enjoyed by the directors or agents, in 
contracting with third persons in the country of the establish-
'
8 Laws of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway on registration, § I 6, criticized by 
NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 189, 193, but recommended by WIELAND, 
43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 218,237, cf. 244. 
79 PILLET, Personnes Morales § I 67. 
80 See supra Chapter 2o, p. 90. 
81 Yet, BALLANTINE, Corporations§ 293 and the same, Cal. Corp. Law 312 
§ 323, defines the scope of the territorial law in a broader way. 
82 See, for instance, Yugoslavia, C. Com. (1937) §§ 104, 165, 504, 507; and 
in general the citations supra pp. xooff. 
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ment, should be determined by the law of the place where 
the authority is acted upon rather than where it- has been 
granted. A slight difference exists in that in the United 
States the decisive place is regarded to be that of contract-
ing83-whatever this may mean practically-while in other 
countries it is assumed to be the place of the establishment 
itsel£.84 
(b) It is likewise consonant with general considerations 
of conflicts law that the manager of a branch office should 
be personally liable to third persons either by collateral or 
subsidiary liability whenever the law of the country so 
provides. 
(c) As a matter of course foreign organizations are subject 
to the general local administrative provisions concerning 
bookkeeping and accounting, publication of balance sheets, 
inspection and information,S5 labor, taxation, and bank-
ruptcy. 86 This explains easily the often discussed rules that 
the issue of shares or bonds within the state by a foreign 
corporation is subject to the territorial provisions, and that 
stock exchange regulations include the quotation of foreign 
stocks.87 In the United States, laws regulating the holding 
or transfer of shares88 and even a local prohibition of partner-
sa American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber Co. (1917) 74 Fla. 130, 77 So. 
168. 
84 Germany: RG. (Dec. s, 1896) 38 RGZ. 194; (April 3, 1902) 51 RGZ. 
147; (Jan. 14, 1910) 66 Seuff. Arch. No. 73; cf. HUPKA, Die Vollmacht 
(1900) 252. 
Yugoslavia: C. Com. (1937) § 507. 
85 Getridge v. State Capital Co. (1933) 129 Cal. App. 86, 18 Pac. (zd) 
37 5; Winter v. Baldwin (x 889) 89 Ala. 48 3, 7 So. 734· 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 2.50. 
Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act (1935) art. 198. 
Denmark: Law of April 15, 1930, §§ 75ff. 
Germany: KoNIGE, Leipz. Z. 1914, 1417. 
Italy: C. C. (1942.) art. 2506. 
Portugal: C. Com. art. I I I. 86 E.g., France: Cass. (req.) (June 19, 19o8) Clunet 1909, I094· 
Yugoslavia: c. Com. § so&, see EISNER, l Symmikta Streit 296. 
87 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ I 141. 88 See 2 BEALE 782 n. 3· 
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ship with other corporations89 have been held applicable. 
(d) Qualification as a merchant, for the purposes of local 
rules on registration, firm name, and accounting, is deter-
mined by the locallaw.90 But when the "commercial" nature 
of contracts, executed at the main office, is examined for 
purposes of jurisdiction or other matters, the personal law 
should be applied. 
IV. STATUTORY IMPOSITIONS 
r. Service of Process and Jurisdiction 
Statutes regularly require foreign corporations and firms 
desiring to do business, to indicate a fixed place of business 
and an agent or a principal manager upon whom service of 
process may be made. This certainly is a fair provision insofar 
as litigation involves contracts, tort, taxation, or other duties 
connected with the business conducted by the agency. It is 
a corresponding good rule that the local courts should refrain 
from taking jurisdiction beyond the affairs of the establish-
mene1 "on a cause which arose wholly outside of the state.m2 
But there is a tendency to extend further the authority of 
local agents to all matters inclusive of the causes of action 
arising abroad. 
89 2 BEALE 782 n. 4· 
9° France: 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ I 127. 
Germany: 36 RGZ. 394; OLG. Kassel, Leipz. Z. I9o9, 954; WIELAND, 
I Handelsr. 6I9 n. r8; STAUB-BoNDI, in I Staub§ 6 n. 3, § 33 n. 4; cf. § 22 
n. 4 explaining that, if the personal law agrees, the local German HGB. §§ 22, 
30 permits the transfer of a branch with its firm name to another person. 
91 See, e.g., Italy: SERENI, Rivista I93I, 266. 
Colombia: Legislative Decree No. 2 of I 9o6, art. 2. 
Costa Rica: Law No. to, of Dec. 3, 1929, art. I (3) (amending Corporation 
Law, art. I5t) "for the decision of the judicial questions to which the trans-
actions of the branch give rise and in all matters concerning requisites of 
publicity, ... " 
Guatemala: C. C. (1933) art. 25 (2); Legislative Decree No. 137o, of 
April I6, I925, art. I. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law ( r889) art. 6. 
92 Canada: Pearson (or Pearlman 1) v. Great West Life Assurance Co. 
(C. A. r9u) 2 W. W. R. 5 63, 4 D. L. R. r54. 
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In England, where no establishment of the foreign com-
pany exists but there is a representative, his authority to 
receive a writ of summons without limitation extends to all 
suits against the company, even though he may manage only 
a share transfer office, 93 but it has been said that his authority 
must be proved by the plaintiff, "which is difficult."94 
The American statutes prescribing the appointment of an 
agent as a condition precedent to licensing, are divided. In 
a distinct group, the authority of the required agent is 
restricted to domestic matters either by an express clause95 
or by implication.96 Of the remaining statutes uncertain in 
language, many more possibly may be claimed for this latter 
class.97 In the great majority of licensing statutes, however, 
in case a foreign corporation has not appointed an agent or 
the agent has disappeared or lost his authority, an official 
93 The Madrid [I937] P. 40. 
94 GuTTERIDGE, "Le Conflit des lois de competence judiciaire dans les actions 
personnelles," 44 Recueil (I933) II, III at u9; cf. DICEY 232. 
95 Kansas: Gen. Stat. (I935) § 17.501. 
Nebraska: Rev. Stat. (1943) §21-I2or. 
New Hampshire: Rev. Laws (I942) c. 28o §I. 
SouthDakota:Code (1939) § 11.2003. 
Washington: Rem. Rev. Stat. (I932) Supp. § 3836-I8. 
96 Alabama: Code Ann. (I 940) tit. 1 o § I 92; Jefferson Island Salt Co. v. 
Longyear Co. (1923) 210 Ala. 352, 98 So. 1 I9· 
Idaho: Code Ann. (I932) § 29-502. 
Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (I933) § 25-304; § 25-306, as amended by 
L. 194I, c. 226 § 8. 
Iowa: Code (I 946) § 494.2. 
North Dakota: Rev. Code (I943) §§ IO-I7IO, IO-I733> IO-I734· 
Rhode Island: Gen. Laws Ann., c. I I 6 § 65 as construed by cases. 
South Carolina: Code (1942) § 7765. 
Tennessee: Code Ann. (1943) § 4I2o. 
Wisconsin: Stat. (I943) § 226.02. 
97 Arkansas: Pope's Dig. Stat. (1937) § 2247; American Ry. Express Co. v. 
Rouw Co. (I927) I73 Ark. 8Io, 294 S. W. 401. 
Arizona: Code Ann. (I939) § 53-8or. 
Georgia: Code Ann. (I933) § 22-I Ioi; Reeves v. Southern R. Co. (1905) 
49 S. E. 674. 
Maryland: Flack's Code Ann. (1939) art. 23 § I19 as amended by L. 1943, 
c. 932, and§ I2o as amended by L. 194I, c. 687. 
Minnesota: Stat. (1945) §§ 303.06, 303.13; Erving v. Chicago & North-
western R. Co. (I927) 17I Minn. 87, 2I4 N. W. u. 
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of the state-the secretary of state, the auditor, et cetera-is 
designated as attorney for the corporation with authority 
to receive service of process either under a declaration to be 
made by the corporation or by a statutory provision. The 
courts, under the guidance of the Supreme Court of the 
United States/8 have developed a system varying in the 
states and apparently still :fluid, which the draftsmen of 
the Uniform Foreign Corporations Act refrained from re-
producing in a section, because it would be enormously com-
plicated.99 One of the particular doctrines is that service on 
an appointed agent or the official designated as attorney, 
may be effected in causes arising outside the state, where 
the corporation has appointed him to this effect, or is deemed 
to have consented to his authority, especially in the case 
of a public officer, by having filed for doing business on the 
ground of a statute unequivocally conferring on him construc-
tive authority, while the corporation is actually doing business 
at the time suit is. brought against it.100 
In a few jurisdictions, the right to sue a foreign corporation 
doing business in the state for all causes of action is a privilege 
of residents. Moreover, a practice has developed that carrying 
on business in a state adds to the probability that the courts 
of the state will take jurisdiction in cases involving the in-
Mississippi: Code Ann. (I942) § 5345· 
New York: Gen. Corp. Law, § 210; Karius v. All States Freight, Inc. 
(I94I) I76 Misc. I55, 26 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 738. 
Ohio: Gen. Code Ann. (I938) § 8625-5; Burke v. McClintic-Marshall Con-
struction Co. (I9Io) 9 0. N. P. (N. S.) 577· 
98 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co. ( 1917) 243 
U. S. 93; Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co. (I 92 I) 
2 57 U. S. 2 '3; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co. Inc. (I 9:zz) 
257 U.S. 533; Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co. (I923) 262 U.S. JI2; 
Mich. Central R. Co. v. Mix (I 929) 278 U. S. 492; Canadian P. R. Co. v. 
Sullivan (C. C. A. ISt I942) u6 F. (2d) 433, cert. denied (I 942) 3 I 6 U.S. 696. 
99 National Conference, Handbook I934> 325; cf. Restatement§§ 90, 9I. 
10° Karius v. All States Freight, Inc. (I94I) I76 Misc. I55• 26 N.Y. Supp. 
(2d) 738; Erving v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. (I927) I7I Minn. 87, 
214 N. W. 12. Note on service of process upon designated state official, I45 
A. L. R. (I943) 630· 
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ternal affairs of the corporation where all parties to the 
controversy are in the state.101 
In many other countries, as clearly laid down in the 
Japanese Code102 and particularly in Latin America,103 juris-
diction is taken on a broad scale against foreign corporations 
domiciled in any sense in the state. The parent corporation 
may thus be exposed to heavy commitments even at home 
when judgments of the territorial courts are accorded en-
forcement in the state of charter.104 A wholesome reaction 
sometimes appears under French influence. For instance, an 
Argentine decision making a branch office in Buenos Aires 
of a Liverpool shipping line liable for faulty performance 
of an affreightment by the branch office of the same firm 
in New York, has been severely criticised on the basis of the 
French principle that a suit must refer to acts done or 
obligations created in the jurisdiction of the branch or agency, 
in order to avoid abusive actions against foreign firms. 105 
2. Registration 
In the great majority of countries, though not in the 
101 See in particular Maryland, Flack's Code Ann. ( r 9 3 9) § I r 9> c and d; 
Missouri Rev. Stat. Ann (1939) § 6oo5 as to insurance corporations; for a 
Delaware corporation doing business in Missouri, State ex rel. Northwestern 
Mutual Fire Association v. Cook (1942) 349 Mo. 225, 16o S. W. (2d) 687, 
cf, Note, 145 A. L. R. (supra n. roo) at 652; 2 BEALE 891 § 192-7 and 
cases cited. 
102 Japan: C. Com. art. 255 par. 2, as construed by the Jap. S. Ct. (February 
15, 1905), covers the whole of the company's business, and according to App. 
Tokyo (July 23, 1920) extends to matters arising abroad. See r C. Com. of 
Japan Ann. (1931) 405, 406. 
103 Brazil: Decree-Law No. 2627, of Sept. 26, 1940, art. 67: foreign stock 
corporations, licensed to do business, are required to have a permanent repre-
sentative in Brazil, subject to be sued and to receive initial service for the 
corporation, with full powers to treat and to determine definitely, any matters. 
The meaning, however, may be restricted to acts and operations on behalf of 
the company in the country; art. 68 subjects only such operations to the laws of 
Brazil. 
104 See CRAWFORD, "The Brazilian Business Corporation," 11 Tul. L. Rev. 
(1936) at 63. 
105 Argentina: Cam. Fed. de la Cap. (March 17, 1941) Praizos Hnos. v. 
Lamport Holt Line, 75 Jur. Arg. 231 1 criticized by DE LA VEGA, id. 232. 
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United States and the Netherlands (which have not instituted 
any special index of foreign corporations), 106 business organ-
izations are recorded in special public registers. Foreign en-
terprises have in most states to register any agency established 
in the territory. Germany and Switzerland traditionally re-
quire only branch offices in the narrow sense to be registered, 
a restriction that has been criticised in the interest of the 
security of commerce.197 Since 1908, England, which has no 
general register of commerce, also has required foreign 
companies having any place of business in the country to 
register.108 Canadian provinces have to some extent followed 
this method.109 
While in England there is a special register for foreign 
companies, in other countries a problem is presented with 
respect to the registration of foreign associations, in view 
of the different registers and regulations for recording 
domestic associations, such as stock corporations, limited li-
ability partnerships, and ordinary firms. 
Generally, the provisions respecting domestic organizations 
are applied by analogy; 110 the formalities of those in situ-
ations most similar to the foreign association are employed.m 
If there is no parallel, the Italian Code prescribes compliance 
with the most exacting formalities, viz., those imposed on 
stock corporations.112 In Germany, it is prescribed policy 
to require only documentation and facts that can be furnished 
106 This was criticized long ago by AssER because of the absence of pro-
visions making foreign corporations known, see KosTERS 688 n. 5· 
107 WIELAND, 43 Z.Schweiz.R. 243ff. 
108 Companies Act, 1929 (19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23) soo, Part XI, s. 343· 
109 Alberta: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1942, c. 240, s. 134· 
British Columbia: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1936, c. 42, s. 179· 
Manitoba: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1940, c. 36, s. 453· 
'Saskatchewan: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1940, c. 113, s. 189. 
110 Japan: C. Com. art. 255 par. 1. 
111 Switzerland's Federal Council (June 16, 1902) discussed by STEIGER, 
67 ZBJV. (1931) at 324· 
112ftaly: C. Com. (1882) art. 230 par. Ji C. C. (1942) art. 2507. 
Similarly, Rumania: C. Com. (1938) art. 358. 
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on the basis of the foreign law; 118 to reconcile both laws, 
it has also been held that where the general law of the 
incorporating state limits the liability of directors in a manner 
unknown to the law of the forum, these limitations must be 
recorded to be available against a third party .114 
Some legislations, however, have imposed special heavy 
burdens of documentation upon foreign corporations, and 
worse, registrars and courts sometimes exaggerate these re-
quirements so as to render compliance extremely cumber-
some.115 
3. Publications 
A number of statutes have prescribed the data to be given 
in registration and in subsequent notifications regarding the 
financial status of the association.116 This is in line with the 
recent strong increase of supervisory policy, tending to en-
large the control of the management by the state and the 
public. But again, the impositions may go too far. Sometimes, 
an inappropriate curiosity is displayed in inquiring into busi-
ness done outside of the state. This is another reason for 
big corporations with a worldwide radius of activity to form 
subsidiaries with capital funds set apart for the purposes of 
the branches.117 
113 German HGB. § I 3 par. 3; see also § 20I par. 5; Aktiengesetz § 3 7· 
Cf. Denkschrift zum Entwurf eines HGB. (I888) 26; NEUMEYER, 2 Int. 
Verwaltungs R. I 9I n. 5, 202. 
114 KG. (March 8, I929) IPRspr. I929 No. 2I; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. 8Io. 
115 For example, complaint has been made by GRANT, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (I934) 
557 against the requirements connected with the obligatory filing of a general 
power of attorney in Mexico and Cuba; by EDER, I 5 Tul. L. Rev. (I 94 I) 
520 at 534 with respect to Panama. 
An effort to remedy these difficulties has been initiated by a Pan-American 
"Protocol on Uniformity of Powers of Attorney Which are to be Utilized 
Abroad," Washington, February I 7, I 9401 signed by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, United States and Venezuela, and ratified by 
the United States, Brazil and several other states. See 36 Am. J. Int. Law 
(I942) Supp. I93 and subsequent volumes. The Protocol includes powers ex-
ecuted in the name of a juridical person (art. I s. 3). 
116 See FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 469. 
111 See CRAWFORD, "The Brazilian Business Corporation," I I Tul. L. Rev. 
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4· Guarantees 
In some countries, the creditors of the branch are protected 
by such measures as deposits to secure future debts, or a 
certain part of the capital stock must be held in the country, 
in Brazil at least two-thirds.118 Again, establishment of a 
legally independent affiliate is the usual answer. 
5. Application of the Internal Law 
As stated above, foreign business assoctattons are quite 
normally governed by the domestic administrative law with 
regard to establishments, and by the domestic law of agency 
as respects the extent of the authority enjoyed by the man-
agers of the establishment. It agrees with the general princi-
ples that article 287 of the Argentine Commercial Code 
subjects the company to the provisions of the Code as regards 
the registration and publication of the articles of organization 
and of the authority conferred upon their representatives 
or agents.119 On the other hand, the legitimate sphere of 
domestic law is also observed in the Treaty of Montevideo 
(art. 5 ), which limits the territorial prescriptions to "the 
exercise of the acts comprised in the objective of incorpo-
ration." 
Only such restricted effect should be inferred when it is 
required that a resident representative of the company must 
possess a general power of attorney with full authority to 
bind the company by his acts.120 By an analogous reasoning, 
(1936) 59 at 63, and "The I940 Corporation Law of Brazil," I6 Tul. L. Rev. 
(I942.) 2.2.8 at 2.37. 
118 Brazil: Decree No. 434, of July 4, I89I, art. 47 §I. 
Rumania: C. Com. (I887) art. 2.45 is probably repealed; such measures 
have been abolished in other countries, except for insurance and similar com-
panies. 
119 To similar effect, Brazil: Decree-Law No. z6z7, of Sept. z6, I 940, art. 68 
(but see n. 12.8). 
Guatemala: C. C. ( I933) art. zs (4). 
Portugal: C. Com. art. I I I. 
120 Expressly, Denmark: Law on Stock Corporations, of April I5, I93o, § 
77 ("in all legal relations arising out of its activity in the country"). 
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if the Chilean law provides that not only must a foreign 
stock company establish a special fund in Chile for the 
fulfillment of its obligation in the country, but also that the 
assets of the company are "affected by the Chilean laws," 
the latter provision reasonably is limited to the assets situated 
in Chile.121 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has twice had 
opportunity to deal with the attempt of Missouri to protect 
resident holders of insurance policies against certain subse-
quent contracts modifying their policies. The court summa-
rized the arguments of the Missouri court as follows: 
"As foreign insurance companies have no right to come into 
the State and there do business except as the result of a 
license from the State and as the State exacts as a condition 
of a license that all foreign insurance companies shall be 
subject to the laws of the State as if they were domestic 
corporations, it follows that the limitations of the State law 
resting upon domestic corporations also rest upon foreign 
companies and therefore deprive them of any power which 
a domestic company could not enjoy, thus rendering void 
or inoperative any provision of their charter or condition in 
policies issued by them or contracts made by them inconsistent 
with the Missouri law."122 
This reasoning the Supreme Court rejected: 
"And this argument we declared unsound since the 'propo-
sition cannot be maintained without holding that because 
a State has power to license a foreign insurance company to 
do business within its borders and the authority to regulate 
such business, therefore a State has power to regulate the 
Costa Rica: Corporation Law, art. 151, amended by Law No. 10, of Dec. 3, 
1929, art. 1 (r). 
Rumania: C. Com. arts. 246(1), 247· 
121 To this effect, HERRERA REYES, Sociedades Anonimas (Santiago 1935) 
274, 275, commenting on Decree-Law No. 251, of May 2o, 1931, art. 123 (c) 
and (d). 
122 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head (1913) 234 U.S. 149 at 163. 
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business of such company outside its borders and which would 
otherwise be beyond the State's authority .... ' " 123 
Some laws, however, extend their realm beyond any such 
limits. They either establish imperative requirements respect-
ing the structure of licensable organizations, or they seem 
to subject transactions of licensed organizations to their law 
of the forum without restriction. 
In the first respect, some Latin-American laws employ 
careless language in subjecting foreign corporations doing 
business in the country to the internallaws.124 The authorities 
of many Latin-American republics, as an American writer 
explains, show "great reluctance to allow qualification of a 
foreign corporation which presents, in its charter or by-laws, 
provisions in conflict with locallegislation."125 Thus, usually, 
unlimited corporation life is forbidden. 126 Sometimes, some 
higher proportions for subscription stock and paid-in stock 
are prescribed, or a fixed percentage of the profits must be 
allocated to a reserve fund, or the corporation may be dis-
solved if the capital structure is deteriorated over a fixed 
percentage. 127 
In the second respect, where a statute sweepingly declares 
that the relations of the organization to third parties, or even 
all commercial operations of the branch shall be subject 
to the laws of the country, 128 the formula raises an issue. If 
123 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U.S. 357 at 376. 
124 E.g., Colombia: Law No. 58 of 1931, art. 22 in fine. 125 GRANT, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934) 556 at 558. 
126 GRANT, supra n. 12.5. 
127 GRANT, supra n. 12.5. 128 Spain: C. Com. art. 15, and its followers, supra p. 18o. 
Hungary: See GuNorscH, 4 Z. Osteurop R. (1937-38) 293, 295· 
Brazil: Decree No. 434, of July 4, 1891, art. 47 applied the law of the 
forum to all "relations, rights and duties between company, creditors, share-
holders and every person interested." Art. 68 of Decree-Law No. 2627, of 
Sept. 26, 1940 seems more modest, see supra n. 119 and CRAWFORD, 16 Tul. L. 
Rev. (1942) 2.2.8 at 237 (last lines), subjecting the companies to the laws 
and tribunals "as to the acts or operations practised in Brazil." But the Intro-
ductory Law of 1942, art. 11 § r. declares the companies having branches 
etc. in Brazil obligated to have their constitutive acts approved by the gov-
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this includes the private law, 129 it may mean that the company 
and a resident of the state in question are forbidden to con-
clude their contract in another state under the foreign law, 
since some codes in fact seem to pretend that the parties may 
not submit their contract made in the state to any other law. 
Actually, extensive claims of lex fori are raised in several 
Latin-American laws. Nevertheless, one would think, at 
least, that the "laws" of the country imposed upon the 
foreign corporation include this country's own conflicts rules. 
Definitely objectionable are unqualified provisions such 
as in the Turkish law/30 that the company must "submit to 
all laws and regulations of the country," in Peru that foreign 
companies are subject, "without any restrictions to the laws 
of the Republic,m31 or in Ecuador that this applies to all 
questions arising in or outside of court.132 
On the usual requirements for licensing in this country 
that the foreign corporation shall be subject to all the re-
strictions and duties imposed on similar domestic corporations 
and shall have no other or greater rights, powers, or privi-
leges, it would be repetitious to observe the exaggerations 
contained in these clauses.183 
In quite a different connection, we have encountered the 
provision introduced in the Codes of Liechtenstein and 
ernment making themselves subject to the Brazilian laws (ficando sujeitas a lei 
brasileira). This law and EsPINOLA, 8-C Tratado 1406, 178t, §§ too, tot, 
emphasizing this text, fail to explain whether this subjection extends to matters 
other than those of the Brazilian business places. 
129 Probably it does not in Cuba, C. Com. art. 15 ("mercantile operations 
within Cuban territory") and similar provisions in Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Mexico, supra n. 32 .. 
130 Turkey: Law of Nov. 3o, 133o/t 914, art. 13; cf. SALEM, 7 Repert. 
zso No. 132. 
131 Peru: Constitution ( 1 9 3 3) art. 1 7. 
132 Ecuador: Companies Law of Oct. 15, 1909, art. 7· 
133 Supra pp. 149ff. Special rules for particular classes of corporations may be 
excepted. For foreign building and loan associations, Colorado, Stat. Ann. 
(Michie 19 3 5) c. 2 5 § 42 anomalously provides that "all contracts made 
with citizens of this state shall be deemed as made under Colorado laws." 
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Yugoslavia, declaring the permanent agency of a foreign 
business association, inscribed in the register of commerce, to 
be legally existent and capable of acting to the same extent 
as a similar domestic corporation.134 This provision grants 
security to third parties, particularly in the case of dissolution 
of the mother corporation. 
6. Special Purposes 
Territorial law will reasonably take on a broader scope 
when particular purposes call for intensified control, as in the 
case of insurance, credit, railroad or other public transporta-
tion, or communication or similar business of public signifi-
cance. Thus, in this country, the regulations regarding do-
mestic corporations have largely been applied to foreign 
organizations, in such fields as savings and building loans, and 
full domestication, involving transformation into a domestic 
corporate entity, has often been required in the case of rail-
road or generally public services.135 
v. SANCTIONS OF TERRITORIAL IMPOSITIONS 
If the duties imposed by the local law are violated, the 
effect is naturally governed by this law itself, and each pro-
vision needs its own construction. However, certain effects 
on contractual obligations, following the two requirements 
of licensing and of registration are of peculiar significance. 
134 Liechtenstein: P. G. R. § 2.36 par. 4· 
Yugoslavia: C. Com. § 503 par. 5; see EISNER, I Symmikta Streit 296. Supra 
Chapter 2.2., p. I5J. 
135 United States: See Restatement § I 69 comment d; FLETCHER, 17 Cyc. 
Corp.§ 8386; I8 A. L. R. 12.4ff., 72. A. L. R. ro5; 2.3 Am. Jur. §§ ur, 387; 
Regimen Juridico 6-2.5, 73-92.. For some comparative notes see E. R. SALEM, 
Clunet I938, 68I. 
For France: NIBOYET 374 No. 3I4, and for insurance companies, NIBOYET, 
z Traite 361 §§ 8z8ff. 
For Latin-American countries: C6digo Bustamante, art. 2.53; Cuba: CRAW-
FORD, "Cuban Corporations," I 0 Tul. L. Rev. ( I936) 568. 
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I. Failure to Obtain Authorization to Do Business 
United States. The extensive discussion of the first question 
in the United States, nourished by an abundance of statutes 
and cases, has been summarized in a comprehensive note in 
the Restatement ( § I 79). Nevertheless, the matter is too 
confused to allow more than a survey of the most significant 
phases.136 In Williston's judgment, the decisions of the 
courts, "do not seem generally based on very secure or sound 
distinctions.m37 The texts of many statutes, particularly the 
older ones, are of little avail, as they are fragmentary and 
use such terms as "unlawful," "void," "voidable," "valid" 
in an unreliable manner. Moreover, many statutes have been 
changed in recent times, several repeatedly, so as to make 
previous summaries and annotations antiquated. 
The outstanding problem is that of the effect of a contract 
concluded by a foreign corporation in the state without com-
pliance with the statutory requirements for doing business. 
Beale distinguishes only two classes of authorities, those hold-
ing the contract valid and those that hold it void.138 This 
is misleading, whereas, on the other hand, regard to all 
particularities of the various regulations has had the opposite 
defect of obscuring all leading ideas. That there are, in effect, 
four classes of statutes, may be gathered from the construction 
given them by the state courts or from their apparent mean-
mg. 
It may be noted, at the outset, that there is a common 
sanction of fine for noncompliance, appearing in the statutes 
of most states. 
136 Valuable suggestions are contained in the classification by LoRENZEN, 6 
Repert. 370, and in such decisions as Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Construction 
Co. (I93o) 2I I Cal. 228, 295 Pac. I, followed in 75 A. L. R. 439 by a 
comprehensive annotation. It is regrettable that all surveys are satisfied with 
indicating cases almost without any regard to the current statutes which have 
very often been changed (c/. the characteristic warning to the reader in 136 
A. L. R. II6I, I in fine; 23 Am. Jur. (I 933) 575 n. 2o) · 
137 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 5028 § I77I. 
138 2 BEALE §§ I 79.24-25. 
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(i) In a small group of states, noncompliance does not in 
any way prejudice the rights and duties arising from a con-
tract concluded in the state.139 The significance of this liberal 
attitude will be illuminated by the description of the other 
groups. 
(ii) A larger class of statutes140 is exemplified by the New 
York statute concerning other than "moneyed corporations," 
which has been construed by the highest court of New York 
139 Delaware: Rev. Code (1935) c. 6s § 220 (only a fine imposed). 
District of Columbia: Code (1940) § 13-103 (provides only for service 
of process after repeated changes). 
Georgia: Code Ann. (Park 1936) § 22-1501, in accord with Alston v. New 
York C. P. Corp. (1927) 36 Ga. App. 777, 138 S. E. 27o. 
Kansas: Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick 1935) § 17·501 and 1943 Supp.; Heart 
of America Ins. Agency v. Wichita Cab and Transport Co. (1940) 151 Kan. 
420, 423, 99 Pac. (2d) 765, 767. 
Kentucky: Rev. Stat. (1946) §§ 271.055, 271.990; Williams v. Dearborn 
T. Co. (1927) 2I8 Ky. 27t; 291 S. W. 388, overruling Fruin v. Chatterson 
(I9I2) I46 Ky. 504, I43 S. W. 6. 
Nebraska: Rev. Stat. (I943) § 2I•120I, 12o6, 1209, 1210 (misdemeanor to 
act for noncomplying corporation, no denial of rights mentioned) superseding 
the law avoiding the contract quoted in Henni v. Fidelity B. & L. Ass'n (1901) 
61 Neb. 744, 86 N. W. 475· 
North Carolina: Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie I 943) § 55-II 8. 
South Carolina: Code Ann. (I942) §§ 7769, 7789 (only fines _provided). 
14° California: C. C. § 408, as amended by L. I933, c. 533 ~ 92. 
Colorado: Stat. Ann. (Michie I935) c. 4I §§III, II3 (changing previous 
milder law). 
Connecticut: Gen. Stat. (I93o) § 349I. 
Florida: Stat. Ann. (I94I) § 613.04. 
Idaho: Code Ann. (I932) §§ 29-504, 29-505, 29-506, cf. § 29-5o3a, intro-
duced I 940. 
Illinois: Business Corp. Act of I933, § 125, changing previous more rigid 
law quoted in Automotive M. Co. v. American S. M. P. Corp. (I924) 232 
Ill. App. 532. 
Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (I933) § 25-3I4 (most statutes declare contracts 
not void, see Ind. Ann. to the Restatement,§ I79). 
Iowa: Code (I 946) § 494·9· 
Louisiana: Business Corp. Act, I928, as amended by Jfd. Extra Session 
I935, Act No. 8 § I; previously contracts were enforceable under Act No. 267 
of I9I4, § 23, as amended by Act No. I2a of I92o, § I. Federal Schools v. 
Kuntz (I93I) I6 La. App. 289, I34 So. u8. 
Maine: Rev. Stat. (I944) c. 49 § 124. 
Maryland: Flack's Code Ann. (I 939) art. 2 3 § 12 I. 
Massachusetts: Ann. Laws (I932) c. I8I § 5· 
Minnesota: Stat. ( I945) §30J.2o. 
Nevada: Comp. Laws (I929) §§ 1842, I848. 
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as establishing inability of the corporation to sue upon the 
contract, as the only penalty for noncompliance.141 The con-
tract, therefore, deserves the term of "valid," despite the 
fact that it is unenforceable by the corporation in the state 
courts. Two important consequences have been drawn. First, 
the party dealing with the corporation is bound to the contract 
in a perfectly normal manner. He is unable to avoid the con-
tract on other grounds than those of the ordinary law of 
contracts; there is no failure of consideration on the part of 
the corporation, until the corporation refuses performance.142 
Second, the corporation itself is able to sue on the contract 
in the courts of other states and in the federal courts, even 
those sitting in the state of noncompliance itsel£.143 The latter 
restriction on the statutory sanction is the more significant, as 
no state has the power to exclude by statute the right of a 
party to remove a suit to the federal courts. 144 
New Hampshire: Rev. Laws (1942) c. 28o § u. 
New Mexico: Stat. Ann. (I94I) §§ 54-805, 8o7; Niblack v. Seaberg Hotel 
(I938) 42 N. M. 28I, 76 Pac. (2d) II 56. 
New York: Gen. Corp. Law,§ 218 (see infra n. I 66). 
North Dakota: Rev. Code (I 943) §§ I o-1709, 1 o-I 735, I o-1 7 3 7 (L. I 9 3 7, 
c. II 6 § 2oa). 
Ohio: Page's Gen. Code Ann., § 8625-25. 
Pennsylvania: Business Corp. Law (I933) § IOI4, as amended by L. I945> 
Act No. 373· 
Rhode Island: Gen. Laws Ann. (I938) c. II6 § 67. 
Virginia: Code Ann. (I942) § 3848. 
Washington: Rem. Rev. Stat. (I932) Supp. § 3836-u. 
West Virginia: Code Ann. (Michie I943) § 309I; Ober v. Stephens (I903) 
54 W.Va. 354,46 S. E. I95· 
141 See 2 BEALE 855 quoting Gray, J., in Neuchatel Asphalte Co. v. Mayor 
of New York (I898) ISS N.Y. 373, 49 N. E. I043i cf. Fritts v. Palmer 
(I889) I32 U. 'S. 282. 
142 See Mahar v. Harrington Park Villa Sites (I9I2) 204 N.Y. 23I, 234, 
97 N.E. 587; Alsing Co. v. New England Quartz & Spar Co. (I9oi) 66 App. 
Div. 473, aff'd, 174 N.Y. 536. 
143 David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America (I 9 I 2) 22 5 
U.S. 489; Republic Creosoting Co. v. Boldt C. Co. (C. C. A. 6th I930) 38 F. 
(2d) 739; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kane (I 94I) II 7 F. (2d) 398; 
133 A. L. R. II63, and Annotation, id. I17I; see 2 BEALE 859 n. 5 andRe-
statement § I 78. 
144 Restatement § I7I; Terral v. Burke Construction Co. (I922) 257 U.S. 
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Under this approach, it may be asked: What extraterri-
torial effect will result from a judgment of the state of non-
compliance, dismissing the action of a foreign corporation on 
the ground of the failure to qualify? Although the problem 
apparently never has been raised,145 it would seem that such 
judgment would not have the effect of res judicata. 
(iii) A third group is characterized by much more se-
verity.146 The corporation is deprived not only of the right to 
be a party in the courts of the state in question but of its rights 
under the contract. It follows, on the one hand, that the other 
party is given in effect the option of suing on the contract or 
cancelling it. On the other hand, the corporation is prevented 
from suing in other than the state courts. For whether the 
statute maintains or prohibits with annulling effect trans-
actions of a nonqualifying corporation, it is recognized in the 
529; Strampe v. Minnesota Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. (I 909) I09 Minn. 364, 
123 N. W. ro83; Ann., z6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 999; Ann. Cas. 1914A 7o6. 
145 Incapacity to sue is generally considered a bar to come into court as con-
trasted with the elements of the cause of action which give the right to relief 
in court. See 6 Cycl. of Fed. Procedure (ed. 2, I 943) 148 § 21 oo. 
146 Alabama: Code Ann. (I 940) tit. 1 o § 191 ; Boddy v. Continental Inv. 
Co. (1921) I8 Ala. App. 65, 88 So. 294. 
Arkansas: Pope's Dig. (I937) § 225I. 
Michigan: Gen. Corp. Act, §§ 93, 95; Hoskins v. Rochester S. & L. Ass'n 
(1903) 133 Mich. 505, 95 N.W. 566. 
Missouri: Gen. and Bus. Corp. Act, § Io9; Flinn v. Gillen (I928) po 
Mo. 1047, 10 S. W. (2d) 923. 
Oklahoma: Stat. Ann. (I94I) tit. I8 § 454; M.S. Cohn G. Co. v. Southern 
S. Co. (1927) I29 Okla. I7I, 264 Pac. 2o6 ("contracts void at the option of 
citizens of the state"), cf. 75 A. L. R. 450,451. 
Oregon: Camp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 77-306, 77-307, 77-207. 
South Dakota: Code Ann. (I939) §I I.2I03. 
Tennessee: (Doubtful whether the contract is not considered absolutely void, 
seen. I2I) Code Ann. (1938) § 4I19; Insurance Co. v. Kennedy (I896) 
96 Tenn. (I2 Pick) 7II, 36 S. W. 709; Harris v. Columbia Water Co. (r9oi) 
108 Tenn. (24 Pick) 245, 67 S. W. 8 I I; Peck-Williamson Heating etc. Co. v. 
McKnight (I9I8) I4o Tenn. (13 Thomp.) 563, 205 S. W. 419; State Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dupre (1935) 19 Tenn. App. 3or, 86 S. W. (2d) 894. 897. 
Texas: Vernon's Rev. Civ. Stat. (I925) art. I5J6, as amended by L. I93I, 
c. IsS. 
Utah: Code Ann. (1943) § r8-8-5. 
Vermont: Pub. Laws (I933) § 5988. 
Wisconsin: Stat. (I943) § 226.o2; Fitzsimmons v. City Fire Ins. Co. of 
New Haven (1864) I8 Wis. 246,86 Am. Dec. 761. 
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sister states; hence, if the statute appears to treat the contract 
as void or voidable, 147 other jurisdictions recognize its effect 
accordingly. 
While usually the contract is called "void" and might be 
better denoted as "voidable" in these jurisdictions,148 yet 
either term is inadequate. 
(iv) Finally, there may be states in which the unlawful 
contract is entirely "void," meaning that no action is granted 
either party in any court.149 
These "penalties," if radically executed, may cause con-
siderable hardship. In most of the jurisdictions involved, this 
has been well noticed, and important mitigations have been 
introduced. Always, however, at least a few states insist on a 
radical sanction. Thus, for instance, it is fair that a corporation 
should be allowed to make contracts preliminary to starting 
business, such as the purchase of equipment, supplies, and raw 
materials, appointment of agents or acquisition of a business. 
While a distinct trend to exempt such preparatory transactions 
from the ban is developing, it is far from a complete victory .150 
The main relief for foreign corporations that have failed to 
qualify, is furnished by the proviso, now widely prevailing, 
that the corporation is prevented from suing only "until" it 
147 Allegheny Co. v. Allen (1903) 69 N.J. Law 2.70, 55 Atl. 724; Hyde v. 
Goodnow (1849) 3 N. Y. :z.66; Wood v. Cascade Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 
(1894) 8 Wash. 42.7, 36 Pac. 2.67 (concerning the New York law on insurance 
companies) but cf. Restatement, New York Annotations 146. 
148 See for Michigan and Wisconsin, Bishop v. Hannan Real Estate Ex-
change (1934) 2.67 Mich. 575, 2.55 N. W. 599; see Martin Bros. v. Nettleton 
(192.6) 138 Wash. 102., 2.44 Pac. 386 (dictum: the "penalty" by the statute 
of Oregon measures the remedy of the individual who deals with the corporation 
not complying with the statute.) 
149 Arizona: Code Ann. (1939) § 53-8o:z., as construed in Eastlick v. Hay-
wood (192.8) 33 Ariz. :1.42., 2.63 Pac. 936: "It is probable that no action of a 
party dealing with a foreign corporation which failed to comply . . . , can 
give the transaction validity." 
Tennessee: Code (1943) § 4119, as construed in Peck-Williamson Heating 
etc. Co. v. McKnight (1918) 140 Tenn. (13 Thomp.) 563, 2.05 S. W. 419; 
State Life Ins. Co. v. Dupre (1935) 19 Tenn. App. 301, 86 S. W. (:z.d) 894, 
897. A long list of cases given by :z. BEALE 86o n. 7 is antiquated. 
150 See 2.3 Am. Jur. (1939) Foreign Corporations §§ 367, 368. 
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complies with the requirements. Yet in a few states, belonging 
to classes (ii) and (iii), this validating and retroactive effect 
of compliance subsequent to the prohibited contract is ex-
pressly denied.151 Generally contracts made outside the state 
may be sued upon.152 Yet the excellent Pennsylvania Annota-
tions to the Restatement think that the disability in this state 
includes any contractual claim wherever it arose.153 The courts 
are inclined, moreover, to grant suits for injuries to property, 
even though there is connection with unauthorized business, 
as where the corporation has assigned goods to an agent for 
sale on commission/54 but a few statutes deny claims sound-
ing in tort as well as in contract.155 It is also ordinarily, though 
not without exception, assumed that claims may be based on 
the ownership of property or possession, including acqui-
sitions of title, not immediately connected with doing busi-
ness.156 
Obviously, therefore, prohibitions of "all court actionsm57 
ought to be understood with restrictions, although, in an 
opinion of the Attorney General of Louisiana, "any action 
in the courts of the state" is declared precluded, even to a 
151 New York Gen. Corp. Law, § :uS, cf. Restatement, New York Annota-
tions § 1 79· 
Tennessee: Code Ann. (1943) § 4II9. See Cary-Lombard L. Co. v. Thomas 
(1893) 92 Tenn. 587, zz S. W. 743· 
Wisconsin: Stat. (I943) § zz6.o2; Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Munday (I9I8) 
168 Wis. 3I; I68 N. W. 393, I69 N. W. 6u, aff'd Munday v. Wisconsin 
Trust Co. (192o) 252 U.S. 499· 
In Idaho, Law of I940, see 1940 Supp. to Code Ann. (1932) tit. 29 c. 5, 
2.2.4, belated filing was allowed only once within three months after the 
provision came into force. Cf. WILLISTON, 6 Contracts§ 1772 n. 2. 152 Leverett v. Garland (I921) 206 Ala. 556, 90 So. 343i 2 BEALE 856 
n. 4, 858 n. 5· 
153 Restatement, Pennsylvania Annotations 78 § 178. 
I54 See 2 BEALE 857; Note, 136 A. L. R. (I942.) u,6o. 155 Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (I933) § 2.5-3I4. 
Wyoming: Rev. Stat. Ann. (I93I) § 28-I41 A, added in I939· 
I56 See 2. BEALE 856 § I79.2.3; Restatement§ 179 note; Note, 136 A. L. R. 
(1941) n6o. 
157 Maryland: Flack's Ann. Code ( 1939) art. 2.3 § I I9. 
Missouri: Gen. and Bus. Corp. Act, § I 09. 
North Dakota: Rev. Code (1943) § 10-1735. 
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foreign corporation solely engaged in interstate business, 
unless the corporation has qualified to do business and all 
taxes due have been paid.158 
If we try, after all this, to ascertain the exact position of a 
noncomplying corporation having wholly or partly performed 
its own contractual obligations, when the other party refuses 
performance and restitution, the situation seems to be as 
follows: 
If the contract is valid under the violated statute but the 
corporation may not sue in the state courts for enforcement 
of the other party's duty, it may, nevertheless, even in these 
courts claim restitution on the ground of failure of consider-
ation, with any of the normal remedies. 
Where the contract is "void," we do not find any secure 
doctrine. Only a handful of cases belonging to two or three 
jurisdictions illustrate the situation. 
Several Michigan decisions have the merit of establishing 
with clear foundation the right of a noncomplying corporation 
to revindicate ownership of a movable which it has retained 
unconditionally159 or under a conditional sale.160 They recog-
nize that, if a contract is void because the plaintiff had no 
authorization, it does not follow that it must forfeit its prop-
erty to the defendant.161 This answers the argument, ex-
pressed for instance in Tennessee, that the Singer Manu-
facturing Co. could not be allowed to recover a machine sold 
conditionally on default of the buyer in payment, because 
"to allow it would be to enforce the contract ... and to put a 
premium on its violation of law.m62 But a federal court in 
158 Louisiana: Opinions of the Attorney General1936-J8, 125. 
159 Klatt v. Wayne C. Judge (1920) 212 Mich. 590. 
160 Mojonnier Bros. v. Detroit Milling Co. (1925) 233 Mich. 312; cf. 
Tuttle, J., in In re Rosenbloom ( 1922) 28o Fed. 139. 
161 Rex Beach Pictures Co. v. Harry I. Garson Production (1920) 209 Mich. 
692, 706. 
162 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Draper (1899) 103 Tenn. 262. 
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Minnesota correctly adds that also an agreement of absolute 
saJe is equally void "so that there is no contract and the title 
has never passed from the corporation to the buyer.m6 a 
Hence, actions of detinue or replevin as well as trover for 
conversion, 164 and cross bills at the suit of the other party are 
available. Where a bill was brought to set aside foreclosure 
proceedings and cancel a mortgage on the ground that the 
defendant was a foreign corporation unlicensed in Michigan, 
the bill was dismissed. The plaintiff could not equitably 
rescind the contract and fail to tender the amount due.165 
In the New York case establishing the principle that the 
contract is valid, Cullen, C. ]., in a remarkable concurrent 
opinion added that, even if the contract were considered void, 
until a foreign corporation refuses to fulfill, the buyer would 
not be entitled to recover back the money paid under the 
contract, good or bad. 166 
In a Missouri case a cross bill for assumpsit for money had 
and received was granted to an Arkansas corporation, to 
recover a large sum advanced for lumber which the plaintiff 
did not deliver. The federal court said: 
"Every principle of justice and fair dealing requires that 
it should pay back this money to defendant .... One cannot 
make a shield of a void contract to rob an associate.m67 
Should this not be true when the corporation has furnished 
163 Dunlop v. Mercer (1907) 156 Fed. 545· 
164 Lu-Mi-Nus Signs Co. v. Regent Theatre Co. (1930) 250 Mich. 535· 
165 Windisch v. Mortgage Security Corp. of America (1931) 254 Mich. 492, 
236 N. W. 88o. 
166 Mahar v. Harrington Park Villa Sites (1912), supra n. 141, 204 N.Y. 
231, at 237, 97 N. E. at 587. 
The New York court constantly supports also the wholesome analogous doc-
trine that failure to procure an occupational or business license, excepting an 
express statutory provision, is not deemed to make a contract void. Denying 
recovery would be "a ruling wholly out of proportion to the requirement 
of public policy." John E. Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen et al. (1937) 276 
N.Y. 274,11 N. E. (2d) 9o8; cf. Annotation, n8 A. L. R. 646. 
167 Lasswell Land & Lumber Co. v. Lee Wilson & Co. (C. C. A. 8th 1916) 
2 36 Fed. 322, cert. denied 242 U.S. 6 52. 
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material and work, and the compensation is refused? The 
question has come up repeatedly in Alabama and has been 
consistently negatived by rejecting any action of quasi-con-
tract.168 The federal court, following the view of the Supreme 
Court of Alabama, resumes the position: 
"The fact that the statutory prohibition is directed against 
the performance as well as the making of the contract is 
convincing that no action can be maintained upon the implied 
contract or upon a quantum meruit.m69 
Yet, the Alabama Supreme Court itself, as early as I9II, 
confessed: 
"Viewed solely from the standpoint of the individuals 
concerned, the apparent result of this conclusion is, it must 
be conceded, abhorrent to the judicial conscience.m7o 
The same court repeated this regret in refusing to enter into 
examinatioin of a case where a bank building had been fur-
nished with marble trimmings and other fixtures and instal-
lations on disputed oral orders for changes.171 This disregards 
the fact that "implied contract" is only a manner of speech, 
while the undue enrichment results from the invalidity of 
the contract and not from the contract. 
This radical view seems not to have been expressed in any 
other jurisdiction, but neither is such an action known to have 
been brought anywhere except in Alabama.172 Could it be 
that counsel are still unfamiliar with the remedies against 
undue enrichment? 
168 Leading case, Dudley v. Collier (1888) 87 Ala. 431, 6 So. 304; accord, 
Alabama Western R. Co. v. Talley-Bates Construction Co. ( 1909) 162 Ala. 
396, 402, so So. 341, and see the three following notes. 
169 Thomas v. Birmingham Railway Light and Power Co. (1912) 195 Fed. 
340. 
170 American Amusement Co. v. East Lake Chutes Co. (1911) 174 Ala. 526, 
56 So. 961 (improvement of an immovable). 
171 George M. Muller Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank of Dothan (1912) 
176 Ala. 21:9, 57 So. 762. 
172 Amos Bridge's Sons, Inc. v. State of New York (1921) 188 App. Div. 
soo, 231 N. Y. 532, sometimes cited in this connection, rejects an action for 
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If in a state of class (ii), prohibiting the corporation from 
suing but without invalidating the contract, the other party 
elects to sue on the contract, the corporation has the right of 
defense, which means that it may claim any right arising out 
of the contract, but in some statutes even this is prohibited.173 
Finally, if the contract has been executed on both sides, in-
validity may not be further claimed.174 
In a number of statutes it is stated that the directors, offi-
cers, or other persons acting on behalf of the corporation, 
contrary to the licensing provisions, are personally liable, 
if more than one, jointly and severally/75 in another group, 
they are punishable as for a misdemeanor.176 Most statutes are 
silent on the point. It seems settled that whether or not the 
contract is valid in regard to the corporation, the agents may 
not be sued except where the statutes so provide.177 
Complicated situations arise, if contracts made lawfully in 
one state are to be performed in another where the corporation 
damages for delay having increased the costs of building a state street. The 
parties disputed whose fault the delay was. In this case, at least, the work 
employer was not enriched and the action could correctly be qualified as based 
on the contract. 
173 Arkansas: Pope's Dig.§ 2251. 
California: C. C. § 408. 
Connecticut: Gen. Stat. (I93o) § 3491. 
Illinois: Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd I9J4) c. 32 § I57.125; Ryerson & Son v. 
Shaw (I917) 277 Ill. 524, IIS N. E. 650. 
Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (1933) § 25-3I4. 
Iowa: Code (1946) § 494·9 (2 Annotations 775 but see also 774 for notes 
on the same case). 
Maine: Rev. Stat. (I 944) c. 49 § I 24. 
Montana: Rev. Code Ann. (I935) § 6653. 
174 See 2 BEALE 862; FLETCHER, I 7 Cyc Corp. §§ 8527, 85JI, ns. 44, 45· 
175 Colorado: Stat. Ann. (Michie I 9 35) c. 41 § I 13. 
Idaho: Code Ann. (1932) § 29-506. 
Massachusetts: Ann. Laws (1932) c. r8r § 5· 
Utah: Code Ann. (I943) § IS-8-5. 
Virginia: Code Ann. (1942) § 3848. 
Wyoming: Rev. Stat. Ann.,§ 28-204. 
17
<l See Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann (1933) § 25-314. 
Iowa: Code (1946) § 494.13. 
Montana: Rev. Codes (1935) § 6656. 
177 See Karvalsky v. Becker (r94o) 217 Ind. 524, 29 N. E. (zd) 56o. 
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has not qualified for doing business. The Restatement has 
attempted to reach a uniform solution.178 
On many problems, however, the courts are divided. In 
particular, on the important topics of estoppel and recovery 
of chattels sold on conditional sale, the prevailing liberal 
trend encounters more substantial opposition. 
Public policy was the ground of objection to the recognition 
of a foreign statute in one Illinois case. The court held that 
an Illinois corporation, contracting in another state in good 
faith and partly executing the contract, had a good cause of 
action in the forum and could not be turned away because the 
action could not be maintained in the other state.179 
Other countries. In Austria it has been discussed whether 
a foreign insurance company, not admitted to do business in 
the country, may sue/80 and the general question is doubtful 
whether persons not admitted by administrative license can 
validly engage in contracts.181 The liberal view has been 
maintained in Czechoslovakia 182 and Prussia.183 
The German law on stock corporations of 1937 prescribing 
licensing of business seems not to impede either recognition 
of the foreign corporation's personality or the efficacy of 
178 Restatement § I 8o; cf. the divided cases of Restatement, Michigan Anno-
tations § I 8o. 
179 Hunter W. Finch & Co. v. Zenith Furnace Co. (191o) 245 Ill. 586 at 
594, 92 N. E. 521 at 524, aff'd, I46 Ill. App. 257. 
180 Denied by OGH. {July z, 1903) GIU. NF. 2398, 13 Z.int.R. 463. 
Contra: the Appeal Court, see WALKER 204; PISKO cited by WIELAND, 43 
Z.Schweiz.R. {N. F.) at 227 who seems to approve for all of Central Europe. 
181 For invalidity OGH. {May 8, 1912) GIU. NF. 5910; {May 2o, 1913) 
GIU. NF. 6453. Contra: OGH. {June 5, 1901) GIU. NF. 1449 and WALKER 
206. 
182 S. Ct. Nos. z86 3, 3 6o9, 5 82o, 6409, cited by LAUFKE, 7 Repert. 186 
No. 59· 
183 Prussia: Law of June 22, 1861, Preuss. Ges. Samml. 1861, 441 § 18 (1) 
has sanctions in the law of January 17, 1845, Preuss. Ges. Samml. 1845, 41 at 
7 5, §§ 176, 177, 189 not including the nullity of transactions. More severe 
are the special laws regarding insurance. In the case of a domestic insurance 
company doing unauthorized business in another German state, voidness of 
the policy has been recognized under § 134 BGB. by OLG. Hamburg {May 23, 
1907) Leipz.Z. 19o8, 249· 
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contracts concluded without compliance. In all cases, the state 
agencies may stop unauthorized carrying on of business.184 
In Latin-American jurisdictions, noncompliance is com-
monly stated as a ground for individual and collective liability 
of the persons who conclude a contract on behalf of the cor-
poration.185 Whether this is an indication that the company it-
self cannot be sued/86 seems doubtful. For in a few statutes it 
is expressly declared that both may be sued.187 On the right to 
sue, the doubts seem to be analogous to those experienced in 
the United States. 
Appraisal. The fact that a foreign corporation intrudes 
into a jurisdiction without having obtained permission to 
enter, should certainly not excuse it from any liability that it 
would incurr if doing lawful business there. For this reason, 
rules are wrong that deny all effect to transactions made in 
the state. But, on the other hand, no better solution is reached 
by giving an option to the other party either to enforce the 
contract or to hide behind its invalidity. Such privilege will 
naturally be exercised according to how the business venture 
inherent in the contract turns out. But a legally riskless 
gamble should not be included in a statutory provision in-
tended to serve the public interest. 
This one-sided justice, however, is much restricted in most 
jurisdictions of the United States, inasmuch as the corporation 
may sue on the contract by belatedly qualifying for doing 
184 BEITZKE, Jur. Personen I 66. 
185 Expressly foreseen in Guatemala, C. C. (I933) art. 26; Legislative De-
cree No. I37o, of April I6, I925, art. 2.. 
186 Regimen ] uridico 34ff., I ooff. 
187 The models were the Italian C. Corn. art. 2.31, and the Portuguese C. 
Corn. art. I I 2.. 
Brazil: C. Corn. art. 30I par. 3 (action against all members of a non-
registered company). 
Chile: C. Com. art. 468 par. z, followed by: 
Ecuador: C. Corn. art. p6. 
Guatemala: C. Com. (I942.) art. 418. 
Venezuela: C. Corn. (19I9) art. 362. (new 337). 
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business. Also other restrictions to the provision denying the 
right to sue have been recognized. Nevertheless, it happens 
sometimes in this country and seemingly much more often 
abroad that the other party may retain values received on 
execution of the contract as pure enrichment. This principle is 
of a rather doubtful morality. Noncompliance with general 
statutory impositions should not grant other private parties 
free speculation nor unearned gains. In addition, the depri-
vation of contractual rights, though not an unconstitutional 
impairment, is essentially a punishment executed without the 
guaranty of regular criminal investigation and judgment, 
which, in contrast to normal penalties, is enforceable in third 
states.188 Moreover, when a case is on the border line between 
"carrying on" business and "isolated" acts/89 too much de-
pends upon the answer when the validity of the contract is 
also at stake. 
The Uniform Foreign Corporations Act, in a compara-
tively moderate proposal, reduces all penalties for doing 
unlawful business to fines supposed to be severe and a stay 
of any action instituted by the corporation until license is 
procured or a year has expired after the stay.190 The commis-
sioners were afraid that, if the foreign corporation had no 
188 See Allegheny Co. v. Allen (1903) 69 N.J. Law 270, 55 Atl. 724. In 
a particular case, the Supreme Court of Indiana has felt the necessity of justify-
ing why it could apply the statute of West Virginia making officers of a foreign, 
noncomplying insurance company personally liable on the contract: "It is a 
penalty designed primarily to provide a private remedy to a person injured 
by a wrongful act," Karvalsky v. Becker (1940) 217 Ind. 524, 29 N. E. (2d) 
s6o. However, this could not be said with respect to an unreciprocated suit 
of the third party. See furthermore, supra n. 147. 
189 That in many cases this border line may be difficult to trace, is confirmed 
by the considerations of the Bar Commissioners stating that "it must be borne in 
mind that frequently the question as to whether or not a foreign corporation 
is doing business in a state and thus as to whether or not it must secure a license, 
is a question involving fine distinctions and one which is not so readily 
answerable. A foreign corporation may, therefore, violate the act by doing 
business without a license and yet be innocent of any willful intention to do 
wrong. For this reason the provisions for penalty must be flexible." National 
Conference of Commissioners, Handbook 1934, 328. 
190 I d.§§ 25-27 and comment 328-330. 
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property in the jurisdiction, the fine could not be enforced. 
But a successful suit would produce just the desired assets in 
the state. Administrative regulations should consistently 
refrain from interfering with private law and civil procedure. 
Of course, in most foreign countries, acceptance of the prin-
ciple of the draft would present an enormous progress. 
2. Failure to Register 
Prevailingly, the provisions that prescribe registration of 
foreign corporations have the same effect as those applying 
to domestic corporations. Most have merely "declaratory" 
effect, i.e., they are destined to make public the existence, 
conditions, and purpose of recognized organizations. The per-
sonality of foreign corporations, however, is not dependent 
either on compliance with the duty of filing or on the favor-
able decision of the registrar.191 Hence, in countries such as 
England, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Switz-
erland/92 contracts concluded by an unregistered but existing 
foreign company, whether domestic or foreign, are valid. 
Penalties, of course, are pronounced; 193 the evidentiary value 
of the company's books may be impaired, and the place of 
business may be threatened by closure.194 Third persons who 
without fault ignore nonregistered facts are protected by the 
more elaborate legislations.195 The agents may be declared 
191 HACHENBURG in 3 Diiringer-Hachenburg (x 934) 553 n. 31. 
192 England: Companies Act, I9Z9 (19 & zo Geo. s. c. :I.J) soo-soz, Part XI, 
s. 344· 
Germany: HGB. § 15 (implicit). 
Switzerland: BG. (July zz, 1887) Clunet 18931 z4o; WIELAND, 43 
Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) Z75 n. u8. 
Austria: OGH. (February s, 1929) Clunet 1930, 746. 
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (May 5, 1934) No. IJ5II, 1oZ.ausl.PR. (1936) 169. 
Yugoslavia: C. Corn.§ 231. 
193 England: Companies Act, 1929 (19 & 20 Geo. s, c. z3) soo, Part XI, 
s. JSI. 
Yugoslavia: C. Corn.§ su par. 9· 
194 Expressly so Japan: C. Com. art. z6o. Cf. Guatemala: Legislative Decree 
No. 137o, of April x6, 19zs, art. z (for failure to appoint a representative). 
195 Germany: HGB. § 151 Aktiengesetz § 34· 
216 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS 
collaterally liable for all debts incurred by them on behalf of 
the company/96 although this is rejected in some countries, 
since under this system the corporation itself is answerable.197 
In Italy the problem has been extensively discussed on the 
basis of the Commercial Code of 1882, practically speaking, 
with the result that the only effect of nonregistration of a 
foreign corporation, having an agency or succursal in the 
country, was the liability, personal, joint and several, of the 
agents in addition to that of the corporation.198 In the case 
of a French partnership, a juristic person, it was declared 
operating in Italy de facto and the partners to be liable with-
out restriction.199 
This system has also been adopted in Argentina and Ven-
ezuela.200 
However some regulations are more severe. For instance, 
in Belgium the sanctions applicable to domestic as well as 
to those foreign corporations having a succursal or other 
business place in the country, are differentiated in various 
cases, and include the right by third parties to oppose being 
sued on a contract if the constitutive documents or th~ yearly 
balance are not published. 201 Colombia declares void all acts 
196 For Latin America, see supra n. 187. 197 E.g., Czechoslovakia, S. Ct. (May 5, 1934) supra n. 192. 198 Ita!. Cass. {June 8, 1932) Foro Ita!. Mass. 1932 III c. 431; App. Torino 
(January 7, 1936) Foro Ita!. 1936 I 397; DIENA, 1 Dir. Com. Int. 245; 
BALLADORE PALLIERI in Riv. Dir. Com. 1929 I 207; CAVAGLIERr, Dir. Int. 
Com. 261, 263, 279, 284. 
Similarly, Rumania, C. Com. art. 247· 199 App. Cagliari {January 17, 1924) Riv. Dir. Com. 1924 II 441. 200 Argentina: C. Com. art. 288 states only the personal liability of the 
agents; C. C. art. 36 declares authorized acts by agents of {any) corporation 
binding on the corporation. 
Followed by Venezuela: C. Com. (1919) art. 362 (new 337), cf Gold-
stone, "The Judicial Status of Non-Registered Foreign Corporations in Vene-
zuela," 17 Tul L. Rev. (1943) 578; personal liability of the acting persons, 
no obstacle for actions on contracts, no penalties. 201 Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act 1873/1935, arts. 198 and II; 
Cass. (March 24, 1930) Clunet 1930, 1113 (the action of a foreign company 
not having filed for publication of its acts is not "receivable." Trib. com. 
Bruxelles {June 27, 1936) Jur. Com. Brux. 1939, 55; (February 1, 1938) 
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executed without complying with the prescribed formal-
ities.202 The Japanese Commercial Code says that "a third 
person may deny the existence" of a nonregistered branch 
office as he may in the case of a nonregistered Japanese 
corporation. 203 
There is, however, much ingenuity deployed in the various 
laws. In Panama, for instance, the Commercial Code punishes 
noncompliance with the duty of registration by a penalty in 
money and the loss of the rights to exercise commercial 
privileges and to file documents for evidence; the stock 
corporation law provides that nonregistered companies can-
not sue and also incur penalties up to s,ooo dollars.204 
Finally, as has been seen earlier, registration is sometimes 
considered a condition precedent to recognition of the comp-
any's personality or, if this exaggerated manner of speech is 
avoided, to the lawfulness of business done in the state. 
A similiar variety of views obtains with regard to the 
failure correctly to appoint a representative. 
VI. TREATIES 
I. Existing Treaties 
The two Latin-American multipartite, and the numerous 
bipartite treaties throughout the world, concerning establish-
ment, commerce, or tax burdens, regularly provide for 
reciprocal treatment of corporations in decoratively styled 
clauses. However, the result is somewhat inadequate. 
id. 1939, 6r; see FREDERICQ, 2 Principes (1930) 575; Novelles Belges, 3D. 
Com. No. 5283. App. Bruxelles (May 3, 1939) Jur. Port d'Anvers 1941, 3o, 
3 3, therefore, denied the right to sue to the United States Shipping Merchant 
Fleet Corporation, although not to the United States Government. 202 Colombia: Legislative Decree No. 2 of r 9o6, art. 6. 
Ecuador: Companies Law of Oct. 15, 1909, art. 14 for insurance companies 
in addition to pecuniary penalty. 
203 Japan: C. Com. art. 257. The defect, however, is cured by subsequent 
registration, Japan, S. Ct. (April 27, 1928) 1 C. Com. of Japan Ann. 410 
case 167. 
204 Panama: C. Com. (1916) art. 296; Stock Corporation Law No. 32, of 
Feb. 26, 1927,art. 91. 
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(a) Commercial clause. The usual clause guaranteeing the 
carrying on of business runs substantially as in the Treaty 
between the United States and Poland of 1931, declaring 
that the right of corporations and associations of either Power 
to establish themselves within its territories, establish branch 
offices, and fulfill their functions therein, shall depend upon 
and be governed solely by the consent of such Party as ex-
pressed in its national, state, or provincial laws and regula-
tions.205 
(b) Special clauses. Essentially more substance is con-
tained in a unique clause of the Treaty between France and 
Germany of 1934, prescribing that authorization for doing 
business cannot be refused for the reasons of contravention 
against the internallaws.206 
Another special clause in the Treaty between Germany and 
the Soviet Union of 1926 states that an enterprise may not 
be impeded in the regular course of its business by laws, de-
crees, or other measures by authorities. 207 
(c) Most-favored-nation clause. Such provisions are con-
sidered to extend to all countries enjoying the rights of the 
most favored nation especially for the purposes of foreign 
organizations of the kind in question. Thus, the privileges 
conceded by Germany to France and Russia have been rec-
ognized in Germany also in favor of the United States on the 
205 United States-Poland Treaty, of June IS, I93I, art. II, U.S. Treaty 
Series No. 862, I39 L. of N. Treaty Series (I933) 397 at 407. 206 Art. 2 par. 5, RGBI. I 934 II 423: The high contracting parties agree, 
however, not to hinder by the means of foregoing authorization, the establish-
ment of companies exercising an activity generally permitted to companies of 
all other countries, and not to revoke a once-granted authorization, except in 
case of violation of laws and regulations of the country, and to refrain in 
addition from any denial or revocation exclusively grounded upon reasons of 
economical competition. 207 Art. I 7, RGBI. I 926 II 1. 
Also the Treaty between Canada and France, of May u, I933, art. 7 (Revue 
Crit. I937, 257) has been interpreted to the effect that Canadian companies for 
maritime insurance or reinsurance do not need in France the individual 
authorization otherwise required, see NIBOYET, 2 Traite 3 73· 
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ground of such a clause providing for reciprocity in the treaty 
between the United States and Germany.208 
Whether the usual general stipulation guaranteeing the 
right of the most favored nation, covers the treatment of legal 
persons, is an old controversial problem. Prevailing opinion 
denies it.209 But more recently special clauses have been added 
for this purpose. Thus, the United States has concluded 
treaties with detailed stipulations declaring the right of most 
favored nations as including the right to organize, control, 
participate in limited liability and other corporations and as-
sociations, for pecuniary profit or otherwise, or similarly to the 
same effect. 210 
(d) Clause of reciprocity. The traditional provision for 
reciprocity of treatment has significance, for instance, in 
Poland and Germany, while in most countries, as we have 
seen, licensing is not dependent on reciprocity. Beyond that, 
the clauses leave everything to the pleasure of the "laws and 
regulations" of each state. Nevertheless, such clauses stand 
unaltered in the Treaties of Montevideo211 and Habana.212 
208 Treaty of Dec. 8, I 923, art. u, U. S. Treaty Series No. 725, 52 L. of 
N. Treaty Series (1926) 133 at 141 RGBI. 1925 II 795> 8oo. See BEITZKE, 
Clunet 1937, roo4. 
209 See 2 L YON-CAEN et RENAULT 924 § 1 I 02; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 2 I 3 
§ r 8 r. See also E. SPRINGER, 2 7 Z.int.R. ( 191 8) 3 I 4· 
210 Treaties of the United States: with Austria (June 19, 1928) art. 1o, U.S. 
Treaty Series Nos. 838 and 839, II8 L. of N. Treaty Series (1931) 241 at 
250; 
with Germany (Dec. 8, 1923) art. u, U. S. Treaty Series No. 725, 52 L. of 
N. Treaty Series (1926) 133 at 141; 
with Turkish Republic (Oct. z8, 1931) art. r, U.S. Treaty Series No. 859, 
138 L. of N. Treaty Series (1933) 345 at 347; 
with Poland (June rs, 1931) art. II, u. s. Treaty Series No. 86z, 139 
L. of N. Treaty Series (1933) 397 at 407; 
with Greece (Nov. zr, 1936) art. r, U. S. Treaty Series No. 930, r83 
L. of N. Treaty Series (1937) 169 at 17o; 
with El Salvador (Feb. 22, 1926) art. 13, U.S. Treaty Series No. 827, 134 
L. of N. Treaty Series (1932) 207 at 209. 
211 Treaty of Montevideo on International Commercial Terrestrial Law 
(I 940) art. 8 par. 2. 
212 Codigo Bustamante, arts. 32-34. 
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2. Draft Proposals 
Real progress has been sought through the efforts of 
numerous international congresses and committees, from the 
Paris Congress ( 1 8 8o) on stock companies to the Draft of the 
Experts of the League of Nations (1928) on juristic per-
sons.213 But, from the last instance, the preliminary draft of 
the Economic Committee of the League of Nations on the 
treatment of foreigners (1929),214 it appears that an embar-
rassing struggle is going on between this endeavor and the 
deference to "the laws and regulations" of the territory in 
which activities are exercised. The draft subjects the doing of 
business to preliminary and revocable authorization, with no 
remedy against arbitrary refusal but the right of retaliation. 
But if authorization is once given, the proposal is that it 
should not be revoked except for infringement of the laws 
and regulations of the country. 
VII. CoNCLUSIONS 
1. The view expressed in old as well as recent American 
decisions as a natural conception that a state may exclude 
corporations created in other states from doing business in 
the forum, is just one of several theories of the past. For a 
time, it was also widely believed that, by natural justice, the 
toleration of foreign corporations depended on formally as-
sured reciprocity of treatment. Some Latin-American authors 
maintain that the theoretically equal position conceded to 
foreigners implies their complete subjection to all domestic 
· laws. Such theories have been but a poor screen for economic 
and social, if not mere power, policies. The requirement of 
213 See the history of recent efforts in Hudson, 7 Int. Legislation 355· 
214 League of Nations Publ., c.36.M.21.1929.II., p. 16; c.97·M.23.1930.II.; 
Revue 1930, 236. Cf. KuHN, Am. J. Int. Law 1930, 570. Opposition was 
raised from several states, and the full conference of 4 7 states has not dis-
cussed the committee draft. 
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governmental authorization or treaty privilege has been es-
tablished either as a means for the government to bolster its 
power of domination or bargaining, or in the belief that 
national autarchy was needed, or that a firm protection of the 
national resources and labor was necessary. On the other 
hand, the theory of freely admitting foreign juristic persons 
has derived from credence in the usefulness of the capitalistic 
system and of the broadest exchange of goods and services. 
The methods of thinking have alternated in the periods of 
modern industrialism and have contended with each other in 
most countries. It would seem, at last, that the real problem, 
the contrast of interests, has made itself acutely felt, particu-
larly in the historic relation between the highly equipped 
corporations of the United States and Latin-American coun-
tries rich in raw materials and labor, but wanting capital and 
skilled management. There may have occurred errors and 
abuses on both sides, and there exists also a natural opposi-
tion of interests. But if we hear in this country the industrial 
leaders profess that the times of colonial exploitation have 
gone forever, that it is an American interest to raise foreign 
wages and help foreign production and that investing coun-
tries should send their capital as private capital rather than 
as an arm of nationalized economic agression,216 the clash of 
real interests would seem easily dissolvable. 
2. We have found recognition of foreign corporations 
made dependent in some jurisdictions on reciprocity, in others 
on general or special authorization or on registration requir-
ing sometimes very exacting documentation. The right to sue 
in a state court is characteristically included in the effects thus 
conditioned. (Chapter 2 2). Even though foreign organiza-
tions may be recognized with some effects, their permission 
to do business, in a number of states, is granted only according 
215 See, for instance, ERIC JoHNSTON, "America's World Chance," in Reader's 
Digest, June 1945, 5· 
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to the pleasure of the government. In not a few states, they 
are subjected to an unlimited amount of domestic law, with 
respect either to their constitution or to their affairs out of 
the state, or to both. If the statutory requirements concerning 
authorization of business or registration of the company's 
place of business, its agents, balances, and often many other 
items, are not observed, contracts made in the state may be 
declared void, or the other party may enjoy the option, ac-
cording to his advantage, of regarding the contract as valid or 
invalid, and frequently the right to sue on the contract may be 
denied to the company. (Chapter 23). 
The harshness of legislative requirements in certain parts of 
the world is surpassed by vexatious bureaucratic procedures, 
abuses, and the necessity of personal connections, if not 
bribery. Of one state, Panama, which might have been ex-
pected to understand the need of peaceful collaboration, an 
excellent author has recently collected a long list of difficulties 
wantonly created for foreign corporations, such as the obscure 
definition of business requiring registration, exaggerated re-
quirements for registration of powers of the prescribed gen-
eral agent and for the proof of corporate existence, potential 
danger that nonregistered companies that have no business 
place or habitual business are not allowed to sue in the courts, 
taxation policies deliberately intended to close the country to 
capital unless it submits to complete domination, and so 
forth. 216 
Some hostility, with uncertainty as to the law, has also 
appeared in this country. A complaint of uncertainty has been 
raised, for instance, with respect to the nature of the refusal 
to allow suit, in the Pennsylvania Annotations to the Restate-
ment. 217 A New York attorney once wrote in Clunet's Journal 
for the information of European readers that the difficulties 
216 EDER, IS Tul. L. Rev. (1941) s:zr. With respect to powers of attorney, 
see supra n. us. 
217 Restatement, Pennsylvania Annotations 77· 
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of security for costs, of standing in court, and of acquiring 
immovables in New York made it inopportune for a foreign 
corporation to do business there otherwise than by creating a 
local affiliate.218 
3· In view of the various circumstances of countries as 
well as of corporate purposes, a uniform regulation may not 
be possible or even desirable. However, an average pattern 
of normal relations can well be envisaged. If a state has no 
reason for intensified control such as is justified over public 
utilities, finance and insurance enterprises, it should cooperate 
with the world and limit its supervision to the really necessary 
measures. Corporations created in one country, particularly 
if their central management is also located there, should be 
fully recognized, without petty obstacles, throughout the 
world as persons capable of acting in transactions and law 
suits. Normative regulation may be imposed on the habitual 
business of a foreign corporation rather than on the corpora-
tion itself. If qualifying to do business is made relatively 
easy as in the United States, due to the professional services 
of special companies for the filing of applications, and to the 
moderate fees imposed by the states, this method of control 
is not objectionable. Also, a foreign organization entering the 
life of a national economy by deploying commercial or in-
dustrial activities, has naturally to obey the local laws and 
decrees destined to govern such activities. They include fiscal, 
jurisdictional, and administrative laws, and above all the laws 
concerning health, labor, and social security, but exclude the 
legal provisions concerning the creation and internal organi-
zation of corporations. Nor should domestic private law with-
out qualification be extended to all contracts made in the 
state; what law governs these is to be determined by conflicts 
rules following entirely different lines of policy. 
Legitimate interests of a state are involved in safeguarding 
218 LOEB, Clunet 19ro, 96. 
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the interests of its citizens dealing with foreign enterprises 
that have an establishment in the state. It is a perfectly sound 
policy to require that the legal capacity of a foreign organi-
zation permitted to carry on business in the territory and its 
locally pertinent economic situation be made recognizable to 
the indiv~duals coming in contact with it either as employees 
or as third parties. Acts of publication for this purpose are 
prescribed almost everywhere, sometimes not sufficiently but 
more often with exaggeration. The proper effect of registra-
tion is well expressed in an Italian decision. Although a 
foreign corporation may be dissolved by appropriate pro-
ceedings at its seat, this dissolution cannot be opposed to a 
third party in the country, unless it has been publicized ac-
cording to the domestic law.219 But it is crude, almost barbaric 
law, under any circumstances, to refuse foreign legal persons 
access to the courts or to deny the validity of their contracts. 
A borderline problem is raised by the statute of New 
York imposing liability on the officers, directors, and stock-
holders of a foreign stock corporation transacting business in 
the state, among other things, for unauthorized dividends 
and unlawful loans to stockholders. 220 Not only is jurisdiction 
taken, but the liability is authoritatively construed as an 
offense against the New York prescriptions rather than 
against those of the charter law. 221 This protection of creditors 
exceeds the normal scope of domestic law as traced in the 
Restatement.222 It may be regarded, however, as a control 
measure defendable in the biggest financial center of the 
world, which would not be justifiable everywhere. Whether 
219 Cass. Ital. (July 13, 1936) Moulenet v. D'Amico, Foro Ital. Rep. 1936, 
1752 Nos. sss-ss6. 
220 Stock Corporation Law of 1939, § 114, derived from the Law of 189o, 
c. 564 § 6o, as added by L. of 1897, c. 384 § 4· 
221 German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl (1915) 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N. E. 
875· 
222 Restatement, New York Annotations 15 7 § 1 8 8. The courts of New York 
emphasize this exception to the law of the state of incorporation which is 
applied whenever the statutes do not expressly extend their domain to foreign 
corporations. Exceptions are provided in addition to § 114 of the Stock Cor-
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rules in the interest of creditors extend to foreign corpora-
tions, such as those prohibiting purchase of their own stock 
out of the capital, seems an unsettled question also in New 
York.228 
That domestic share- or bond holders should be protected 
by special measures, only because the company does business 
in the state, goes certainly too far. Nor does acquisition of 
securities by local investors need any particular legal favor. 
German judges deciding on the registration of foreign com-
panies have conveniently investigated into the amount of 
the capital stock and its sufficiency for a minimum standard 
of trustworthiness for creditors, but have refrained from any 
regard for the organization and the rights and interests of 
shareholders. 224 
Finally, no objection can be made to the exaction by certain 
states of a reasonable compensation from foreign enterprises 
which they admit, as an additional burden on capital profit 
leaving the country. From this angle, discriminatory taxation 
can be vindicated, while overtaxation in order to lower the 
competitive strength of foreign capital is a measure of econ-
omic warfare rather than a policy of neighbors. 
That these are the basic lines of a satisfactory compromise 
must have been felt in many quarters. It is the more regret-
table that not one of all the positive enactments is entirely 
commendable, and that, to my knowledge, not much has been 
done even in legal and economic science to develop the par-
ticulars. The elaboration of a comprehensive model statute 
for foreign organizations would be a worthy object of inter-
national endeavor. 
poration Law by § 222 of the General Corporation Law, but not with respect 
to §§ 71-73 of the Stock Corporation Law; Bogardus v. Fitzpatrick (1931) 
139 Misc. 533, 247 N.Y. Supp. 692; Armstrong v. Dyer and Hobby (1935) 
268 N.Y. 671, 198 N. E. 551; Gonzales v. Tuttman (1945) 59 F. Supp. 858, 
8 62 (stockholders' liability to laborers, servants, and employees). 
223 The question was left undecided in Hayman v. Morris (S. Ct., N. Y. 
County, 1942) 36 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 756. 
224 HACHENBURG in 3 Diiringer-Hachenburg ( 1934) § 201, ns. 40-46. 
PART SEVEN 
TORTS 
In this part, the following books and articles will be cited in ab-
breviated form: 
Common law: Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws ( 1942) ; 
Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," 4 7 Law Q. 
Rev. ( 1931) 483, with comparative research; Goodrich, "Tort Obli-
gations and the Conflicts of Laws," 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1924) 19 
(a chapter of his handbook) ; Stumberg, "Conflict of Laws-Torts-
Texas Decisions," 9 Texas L. Rev. (1932) 21; Cook, "Tort Liability 
and the Conflict of Laws," 35 Col. L. Rev. ( 1935) 202 and Logical 
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws ( 1942) 311, mainly con-
cerned with polemics. 
Henri Mazeau, "Conflits de lois et competence internationale dans 
le domaine de la responsabilite civile delictuelle et quasi-delictuelle," 
Revue Crit. 1934, 377; von Schelling, "Unerlaubte Handlungen," 
3 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1929) 8 54· 
For comparative substantive law, see Rabel, "Die Grundziige des 
Rechts der unerlaubten Handlungen," in Sonderheft, 6 Z.ausl.PR. 
( 1932) 1 o; ten articles on "Haftung" in 4 Rechtsvergl. Hand-
worterbuch 43-113; Titze, "Unerlaubte Handlungen," in 6 Rechts-
vergl. Handworterbuch 6']6. 
CHAPTER 24 
The Principle 
I. THE MEANING oF ToRT 
r. Delict and Quasi Delict 
THE conflicts rules applicable to torts have been de-veloped mostly with respect to delicts, viz., torts com-mitted by fault, that is, intentionally or negligently.1 
The expression lex loci delicti commissi is still used to denote 
the principle that refers to the law of the place where the 
alleged tort occurs. However, in modern legislation, the 
separate position of liability quasi ex delicto-of "quasi del-
icts"-is practically abolished, 2 and accordingly by universal 
understanding, this conflicts rule at present covers any un-
lawful conduct without fault generating liability.3 
1 See, for instance, Codigo Bustamante, art. r68. 
2 TITZE, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 678ff. 
In a part of the French literature, quasi-dilit is understood to mean liability 
for negligence, but such terms are ordinarily used to denote liability without 
fault, as by PoLLOCK, Torts (ed. 13) 17. 
3 Restatement§ 379 (c) comment f; Le Forest v. Tolman (r875) 117 Mass. 
ro9; Young v. Masci (1933) 289 U.S. 253,53 S. Ct. 599· 
England: Walpole v. Can. Northern R. Co., Privy C. [1923] A. C. rq, 
120. 
Austria: GlU. NF. 7252 (automobile); 3469, 5219, cf. 3439 (railroad); 
6 51 r (fraud). 
Belgium: PouLLET § 317; Trib. Arion (July IJ, 1904) Revue 1905, 539 
and (July 20, 1904) id. 543; Cass. (Feb. zr, 1907) and {Nov. ::.6, 1908) 
Revue 1909, 95 2, the latter decision also in Clunet 1909, 1178. 
France: PILLET, 2 Traite § 549; WEISS, 4 Traite 415; NIBOYET 6r6 § 490; 
ARMINJON, 2 Precis 278. 
Germany: RG. (June 14, 1915) Leipz.Z. 1915, 1443 No. 16; RG. (Feb. 25, 
1904) 57 RGZ. 145; OLG. Karlsruhe (Oct. 28, 1931) IPRspr. 1932 No. 41. 
Italy: Disp. Prel. (1942) art. 25 par. 2, and previously 3 FIORE§ u62ff.; 
DIENA, 2 Prine. 266; CERETI, Obblig. 195; Cass. Torino (Dec. 19, 1911) 
Riv. Dir. Com. 1912 II 177. 
Spain: LASALA LLANAS 365. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Sept. zo, 1933) NJA. 1933, 364, see 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 
931. 
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. ro, 1925) 51 BGE. II 327· 
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This liability is based on the idea that a person who con-
ducts for his own benefit a business subjecting other persons 
to possible loss, should bear the risk of the damage as a part 
of his business costs. In the terms of the civil law doctrine," 
it is a liability for risk ( Gefahrdungshaftung, responsibilite 
pour risque). Among the classes of persons frequently sub-
ject to such liability, we find the owners or keepers of animals, 
vessels, railroads, motor vehicles, aircraft, houses, inns, lab-
oratories, et cetera. Thus assimilated to delictual obligations, 
obligations to pay damages irrespective of fault, when im-
posed by the state of the place where the act is done, are 
enforced outside this state. In fact, the liability for risk, 
whether based on the mere fact that the defendant has caused 
the damage or on a presumption of his fault, cannot be reason-
ably subjected to a conflicts rule entirely different from that 
selected for liability based on the proved fault of the defend-
ant. The policies pursued in the national laws by all these 
various tort rules are too closely related to permit divergent 
determination of the applicable law. 
The scope of the conflicts rule ought even to include 
in addition certain liabilities without fault attending acts 
that, although damaging to the interests of other persons, are 
permitted on account of the superior interests of the actor, 
acts, which, therefore, are termed lawful only in a formal 
or restricted sense.5 For instance, it is formally lawful to effect 
an arrest or seizure on the mere probability of a claim, but 
the claimant will be liable, if in a subsequent suit he is shown 
to have known or negligently failed to ascertain that his claim 
did not exist or, as frequently enacted, even merely because 
4 Basic: JosEPH UNGER, Handeln auf eigene Gefahr (ed. z, 1893); id., 
Handeln auf fremde Gefahr (1894); MATAJA, Das Recht des Schadenersatzes 
vom Standpunkt der Nationalokonomie (1888); for the modern literature 
see MOLLER-ERZBACH, "Ersatz durch Gefahrdungshaftung und Gefahr-
tragung," 106 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1910) 309. 
For common law, see infra p. 2.74 n. 87. 
5 TITLE, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 68o; ENNECCERUS-KIPP-WOLFF, 
AUg. Teil § 199. 
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he had no actual claim. Here again liability is based on the 
idea of acting at the actor's own peril, although the damaging 
act is permitted by the law. Arrest and seizure have been 
subjected, therefore, to the law of the court that grant~ them 
provisionally. 6 
It. is true that the differences between the laws of the 
various countries are greater with respect to liability for risk 
than with respect to liability for intentional or negligent 
harm. For a while in the past, radical tendencies swung to 
extreme elimination of the principle of fault. A few recent 
drafts and codes, including the Soviet Code, have conferred 
on the victim of fortuitous damage a claim for indemnification 
to an equitable extent/ and the Mex1can Civil Code imposes 
a presumption of fault on any person who: 
Makes use of mechanisms, instruments, apparatus or sub-
stances dangerous in themselves, or in the velocity they 
deploy, in their explosive or inflammable nature, in the 
energy of the electric current conducted or for any other 
analogous causes .... 8 
At times, judges of more conservative jurisdictions may hesi-
tate to apply such a foreign extracontractual liability based 
upon the mere fact of keeping a dog or carrying on an in-
dustrial enterprise, owning a house, or granting a third per-
son the use of a car.9 The way to overcome such doubts has 
been shown in the following classical reasoning of Judge 
Learned Hand: 
"There is nothing inherent or antecedently necessary in 
6 Germany: RG. (Sept. zo, I88z) 7 RGZ. 378; z BAR 396. 
Switzerland: App. Zurich, I I HE. I 97, cited by z MEILI 96. 
7 Soviet Russian Civil Code, art. 406; Hungarian Draft, C. C. (I9I4) 
§ I486; id. (I928) § I737; also the second draft of the German BGB. § 752· 
contained such rule. 
8 Mexico: C. C. (I928) art. I9I3· 
9 Characteristically, BARTIN, z Principes 410H., 433, as late as I9JZ, tries to 
explain the liabilities for risk as diverted liabilites for fault, and confesses em-
barrassment where his effort fails. 
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the conventional limitation of liability to such consequences 
as may be anticipated by ordinary foresight, within which 
limits the law of the state where the damage occurs con-
cededly controls. No such limitation existed in ancient times, 
and the law is abandoning it in field after field; fault is by 
no means an inevitable condition of liability. Provided that 
the result be not too distasteful to the mores of the forum, 
we think that the state where the damage occurs may impute 
liability to one outside, if he be in fact the voluntary author 
of it ... . mo 
Some statutory provisions, apparently or really, go even 
farther, by subjecting all "extracontractual" claims to the 
law of the place where the act in question has been done.11 
This would include all causes of action claimed to arise out 
of formally and substantially lawful acts, such as, on the one 
hand, the so-called quasi contracts-e.g., negotiorum gestio, 
unjust enrichment, constructive trust-and on the other hand, 
destruction of private property for public use, if connected 
with the duty of compensation, and the like. All these cases 
must be reserved for discussion separate from torts and con-
tracts. 
2. Characterization of Tort 
How do we determine the meaning of the term "tort" in 
the conflicts rule referring "tort" to the law of the place 
where the act alleged to be tortious has been done? 
If the usual doctrine of characterization according to the 
law of the forum is taken literally, an act done abroad cannot 
support a claim for liability, except where it is an actionable 
tort also by the internal private law of the forum. This, in 
fact, is the British, Japanese, and Chinese approach (soon to 
10 Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp. (I934) 68 F. (zd) 942. at 944· 
11 Belgian Congo: C. C. art. II par. 3· 
Italy: C. C. (I942.) Disp. Prel. art. zs par. 2.. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. I 1 No. r. 
Treaty of Montevideo on International Civil Law of I889, art. 38: place 
where the licit or illicit act has been done. 
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be discussed), but it has been very decidedly rejected in all 
other countries. Moreover, the extension of the conflicts rule 
on tort so as to include foreign liabilities for risk is not com-
patible with this view. 
To escape these obvious inconsistencies, the advocates of 
the lex fori are prepared to recognize any foreign type of 
liability that would be classified as tort if it were ordained 
by the domestic statutes of the forum.12 This idea has some 
significance but in reality points to systematic problems be-
yond the domain of the internal law. 
In consideration of the impossible consequences of the 
lex fori theory, the opposite theory of characterization accord-
ing to the law referred to, has had more followers in this 
special field than generally.13 In this view, the commonly 
used conflicts rule refers to the law of the place where an act 
is done to decide whether it is a tort, and no limitation is 
added. The result would seem acceptable in most cases. But 
no easy solution is afforded by this method where the posi-
tive laws disagree in characterizing certain obligations, as the 
duty to support illegitimate children or the liability for 
breach of promise to marry, which are based on tort in one 
country and on entirely different theories in others. In these 
cases, it does not help to say that "the predominance of the 
territorial law is justified only insofar as one is in the presence 
of an obligation of tortious character.m4 
Once more resorting to comparative law, we have to form 
a category of tort broad enough to embrace all definitions 
that may be given to the term on the basis of a conscientious 
general system of law. Actually or virtually, this concept 
underlies the thinking of lawyers, not only in civil law 
countries but also in England and the United States. 
We do not touch hereby, of course, the great controversy, 
12 RAAPE zo8, and D. IPR. 325 Ill. 
13 POULLET 355; WALKER 523· 
14 PILLET, 2 Traite 3 r 3· 
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pending for a long time in the English literature, which con-
cerns the existence of a general liability that would over-
shadow the historical separate categories of tort, 15 such as 
assault, trespass, conversion, nuisance, defamation, etc. How-
ever this problem may be solved, it has become common 
ground that, by inductive generalization from the recog-
nized separate types of peculiar tort liabilities, principles of 
tort can be formulated. 16 This is quite enough to reach the 
doctrinal state of German private law. Neither system im-
poses by a general rule liability for all negligent conduct. 
Nevertheless, the provisions given in the Civil Code for a 
number of important types of tort serve as a subsidiary regu-
lation for tort actions established in special laws, including 
liabilities without fault. 17 The general rules of tort thus 
achieved, though more compact, are comparable to what may 
be called principles of tort in England, and still more so to 
the American doctrine. 
On the other hand, the French Civil Code has formulated 
its famous principle of responsibility for fault-the product 
of the European pandectistic practice and itself the model 
of innumerable codes- in the broadest terms, too broad in 
fact for the purpose of municpal law. Article 1382 of the 
French Civil Code reads as follows: 
Any act whatever done by a man, which causes damage 
to another, obliges him by whose fault the damage was 
caused to repair it. 
This definition has been narrowed by common opinion as 
well as in more modern reproductions in other countries, 
such as article 41 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. The con-
duct must not only be tainted by fault but unlawful. In the 
prevailing conception of modern continental lawyers, be-
15 See G. W. WILLIAMs, "The Foundation of Tortious Liability," in 7 
Cambr. L. J. (1941) III. 
16 SEAVEY, "Principles of Tort," s6 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 72· 
17 67 RGZ. 144, cf. 122 RGZ. 326. 
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havior is unlawful, if it is prohibited by the rules establishing 
general duties for the protection of individual interests or 
the interests of the community. In this view, breach of con-
tract, at least by the debtor himself, is not "unlawful" in 
itself, since it is the violation of a relation between two per-
sons rather than of a duty incumbent on every one. With this 
supplement, the concept holds true as a basic definition of 
tort in comparative consideration of any municipal system, 
special types as established in the various laws being defined 
by additional requirements. 
The only concept of delict, useful on an international scale 
to the prevailing conflicts rule, is identical. It is equally easy 
to extend this concept to responsibility for risk. "Tort," 
thus, in the meaning of the conflicts rule, is any unlawful 
invasion of the interests of another person, causing damage 
or harm to a person. The conflicts rule, of course, will predi-
cate what system of law shall determine these elements. 
It is immaterial on what basis the law of the forum 
establishes the protected sphere, whether as property, status, 
or bodily integrity, and which unlawful invasions it recognizes 
as ground for actions or injunctions. 
It is submitted that in practice the courts apply this very 
concept.18 
II. THE PRINCIPLE 
I. The Dominant Principle 
The principle unanimously established by the canonists 
and later the statutists since the I 3th century19 and generally 
adopted today is that the lex loci delicti commissi governs. 20 
This predicates that the law of the place where an alleged 
18 See RG. (March 12, 19o6) JW. 1906, Z97; z3 ROLG. 14 and RABEL, 
3 Z.ausl.PR. (19z9) 75Si NEUNER, Der Sinn 105. 
19 See NEUMEYER, Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung 138ff; z BAR 115; 2 
MElLI 90· 
20 Mr. Justice Holmes in Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby (1912) 222 U.S. 473, 477, 
and in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown (1914) 234 U.S. 542, 34 S. Ct. 
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tortious act in the broad meaning described above has been 
done, determines whether, under what conditions, to what 
extent, and with what consequences, this act constitutes a 
cause of action. 
955; Walsh v. New York & New England R. Co. (1894) 160 Mass. 571, 36 
N. E. 584; 2 BEALE 1289; GOODRICH§ 89; LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 325; Re-
statement§§ 378, 379, 381, 383, 384, 385, 386, 390. 
Austria: OGH. (Nov. 2, 191o) 13 GlU. NF. 5219; (July 2, 1913) 16 
GIU. NF. No. 6sn. 
Belgium: Cass (Feb. 21, 1907) Pasicrisie 1907.1.135; (Nov. 26, 1908) 
id. 1909.1.25. 
Belgian Congo: C. C. art. 11 par. 3· 
Brazil: See ESPINOLA, 8 Tratado 478. 
Czechoslovakia: Draft (1931) § 14. 
Denmark: Trib. Marit. Copenhague (May 31, 1905) Clunet 1909, n84; 
BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 224 No. 85. 
France: Cass. (req.) (Feb. 24, 1936) S.193 6. 1. I 61, first formal confirma-
tion of the rule (see BATIFFOL, Revue 193 7, 441) which was certain; however, 
see Cass. (req.) (Feb. 15, 1905) S.1905.1.209; Cass. (civ.) (May 16, 1888) 
S.I89I.I.509· 
French Morocco: Dahir of II-13 August, 1913, art. 16. 
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 12 (implicitly) ; formerly common practice, start-
ing from OLG. Miinchen (Dec. '• I829), I Seuff. Arch. No. I53; see in par-
ticular ROHG. (Jan. 19, I878) 23 ROHGE. 174; RG. (Sept. 23, I887) 
I9 RGZ. 382; and constant practice. 
Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. 3 1. 
Hungary: Curia, Nos. 7674 (of I 9os), 9016 (of I926); see ScHWARTZ, 
40 Z.int.R. 2o6; SZASZY, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) I72; Curia, (Oct. 27, I937) 
5 Z. Osteurop. R. (1939) 396. 
Italy: C. C. Disp. Gen. (I 942) art. 2 5 par. 2; the rule was recognized 
before, although it was controversial whether it was included in art. 9 par. 2, 
Disp. Prel. of 1865, see FEDOZZI 759; Cass. (July 19, I938) Foro Ital. 1938 
I 1216. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Utrecht (Feb. 4, 1927) W. n675, N.J. (1927) 99I; 
Rb. Amsterdam (June 22, 193I) N.J. (I932) 325; VAN HASSELT 305. 
Norway: S. Ct. Christiania (Dec. IS, 1905) Clunet I9o7, 852. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. I 1. 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674 (as to collisions); CUNHA GON<;ALVES, 1 
Direito Civil 670. 
Scotland: The rule seems certain, although the courts still have difficulties 
in ascertaining their own jurisdiction. See Dalziel v. Coulthourst, Executors 
(I934) s. c. 566. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Sept. 20, I933) 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 93I; (Dec. 2, I935) 
10 id. (1936) 624. 
Switzerland: 22 BGE. 486 and I17o; 35 id. II 48o; 43 id. II 315; 5I id. 
II 328; 66 id. II 167. 
Montenegro: C. C. art. 793· 
Treaty of Montevideo on International Civil Law (I889) art, 38; (1940) 
art. 43. 
Codigo Bustamante, arts. I 67, 168. 
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2. Lex Fori 
Against the dominant rule, in the early half of the nine-
teenth century, Waechter and Savigny advanced the opinion 
that tort problems should always be governed by the law of 
the forum. 21 They both believed that the tort rules of the 
various municipal laws were of such an ethical and impera-
tive nature that no country would ever apply the tort rule 
of another country, especially when it does not consider the 
act unlawful. This thesis, formed in too close relationship with 
ideas current in penal law, has sometimes influenced courts 
in England, 22 Spain, 23 and elsewhere. 24 In Greece, it was 
repealed only by the Civil Code of I 940/5 and a recent 
French writer has attempted to revive it.26 Soviet Russia 
has no fixed rule, but most writers seem to agree that applica-
tion of Soviet Russian law even to acts done abroad suits 
the spirit of Soviet law. 27 
3. Rule of Similarity 
The idea that a "foreign tort" could be sued on without 
regard to the internal law of the forum has encountered 
opposition in the conception that in every case the foreign 
municipal law should be substantially similar to the law of 
the forum. 
American cases. This view has been held in a number of 
21 WAECHTER, 25 Arch. Civ. Prax. (I842) 392; SAVIGNY (tr. Guthrie) 2I7 
§ 3 7I, cf. 2 53 § 3 74; their opinion was followed by some now obsolete 
German decisions: 9 Seu.lf. Arch. No. I, I I Seu:ff. Arch. No. 3; 25 Seu:ff. Arch. 
No. I I 5; in partial sympathy with the lex fori theory, ROLIN, I Principes 
§§ 363-365. 
22 See CHESHIRE's (297) resume of the case of The Halley. 
23 See the case history by LASALA LLANAS 365, where he has difficulty in 
reaching the dominant opinion. 
24 France: Cass. (req.) (May 29, I894) S.I894·1.48r. 
Italy: App. Milano (July 8, 1925) Rivista 1926, 125. Contra: DE SANcrJs, 
id. 12 7; FEDOZZI 7 58 ; ScHNITZER 2 8 9 n. r. 
25 Greece: C. C. (1856) art. 6; cf. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 26o; C. C. (1940) 
art. 31. 
26 HENRY MAZEAUD, Revue Crit. 1934, 377; PRUDHOMME, Clunet 1936, 
626. 
21 MAKARov, Precis 305 and authors cited. 
TORTS 
American cases involving foreign death statutes. Such statutes 
have been introduced in practically all jurisdictions in the 
United States to abolish the common law rule that "actio 
personalis moritur cum persona," that is, that an action for 
injury to a person cannot be maintained after his death by the 
deceased man's heirs. As the statutes vary in many details, 
extraterritorial application is important. But originally they 
were considered to create a new right on the ground of wrong-
ful death rather than on that of a precedent tortious invasion 
of the body, and were construed as penal statutes, inappli-
cable in other states. It was a progressive step to apply them 
where there were similar domestic statutes. 28 The entire 
peculiar conception was forcefully refuted by the Court of 
Appeals of New York in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New 
York. 29 Although the rule was followed as late as in I 9 3 I and 
I9J6 in Maryland,S0 and has not yet been expressly over-
ruled in Texas/1 American law as a whole may be claimed, 
at present, to agree with civil law in submitting injuries 
ending in death, like all others, exclusively to the statute of 
the place of wrong.82 
British rules. A famous double rule is generally regarded 
as governing tort problems in England, in a formula repro-
28GoooRrcH, 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (19:14) I9, z8; HANCOCK, Torts z1-z9; 
Texas & P.R. Co. v. Richards (1887) 68 Texas 375, 4 S. W. 6z7 and other 
Texas cases. See also STUMBERG, 9 Tex. L. Rev. (I931) at z9; furthermore, 
Wooden v. Western New York and Pennsylvania R. Co. (r89r) rz6 N.Y. Io1 
z6 N. E. 1050, cf. STUMBERG, id. I63. 
29 (r9r8) zz4 N.Y. 99, rzo N. E. I98; see also Powell v. Great Northern 
R. Co. (1907) IOZ Minn. 4481 II3 N. W. IOI7· 
80 London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Balgowan S. S. Co. (I93I) I6I 
Md. I45, 155 Atl. 334, 77 A. L. R. I3oz; Davis v. Ruzicka (I936) 170 Md. 
ru. Cf. 155 F. (zd) 67 n. 3· 
81 El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth (Tex. I9z3) :155 S. W. I 59> de-
claring Mexican law substantially dissimilar. No recent case has treated the 
law of a state of the United States likewise. The theory has been confirmed de-
spite art. 4678, Rev. Civ. Stat. (r9z5) in Wells v. Irwin (I94z) 43 F. Supp. 
zrz, :114. See STUMBERG, 9 Tex. L. Rev. (1931) z1, Texas Annotations 
to the Restatement (I936) § 384. 
On a California case see infra pp. :149 f. (public policy). 
82 Restatement§§ 38I-39z. The contrary statement in I I Am. Jur. 496 § 184 
seems to be founded on antiquated cases. 
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clueing a passage of the opinion of Willes, J ., in Phillips v. 
Eyre: 
"As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England, 
for a wrong alleged to have been committed abroad, two 
conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such 
a character that it would have been actionable if committed 
in England. . . . Secondly, the act must not have been 
justififlble by the law of the place where it was done."83 
Independently of the meaning Willes, J., himself clothed in 
these words, 34 they have become a rigid rule of secure, though 
very unhappy, standing. 
The second part of this rule has an old history. In its 
oldest phase, this rule was intended to excuse a defendant 
who would be liable to damages under English law-for 
Seizure35 Or Capture Of a Ship, 36 detentiOn37 Or arrese8 Of a 
man-in view of the lawfulness of such act in the instant case 
as done under a foreign sovereign. Thus far, the English rule 
aims at the same result as the prevailing rule that makes the 
local law of the place of wrong alone decisive. However, by 
strange complications the English judges arrived at the idea 
that the law of the place of wrong controls only the "justi-
33 ( r8 70) Q. B. r at z 7; Lord Macnaghten in Carr v. Fracis Times & 
Co. [r9oz] A. C. I76, r82.. 
34 HESSEL E. YNTEMA suggests the possibility that "The celebrated two 
rules are an effort to formulate-as the event has shown, an unhappy one-the 
theory that 'a right of action,' as well as the obligation, is 'the creature of the 
law of the place and subordinate thereto.' The first rule might thus be re-
garded as an expression of the truism that the case must be one of which the 
court of suit will take jurisdiction, a construction to which the immediately 
preceding observation, in the opinion, instancing the local nature of actions 
for trespass to land, that English courts do not undertake 'universal jurisdiction' 
over foreign transactions, lends countenance. This supposes that Willes, J., did 
not intend to suggest that the lex fori is the primary measure of the existence 
of either the 'obligation' or the 'right of action.' In subsequent cases, the two 
rules have come to exercise an autonomous and unwarranted fascination, 
eclipsing the more detailed analysis that formed their context. Which, if so, 
would serve to remind us of the great dangers inherent in formulae as a means 
of transmitting doctrine." 
85 Blad's Case (I673) 3 Swan. 6o3, Blad v. Barnfield (r674) 3 Swan. 604. 
36 Dobree v. Napier (I836) z Bing. N.C. 781. 
37 Regina v. Lesley (I86o) Bell C. C. no, Z33· 
88 Carr v. Fracis Times & Co. [I 9oz] A. C. I 76. 
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fiability" of the act. They did not ask whether it was a tort 
entailing damages at that place. The case definitively causing 
this deviation from the world-rule was Machado v. Fontes.39 
A libel published in Brazil injured the plaintiff. The de-
fendant seemed to raise in objection the absence of a civil 
action for damages in the case of a libel under Brazilian law 
and requested inquiry into that law by a commission to be 
sent to Brazil. The Court of Appeals reasoned in the follow-
ing way: A libel certainly was a criminal offence also in 
Brazil, hence not "justifiable." Even if no action for damages 
ensued there, it had to be granted according to English law. 
It should be conceded that the judges felt strongly the in-
equity of dismissing the action, under such extraordinary cir-
cumstances.40 It has been suggested, therefore, that the court 
should have contented itself with an exceptional ruling on 
the basis of stringent public policy; 41 this, in fact, would have 
prevented the crystallization of a rule that generally sub-
stitutes the law of the forum for that of the place of wrong. 
However, the court and its numerous critics would have done 
still better by examining the assumption of the "unusual,"42 
nay fantastic, legal situation ascribed to Brazilian law. There 
was a double ground for not denying a civil action for 
damages on the ground of a punishable act in Brazil. On 
the one hand, the general liability for fault, embodied in 
the French Civil Code, article 1382, adopted in the Portu-
guese Civil Code of 1867, articles 2361 and 2362, which 
now appears in the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916,43 was recog-
nized in all drafts44 and no doubt was a living rule. On the 
39 [1897] 2 Q.B. 231. 40 GUTTERIDGE, review of CHESHIRE, 55 Law Q. Rev. (1939) 131. 
41 ROBERTSON, "The Choice of Law for Tort Liability in the Conflict of 
Laws," 4 Modern L. Rev. (1940) 27. 42 HANCOCK, Torts 17, 121. 43 Brazil: C. C. art. 159 and for defamation, the special provision in art. 1547· 
44 See CARLOS AUGUSTO DE CARVALHO, Direito Civil Brasileiro Recompilado 
ou Nova Consolida~ao das Leis Civis (Rio de Janeiro 1899) 302 art. 1014. 
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other hand, the Penal Code of r 890, conforming to another 
French rule/5 stated a duty of indemnification, as an effect 
of every final criminal condemnation/6 Thus, the feeling 
of the English courts would have been shared by Brazilian 
lawyers. In this case, the helplessness of the court in regard 
to foreign law was to be blamed on the pleading, but it 
became consequential. In a later case in the Privy Council, 
the difficulties of workmen's compensation in Canadian 
provinces caused incidental argument to the effect that an 
accidental injury to a worker was "justifiable" as it was 
"neither actionable nor punishable," a manifest lapsus linguae 
in a case where the Privy Council in fact dismissed a claim 
that was not actionable by the lex loci actus.47 Cheshire, in 
demonstrating this, has concluded that the second part of 
the rule in Phillips v. Eyre has been overruled and that the 
act must be actionable (also) under the law of the place of 
wrong. 48 The Scotch courts, in fact, have adopted the same 
view when they refuse to award "solatium" (satisfaction) for 
mental anguish in cases of wrongful accidents on English 
territory or vessels, despite the Scottish law. 49 The Canadian 
courts, however, follow the English rule and in constant 
practice, before granting damages for a foreign act, state that 
it is not justifiable where committed.50 
45 SeeM. S. AMos and F. P. WALTON, Introduction to French Law (I935) 
2 I5. 
46 Penal Code, Decree No. 847, of Oct. I I, I 89o, art. 69 (b), cf. BENTO DE 
FARIA, Anotac;iies ao C6digo Penal do Brasil (ed. 4, 1929) 16o; cf. art. 315 
et seq. on "Cal umnia e Injuria." 
47 Walpole v. Canadian National R. Co. [1921] 66 D. L. R. 127; [1923] 
A. c. I q, 70 D. L. R. 201. 
48 CHESHIRE 301ff. 
49 Ld. Pres. Robertson in Kendrick v. Burnett (1897) 25 R. 82; law of 
the flag applied, as interpreted by Lord Dundeen in Convery v. Lanarkshire 
Tramways (1905) 8 F. 117; Naftalin v. London, Midland & Scottish R. Co. 
(1933) S.C. 259; See O'RIORDAN, "Choice of Law in Actions ex Delicto under 
Scots Law," in 4 Modern L. Rev. (r941) 214. 
50 S. Ct. of Canada: O'Connor v. Wray [I93o] S. C. R. 231, [1930] 2 
D. L. R. 899; Howells v. Wilson (C. A. 1936) 69 Que. K. B. 32. 
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The "first rule" of Willes, ]., has been developed in the 
converse case of a defendant liable under the foreign law 
who would not be liable under English law if the facts had oc-
curred in England. This doctrine also rests mainly on one 
decision, The Halley, 1868,51 concerning the liability of a 
shipowner for negligence of a compulsory pilot in Belgian 
waters, a liability existing under Belgian but not under 
English maritime law. A perfectly analogous case of com-
pulsory pilotage was decided by the German Reichsgericht 
in I 891 to the same effect,S2 both decisions being equally 
overridden by later events.53 Yet while the latter court re-
ferred to public pblicy as the basis of an exceptional objection 
to the suit on the foreign tort, the Privy Council went to the 
length of asserting the principle that an English court of 
justice will not: 
"Give a remedy in the shape of damages in respect of an act 
which according to its own principles, imposes no liability on 
the person from whom the damages are claimed."54 
Since then, the formula demands that the tort be "actionable 
in England."55 
The double rule with its twofold implication approaches 
unconditional application of the law of the forum, with a 
tempering proviso for the protection of a defendant whose 
act was "justifiable" at the place where done.56 This rule 
is applied in Canada, far beyond the peculiar cases in which 
51 (I868) 2 L. R. P. C. I93· 
52 RG. (July 91 I892) 29 RGZ. 93· The analogy was first pointed out by 
LORENZEN, 47 Law Q. Rev. (I93I) 498 ns. 57 1 62. 
53 Infra p. 276. 
54 L. J. Selwyn's dictum in The Halley at 204; repeated in Machado v. 
Fontes [I 897] 2 Q. B. 23 I by L. J. Lopes and L. J. Rigby. 
55 2 WHARTON Io96; GooDRICH 230. 
56 FALCONBRIDGE, 17 Can. Bar Rev. (I939) 546, 549; 18 Can. Bar Rev. 
(I94o) 308, 3IO. Even more definitely, M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 4941 soo 
explains the double rule as restricting the lex loci delicti "to the question: is the 
act that caused the damage justifiable? All other questions must be answered 
by the (English) lex fori." 
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it originated, so as to prevent enforcement of claims not only 
arising in the United States but even in other Canadian 
provinces, when the laws involved "differ slightly from their 
own.ns7 The Supreme Court of Canada has extended this un-
fortunate practice to Quebec, because in the Court's opinion 
no sufficient authority was cited for a prevailing more gen-
erous rule. 58 A recent application has afforded a true counter-
part to Machado v. Fontes, even better substantiated in its 
facts. The Ontario Highway Traffic Act, 1937 (s. 27) makes 
careless driving punishable but ( s. 4 7) denies civil relief to a 
gratuitous passenger of the car causing the accident. On this 
premise, the Canadian Supreme Court awarded damages to 
the victim on the ground of the tort law of Quebec qua lex 
fori, because the act was punishable, though not actionable 
at the place of wrong. 59 A remedy against the rule has been 
shown by the Supreme Court of Ontario. A gratuitous pas-
senger injured in New York was granted relief according to 
New York law, on the thesis that the Ontario statute of 1930 
which excludes such claim was devoid of extraterritorial ap-
plication. 60 
A somewhat analogous conflicts rule has been adopted in 
the conflicts laws of Japan and China,61 with the difference 
57 HANCOCK, Torts 89 n. ro. 
58 O'Connor v. Wray [r93o] S. C. R. 231, [r930] 2 D. L. R. 899, as 
stated by Duff, C. J.,1n Canadian NationalS. S. Co. v. Watson [r939] S.C. R. 
rr, q, [1939] I D. L. R. 273, 274, cf. FALCONBRIDGE, I8 Can. Bar Rev. 
(I940) 308. Howells v. Wilson (C. A. 1936) 69 Que. K. B. 32; cf. 3 JoHN-
SON 357. Adde Lieff v. Palmer (I937) 63 Que. K. B. 278, and next note. 
59 McLean v. Pettigrew (r944) [I945] S.C. R. 62, [r945] 2 D. L. R. 65, 
affirming Pettigrew v. McLean (I942) 48 R. L. (N. S.) 400, See comment by 
FALCONBRIDGE [I945J 2 D. L. R. 82, 23 Can. Bar Rev. (1945) 309. It is a 
curious case also inasmuch as the Court, through Tascherian, J., in a learned 
exposition adopts the doctrine of French writers that there is no such thing as 
a contrat de bienfaisance, which in this case would have given relief under the 
law of Quebec, qua lex loci contractus. The French, in fact, do recognize a 
liability for fault which could have been correctly used as quasi-contractual 
but not as quasi-delictual ground for damages. 
6° Curley v. Clifford [1941] 2 D. L. R. 729, [194I] 0. W. N. 154. 
61 Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. II par. 2; China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 25; 
I ZITELMANN r86, 187. 
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that both laws are clearly based on the foreign tort law 
and, by exception, exclude its application, if the act is "not 
unlawful" under the domestic law of the court. 
4· Harm Done in a Territory Not Belonging to Any Country 
Apart from injuries occurring on board a vessel or air-
craft, a topic to be discussed later, doubts have been ex-
pressed whether harm done in a territory without organized 
government, would be more appropriately subjected to the 
personal law of the alleged tortfeasor,S2 or to the law of the 
forum. 63 In those places of the Orient where the personal law 
determines jurisdiction, liability of the subjects of these 
powers 1s usually determined by their respective national 
laws. 
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE 
Not so far-reaching as the emphasis laid on the law of 
the forum in the British, Japanese, and Chinese rules, the 
following exceptional rules have modified the main principle 
to the benefit of the law of the forum. 
r. Law Common to the Parties 
In Latin countries, there is a tendency with respect to 
contracts to apply to two parties having the same nationality 
the law of their common country; it has sometimes found 
expression in the field of torts. According to this opinion, 
an act which is lawful under the lex loci, but unlawful under 
the national law of the parties, is held to constitute a tort by 
a court of the common country of the parties. 64 Some authors 
62 2 FRANKENSTEIN 371; RAAPE 217, III; M. WoLFF, IPR. 103. Contra: 
GIESE, 29 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts (N. F.) (1937) 310, 341; and for 
Norway, CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 579 No. 155· 
63 England: FooTE szo. 
France: 2 ARMINJON ( ed. 2) 342, 348 §§ 12o, 122. 
Contra: 2 BAR 121 : "a precarious way out of embarrassment." 
64 Belgium: Cass. (Nov. 26, 19o8) Pasicrisie 1909.1.25, Clunet 1909, n78, 
Revue 1909, 951; cf. Ministere Public in Pasicrisie 1909.1.27; RoLIN 
§§ 363ff. 
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have even gone so far as to advocate that the person.allaw 
common to the parties should be applied also by the courts 
of any other country where the case might come up for 
decision. 65 Others have limited the national law to quasi 
delicts.66 
The proposition has been defeated in France where it ori-
ginated and is rejected in most countries.67 It is certainly un-
reasonable in all those cases where private liability is closely 
connected with the local administrative and insurance policies. 
These bind every one in the territory, as expressed for in-
stance in the International Convention on Motor Traffic, 
providing that the driver is bound to observe the laws and 
regulations of the country where he travels.68 
This seems also to be the general attitude of common law 
lawyers. It is true that once, in r 862, an English judge, 
Wightman, in a dictum stated that in an action brought by 
France: Trib. civ. Strasbourg (Jan. 28, 1929) Clunet 1929, 1131. 
Greece: App. Athens (1899) No. 885, Clunet 1904,450. 
Italy: Cass. Torino (Dec. 19, 1912) Revue 19'3• 586; App. Milano (July 8, 
1925) Rivista 1926, 125; 3 FIORE§ 1266. 
Switzerland: BG. (June 15, 1917) 43 BGE. II 309, at 317, "as an ancillary 
argument"! 
65 WEiss, 4 Traite 417 n. 1. 
66 3 FIORE§ 1266. 
67 E.g., Austria: OGH., GlU. NF. 47 No. 5219 (accident on an Austrian 
train having passed the border into Bavaria, German law). 
Belgium: 8 LAURENT 25. 
France: CREMIEU, 5 Repert. 491 No. 2: "out of question." 
Germany: RG. (June 14, 1915) Leipz. Z. 1915, 1443 (automobile accident 
in Austria, of parties domiciled in Germany, Austrian law); RAAPE, D. IPR. 
324· (A contrary view in 2. FRANKENSTEIN 375 is isolated.) Nevertheless, the 
;\lational Socialist Decree of December 7, 1942, RGBl., Part I, 706 provided 
that all extracontractual damages between German citizens should be governed 
by German law, wherever the act may be done. 
Italy: Cass. Torino (Dec. 19, 1911) Riv. Dir. Com. 1912 II 177; 3 FIORE§ 
1264 and in Clunet 1900, 719; DESANCTIS, Rivista 19:1.6, 128; FEDOZZI 758. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Sept. zo, 1933) NJA. 1933, 364, see 7 Z.ausl.Pr. (1933) 
931; (Dec. 2, 1935) NJA. 1935, 585, 1 o Z.ausl.PR. ( 1936) 624. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 30, 1940) 66 BGE. II 165 (implicit); SCHNITZER 
289 n. 1. 
68 Paris Convention on Motor Traffic of April 24, 19:1.6, art. 8, HuDSON, 
3 Int. Legislation at x 865; Pan-American Convention, Washington, Oct. 6, 
1930, art. 1o, HuosoN, 5 Int. Legislation at 790. 
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a British subject against a British subject the common law 
should be applied if it was more favorable to the plaintiff 
than the law of the place of wrong.69 This proposition seems 
never to have been followed in England70 and ,~here are 
numerous cases in the United States where it was not even 
taken into consideration, although the facts of the case might 
have invited its application.71 
However, in a group of cases involving foreign-committed 
unfair competition, the German courts and writers have con-
sidered that common German nationality of both parties or 
rather their common German domicil, should determine the 
application of the more severe German law.72 This specific 
problem is to be discussed in connection with the complex of 
violations of commercial property.73 
2. Local Actions 
In the common law jurisdictions of both the British Empire 
and the United States, actions involving determination of 
title to real estate are still regarded as "local actions," i.e., 
as actions which can only be pursued in the forum where the 
land is situated and which are always to be decided in ac-
cordance with the law of that place.14 Prevailing English and 
American opinion has extended this rule to actions for tres-
pass to land.75 This historical residue of the English juris-
69
'Scott v. Seymour (I86z) I H. & C. ZI9 1 Ex. Ch. 
7° Cf. CHESHIRE 304· 
11 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (I9o9) ZI3 U. S. 347, z9 
S. Ct. 5II; Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby (I9IZ) zzz U.S. 4731 3Z S. Ct. I3Z; 
Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co. (I9z9) z5z N. Y. 1271 I69 N. E. I12; 
Alabama, Great Southern R. Co. v. Carroll ( I89z) 97 Ala. u6, II So. 803. 
72 I8 RGZ. z9; 55 id. I991 and others, see infra p. Z97 n. I78. 
13 Infra pp. z95 ff. 
74 See KUHN, "Local and Transitory Actions in Private International Law 
( I91 8) ," 66 U. of Pa. L. Rev. ( I9I8) 30I; WHEATON, "Nature of Actions--
Local and Transitory (I9:tz)," I6 Ill. L. Rev. (I9zz) 456; WICKER, "The 
Development of the Distinction Between Local and Transitory Actions (I9:t6)," 
4 Tenn. L. Rev. (I9z6) 55· 
75 Restatement §§ 6141 6I5; British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de 
Mo~ambique [I893] A. C. 6oz; Livingston v. Jefferson (I811) I5 Fed. Cas. 
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dictional doctrine has shocking results amounting to out-
right denial of justice76 and has no counterpart anywhere 
outside the common law countries. 
3· Protection of Defendant Nationals of the Forum 
While the English and Japanese rules that a claim for 
tort must be actionable under the law of the forum result in 
protection for eve;y defendant, in Germany a special limita-
tion upon the application of the law of the place of wrong 
has been established in favor of defendants of German nation-
ality alone. Article 12 of the Introductory Law to the German 
Civil Code provides expressly as follows: 
"By reason of an unlawful act committed in a foreign 
country, no greater claims can be enforced against a German 
than those constituted by German law." 
The interference of the local law is understood to involve 
the existence of liability as well as the measure of damages. 
Thus, a defendant of German nationality is not condemned, 
if under German private law he lacks capacity to commit 
tort, or his act is deemed lawful, or the negligence of the 
plaintiff was overwhelmingly superior, or the period of pre-
scription has elapsed.77 It suffices, however, that the award is 
agreeable to German law under some other theory, such as 
undue enrichment. 78 The application of article I 2 to the cases 
has been proved very difficult. 79 For its nationalistic narrow-
66o; Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co. (r895) 158 U. S. ro5, 15 S. Ct. 
771; Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co. (rqzo) 2.36 
Mass. r 85, 128 N. E. 4· C,ontra: The Minnesota courts, Little v. Chicago etc. 
R. Co. (1896) 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846; Peyton v. Desmond (r9o4) 12.9 
Fed. r; and New York Real Property Law,§ 536. 
76 GooDRICH states that "the more reasonable view seems opposed to the self-
imposed limitation of jurisdiction, which seems an archaic survival of outworn 
rules of venue." (73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (192.4) 2.4-2.5; Handb. 2.2.9); KUHN, 
supra n. 74, 301. LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws 56 adduces a very im-
pressive example. 
77 RAAPE zii, VII, r; rr8 RGZ. 141; 12.9 RGZ. 385,388. 
78 RG. (Sept. 2.9, 1927) ll8 RGZ. 14r. 
79 See the laborious discussion by RAAPE 2.09, 2.13 (a); WALKER 530. 
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ness, the rule was widely criticized,S0 until in the recent dark 
period it has found praise in Germany.81 
4· Public Policy as a General Limitation 
The various rules discussed above protecting the law of 
the forum in certain cases against the law of the place of 
wrong, are specially formed expressions of the general 
principle that reserves the public policy of the forum. This 
safety valve for an "outraged feeling of justice"82 remains 
available in addition. For example, in case a man was wrong-
fully killed, a European court that regarded him a subject 
of the forum would certainly disregard the common law ex-
isting at an American place of wrong and not providing a 
satisfactory remedy.83 
A former opinion, which has been reflected in recent Italian 
writings, has argJled that an obligation to pay damages rest-
ing upon a penal statute of the forum possesses extraterritorial 
effect at the forum as a unilateral special norm, applicable 
despite a foreign locus delicti.84 By far the prevailing doctrine 
rejects this thesis sharply. But the C6digo Bustamante has 
80 2 ZITELMANN 505; KAHN, I Abhandl. 446·; WALKER 534; NEUMEYER, 
IPR. (ed. 1) 32; LEWALD No. 326 in fine; RAAPE 209, I, and D.IPR. 324: 
"the entire doctrine repudiates the provision." 
81 RuDOLPH SCHMIDT, Ort der unerlaubten Handlung 193 enjoys "the pro-
tecting effect of article 12 for Germans by helping the German (defendant) 
even though he may hurt a foreigner," and looks to EG. BGB. art. 30 (public 
policy) for further tight protection. 
The provision has been copied in China, Int. Priv. Law, art. 25 par. 2, 
and in the Brazilian Draft, art. 86, which contained more such nationalistic 
clauses (arts. 85-88), but does not appear in the Introductory Law of 1942. 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal (Sept. 10, 1925) 51 BGE. II 327, 329, does not 
exclude application of the law of the forum if it were more advantageous 
to the defendant! 
82 NIBOYET 616; 2 WHARTON 1095 required a fundamental difference of 
policy. 
83 App. Aix {Jan. 23, 1899) 15 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 42 (collision on the 
high seas); Germany: RAAPE 223. Similar isolated suggestions have been made 
for acts deemed immoral at the forum (RUDOLF ScHMIDT, op. cit. supra n. 
81 at 193) and fraud or gross negligence (PoULETT § 319). 
84 The Italian writings by MANZINI, GHIRON, and SERENI are discussed by 
MIELE, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 84 n. 3· 
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turned a seemingly related consideration even into a general 
exception to the application of the lex loci delicti, punishable 
deeds or omissions being subjected to the law containing 
the penal statute; it is very difficult to understand the working 
of this rule.85 
Fortunately, the known cases where courts in this country 
and elsewhere have refused the application of foreign tort 
law on the ground of an offended policy of the forum are 
very few. 86 There are ethically grounded divergences, such as 
those regarding the right of a spouse to damages from a per-
son who has alienated the other spouse's affection. An Italian87 
and possibly a German88 court would dismiss such an action 
based on English or American law. The Swiss Federal Court, 
on the other hand, has upheld an action for disruption 
of marriage, despite the contrary Danish domiciliary law of 
the spouses, though basing the decision on an additional 
Swiss place of wrong rather than on public policy.89 Most 
applications of public policy have been examples of the well-
known feeling of superiority. Thus, when a governess, who 
had been gravely injured by the child of her employer in 
Hawaii, sued for damages on the ground of parental liability, 
adopted in the Hawaiian Islands as in all French-influenced 
legislations, the Supreme Court of California in dismissing 
85 C6digo Bustamante, art. I67: Those (obligations) arising from crimes 
or offenses are subject to the same law as the crime or offense from which they 
arise; art. I 68: Those arising from actions or omissions involving guilt or 
negligence not punishable by law shall be governed by the law of the place 
where the negligence or guilt giving rise to them was incurred. 
86 For the United States see HANCOCK, Torts 86: "quite unusual"; STUMBERG 
collects only a few cases. 
87 3 FIORE§ 1267. 
88 RAAPE I 9 8 advocates even in this case the enforcement of the foreign law. 
H. and L. MAZEAUD, 3 Responsabilite civile (ed. :z, I934) § :z:z4o, and 
EsMEIN in 6 Planiol et Ripert § 558, discard foreign rules that would not 
recognize legitimate defenses; and adopting this suggestion for Belgium, PrRSON 
et DE VILLE, 2 Traite de la responsabilite civile extra-contractuelle (I 935) po 
§ 407 propose to eliminate foreign laws not making a person liable for fraud 
and grave fault. Where do such laws exist? 
89 BG. (June IS, I9I7) 43 BGE. II 309, 3I7. 
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the claim, revived the similarity doctrine and applied-in 
1927-the harsh common law rule of the state, as if it were 
a model. 90 The Court seems to have felt as the Supreme Court 
of the United States did considerably earlier in apply-
ing what it then regarded as the "true" common law rule, 
namely, the antiquated fellow-servant doctrine under the 
theory that it embodied the "general law"; for this reason,, 
the claim of a fireman against a railway under Ohio law 
was defeated, in a case where the plaintiff had suffered injury 
in an accident in Ohio due to the locomotive engineer's neg-
ligence.91 The French Supreme Court once declined to give 
effect to a bank monopoly in the territory of Monaco be-
cause of the freedom of commerce in France. 92 The courts, 
including American and French, seem to have endeavored 
more recently to avoid such "provincialism," as Cardozo 
has termed it in a famous tort case.93 We shall encounter, 
however, a few borderline cases. 94 And occasionally courts 
contrive the application of their own law by such devices as 
finding at all costs a place of wrong within the forum. 95 
5. Rationale 
In some countries, the doctrine referring to the law of 
the forum derived support from analogies with penal law, 
90 Hudson v. Von Hamm (1927) 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374; see the 
just criticism in the Notes, 13 Cornell L. Q. (1928) 266, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 
(1928) 439· 
91 Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh (I893) I49 U.S. 368. Chief Justice 
Fuller, in his dissenting vote, said that the decision unreasonably enlarged the 
fellow servant exemption of the employer. 
92 App. Aix (Dec. 19, I892) S.I893.2.2oi, aff'd, Cass. (req.) (May 29, 
I 894) S.1 894·1.481. Contra: NIBOYET 6I6 n. 3; BAR TIN, 2 Principes 404. 
93 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (19I8) 224 N.Y. 99, xzo N. E. 
I 98. See, for instance, the express denial of an objection drawn from public 
policy in Loranger v. Nadeau (I932) 215 Cal. 362, IO Pac. (2d) 63 (liability 
to a guest passenger) . 
French Trib. Valenciennes (Dec. 19, I935) Revue Crit. I936, 468 (fraudu-
lent seduction, as opposed to status questions). 
94 Infra Chapter 25, pp. 274-276. 
95 E.g., Germany: 150 RGZ. 265, 27I on which see infra pp. 297 n. I 79, 298, 
3 I 3 n. 39· 
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under the continuing influence of Savigny. This lasted longer 
in Latin America than elsewhere, but it has ended also 
there. 96 Neither jurisdiction nor choice of law can be or-
ganized on the same lines for criminal offenses and private 
tort obligations. Even where a court of criminal procedure 
is authorized to award equitable damages in ancillary pro-
ceedings-the so-called procedure by adhesion-it has to 
follow its own internal law. 
Application of the law of the place of wrong has often 
been based on the idea that a right to damages is vested in 
the injured person by that law,97 or in the famous variant 
of Mr. Justice Holmes, that the law of the place of the act 
is the only source of the obligation on which the case de-
pends.98 These attempted justifications merit the same re-
proach as the vested rights theory in general.99 
European authors, continental and English, have been 
more inclined to explain the rule upon grounds of policy. A 
person owes obedience to the law of the country in which he 
is actually present. It is that law under which he is living 
at the time of the conduct complained of, and it is that law 
alone which can claim to determine the legality or illegality 
of his actions/00 the law to whose standards he must elevate 
his behavior. He who stays in a state is subject to the legal 
Italy: Cass. (April z, I92.7) Foro Ita!. Mass. I92.7 II 472., cited by MIELE, 
5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 84 n. r. 
96 See, for instance, 2. BAR I I 8; ALCORTA, 2. Der. Int. Priv. 346; 3 Vrco 13 7 
§ 159· 
97 United States: BEALE, 3 Summary §§ I-5, reproduced 3 BEALE I 968; 
Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (19I8), supra n. 93, 
224 N. Y. at I 20; more cautious, GOODRICH 2.20. 
England: Strangely enough, CHESHIRE 294 adheres to this approach which 
he generally rejects. 
98 Mr. Justice Holmes in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R. Co. ( 1904) I 94 U. S. 
uo, 126; in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown (xgx4) 234 U.S. 542, 
547· Similarly, it is said in France that the law of the country is competent 
where the accident as generating factor occurs; see CREMIEu, 5 Repert. 491 
No.6. 
99 CooK, 35 Col. L. Rev. (1935) 202, Legal Bases 311. 
10° CHESHIRE 294· 
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order of that state, or, according to the old fiction, he "sub-
mits" himself to the state.101 At the moment of the act, the 
author and the victim of a wrong move in social surrl!>undings 
in which they may appreciate their risks and potential liabili-
ties under the local law. The reasonable expectations of the 
parties cannot be protected otherwise.102 
In recent years, however, this individualistic and educa-
tional theory has been partly replaced by the governmental 
consideration of social policy that regards the law of torts 
as a law of "social defense" and under which it appears that 
the state where the injury occurs has a predominant interest 
to protect the injured private interests and to determine the 
legal effects of the injury. The primary object of the law of 
torts is to regulate the social order and prevent its infringe-
ment; the secondary concern is to compensate the victims of 
violations of this order. The state cannot fulfill this duty 
without including foreigners in its commands.103 
This line of thought leads back to the more solid part of 
the ancient theory of territoriality. Every state has a legiti-
mate interest, right, and duty to determine the licit or illicit 
character and the effects of acts committed on its soiP04 
In this sense, the law of torts has been classified in France 
under the heading of the "laws of public safety and police" 
(lois de surete et de police), declared in article 3 of the 
Civil Code to be imperative.105 These laws do not present 
"public policy" in contrast with a foreign applicable law, but, 
as public law, are territorial by virtue of their normal force. 106 
101 As late as 1933, Mr. Justice Brandeis in Young v. Masci (1933) 289 
U. S. 253 applied this idea to a nonresident owner of a car who authorizes its 
use in the state. See infra Chapter 23, p. 270 n. 72. 
102 RHEINSTEIN, "The Place of Wrong," I 9 Tul. L. Rev. (I 945) 4, qff. 
103 See the various arguments of 8 LAURENT 24 § Io; RoLIN, I Principes 
577; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE §§ 25I and 294; BARTIN, 2 Principes 4I7; 
PouLLET § 3 r 7· 
104 FEDOZZI 7 59: It is logical that the law governing on the territory deter-
mines the effects and consequences of its own violation; WALKER 522; BARTIN, 
2 Principes 3 8 7 § 3 JO. 
105 3 FIORE § I 263; NrBOYET § 490. 
106 CREMrEu, 5 Repert. 493 No. I 3· 
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Each state is said to be in the best position to evaluate its local 
conditions, as well as the habits and needs of its population.107 
Finally, the interests of the injured person are emphasized 
when it is apparently felt that the natural place for the victim 
to seek redress would be the place where his injury occurred, 
and if he cannot sue in this jurisdiction, he should at least be 
treated upon the basis of its law. 
Some of these arguments may appear phrased too neatly 
and open to one objection or another. But the principle of 
the lex delicti commissi ought not to be deduced from a 
single, all-embracing rationale of absolute validity. In search-
ing the relatively most convenient local contact for an alleged 
tort, it is reasonable and relatively simple to connect it with 
the territory where it was committed. There remains, of 
course, the additional task of determining the territory in 
which a tort should be considered as having been committed, 
and this choice has been unhappily influenced by individual 
selection from the mentioned reasons for the lex loci delicti 
commtsst. 
The advantages of the principle of the lex loci delicti com-
missi are strong enough to have secured to it an almost uni-
versal adherence. The English rule, on the other hand, al-
though it has found favor with a solitary French author108 
and indulgent consideration in this hemisphere/09 has lost 
ground in England itself. Cheshire recognizes fully the 
"superior claim of the lex loci." Inasmuch as the English 
rule requires actionability under the English law of the 
forum, he tries to excuse this requirement as a clear-cut ap-
plication of the principle of public policy, easy to be applied 
because of its simplicity.110 This is an exorbitant and harmful 
107 2 ARMINJON ( ed. 2) § I 20. 
108 VALERY 974 § 676. . 
109 RHEINSTEIN, "The Place of Wrong," I9 Tul. L. Rev. (I945) 4, 23; 
13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (I 945) I I I advocates it; justice of the results only is 
questioned by FALCONBRIDGE, "Torts in the Conflict of Laws," 23 Can. Bar 
Rev. (I94S) 309, 3I4, 3I6; id., Conflict of Laws (1947) 701 ff. 
11° CHESHIRE 302. 
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kind of public policy, however, explained only, as ,Hancock 
remarks, as a remainder from the time when the common 
law jurisdictions "dimly perceived" the conflicts problem.111 
The consequences in the courts of Canada are deterrent ex-
amples.112 American and Continental lawyers alike claim 
that a state which assumes to regulate conduct carried on upon 
its soil ought to concede a corresponding power to all other 
states. While a state may refuse to apply in its criminal courts 
any criminal law other than its own, such an exaggerated ex-
tension of public policy in matters of private law contradicts 
the very idea of conflict of laws. 
111 HANCOCK, Torts 88. 
112 HANCOCK, Torts 89, supra n. 57· 
CHAPTER 25 
The Scope of the Principle 
r. The Law of Wrong Governs Capacity to Commit a Tore 
THIS universal rule operates in Continental and Eng-lish courts as a considerable breach in the personal law, while it conforms to the territorial doctrine maintained 
in the United States subjecting transactions of various kinds 
to the law of the place where the "act is done." 
Illustration. An American youth of I 5 years, by driving 
a car in Brazil, injures a person. In all courts, his responsibility 
is to be determined according to the Brazilian Civil Code, 
article I 56, which is understood as rejecting liability of per-
sons under sixteen years. 2 A Brazilian boy of the same age, 
acting in Venezuela, is capable according to his faculty of 
discernment (Venezuelan Civil Code, article u86). 
Equitable compensation for damage done by an irrespon-
sible individual, now frequently provided after the pattern 
of article 829 of the German Civil Code,3 is naturally in-
cluded in the law of wrong.~ 
2. Unlawfulness 
Liability for tort, m contrast to other forms of liability 
1 Restatement §§ 3 79-3 8I (by implication). 
Germany: RAAPE I97· 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 579 No. I 54· 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. II No. z. 
Switzerland: BECK I37 n. zo. Contra: for the present law, ScHNITZER z89 
( ed. z, 544) with formalistic arguments. 
2 J. M. DE CARVALHo SANTOS, 3 Codigo Civil Brasileiro Interpretado (ed. 
3, I94z) z98; Cwvrs BEVILAQUA, r Codigo Civil (ed. 6, I94o) 4zo. 
3 The Belgian C. C. art. 1386 bis, as amended by Law of April I6, 1935, 
formulates the idea more correctly: the judge may hold a lunatic or abnormal 
person liable to pay what he would be obligated to, if he had control of his 
acts. 
4 However, BARTIN, z Principes 398 § 333 would follow French public policy 
in the case of a French defendant. 
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created by law, presupposes that the conduct causing the 
harm be unlawful. This requirement has two phases regard-
ing the type of interests invaded, and the circumstances of 
the invasion. 
(a) Illicit conduct. The various legislations determine dif-
ferently the spheres within which private persons are pro-
tected and those left to free action by the other members of 
the community. A fundamental cleavage exists between the 
two great systems, of which one establishes separately shaped 
torts and the other recognizes a general tort liability. The 
first is represented by the common law as well as by the 
Roman law and the German Civil Code, the second by the 
French Civil Code and its numerous followers. 
The primary question to be asked under the law of wrong 
is, therefore, whether the facts complained of constitute for-
bidden conduct. In regard to omissions, which cannot be 
tortious without violation of a general duty, it seems to be 
recognized, conforming to principle, that the duty must be 
imposed by the law of the place of wrong.5 Thus, failure by 
a locomotive driver to signal at a railway crossing, and failure 
of an employer to guard dangerous machinery, are con-
sidered wrongful to the extent admitted by the law at the 
place.6 What the extracontractual duties of a bank are in pay-
ing a check, is determined by the locallaw.7 
(b) Authorized acts. An invasion of interests, not or-
dinarily allowed, may yet be lawful under particular circum-
stances constituting justification and excuse. The law of 
wrong determines these exceptions to liability such as self-
defense, defense of other persons or of the interests of the 
state, consent or assumption of risk by the injured person, 
legislative, judicial, or executive acts, or authorization by the 
state. 
5 The question is, however, what place this is. See infra Chapter 26, p. 312. 
6 See Restatement§ 384; HANCOCK, Torts 107. 
7 App. Paris (June 23, 1899) Clunet 1901, 128. 
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The Restatement ( § 3 82) mentions some of these de-
fenses for the particular purpose of assigning them to the 
law of the place of "acting" rather than to the law of the 
place where the harm is done. At this juncture, it is impor-
tant only that they are not governed by the law of the forum. 
However, it should be noted that the existence and extent 
of disciplinary rights of husbands, parents, guardians, teach-
ers, and so forth are governed by none of these laws but 
are subject to their proper conflicts rules. Whether, for ex-
ample, a father may forcibly coerce his child or a husband 
may open the letters of his wife, depends on the family law 
applicable. As we have seen before, in American courts such 
incidents are usually determined by the temporary common 
residence of the parties, which may be, or may not be, identi-
cal with the place of wrong or the forum. 
3· Causation and Fault 
(a) Causation. There are not five or more meanings of 
causation to deal with here, but only two, a logical and a 
juridical denotation. Causal nexus, causation in its only 
logical meaning, exists when the conduct complained of is 
one of the antecedents in the sequence of events resulting 
in the injury-a ccconditio sine qua non"-i.e., the harm 
would not have happened if the act had not been done. Such 
causal connection, although necessary for any liability, a 
requirement sometimes neglected,8 is not the only qualifica-
tion of a juridically significant causation. The doctrines con-
cerning its other elements vary. The Anglo-American doc-
trine of proximate causation, the German theory of "adequate 
causation," and the French view halfway between the first 
two, have much in common, as they all seek to eliminate the 
influence of extraordinary events on the reasonably foresee-
8 Even POLLOCK, Torts r 2 3 fails to make these concepts clear. 
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able course of things. But they vary in details.9 Also a;nong 
the jurisdictions of this country, certain differences exist, for 
instance in regard to the scope of proximate effects.10 
The principle implies that all courts observe the rules of 
the courts at the place of wrong. 
(b) Fault. The law of wrong further determines, whether 
fault is a condition of liability and, if so, whether it may be 
ordinary negligence (culpa levis in Romanistic language) or 
has to be gross negligence or wanton recklessness (culpa 
lata) or some intermediary degree of culpability (culpa in 
concreto) .11 A divergent standard used at the forum cer-
tainly does not involve public policy.12 
American courts, for instance, hold an automobile driver 
liable to a guest passenger for injury suffered, as the law 
of the wrong requires, either for nonobservance of ordinary 
care and skill or only for gross negligence.13 The law of 
the forum is immaterial in this regard. 
Mere questions of evidence respecting negligence, 14 of 
course, are determinable by the law of the forum. Jury find-
ings, moreover, may be uncontrollable to the extent to 
which they follow a foreign view.15 
(c) Contributory negligence. The law of wrong governs 
any behavior of the plaintiff influencing causation or avoid-
able consequences. This conduct, despite such expressions as 
contributory negligence, cannot be "fault" in the strict sense 
9 A comparative study has been undertaken in my Recht des Warenkaufs 
473fi. 
10 Illustrations in Restatement § 383 and by HANCOCK, Torts ro8. 
11 Restatement § 3 79· 
12 Expressly to this effect, in the case of a more severe standard for the forum: 
Loranger v. Nadeau (1932) 215 Cal. 362., ro Pac. (zd) 63; Eskovitz v. 
Berger (1936) 2.76 Mich. 536,2.68 N. W. 883. 
13 See the collection of cases by HANCOCK, Torts 105. Against the usual 
superficial assertions that degrees of fault are practically impossible, see True-
man, J. A., in Knutson v. Rawn [1943] z D. L. R. 582.. 
14 For burden of proof and presumptions see infra ro(b) pp. 2.83 ff. 
15 HAMS HAW, Note, 4 Mo. L. Rev. ( r 939) at 305; cf. the informative note 
by HANCOCK, Torts§ 33 on determination of facts by court or jury. 
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of the word, which would require the existence and violation 
of a duty toward another person. What the plaintiff may have 
infringed, was a precept for his own benefit. But his conduct 
is evaluated in analogy to the standards of the care due to 
others.16 The law of wrong is competent to define the effects :17 
whether plaintiff is barred from his action according to the 
common law principle of contributory negligence/8 whether 
his action depends on somewhat more modern theories such 
as that of "last clear chance," or the recovery of damages 
is subject to a deduction proportionate to the plaintiff's con-
tribution to the end result.19 
Illustrations: (i) A brakeman injured in the Province of 
Quebec suing his employer in Vermont, was permitted re-
covery under the Quebec theory of comparative negligence, 
although Vermont law shared in the common law doctrine 
of con tri bu tory negligence. 20 
(ii) The plaintiff's conduct having contributed to the dam-
age, done in a place where French law was in force, the 
Reichsgericht applied the doctrine of the French courts of 
balancing the actions of both parties, although the Reichs-
gericht itself had developed a different theory when the Code 
Napoleon was in force in the Rhineland.21 
If under a statute a party is liable without fault, as a 
railway may be in case of accident, this party's own claim for 
damages suffered in such case will generally also be reduced 
by reason of having contributed to its own damage by mere 
causation. In any case, the law of wrong decides how to 
estimate the factors of the damage. 
16 Cf. 2 Restatement of the Law of Tort § 463. 
17 Restatement § 385. 
18 The Canadian Supreme Court in Ottawa El. R. Co. v. Letang [I924] 
S. C. R. 470 applying Ontario law as that of the place of wrong dismissed the 
action, in subordinating contributory negligence (wrongly) to the maxim 
"scienti non fit injuria." 
19 For cases, see STUMBERG I 69 n. 25; HANCOCK, Torts I I I n. 6. 
20 Morrisette v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (I.9o4) 76 Vt. 267, 56 Atl. noz. 
21 RG. (March u, I 906) JW. I 9o6, 297. 
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Illustration. A street car of the plaintiff, a Swiss company, 
collided on the territory of the Swiss Canton Basel with the 
motor truck of the German defendant. The German courts 
applied the Swiss law of March 28, 1905, on the liability 
of railroads for risk, to judge the quasi liability of the plain-
tiff street car company; assumed negligence of the defendant 
under article 41 of the Swiss Code of Obligations; and 
distributed the damages in the proportion of two-thirds to 
one, according to article 44 of this Code. 22 
In a singular American case, a wife was injured by a third 
person in an accident for which her own husband was jointly 
responsible. Her claim against the tortfeasor was made de-
pendent on the question whether her husband would benefit 
by her recovery. This latter question was subjected to the 
law of the place of wrong,23 by exaggerating the usual en-
croachment of this law on family relations. 
Characterization. All these rules are substantive and sus-
ceptible of foreign application. This has been fully realized, 
not only in cases where the laws of the place of wrong and 
of the forum agreed in characterizing their rules on con-
tributory or comparative negligence as substantive in all re-
spects, 24 but also where the rule of the forum was regarded 
as "procedural for most purposes."25 We may add that, even 
if at the place of wrong concurrent fault of the plaintiff is 
treated as a bar to his action under some procedural view, 
the action has to be dismissed because this is the "law" to 
which we are referred. This probably is true everywhere 
without regard to the usual fallacies of "characterization." 
22 0LG. Karlsruhe (Oct. 28, I93I) IPRspr. I932 No. 41. 
23 Traglio v. Harris (I940) I04 F. (2d) 439; Note, I27 A. L. R. 8I3. 
24 Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co. (I929) 25Z N.Y. I27, I69 N. E. 
I I 2 (applying Ontario law); HANCOCK, Torts I 20 n. I 7· 
25 Precourt v. Driscoll (I93I) 85 N.H. 28o, I57 Atl. 525; KinB:ery v. 
Donnell (1936) 222 Iowa 24I, 246, 268 N. W. 617, 6zo; Restatement~§ 385, 
595 comment a; RoBERTSON, Characterization 259. 
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4· Proper Plaintiff 
The lex loci delicti governs :26 
(a)Beneficiary of the to,rt claim. Thus, a Scotch court dis-
missed an action of a woman seduced in London on the 
ground that English common law gave the right of action 
to her parents only.27 In the United States, the death statute 
of the state of wrong decides the beneficiaries on behalf of 
whom representative action should be brought.28 
Suppose an American is negligently killed in Switzerland 
by a German. The personal action does not disappear as 
under common law, nor does any American death statute 
apply, neither will the German rule govern, entitling the 
relatives having a legal claim to be supported by the de-
ceased. Instead, all courts will apply the Swiss rule under 
which all persons deprived of their support by the death 
may sue for compensation.29 
Consistently, the Quebec court has applied the domiciliary 
law of Massachusetts to the action of a husband for the loss 
suffered by himself through the death of his wife.30 Notably, 
the Belgian Supreme Court applying the French law of 
workmen's compensation to a minor's death occurring in 
France, has refused an exception of public policy against the 
French provision granting the right to sue only to the rela-
tives living in France at the time of the accident. 31 
On the other hand, it is correct for a court of a civil 
26 Sapone v. New York Central R. Co. (I927) 225 N.Y. Supp. 2II, Clunet 
1928, 795 criticized in procedural respects in Note, 37 Yale L. J. (I928) 666; 
WHARTON II27i GOODRICH 253 § IOI; LORENZEN, 47 Law Q. Rev. (I9JI) 
at 497; KUHN, 21 Recueil (1928) I at 263. 
27 Ross v. 'Sinhjee (1891) 29 Scot. L. R. 63. 
28 HANCOCK, Torts 124; see ibid. his considered review of the cases dealing 
with the interpretation of the statutes ordaining distribution of the damages in 
the same proportions as personal property of a deceased intestate. 
29 See Swiss Code Obl., art. 45 par. 3, cf. German BGB. §§ 844 par. 2, 845· 
30 Lister v. McAnulty [I 943] Que. K. B. I 84. 
31 Belgium: Cass. (Feb. 21, 1907) Pasicrisie 1907.I.IJ5. 
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law country to assume that the applicable statute of distribu-
tion determines who is the beneficiary after the death of an 
injured person having acquired an inheritable right against 
a tortfeasor. Thus, where a domiciliary of New York had 
suffered an automobile accident in France and died in New 
York, and the surrogate's court of New York appointed an 
executor, the French Court of Cassation recognized this 
executor as a successor to be the right plaintiff to enforce the 
tort action in France, whereas the court below had insisted that 
according to the French law, being the lex loci delicti, the 
heirs had to appear.32 Evidently, the courts were not aware of 
the American controversies regarding the application of death 
statutes. In any event, an American court should recognize 
in this case that French law, including its conflicts law, de-
cided to whom the action belonged. 
(b) Indirect harm. Whereas in many legislations, includ-
ing the French, all persons injured by the tortious act are 
entitled to claim damages, in others, particularly in German 
law, only the person "directly harmed" may sue. If, for 
instance, goods sold but not delivered are injured and the 
title has not passed, the buyer may sue the tortfeasor under 
French but not under German law. Which law governs de-
pends on the place of wrong. The same is to be said with 
respect to the Anglo-American rule that injury, not malicious 
or fraudulent, inflicted upon a person does not give rise to 
an action for damages by a third person suffering a loss in 
his contractual right against the injured.33 
(c) Plaintiff in own name on behalf of the injured. The 
question who may bring the suit on behalf of the party en-
titled, in the opinion of Beale, is a procedural matter, 34 but 
32 Cass. (crim.) (June 4, 1941) Clunet 1945,112. 
33 KENNY, 62. C. J. 112.o § 30. On the question of whether seller or buyer 
or both may sue for tortious injury to the object of a sales contract, a com-
plicated proposal appears in the Final Draft No. 1 of a Revised Uniform Sales 
of Goods Act§ 127. 
34 Restatement§ s88 j 3 BEALE 160J. 
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this assertion conflicts with the prevailing practice of applying 
the death statutes35 governing the wrong. Whether a hus-
band may enforce the claim of'his wife in his own name or a 
parent in the name of his or her child is also determined in 
this country by the law of wrong (see infra p. 265), whereas 
abroad the law governing marital property311 applies. 
5. Proper Defendant 
(a) Co-obligors. Although a few authorities have appl;ed 
local procedural law to the question whether co-obligors 
must be joined in an action/7 it is the consistent and prevail-
ing opinion that the entire problem of determining the per-
sons to be sued pertains to the law of the place of wrong. This 
includes the questions whether several debtors are liable for 
the whole damage jointly, or jointly and severally, or sepa-
rately, each for the damage done by him, and whether the 
action may, or must, be directed against the several debtors 
jointly or separately.38 Only the manner of bringing the suit 
against such obligors pertains to the procedure of the forum.39 
(b) Claim against the insurer of the tortfeasor. The in-
jured person enjoys a direct action against the insurer of the 
tortfeasor, if, and only if the law of the place of tort gives 
it. The French law imposing direct liability on the insurer40 
35 See HANCOCK, Torts u6ff. 
36 Canada, Ontario: Lucas v; Coupal (I93o) 66 0. L. R. I4I (suit by 
mother). 
Germany: BGB. § 1380; E. G. art. IS· 
37 General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou (I843) 11 M. & W. 877, IP, 
Eng. Re. I o6 I ; Fryklund v. Great Northern R. Co. (I 907) I oi Minn. 3 7, I I I 
N. w. 77.7; 3 BEALE I603, 
38 Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co. (C. C. A. 8th I93I) sz F. (zd) 364; 
HANCOCK, Torts I o9, uo n. I 6, I 3:1.. 
39 STUMBERG zzo n. 74· 
4
°C. C. art. zioz § 8, as amended by Law of May z8, I9I3; Cass. (req.) 
{Feb. 24, I936) Ocean Accident v. Dewinter, D.I936.I.49, S.I936.1.I6I, 
Revue 1937, 441. The Appeal Court of Orleans (Dec. 21, 1936) Nouv. Revue 
1936, 75I, simply recognized the lex loci delicti, although it ascribed exclusive 
jurisdiction over the Swiss insurer to the Swiss courts, under the then existing 
text of the French-Swiss Convention of I 869. On the various arguments in the 
lower courts, preceding these decisions, see J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 595ff. 
TORTS 
necessarily applied in a case where an automobile accident 
occurred in France. It was needless for the French Court of 
Cassation to stress the public interest involved.41 
The problem, however, has been regarded as more com-
plicated in this country. On one hand, a statute imposing 
upon an insurer direct responsibility to the injured third 
party has been held binding with respect to all contracts made 
in the state, irrespective of the place where an injury occurs.42 
On the other hand, cases conflict on the question whether the 
direct recourse provided by the state of the place of wrong 
may be applied to a foreign insurer who has contracted 
outside the state. 43 Although the refusal to apply the law of 
the place of injury certainly should not be based on the 
ground that it concerns only a remedy/4 both opinions have 
been supported by policy considerations.45 But it seems that 
when the insurance contract covers injuries committed by 
the insured party in the state where the tort occurs, there is 
no valid reason why the statute of the state of wrong should 
41 See the criticism of Cass. (Feb. 24, 1936) supra n. 40, by BATIFFOL, 
Revue 1937, 441 and EsMEIN, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 861. But a Swiss writer, 
Eo. ScHMID, "Zur Frage der Rechtsanwendung bei Verkehrsunfallen Schweizer-
ischer Motorfahrzeugbesitzer im Ausland," 35 SJZ. 248, has urged that the 
Swiss Law of 1932, art. 49, granting the injured person a direct suit against 
the insurer should be applied in the case of Swiss insurance parties and a German 
place of accident, while the Appeal Court of Ziirich (Feb. 23, 1938) 38 
Bl.f.Ziirch.Rspr. (1939) 356 No. 145, 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) No. 10753 
conformed to the (German) law of the place of wrong. 
42 HANCOCK, Torts 240; Cormier v. Hudson (1933) 284 Mass. 231, 187 
N. E. 625 {statute of the forum); Farrell v. Employers' Liability Assurance 
Co. (1933) 54 R. I. 18, 168 Atl. 911, Note, 18 Minn. L. Rev. (1933) 737 
(implied). 
4 3 Denying the liability: Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1927) 48 R. !· 
433, 138 Atl. 186; Martin v. Zurich General Accident Co. (C. C. A. rst 1936) 
84 F. (2d) 6; Lowery v. Zorn (C. A. La. 2d 1934) 157 So. 826, 831. 
Allowing the recourse: Kertson v. Johnson (1932) 185 Minn. 591, 242 
N. W. 329 (law of Wisconsin applied in Minnesota) ; Burkett v. Globe In-
demnity Co. (1938) 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316; cf. HANCOCK, Torts 24di. 
44 Thus McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1939) 184 Miss. 663, 186 
So. 305. Contra: HANCOCK, Torts 242. 
45 Correct: Kertson v. Johnson (1932) 185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329; 
but see cases and discussion by HANCOCK, Torts 241 whose arguments for doubt 
I cannot follow. 
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not be able to turn the claim for damages directly against the 
insurer. Nothing more is done thereby than that the insurance 
claim is transferred, by operation of law, from the injurer 
to the injured, instead of the longer way of recourse by 
assignment, which may be voluntary or by way of garnish-
ment. The insurance company does not lose any advantage 
and cannot complain about any mentionable extension of its 
liability. Any other solution jeopardizes the efficacy of the law 
of the place of wrong. 
6. Influence of Family Relations 
American courts extend the law of the place of wrong to 
the problems: whether a married person may sue the other 
spouse for tort suffered during the marriage, 413 and even 
whether a claim for injury may be brought after the parties 
marry each other in another state; 47 whether a claim belongs 
to the injured wife48 or to the husband49 or to the com-
munity property; 50 whether a wife may avail herself of the 
claim of her injured husband.51 
Nevertheless, when New York law prohibited litigation 
between spouses, the Court of Appeals of New Y ark ex-
tended the prohibition to domiciled spouses also in the case 
of an injury committed in a state allowing such suits.52 This 
46 Dawson v. Dawson ( 1931) 224 Ala. IJ, 138 So. 414; Howard v. Howard 
(1931) 200 N.C. 574, 158 S. E. xor; Gray v. Gray (1934) 87 N.H. 82, 
I 74 Atl. soS j Darian v. McGrath (Minn. 1943) 10 N. w. (2d) 403 (injury 
in Wisconsin, action against husband would be allowed despite the contrary 
domiciliary law of the forum, hence wife is granted relief against the car 
owner). 
47 Buckeye v. Buckeye (1931) 203 Wis. 248, 234 N. W. 342 (law of 
Illinois contrary to the domiciliary law of Wisconsin). See Notes, 29 Mich. L. 
Rev. (1931) 937, 1072; 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (rgJr) 8o4; 44 Harv. L. 
Rev. (1930) IIJ8; 31 Col. L. Rev. (r931) 884; 6 Wis. L. Rev. (1931) 
IOJ. 
48 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Humble (1901) 181 U. S. 57· 
49 Snashall v. Metropolitan etc. R. Co. (r89o) 8 Mackey (D. C.) 399; 
see GooDRICH p8 n. 18. 
~0 Justs v. Atchison etc. R. Co. (1910) 12 Cal. App. 639, ro8 Pac. 32.8. 
51 Usher v. West Jersey R. Co. (x88g) 126 Pa. 'St. z.o6, 17 At!. 597· 
52 Mertz v. Mertz (1936) 2.71 N.Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597; Note, ro8 
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decision has been followed in some other jurisdictions.53 The 
action against the spouse or his insurer may thus fail due to 
one or the other of both statutes involved. The New York 
court has not allowed its own new policy of permitting the 
suit, 54 to prevail against a foreign statute barring it. 55 
However, the contrary approach, exclusively applying 
the personal law that governs the marital relations, has in-
creasingly found sympathy with American writers.56 This is 
the common view held in all the world. 57 In a recent case,S8 
Judge Learned Hand refused to give effect to the common 
law rule governing tort in Florida, whereby a husband would 
be liable for his wife's tort committed in Florida in his ab-
sence. Both spouses were citizens of New York, and the 
various reasons for exonerating this resident from vicarious 
liability may seem debatable.59 But the emphasis on the 
domiciliary law in this case confirms the trend. 
The Louisiana Court, however, abandoned its domiciliary 
principle60 in favor of the prevailing approach in a recent 
case where a wife, injured by the negligence of her husband 
in Louisiana, sued the insurance company in Louisiana. The 
defendant objected that under the law of Texas, the domicil 
of the spouses, the claim belonged to the community property 
A. L. R. II26. Against the argument of the court that the common law pro-
hibition of actions between spouses belonged to procedure, see HANCOCK, Torts 
2J6. 
53 Poling v. Poling (I935) 116 W.Va. I87, I79 S. E. 6o4; Kircher v. 
Kircher (I939) 288 Mich. 669, 286 N. W. uo; Kyle v. Kyle (I94I) 2IO 
Minn. 204, 297 N. W. 744 (no action despite the law of Wisconsin). 
54 § 57 Domestic Relations Act, as amended by Laws I937> c. 669 § I. 
55 Coster v. Coster (I943) 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N. E. (2d) 509; Note, I46 
A. L. R. 7oz, 705. 
56 STUMBERG I86; CooK, Legal Bases 248, 345; HANCOCK, Torts 236; 
RHEINSTEIN, 4I Mich. L. Rev. (I942) 83, 95 and I9 Tul. L. Rev. (I944) 
I99· 
57 See Vol. I, 322, 6o6. 
58 Siegmann v. Meyer (C. C. A. 2nd I938) Ioo F. (2d) 367. 
59 Particularly in extending the position taken by Justice Brandeis and Judge 
Learned Hand in the case of an absentee-nonresident employer, on which see 
below pp. 267 ff. In other respects cf. Note, 52 Harv. L. Rev. (I939) 834; 
HANCOCK, Torts 255. 
so Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. (I9oo) 52 La. Ann. I417> 27 So. 
s5 I. 
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fund and only the husband was entitled to sue. The court 
disregarded the law of the domicil preferred hitherto. In-
stead, it stated that the right to sue would ordinarily be 
subject to the law of the forum, but that suing the husband 
is also concerned with a substantive problem governed by 
the law of the place of wrong which therefore is also to 
be consulted.'61 This approach is really untenable. 
7. Vicarious Liability 
(a) Principle. It may be stated as a universal principle, 
though certain limitations are in discussion, that the law of 
the place of wrong determines the liability of third persons 
who are not tortfeasors, accomplices, instigators, or ac-
cessones. 
This proviso should be noted. Vicarious liability is not in 
question, if the third person is a tortfeasor himself. For in-
stance, if the general concessionaire of an amusement park 
has contracted with an independent manufacturer of fireworks 
for a display, he may be sued for his own negligence, if he 
did not take care that the premises were kept in a safe con-
dition for the public invited by him.62 He may incur vicarious 
liability, however, if he is responsible under the applicable 
law for the negligence of the independent contractor. 
The liability involves such persons as masters of servants, 
parents of minor children, custodians of juvenile or dangerous 
persons, schoolmasters or artisans in respect to pupils and 
apprentices, employers of independent contractors for risk 
inherent to the work, or owners of vessels, as the various 
laws may ordain their liabilities. 63 The English case of The 
61 Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc. (1942) 12 So. (2d) 253; Note, 18 Tul. L. 
Rev. (1943) 319. 
62 Sebeck v. Plattdeutsche Volkfest Verein (19oo) 64 N. J. Law 624, 46 
Atl. 631. Cf. in general, Restatement of Torts§ 875 in connection with§§ 430-
453· 
63 United States: Restatement§ 387; Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1933) 349· 
Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 23, 1936) Jur. Port d'Anvers 1936, 197. 
See also PouLLET 398 § 318 (with some restrictions). 
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Mary Moxham is typical for the negative side of this princi-
ple. Negligent navigation in a Spanish harbor not constitut-
ing a cause of liability of the vessel's owner according to 
Spanish law, the court in England disregarded the English 
law which would have made him responsible.64 On the other 
hand, a Michigan freight transport company using the serv-
ices of a truck owner by contract for hauling freight is held 
answerable even in Michigan courts for negligence of the 
independent contractor, in conformity with the law of the 
Ohio place of accident, whereby a common carrier cannot 
delegate its duties to ensure public safety. 65 
(b) Persons out of state. Although the principle is firmly 
established everywhere, except under the dual requirement 
of English law, some doubts have arisen respecting the 
propriety of the imposition of liability by the state of wrong 
on a person, not a subject, who, according to the premises 
of our topic, is innocent, though a cause of the tort. These 
scruples have taken diverse shapes in this country and in 
Europe. A small group of European writers and courts have 
claimed that liability cannot be imposed on an innocent third 
person except by the law which is considered his personal 
law.66 Otherwise, it has been argued, foreigners lacking any 
Germany: ROHG. (Jan. I9, I878) 23 ROHGE. I74; RG. (Sept. 23, I887) 
I9 RGZ. 382; (July I, I896) 37 RGZ. I8I; (May 30, I9I9) 96 RGZ. 96. 
See for other cases LEWALD 267 No. 324 sub (4); RAAPE n6. 
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (June 5, I9I4) W. 9753 (Englishmen 
damaged by receipt with false signature issued in Germany by a bookkeeper 
beyond the course of his employment in the service of a Dutch firm in Utrecht; 
§ 83I of the German BGB. applied); H. R. (March I8, I938) W. I939 
No. 69 as commented by the Note (MEIJERS) ibid. 
Switzerland: 2 MElLI 94· 
64 The Mary Moxham (C. A. I876) I P. D. Io7. Cf. RoBERTSON, "Law 
for Tort Liability," 4 Modern L. Rev. (I94I) 35· 
'
65 Laughlin v. Michigan Motor Freight Co. (I936) 276 Mich. 545, 268 
N. W. 887. Restatement§ 387 (c) illustration 3· 
66 2 BAR In; 2 ZITELMANN 533; OLG. Hamburg (April 5, I895) 6 
Z.int.R. I70 and {Nov. u, I9o6) I4 ROLG. 39I; OLG. Karlsruhe (Dec. I8, 
I917) 20 Badische Rechtspraxis 99 (cited byLEWALD 267). 
Switzerland: BG. (April ro, 1896) 22 BGE. 471, 486. A particular 
opinion has been suggested by BAR TIN, 2 Principes 430 § 340: the law gov-
erning the contractual relationship between master and servant. Contra: z 
MElLI 94· 
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connection with a state, might be involved, at the pleasure 
of the state, in heavy obligations without being able to avoid 
them.67 Hence, a Swiss principal employing a traveling sales-
man, who injures someone in France by negligently handling 
inflammable material, would be free from liability under 
Swiss .law, by proving that he has chosen and supervised his 
agent with due care.68 The prevailing approach allows no 
such exemption, the commettant (master) being absolutely 
liable for the fault of his prepose committed in the course 
of the employment in France, according to French law.69 
In this country, in the same vein, two outstanding judges 
have penetrated the problem from the angles either of the 
constitutional requirement of due process or of a peculiar 
requirement brought into the conflicts rule. In both cases 
the question was whether the owner of a car, who had been 
out of the state at all material times could be held liable for 
negligence of the driver on the ground of a statute at the 
place where the accident occurred subjecting the owner to 
liability. 
The first case was concerned with the New York statute 
imposing absolute liability on the owner of a car, if the 
negligent driver was "in the business of such owner or other-
wise ... legally using or operating the same with the per-
mission, express or implied, of such owner.mo The courts 
of New Jersey, the domicil of the defendant owner, applied 
the New York statute as lex loci delicti on the ground of the 
owner's permission to take the car to the state of New York.71 
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the con-
stitutionality of this choice of law.72 Mr. Justice Brandeis, 
in delivering the judgment, reviewed the various remedies 
67 
2 ZITELMANN 534· 
68 Swiss Code Obi., art. 55· 
69 French C. C. art. 1384, cf. AMos and WALTON, Introduction to French 
Law (Oxford 1935) 259. 
70 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law,§ 59· 
71 Masci v. Young (1932) 109 N. J. Law 453, 162 Atl. 623. Similarly, 
Kernan v. Webb (1929) so R.I. 394> 148 Atl. 186, 188. 
72 Young v. Masci (1933) 289 U.S. 253. 
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introduced in American jurisdictions to supplement the in-
sufficient doctrine of principal and agent, among which, in 
a few jurisdictions including New York, statutory liability 
has been imposed on the mere basis of the owner's permission 
or consent to drive the car into the state. This condition, 
under any circumstances, secured such due process of law 
as a nonresident could expect. For the defendant who lent 
his car to the driver, "subjected himself to the legal con-
sequences imposed by that state . . . as fully as if he had 
stood in the relation of master to servant.m3 
This line of thought has been transposed into the con-
flict of laws by the Federal Circuit Court of New York, in 
a celebrated decision delivered by Judge Learned Hand, in 
Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corporation. 14 An automobile sales 
corporation of Buffalo, New York, employed a sales agent, 
Clemens, who took an automobile owned by the firm to 
Ontario and there caused an accident, supposedly by negli-
gence. The statute of Ontario, taken literally (and probably 
in its intended meaning), made the owner of the car liable, 
unless the car was without his consent in the possession of 
another person.75 Since Clemens might not have acted within 
the scope of his employment, the problem was whether the 
73 Mr. Justice Brandeis added that "A person who sets a means in movement 
whereby injury is inflicted, makes himself liable, whether by responsible agent 
or an irresponsible instrument." This is an unfortunate confusion of our case of 
an innocent third person with the cases of tortfeasors acting by an intervening 
person or by an instrument. On the other hand, 2. BEALE I297 unnecessarily 
interprets this passage to the effect that someone who puts an instrument into 
the hand of a tortfeasor without knowing that it is to be used in another state, 
should be liable under this state's law. 
74 Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp. (I934) 68 F. (zd) 942. 
75 Two opinions of Canadian barristers on the construction of art. 41 (I), 
in the Ontario Highway Traffic Amendment Act, 1930, submitted in Scheer v. 
Rockne Motors, supra n. 74, contradicted each other. 
No other case in point seems to have occurred. However, in the interpretation 
of the majority in Thompson v. Bourchier [1933] 0. R. szs, [1933] 3D. L .. R. 
I I 9, the intention of the legislature was to impose liability on the owner With 
whose consent someone else has possession and control of the car. The court ex-
cluded the possibility for the owner to evade his liability by parting with the 
possession and control and renting the car under an agreement whereby the 
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Ontario statute, if understood in its more rigid meaning, 
could be applied by the court in New York. The court denied 
this: "The mere possession of the car did not suffice for 
Ontario to reach the defendant," and held that, only "if the 
defendant authorized Clemens to take the car into Ontario, 
it (the defendant corporation) became liable to the extent 
contemplated by the statute." 
It is well to bear in mind that neither decision dwells on 
the fact that the law of the place of injury was more severe 
than that of the defendant's domicil or of another place. 
If no vicarious liability arose at the place of wrong, none 
would result from the law of a state in which no harm has 
been done, whatever this law may predicate. 
Finally, the Restatement has concluded the evolution by 
a general rule ( § 3 8 7, comment a) : 
"In order that the law of the state of wrong may apply 
to create liability against the absentee defendant, he must in 
some way have submitted himself to the law of that state. 
It is sufficient if he has authorized or permitted another to 
act for him in the state in which the other's conduct occurs 
or where it takes effect .... For analogous situations involving 
this problem see §§ 343 and 344" (referring to cases of 
contracts made on the authority of a third person).711 
This "analogy" is a delicate point. The Anglo-American 
doctrine of the master's liability for torts committed by his 
servant has been established traditionally on the assumption 
of an authority, but this assumption is fictitious and not really 
observed. Whatever is within the scope of the employment 
is covered by the liability, even though it may strictly run 
other person should comply with all duties of care. It would seem that the 
owner should no more he exempted by an agreement not to drive the car into 
New York. This broad construction of the statute agrees with the inferences 
by the New York court (at p. 495) from two older Ontario decisions. 
16 Restatement, comment a to § 3 8 7. The black letter text itself is too vague 
and obscure to be discussed here. 
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against the express orders of the employer. 77 To refer to this 
old fiction confuses our problem the more as contract and 
tort are essentially different sources of obligation. Where a 
person grants a power of attorney to contract on his behalf 
in another state, he fulfills an essential requirement for his 
becoming a party to the contract; sending his agent to Rome, 
he may be supposed to do as those in Rome do; it is reason-
able, in this case, to argue that he has, in some sense, sub-
mitted himself to the law of the foreign state. The case of 
apparent authority implied by the principal's conduct, is 
"analogous." But regulations of traffic on highways and the 
corresponding imposition of liabilities are in no sense de-
pendent on the consent of private persons. Only the historical 
connection of vicarious liability with the doctrine of master 
and servant has induced an enlarged concept of "agency," 
broad enough to destroy its proper meaning. Judges Brandeis 
and Learned Hand had still to break a path for the recog-
nition of foreign liabilities beyond the acts of a servant com-
mitting a tort within the scope of his employment. Their 
opinions have to be read in this historical connection and to 
the affirmative effect. Judge Hand took care to express that 
it did not matter whether the car owner knew the law of 
Ontario and thus plainly accepted the risk of liability under 
the Ontario statute. Not that he submitted himself to the 
foreign law but that his conduct was a contributory cause 
of the injury, was the basis of the New York judgment. It 
may perhaps be asked why the mere fact of entrusting the car 
to somebody else could not be equally regarded as sufficient. 
In no case, however, is the problem concerned either with 
agency proper, which requires a legal transaction on behalf 
or on account of the principal, or with the proper concept of 
instrumentality which presupposes that the third person 
himself is a tortfeasor. The idea of the Restatement that a 
77 See WEIGERT, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 53· 
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state could not make any private person liable for a tort 
committed on its own territory, unless this person submitted 
himself to this state, is antiquated. The old and universal 
liability of the owners of vessels for collisions, irrespective 
of their consent to anything, not to speak of the ancient 
liabilities for slaves and cattle, should have been a warning. 
A county court in Pennsylvania has correctly held that the 
resident owner of a dog was absolutely liable for the dog's 
biting a person thirty miles away in New Jersey, in accordance 
with the New Jersey law and regardless of negligence re-
quired at the forum. 78 Moreover, the Restatement admits 
that the law of the place of wrong decides whether an actor, 
at the time of the injury,'9 is acting within the scope of his 
employment,80 and whether an acting person is an independ-
ent contractor or a servant.81 It would seem logical that the 
same law should determine whether a car owner has permit-
ted his wife to use the car; what the circumstances are under 
which a car owner is deemed to permit his wife or son the use 
of the car; and whether the permission of use must refer to 
the particular state or only to foreign states in general, or 
whether the simple abandonment of "possession" suffices (as 
seemingly in the Ontario statute). If the foreign state's juris-
diction or law really depended upon a consent of the party, its 
court would have to consult his domiciliary law respecting 
the existence of this premise. Indeed, Zitelmann, who de-
veloped a line of thought similar to the two American 
decisions, 82 considered vicarious liability governed by the 
personal law of the third person. 
Reducing the overextended and oversimplified rule of 
78 Fischl v. Chubb (1937) 30 Pa. D. & C. 40; Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 
(1938) 7J8. 
79 Followed, Venuto v. Robinson (C. C. A. 3rd 1941) 118 F. (zd) 679, 
per Goodrich, J. 
80 Illustrations 1 and z to Restatement§ 387. 
81 Illustration 3 to Restatement§ 387. 
82 2 ZITELMANN 541, 
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the Restatement again to the original thought, there remains 
the constitutional limitation asserted by the Supreme Court, 
and, as the result of the New York decision, a public policy 
disapproving of foreign liability for risk, unfair to an absentee. 
But there are few, if any, foreign types of liability to be 
feared. Nowhere is a car owner made liable without any 
possibility of exemption.83 There exists a broad risk liability 
under a German law84 and a severe liability established by 
the French Court of Cassation for any injury by an "in-
animate thing" (C.C. art. 1384) except when it is proved 
that the injury was unavoidable or caused by concurrent fault 
of the injured,85 yet in both cases not the car's owner as such 
is liable but its "custodian" (Halter, gardien) i.e., a person 
exercising all care, supervision, and factual disposition of the 
vehicle. An American firm sending its car to Algiers to be 
used there by an employee at his discretion would be liable 
for the latter's negligent acts as master of a servant but not 
because of the use of the "inanimate thing." 
Thus, the case of the Ontario statute is rather infrequent. 
Even in this case, it has been pointed out that liability for 
transferring a dangerous object to another does not appear 
extraordinary.86 There is much to be said for this view. 
Vicarious liability, in general, has often been conceived as 
a special application of the doctrine that risk connected with 
an enterprise should be borne by the person entertaining 
the enterprise. Who has the profit should have the loss, on 
the principle of acting at one's own peril-a classical princi-
ple of English law, lately recognized on the continent.87 A 
principal's liability for his servant has usually been justified 
83 See RHEINSTEIN, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 82 No. 2. 
84 German Law of May 3, I 909 on traffic of motor vehicles. 
85 Cass. (civ.) (July 29, I924) BESSIERES, S.I924.I.32I, D.I925.1.5; 
Plenary Decision of the United Chambers (Feb. 13, I 930) D.r 930.1.57· 
86 GOODRICH 236 § 95· 
87 WIGMORE, "Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History," 7 Harv. L. 
Rev. (1894) 315, 383, 441 at 454, and n. 4· On the various modern theories, 
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in this way, and so it may also be explained why an acquirer 
of a house in France becomes immediately liable for purely 
accidental injuries caused by a collapse of the house.88 No 
one will doubt that this liability extends to foreigners. 
Applying the law governing the wrong to the accessory 
liability of third persons affords, in the eyes of the German 
Supreme Court, the additional advantage of consistency in 
deciding, under one law, the obligations of both the tortfeasor 
and his joint debtor in relation to the injured party.89 Also 
the assessment of indemnity and contribution between the 
codebtors will be facilitated thereby, although, of course, 
the internal recourse of one debtor against his faulty associate 
is governed, according to its source, by the law governing 
the employment contract, the bailment, the parental, or any 
other underlying relation.90 
(c) Other effects of public policy. While the New York 
Court has narrowed the application of a foreign tort law 
for the sake of public policy, the Connecticut Court has en-
larged the extraterritorial effect of a statute abnormally. 
A statute in the latter state provides that "any person renting 
or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall 
be liable for any damage to any person or property caused 
by the operation of such motor vehicle .... "The court applied 
the provision to an injury occurring outside the state, by 
the construction that the statute formed a part of every 
contract. 91 Thus, by an unprecedented, broad statutory li-
see YouNG B. SMITH, "Frolic and Detour," 23 Col. L. Rev. (1923) 444,453, 
455· 
UNGER, Handeln auf eigene Gefahr (r9o4) initiated an extensive literature. 
88 See the commentaries on French C. C. art. r 3 8 6. 
89 German RG. (July 1, 1896) 37 RGZ. 181; LEWALD 268; RAAPE 226. 
90 BARTIN, 2 Principes 432. 
91 Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co. (1928) 108 Conn. 333, 143 
Atl. 163. Notes, 29 Col. L. Rev. (1929) 2ro; 42 Harv. L. Rev. (1929) 433; 
27 Mich. L. Rev. (1929) 462; 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1929) 410. The New 
York Statute has not been applied to injuries in other states, Miranda v. Lo 
Curto (1928) 249 N.Y. 191, r63 N. E. 557· 
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ability of the bailor to third party beneficiaries and its ex-
traordinary extension to foreign injuries, the injured person 
acquires a new and unexpected right. This decision has been 
benevolently discussed by thoughtful writers under the sup-
position that a true and better justification of the statute 
is that it may have been regarded as intended to induce rent-
ing companies to select their customers carefully.92 But, if so, 
why should not a dealer selling cars be subjected to a similar 
educational policy? There does not seem to exist any urgent 
reason for interfering with conflicts law by unusual local 
policies. 
The famous rejection of the foreign liabilities of a ship-
owner for the negligence of a compulsory pilot in The Halley 
and by the Reichsgeriche3 have been ironically illuminated 
by the English Pilotage Act of I9IJ, which introduced such 
liability into the English law, and the Brussels Convention 
of 1924 on the liability of owners of seagoing vessels, which 
provided for liability in case of definitive international 
arrangements. 
8. Damages for Tort 
At common law, the right to damages was regarded as 
a remedy subject to the law of the forum, 94 with the question-
able justification that it is a general right to recover such 
damages as the court may choose to give. At present, how-
ever, excepting some doubts in England, prevailing opinion, 
92 STUMBERG I 84ff; HANCOCK 2.38. 
93 Supra p. 2.42.; see RoBERTSON, 4 Modern L. Rev. (I94I) 33 n. 35· 
94 England: See, for example, Baschet v. London Illustrated Standard Co. 
(I 900) I Ch. D. 7 3 (infringement of French copyright in France). 
United States: MINOR 488; Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat'l Bank 
(I904) 12.7 Iowa I53, 98 N. W. 9I8, I02. N. W. 836, but evidently the court 
disapproved of the Illinois liberal rule on credit damages, cf. RoBERTSON, 
Characterization 2.69; for other cases see Note, What Law Governs the Meas-
ure of Damages? I4 Minn. L. Rev. (I930) 665,669 n. I7. 
THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE 277 
abroad95 as well as in this country,06 does not hesitate to 
include the right to damages in the substance of the tort 
obligation or, for that matter, of any obligation. Accordingly, 
the law of the place of wrong governs the problem universally 
and in all respects. As Holmes stated in a famous dictum, the 
law of the place of the act, "only source" of the obligation 
for tort, "determines not merely the existence of the obliga-
tion but equally determines its extent,"97 or, without the 
peculiar note reminiscent of the vested rights theory, "the 
measure of damages for a tort is determined by the law of 
the place of wrong.ms The great weight of Anglo-American 
authority supports this doctrine.99 
Thus the Minnesota court has awarded damages superior 
to the amount recoverable under the law of the forum, for 
wrongful death in an accident in Montana.100 In Connecticut, 
damages for a tort committed in New York have been re-
garded subject to New York law/01 "Remoteness" of dam-
ages finds the same treatment.102 In case a sailor has been 
negligently killed in Dutch waters, a Belgian court awards 
damages, estimating the circumstances and excluding funeral 
expenses in accordance with Dutch law.103 Damages for non-
95 HARTIN, 2 Principes 407 § 336. 
Canada: Mr. Justice Duff in Livesley v. Horst [1924] S.C. R. 6os, [1925] 
r D. L. R. 159, construing Cope v. Doherty (r8sS) 2 De G. & J. 614, 44 Eng. 
Re. I I 2 7; cf. HANCOCK I2 3· 
96 See SEDGWICK, I Measure of Damages (ed. 9) § 1373; WHARTON 
§§ 427a, 478c. 
97 Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R. Co. (1904) 194 U.S. no, 126. 
98 Restatement§§ 412,414,415,417,419,421. 
99 More recently, e.g., Rauton v. Pullman Co. (1937) 183 S.C. 495, 502; 
191 S. E. 416, 419; Wynne v. McCarthy (C. C. A. roth 1938) 97 F. (2d) 
964, 970 with references; Smyth Sales v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co. (1942) 
128 F. (2d) 697, 702 (by Goodrich, J., speaking of tort and contract); 2 BEALE 
§ 4n.2; GoODRICH 211 § 88; CHESHIRE 657; HANCOCK, Torts 113ff. 
100 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Babcock ( r 8 94) r 54 U. S. I 90. 
101 Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil (1925) 103 Conn. 390, 405, 130 
Atl. 794, 8oo. 
102 See for England, CHESHIRE 657; ROBERTSON, Characterization 270. 
iOa Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 23, 1936) Jur. Port d'Anvers 1936, 197, 36 Revue 
Dor 1937, 158. 
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pecuniary loss, physical pain, and suffering, as well as for 
mental anguish, are accorded when granted by the law of 
the place of wrong, irrespective of the lex fori. 104 
Influence of lex fori. But the last mentioned problem has 
sometimes been treated in another way. Although such types 
of damage as were not foreseen at the place of wrong will 
be refused, recovery has also been denied in the converse 
case where they were alien to the law of the forum. How 
much does public policy interfere in this matter? Pure 
penalties, certainly, may not be awarded on the ground of 
a foreign law.105 But a statute providing for recovery of 
exemplary damages "is not a penallaw.mos Nor are statutory 
provisions that include pecuniary recovery, inestimable loss, 
and compensation for injured feelings, in a lump sum ("pen-
ance," "satisfaction," "Bussem01 ). An amount fixed in a 
death statute for all cases represents "the legislature's ap-
proximate estimate of reasonable compensation" and is en-
forceable in other states.108 On the ground of a railway or 
automobile accident in France, damages for "tort moral" 
104 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith (1909) 135 Ky. 462, 122 S. W. 8o6; 
Texas etc. R. Co. v. Gross (1910) 6o Tex. Civ. App. 6:u, 128 S. W. 1173; 
Davis v. Gant (Civ. App. Texas 1922) 247 'S. W. 576; Boyle v. Southern R. 
Co. (1901) 36 N.Y. Misc. 289, 73 N.Y. Supp. 465; BEALE§ 421.I p. 1339 
n. 8; HANCOCK 118 n. 11, 120 n. I6. 
Germany: OLG. Kolmar (April 29, 1913) 6 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil-und 
Prozessrecht I 3 7. 
Scotland: Cf. supra p. 241. Naftalin v. London, Midland & Scottish R. Co. 
(1933) S. C. 259 (accident in England, no solatium, under Lord Campbell's 
Bill). 
105 2 BEALE § 42 I. I. 
106 Mr. Justice Brandeis in James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry 
(I927) 273 U.S. II9, citing Huntington v. Attrill (1892) 146 U.S. 657, 
666. 
107 Examples are the double and treble damages and fixed monwtary penalties, 
incorrectly refused extraterritorial application in various state decisions, see 
HANCOCK, Torts xI 8 ; Swiss Code Obl., art. 4 7, "reparation morale"; German 
BGB. § 847 and special laws. 
108 HANCOCK, Torts 1I9 and n. I3; Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Nichols (1924) 
264 u. s. 348. 
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in accordance with French law have been awarded in Austria 
and Germany.109 
It should be added that courts may easily find the 
desired liberty of discretion under almost any rule of the 
world. Modern legislations without provision for juries, 
which follow the pattern of the Swiss Code of Obligations,110 
leave the judge a broad margin in appreciating the damage 
and equitably considering the reciprocal situation of the 
parties. Even apparently unpliant rules are usually applied 
in their own jurisdictions with considerable discretion. 
The only serious restriction to the rule may result from 
insufficient procedural machinery at the forum. However, 
it may be questioned how rigidly the domestic procedure 
ought to be conceived. The Supreme Court in a famous 
case
111 has correctly stated that the Mexican law governing 
the tort obligation would have granted the plantiffs an 
annuity that could be judicially modified under circumstances, 
while the law of Texas, the forum, provided a lump sum, 
and that the court had to follow the conflicts principle and 
hence not award a lump sum. Nevertheless, by the determina-
tion that the Texas court had no power to make and super-
intend a decree such as the Mexican law prescribes, and the 
consequent dismissal of the suit, both the assumption of 
jurisdiction and the conflicts rule were practically frustrated. 
So long as courts must stumble over limitations on their 
power and narrowly construed procedural rules, adjustment 
109 Austria: OGH. (Nov. z, 1910) GlU. NF. 5Z19. 
Germany: OLG. Kalmar (April z9, 1913) 6 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil-und 
Prozessrecht 1 3 7. 
Similarly, France: BAR TIN, z Principes 409. 
110 Swiss Code Obi., arts. 43, 44 par. z. 
Mexico: C6digo Penal, art. 31 par. I. 
Thailand: C. C. art. 43 8 par. 1. 
China: C. C. art. 218. 
111 Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R. Co. (1904) 194 U.S. uo. 
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of the machinery necessary for reciprocal application of laws 
is severely impaired. Why should any American court not 
be directed by its legislature to render decrees which Mexican 
courts are able to issue and which are perfectly similar to 
alimentary decrees familiar to this country? Under the con-
stitutional conceptions of most other countries such doubts 
do not even appear. Otherwise, the characterization of dam-
ages as a problem of procedure, wrong as it is, would have 
a great practical advantage! 
How simply the problem can be internationally managed, 
is illustrated by the Warsaw Convention on International 
Air Transport concerned with the converse case. In the 
carriage of passengers, liability of the carrier is limited to 
the sum of 125,000 francs. "Where in accordance with the 
law of the court seised of the case, damages may be awarded 
in the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capi-
tal value of the said payments shall not exceed 1 2 5 ,ooo 
francs."112 
9· Other Sanctions 
Apart from damages, the effects of a tort may consist 
in a declaratory judgment or exemplary damages, specific 
restitution ("in integrum," "in natura"), and restraint from 
continuance or repetition. A lively discussion in France has 
been concerned with the interprovincial treatment of "astrein-
te," i.e., an order to pay a sum periodically so long as the 
cause of damage continues or so often as the cause is reiterated. 
Was this kind of judgment, developed in the French courts, 
to be applied in the case of a tort committed in France 
proper, by a court of Alsace-Lorraine where alongside of 
French private law German civil procedure was in force? 
112 Art. zz, I, HuDSON, 5 Int. Legislation I oo «t I I 2. We may also point to 
the treatment of damage in admiralty proceedings infra Chapter 27, p. 353· 
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The literature has recognized the "astreinte'' as substantive 
despite its origin in the courts and enabled the plantiff to 
elect this relief, in addition to direct enforcement provided 
by the procedurallocallaw.113 
Also, all other forms of injunctive decrees or judgments 
serve special purposes of the substantive right and should 
be granted, on principle, on the basis of the law governing 
tort. Thus, such specific reparation as recovery of an un-
lawfully opened letter, public revocation of a public libel, 
reemployment of a worker improperly dismissed, may be 
decreed, unless the machinery of the forum is really unable 
to accommodate itself to the task. 
IO. Relation to Procedural Law 
(a) In general. In the traditional view, conflicts law pro-
vides for the application of rules and standards of the state 
considered most closely connected with the legal relations 
of the parties; but by what steps and in what order of activi-
ties the rights and duties thus created are to be enforced, is 
the object of the procedural law of the forum. This apparent-
ly simple distinction between "substance" and "procedure" 
has more recently revealed its difficulties in incipient special 
investigations; it has been materially affected, on the other 
hand, by a gradual reduction of the large scope assigned to 
procedure in the Anglo-American courts. The Restatement 
started with the orthodox principle, yet it seems to concede 
considerable space to the application of foreign law, though 
its statements, vague and contradictory, 114 testify to the 
draftsmen's uneasiness. In fact, among the various problems 
involving demarcation between foreign substantive law and 
113 See the description of the controversy by J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 589, 
590· 
114 Restatement§§ 584ff.; criticized by MoRGAN, "Choice of Law Governing 
Proof," 58 Harv. L. Rev. (1945) 153ff. 
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the procedure of the court seized of litigation, few are ripe 
for solution, and not a few arguments of contemporary dis-
cussion are debatable. The well-justified tendency to enlarge 
the domain of the applicable foreign law, indeed, should not 
be exaggerated. One would think that an Anglo-Saxon in-
stitution such as the bipartition of judicial functions between 
judge and jury is an exclusive concern of the forum. Despite 
all the influence on the decision of cases exercised by jury 
verdicts or by the different mentalities of learned judges and 
laymen, 115 the modes of organizing matters of procedure, 
are a part of the administration of justice. Conflicts law does 
not purport to counterbalance all the differences of countries 
and courts. We have to be satisfied with presenting to the 
court the requisites of the cause of action ("substance") and 
the final request in the form most similar to that in a court 
of the state referred to. A party seeking redress for a tort 
or even defending in a state where the tort has not been 
committed, must be content with the machinery and the 
habits of the forum in finding the facts. Nobody could seri-
ously insist on the privilege of having a jury decide his case, 
despite any guarantee furnished at the locus delicti, if the 
forum does not allow a jury in his case. Theoretically, the 
two questions involved are rather simple and seem well-
known to the courts. The first question concerns the set of 
facts forming the cause of action; this set is determined by 
the law governing the tort. Thus, if the plantiff's alleged 
conduct, under the statutes and authorities of the foreign 
place of wrong, constitutes contributory negligence barring 
relief, the forum takes over the foreign qualification of this 
conduct as a part of the applicable substantive law.116 The 
115 On this point, after a most interesting discussion of the cases, MoRGAN, 
supra n. 114, at 1 71 is hesitating. He believes in a balance of arguments and 
refrains from advising the courts whether the forum should conform to the 
foreign rules concerning the use of the jury. 
116 Wieden v. Minneapolis, St. Paul etc. R. Co. (1930) 181 Minn. 235, 238; 
232 N. W. 109, 1lo; Smith v. Brown (1939) 302 Mass. 432, 433, 19 N. E. 
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second question, procedural under all theories, is that of 
ascertaining the facts, and judging them according to the 
foreign standard. It is naturally the law of the forum that 
decides whether a jury is to be charged and how the verdict 
is to be framed. 
Of course, there are difficulties inherent in the distinction 
between facts and law; they are enhanced by the subtle 
shades of distinctions concerning verdicts in the courts of 
this country. However, these difficulties would be consider-
ably aggravated by their transfer into conflicts law. Maintain-
ing the principle that the applicable law is that of the place 
of wrong and that the ascertainment of the facts pertains 
to the procedure of the court, including the intervention and 
direction of a jury, the task of the forum will be facilitated 
rather than involved. 
(b) Burden of proof. At civil law, distribution of the 
burden of proof, always understood as fixing the burden of 
persuading the courts, is sharply distinguished from trying 
of evidence, and is considered substantive law in every 
regard.117 Therefore, no one doubts that a rule, under which 
a plaintiff suing a railway for injury is relieved from the 
burden of showing the defendant's negligence, belongs to the 
law governing the wrong.118 This is the more readily acknowl-
edged, as this lightening of the plaintiff's task is commonly 
(2d) 732, 733 and later decisions of the Massachusetts court, see MoRGAN, 
supra n. II4, at I66. The decision in Pilgrim v. MacGibbon (1943) 3I3 Mass. 
290, 47 N. E. (zd) 299 seems to apply the same principle, advocated here: 
the Nova Scotia law of the place of the accident, including judicial decisions 
defining gross negligence in a comparable case, determines whether a given set 
of facts does or does not constitute gross negligence, requisite of an action of a 
gratuitous passenger; the law of procedure, however, determines whether there 
is sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury on the question whether the 
defendant conformed to the standard. Similarly, Gregory v. Maine Central R. 
Co. (r945) 317 Mass. 636, 59 N. E. (zd) 471, I59 A. L. R. 7I4. 
117 RG. (April I 7, 188:z.) 6 RGZ. 4I 3· 
Switzerland: 16 BGE. 783, 790; 20 id. 496; 24 id. II 357,390. 
C6digo Bustamante, arts. 398, 401. 
118 2 BAR 383; 2 ZITELMANN 253; DIENA, 2 Prine. 399; MEILI-MAMELOK, 
IPR. 403; I FRANKENSTEIN 363; NussBAUM, D.IPR. 413. 
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felt to rest half way between the traditional liability for 
negligence and the modern cases of absolute liability. It may 
be construed either as a qualified liability for fault or as a 
moderated liability for risk.119 One of the most powerful 
reasons for reforming the law of tort was the experience 
that victims of business carried on by big and complexly 
organized enterprises are unable to identify the source of 
harm somewhere in the central or local machinery responsible 
-an "emergency of evidence."120 This difficulty may be 
overcome by reversing the roles and presuming the negli-
gence, without entirely eliminating the requirement of fault. 
Not all "presumptions" have an analogous meaning, but 
they are generally deemed to present rules modifying the 
burden of proof.121 Prima facie cases, however, are often 
believed to pertain to the procedural field of evidence. But 
this does not agree, for instance, with the universally settled 
practice in maritime tort cases, that navigation contrary to 
the local port or river regulations amounts to negligence by 
an average experiential conclusion (prima facie case), so 
long as the assumption of fault is not deprived of its empirical 
value of counterproof. The evidence that the defendant 
vessel has followed the wrong side of the road or shown 
red instead of green lights, replacing until counterproof the 
evidence of negligent navigation, reverses the burden of proof 
for negligence, quite as a legal presumption de facto does; 
the judge need not be convinced of the truth of negligence, 
because this additional fact is supplied by experience.122 
Likewise, negligence is assumed from the breach of a statu-
119 TITLE, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 681. 
120 
"Beweisnotstand," ADOLF ExNER, Der Begriff der hoheren Gewalt (vis 
major) (1883) esp. 46, 50. 
121 See, e.g., VON TUHR, Allgemeiner Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationen-
rechts (1924) 142. 
122 RABEL, Der Prima Facie Beweis, in Festheft fiir Adolph Wach, I2 
Rheinische Zeitschrift fiir Zivil-und Prozessrecht 428; accord, HEINSHEIMER, 
1J id. I. 
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tory duty, such as the obligation to clean the sidewalk, until 
a more probable causal connection is shown by expert evi-
dence.123 In a suit of a guest passenger injured in a territory 
of German law, a French court even adopted the reduction 
of proof resulting from the practice of the Reichsgericht, 
which presumes prima facie that any unlawful bodily harm 
is negligently done.124 
American law. American courts, in the wake of English 
tradition, have long persisted in allocating all these matters 
to the broad procedural field of evidence.125 However, not 
only are "conclusive presumptions" commonly said to be of 
substantive nature, 126 but a vigorous trend favors the same 
characterization for other rules regulating the burden of 
persuasion.127 The matter evidently pertains to those slowly 
shifting from informal preferences of judges hearing evidence 
to tight rules of law for deciding cases. The New Hampshire 
court has recognized as a part of the Vermont tort law the 
rule that the plaintiff has to show his freedom from con-
tributory negligence. 128 In other cases there may be doubt. 
123 Dawson v. Murex, Ltd. [1942] 1 All E. R. 483, C. A. 
Germany: RG., JW. 1904, 408; 19091 687; 1911 1 98o; 1912, 390 and 
often since. 
124 App. Colmar (May 29, 1934) Clunet 1936, 626. 
125 Philip L. Gregory v. Maine Central R. Co. (1945) 317 Mass. 636, 59 
N. E. (2d) 471, 159 A. L. R. 714. 
126 WIGMORE, Evidence (ed. 3) § 1354, cf. §§ 2483-2491; Restatement 
§ 595 comment c. 
127 See MAGUIRE and MoRGAN, "Looking Backward and Forward at Evi-
dence," so Harv. L. Rev. (1937) 91o; HAWSHAW, "Conflict of Laws as to 
Presumptions and Burden of Proof," 4 Mo. L. Rev. (1939) 299; HANCOCK, 
Torts I 12, 155. Rationes dubitandi, however, have been developed by MORGAN 
in his important article cited supra n. 1I4, 58 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) at I9off. 
On the difficulties wrought by ( 1) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 
I 9 3 8, (2) the submission of the federal courts to the conflicts law of the state 
where they sit, see UHL, Note in 37 Mich. L. Rev. (1939) 1249; MoRGAN, 
op. cit. at 1 7off. 
128 Precourt v. Driscoll (1931) 85 N.H. 28o, 157 Atl. 525; accord: Fitz-
patrick v. lnt'l Railway Co. (1929) 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112, cf. KuHN, 
Comp. Com. 307; Francis v. Humphrey (1939) 25 F. Supp. 1. Cf. LEFLAR, 
Arkansas Conflict of Laws 198 on the application of the Arkansas statutory pre-
sumption against railroad companies. 
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The Restatemene 29 seems to reflect this uncertainty. While 
it assigns "presumptions" to the law of the forum, it con-
trasts them with foreign requirements concerning proof of 
freedom of fault, which are interpreted at the place of injury 
"as a condition of the cause of action itself, or as affecting 
the nature or amount of recovery." But the comment adds as 
explanation, what in reality stands as a well-established 
rule, 130 that foreign rules shifting the burden of proof should 
be applied where "the remedial and substantive portions of 
the foreign law are so bound together that the application 
of the usual procedural rule of the forum would seriously 
alter the effect of the operative facts under the law of the 
appropriate foreign state."131 This formula evidently is a 
sign of the present transitory stage in recognizing the sub-
stantive nature of permanently fixed presumptions for the 
purpose of conflicts law. Any rule including a presm11ption 
fixing the burden of persuasion, should always be taken as 
a part of the applicable law, 132 while no such rule can be 
advocated with respect to other categories of presumptions.133 
(c) Conditions of bringing suit. If the wrongdoer in an 
automobile accident in Florida has died, the administrator 
of his estate may be sued in Tennessee despite the domestic 
rule of this state allowing such suit only in case the wrong-
doer has been previously sued in his lifetime.13" 
In a similar way, provisions requiring service of notice 
129 Restatement§ 595 and comment a; see also 3 BEALE §§ 595.2, 595·3i 
GOODRICH 199 § 81; STUMBERG 131; Note, 78 A. L. R. (1932) 883. 
13° Central Vermont R. Co. v. White (1915) 238 U.S. 507; New Orleans 
etc. R. Co. v. Harris (1918) 247 U.S. 367; Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves 
(1937) 89 F. (2d) sz8, 530· 
131 Restatement§ 595 comment a. 
132 But MoRGAN, supra n. 114,58 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) at 190,193, 
professes grave doubts. On the different meanings in which res ipsa loquitur 
is understood, see PROSSER, "The Procedural Effects of Res Ipsa Loquitur," 
20 Minn. L. Rev. (1936) 241. 
133 Approximately to the same effect, MoRGAN, supra n. 114, at 193. 
134 Parsons v. American Trust & Banking Co. (1934) 168 Tenn. 49, 73 
S. W. (zd) 698. 
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of the claim upon the defendant before suit for damages can 
be brought, are applicable when part of the law of the place 
of wrong, 135 irrespective of the law of the forum. 136 
I I. Relation to Contractual Obligations 
(a) Distinction in the municipal laws. Tort and contract 
form an antithesis, but historic connections between them still 
persist, as in the English controversy whether an anticipatory 
breach of contract may not be a tort, or in the French dis-
cussion whether a breach of contract produces an obligation 
for damages under article I382 of the Civil Code, the 
cornerstone of tort recovery. The general view of modern 
legal science, however, precisely separates tortious and con-
tractual obligations. Each source of obligation is characterized 
by its own premises and effects. It may be that the facts of 
a case create a claim in contract and another in tort. The 
normal rule is that in such case both rights are at the disposal 
of the injured party137 in some kind of concurrence. If a 
tenant wantonly cuts the trees surrounding a rented cottage, 
the landlord may sue him on the contract or for destructive 
135 Sawyer v. El Paso & N. E. R. Co. (1908) 49 Tex. Civ. App. 106, 108 
S. W. 718; Husted v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (1910) 143 Mo. App. 623, 128 
S. W. 282. 
136 Contra: Arp v. Allis Chalmers Co. (1907) 130 Wis. 454, 110 N. W. 
3 8 6 under the theory of a general statute of limitation. 137 England: PoLLOCK, Torts 426; WINFIELD, Text-book of the Law of Tort 
(ed. 2, 1943) 717 § 191; SALMONo-STALLYBRAss, Torts 8. United States: 
PROSSER, Torts 201ff. 
France: Despite great confusion the practice tends to accumulate the benefits 
for the plaintiffs, as in the case of carrier liability for personal injury, see the 
critical review by JossERAND, Les Transports (ed. 2, 1926) § 894 bis, ter. 
and the resume by EsMEIN in 6 Plano! et RIPERT 683 § 493· 
Germany: 88 RGZ. 317, 433; 89 id. 385; 90 id. 68, 410; 99 id. 103; 103 id. 
263; 106 id. 133. The doctrine followed therein, with its exceptions (infra 
n. 149) was initiated by FRANZ VON LISZT, Die Deliktsobligationen im System 
des Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs (1898) 12-15. 
Italy: Cass. (April 27, 1937) Giur. Ital. Mass. 1937, c. 395; App. Milano 
(Nov. 5, 1937) Giur. Ital. 1938 I 2, 53; App. Bologna (April 20, 1938) 
Foro I tal. Mass. 193 8 No. 34· 
Switzerland: 64 BGE. II 259; 67 id. II q6. 
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waste (Aquilian culpa, in other laws). Of course, he cannot 
request damages twice for the same loss. The concurrence 
is not "accumulative" in this sense. Sometimes, it is true, 
there exists reluctance to admit concurrence. Thus, for in-
stance, the Restatement of the Law of Torts, in a modern 
view, 138 recognizes a tort liability when a lessor of land fails 
to make repairs that his contract calls for and the lessee is 
bodily harmed thereby; but it denies that there is a con-
tractual obligation for damages.139 In a similar thought, the 
same Restatement carefully states a tort liability for negli-
gence in performing gratuitously promised services for the 
safety of another person, evidently on the assumption that 
when services are promised for consideration, the contractual 
claim takes care of the damages and no tort action is given.140 
Such exclusion of rights should be confined to certain narrow 
common law situations.141 
Another difference of views concerns the nature of the 
concurrence. At common law, from the times when the 
plaintiff had to "waive the tort" for the purpose of suing 
in assumpsit on a fictitious contract, there seems to exist a 
strong tendency to think in terms of remedy rather than 
of rights and to offer the plaintiff the remedies only for his 
selection. Sometimes, the plaintiff's declaration of choice is 
even said to be final. 142 In this country, the jurisdictions are 
divided. At present, however, many courts allow the injured 
to pursue both actions,143 and this is the prevailing Con-
tinental doctrine.144 Therefore, the plantiff is entitled to all 
138 See HARPER, Torts§ 103 n. 84. 
139§357· 
140 § 325· 
141 On the reluctance of a part of the American courts to recognize that the 
modern liability of carriers for safe transportation may produce contractual 
as well as tortious effects, see infra p. 291. · 
142 See PROSSER, Torts 1127 n. 12. Similar views occur in Latin America, 
e.g., CARVALHO SANTos, 3 C. C. Brasileiro, supra n, z, 317 No.4· 
143 See PROSSER, Torts 202 n. 85; WILLISTON, 6 Contracts § 1528. 
144 Germany: 63 RGZ. 308; 87 id. 309; 88 id. 317; 88 id. 433; 89 id. 385; 
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advantages either remedy may afford him, as to facts to be 
proved, defenses, joint liability of defendants, statutes of 
limitation, extent of compensable material damage, reparation 
of nonpecuniary damage, vicarious liability of third persons, 
and so forth. In the United States, tort actions as a whole, 
are considered to be the more advantageous remedies, 145 while 
they are usually less profitable in Germany.146 
A similar relation exists with respect to the parties in-
volved. A passenger injured in a railway accident may sue 
the railway company which sold him the ticket in contract, 
as well as the company on whose tracks he suffers harm in 
tort. 147 Or one plaintiff may sue the defendant for tort 
damages, while another on the same facts claims a breach 
of contract by the defendant.148 
On the other hand, if the law of contracts restricts the 
extent of the promisor's duties, the French and German 
doctrines definitely infer that he cannot be deemed liable 
for more under tort law. Also, an English plaintiff is now 
allowed to disregard any limitation of liability under the 
contract by alleging a broader liability in tort.149 For instance, 
as a gratuitous deposit makes the bailee liable only for fraud 
and gross negligence under French and German laws/50 a 
90 id. 68, 4 I o etc. 
Switzerland: 26 BGE. II 105; 35 id. II 424; 37 id. II 1o; so id. II 378 
sub (2). 
145 PROSSER, Torts 1123. A similar opinion prevails in France. 
146 RABEL (supra p. zz&) 26. 
147 PoLLOCK, Torts 432· 
148 PoLLOcK, id. 437· 
149 England: SALMOND-STALLYBRASs, Torts 9> although not really supported 
by the case of I933 cited ibid. note (i). 
France: Cass. (Jan. u, I922) S.1924.1.Io5 and Note; JossERAND, Les 
transports ( ed. 2) 6 I o § 62 8: "La responsabilite contractuelle refoule la 
responsabilite delictuelle a laquelle elle vient se substituer, ... du moins dans 
la mesure ou les rapports (des parties contractantes) sont £xes par la con-
vention." 
Germany: RG. (June 20, I916) 88 RGZ. 3I9, 320 as generally interpreted. 
Switzerland: BG. (May 2I, I94I) 67 BGE. II 132, 137· 
15° French C. C. art. I92?; German BGB. § 690. 
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simple failure of ordinary care in the custody is not enough 
to substantiate a tort action. The American courts that have 
borrowed from Roman law a similar restriction of the bailee's 
contractual liability, by the intermediary of Chief Justice 
Holt's doctrine, 151 are likely to decide in the same manner 
on the tort aspect in the absence of statute, on the theory that 
the creditor has assumed the risk. 
(b) Conflicts law. Obviously, on principle, conflicts law 
ought to follow the described conceptions prevailing in the 
modern municipal laws that tort and breach of contract 
generate two independent and concurrent rights, also when 
the supporting facts (excepting the existence of the contract) 
are identical. The correctness of this proposition is even more 
self-evident when the causes of action arise from a tort 
committed in one jurisdiction and from the breach of a 
contract governed by the law of another jurisdiction.152 In 
further conformity with this general approach, the injured 
may combine both actions, unless the court following pro-
cedural rather than substantive considerations, restricts the 
plaintiff to a choice between the causes of action. 
The American cases, unfortunately, lack consistency, but 
they seem to approach the same result. Apart from workmen's 
compensation, to be discussed separately, they are mainly 
concerned with railway and carrier liability. 
Injury inflicted on a passenger in railway accidents has 
always been held. sufficient as a possible ground of tort. 
Several courts, however, following the lead of the New 
York Court of Appeals, have awarded damages on the ground 
that the plaintiff entered into a contract with the railway 
151 Coggs v. Bernard ( r 704) 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Re. 107; PROSSER, 
Torts 257. 
152 This argument has been pointed out by BARTIN, 2 Principes § 335· For 
Germany the obvious result has been briefly mentioned by M. WoLFF, IPR. 
92 § 26 I. 
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whose ticket he bought.153 Thus, the contract was a protection 
to the plaintiff, in the New York court, in a case in which 
the tort action was barred by statutory limitation at the place 
of wrong/54 as also in a Texas case where the tort action was 
frustrated by the plaintiff's failure to give notice of his claim 
under the law of New Mexico, while the contractual claim 
was independent of this failure according to the law of 
Pennsy 1 vania.155 
The contrary leading case of Pittsburgh Railway v. Grom156 
contends that "the duty of the carrier to use proper care in 
the transportation of the passenger is one imposed by law, 
and the right of action grows out of the liability which the 
law imposes rather than out of the contract of transportation." 
The court construed this contract as evidenced by the ticket 
which contained no express promise of care or to transport 
the passenger in safety. We are, thus, in the continued pres-
ence of an ancient theory, which is evidently also connected 
with the idea that the tort is exclusively committed at the 
place where the injury occurs. 157 More advanced thinking 
has realized that the ordinary carrier's liability at common 
law also presupposes a contract of transportation, is implied 
in the contract, has to be read into it. The modern develop-
ment needs a clear vision of the contractual fundament of 
accessory duties. It goes even farther, by acknowledging also 
the contractual ties between the customer and ulterior carriers. 
It is interesting to compare with both views the inter-
national conventions on carriage of goods, and more recently 
also on transport of passengers, which support "actions arising 
out of the transport contract" against the railway of dispatch 
153 See HANCOCK, Torts 192, I93· RoBERTSON, Characterization I82 seems to 
advocate the same solution. 
154 Dyke v. Erie R. Co. (I87I) 45 N.Y. I I3· 
155 Sawyer v. El Paso etc. R. Co. (I 908) 49 Tex. Civ. App. I o6, I o8 S. W. 
718. 
156 Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. v. Grom (I911) I42 Ky. 51, 133 S. W. 977· 
157 Infra Chapter 26 pp. 3o2f. 
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or departure, respectively, the railway of destination, and 
"the railway on which the cause of action arose.mss The last 
mentioned action, despite its possible connection with the 
contract, is visibly based on tort. 
An extreme variety of treatment appears in the cases con-
cerned with misdelivery or delayed delivery of goods by 
carriers or of messages by telegraph companies, dating from 
the period before federal legislation regulated a large part 
of such business. The courts have referred to the law of the 
place of contracting, to that of performance, or to the law 
of the place of wrong, which again has been found either 
at the place where prompt and correct delivery should have 
been made or at the place where the negligent acts were 
done.159 The Restatement does not even mention contractual 
actions in this connection. The apparent inconsistency of the 
courts may be explained in part by their desire to help the 
plaintiff, because he lacks the benefit of the option that he 
ought to have. In the telegram cases of Arkansas, Leflar has 
demonstrated how this benevolence has been manifested 
in a striking manner. In order to allow recovery under Ar-
kansas law, which annulled clauses exempting the telegraph 
company from liability, the Arkansas courts applied their 
own law as the law of contract to outgoing messages and 
as the law of the place of wrong when the delivery had to 
be made in the state.160 
The liability of employers for injury suffered by their 
employees, before the workmen's compensation legislation 
came into force, was clearly determined. The employee had 
158 International Convention concerning the Transport of Goods by Rail, 
Rome, Nov. 23, I933> art. 42 § 3, I92 L. of N. Treaty Series 39I, 443, 
HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 527, 554· 
International Convention concerning the Transport of Passengers and Lug-
gage by Rail, Rome, Nov. 23, I 933, art. 42 § 2, I 92 L. of N. Treaty Series 
329, 36I. HUDSON, id. S68, S82. 
159 See HANCOCK, Torts I 94-I 98 and resume I 99· 
160 LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws I88 § 78. 
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the choice between the law governing the employment con-
tract arid the tort action governed by the law of the place of 
the accident. The courts maintained this liberal attitude in 
regard to the fellow servant doctrine and its counterparts; 
even if in the state whose law governed the employment 
the common law doctrine still barred suits on the contract 
as well as for the tort, the courts of this same state awarded 
tort damages upon the foreign law of the place of tort.161 
Stipulations for exemption from liability. Agreements 
"contracting out" or limiting the responsibility for tort, if 
they are not covered by international agreement, ought to 
follow appropriate conflicts principles concerning contracts. 
In fact, in the United States the question whether future 
personal injury claims can be reduced by agreement between 
a passenger and a transportation enterprise, is usually treated 
as a contract problem, although the claims themselves are 
regarded as tort claims. 162 
Thus, the law governing a contract clearly is competent 
to answer the question whether a stipulation generally ex-
empting the debtor from future liability is to be construed 
as including his responsibility under the theory of tort. Under 
the same rule, a waiver by which a debtor is released from 
his existent obligation arising out of tort, must be judged 
according to its own merits rather than to the law of the 
place of wrong. But the main problem, of course, is that 
concerning the permissibility of exemption clauses. This prob-
lem, commonly complicated in the courts by a rivalry be-
tween the law governing a contract and the public policy of 
the forum, may entail more difficulties when the law of the 
place of wrong prohibits an anticipatory renunciation of 
161 For cases see HANCOCK, Torts 207 n. 3· 
162 Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc. (1935) 266 N. Y. 244, 194 
N. E. 692; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (1925) 9 F. (2d) 724. 
England: Jones v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. [1924] 2 K. B. no. 
Quebec: C.P.R. v. Parent (1914) 24 Que. K. B. 193. 
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responsibility for tortious negligence. Consistency and con-
venience require that the law governing the agreement should 
prevail. 
12. Statutes of Limitation 
In civil law countries the principle of the place of wrong 
extends, as a matter of course, to those limitations upon the 
time for bringing the action, that are regarded as a part of 
the substantive law of the place of wrong.163 The same ought 
to be recognized in American law.164 
The well-known difficulties, however, existing in this coun-
try with respect to general statutes of limitation, classified 
as procedural, make themselves felt in this matter. European 
courts, nevertheless, no longer hesitate to apply English and 
American limitations of this kind as a part of the English 
or American tort law, although some courts prefer their own 
periods of limitation if they are shorter than the foreign 
one.165 Certain American statutes barring suits upon an 
obligation barred by its proper law take the right way, pro-
vided they are not of the kind of the Wisconsin statute 
163 The problem has prevailingly been treated with respect to contracts, but 
is general. See FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 386. 
A problem of international procedural law concerning foreign torts has been 
discussed in two German cases, OLG. Stettin (Dec. 5, 1929) JW. 1930, 1882, 
IPRspr. 1930, No. 151, and OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 18, 1929) Hans. RGZ. 
1930 A 68z, IPRspr. 1930, No. II5; aff'd, RG. (July 8, 193o) 129 RGZ. 
385, IPRspr. 1930 No. 156: An action brought at the foreign place of tort 
interrupts the period of limitation at the forum running for a German tortfeasor 
(significant under art. 12 of the German EG. BGB.) only if the judgment of 
the foreign court would be recognized as binding at the forum. Contra: cor-
rectly, NEUMEYER, JW. 1926, 374· 
164 According to the usual formula, a statute extinguishing the plaintiff's right 
is applicable. More appropriate rules appear in the frequent statutes against 
entertaining foreign suits barred by the applicable law. See Note, 75 A. L. R. 
203; HANCOCK, Torts 136, 137. 
The limitation of twelve months for tort actions arising from accidents, under 
Lord Campbell's Act in England, has been applied, as the ground of action 
"entirely arose in England", Goodman v. London R. Co. (1877) 14 Scot. L. 
Rep. (1877) 449, 450. 
165 Cf. Vol. I, pp. 64, 66. 
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declaring that a claim for personal injuries shall be barred 
by the lex loci delicti "unless the person so injured shall, 
at the time of the injury, have been a resident of this state.))l66 
This, indeed, is an illogicaJ167 and narrow-minded public 
policy. 
The topic is too broad to be discussed at this juncture. 
1 3· Industrial Property 
(a) Territorial limitation of protected interests. Patents 
are granted in every state for the territory of the state only. 
Hence, the rights accorded by a patent cannot be violated 
outside the state. 168 The same is true with respect to trade-
marks169 and designs,170 barring the cases in which imitation 
constitutes liability for unfair competition. The existing in-
ternational unions and treaties in these matters intend to 
assure these territorially limited rights to foreigners. 
If, however, such a right is tortiously invaded in the terri-
tory where it is protected, a claim for damages on this ground 
may well be brought in a foreign court having jurisdiction 
over the defendant.171 
(b) Unfair competition. Being of a different nature, lia-
bility arising from unfair competition is not bound to a certain 
territory. The law of the jurisdiction in which the competi-
166 See 48 L. R. A. (r9oo) 639; 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) (r9o6) 1029; 51 id. 
(1914) 96; L. R. A. r9r5C, 976. 167 AlLEs, "Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws," 31 Mich. L. 
Rev. (r933) 474, sor. 
168 German RG. (Oct. 15, !892) 30 RGZ. 52; WEISS, 4 Traite 502; HERM. 
ISAY, Patentgesetz (ed. 6, 1932) 230. 
169 United States: Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. ( C.C.D.N .J. 1903) 122 
Fed. ros and (C.C.D.N.J. r9o7) 154 Fed. 867,869. 
France: PICHOT, 9 Repert. 120 No. r r r. 
Germany: RG. (Sept. 20, r 927) ll8 RGZ. 76 (against previous practice); 
(April 2o, 1928) JW. 1928, 1456; RG. (July r, 193o) 129 RGZ. 385, IPRspr. 
'939 No. rs6. 
Italy: DESANCTIS, r8 Rivista (r926) 127, 132. 170 WEiss, 4 Traite 509. 
171 RG. (July 8, 1930) 129 RGZ. 385, against former cases, see NussBAUM, 
JW. 1931, 428. 
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tion occurs, governs the claim. When the Swiss Federal 
Council submitted the draft of the Swiss Law of I 943 on 
Unfair Competition to the parliament, it said: the law 
applies according to the general principles of conflicts law, 
that is, according to the law of the place where the wrong 
is committed, as well as by analogy to arts. 3ff. of the Pemil 
Code. If an act of unfair competition is committed in Switzer-
land, this law applies. Hence, it applies also in case the act 
has effects not only on the Swiss market but also on a foreign 
market; the Swiss and foreign competitors are equally en-
titled to sue. This solution conforms to the obligations as-
sumed by Switzerland in the Convention of Paris, of March· 
20, I88J.172 
The case of unfair competition alleged .to have been com-
mitted by the use of a trade-mark is of particular interest. 
The practice of the federal courts in the United States has 
been recently clarified. The courts have taken jurisdiction 
and granted injunctions when a fraudulent scheme of unfair 
competition was carried out in essential part in this country, 
such as when upon a conspiracy undertaken in this country, 
barrels were sent unmarked from American ports and then 
marked abroad with the plaintiff's brand.173 A complainant 
protected by an American trade-mark is also granted relief 
against a competitor who uses the mark in the United States 
for export to another country in which the complainant is 
likewise entitled to a trade-mark right against the re-
spondent.174 But if in the foreign country the defendant 
himself has the trade-mark right, the employment of the 
mark which will be consummated in this foreign country is 
172 MESSAGE, I 942, ad C III 3 p. I 9, see 0. A. GERMANN, Concurrence 
deloyale (Ziirich I 94 5) I 34· 
173 Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. (C.C.D.N.J. I907) I54 Fed. 867, aff'd 
(C.C.A. Jd I9o8) I62 Fed. 67I; cert. denied 2I4 u.s. 5I5. 174 Hecker H-0 Co. v. Holland Food Corp. (C.C.A. 2d I929) 36 F. (2d) 
767, as commented on or rather corrected in Luft v. Zande, next note. 
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not considered to constitute unfair competition.175 
The German Supreme Court, however, which had fol-
lowed somewhat similar lines,176 more recently favors the 
application of its own domestic rules by multiple devices, on 
the assumption that the German rules repressing unfair 
maneuvers are particularly exacting. One principle held is 
that a plaintiff, having his principal establishment in Ger-
many, can sue under German law, because his suffering dam-
age there has constituted the forum a place of wrong.117 Later 
decisions advance the idea that, if both parties are of German 
nationality or domicil, they have to observe also in their 
foreign activities the mutual duties flowing from honesty of 
business as prescribed in the German law.178 Finally, places 
of wrong have been construed in Germany and Italy on. 
various theories.179 The Dutch courts have resisted the temp-
tation to adulterate the principle for any such reasons/80 but 
National Socialist writers made capital out of the nationalistic 
elements of the Reichsgericht decisions.181 
175 George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co. (C.C.A. 2d I944) I42 F. 
( 2d) 53 6, 540. On the difficulties of determining whether a federal court has 
to follow on this subject state conflicts rules, see also Kerner, J., in Philco 
Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co. (1943) I33 F. (2d) 663, and the annotation by 
SCHOPFLOCHER, Conflict of laws with respect to trademark infringement or 
unfair competition, including the area of conflict between federal and state law, 
148 A. L. R. '39· 
176 See RG. (June 5, 1928) Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 1927/28, 491ff.; 
(March 31, 1931) JW. 193I, 1904. 
177 Decisions from 18 RGZ. 28, 31 (1886) to 108 RGZ. 9 (1923); see 
MELCHIOR, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 86. The contrary thesis by BAUMBACH, 
Unlauterer Wettbewerb (ed. 2) 82 that this meant a trespass on foreign juris-
diction was approved by RG. in I40 RGZ. 29 (next note), but the theory is 
repeated in the literature. 
178 RG. (Feb. 2, I933) I4-0 RGZ. 25, 29, approving a thesis of NussBAUM, 
D.IPR. 34-o; the RG. was understood in this sense by OLG. Kiiln in I5o RGZ, 
265. Also RG. (May 19, 1933) Markenschutz und Wettbewerb I933, 446; 
(Jan. 10, 1936) JW. I936, IZ9; and other decisions followed this approach. 
C/. 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. Nos. 4o, 4I. 
179 See RG. (Feb. I4, 1936) 150 RGZ. 265 and Italian Cass. (April 2, 
1927) Foro Ital. Mass. 1927 II 472; infra Chapter 26, p. 313. 
180 See KoSTERS 794 and n. 2. 
181 RUDOLF SCHMIDT, Ort der unerlaubten Handlung I 8 3, I 8 7 endorses all 
three contradictory theories of the Reichsgericht and surpasses them. A previous 
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Illustration. In the last-mentioned German case, P. and 
D., both firms in Aachen, manufactured pins and needles of a 
certain kind and exported them to the United States. The 
defendant firm founded an American subsidiary corporation 
and advertised its needles in this country as "entirely Ameri-
can," "a truly American product," "buy American pins," 
and so forth, and agitated for boycott against the plaintiff 
company. The court considered that, if the defendant in 
Aachen participated in the acts or used the American firm 
as an instrument in America, it would be subject to the 
German law, because German merchants have to adjust their 
competition to this law even abroad. But also, if the de-
fendant merely tolerated or approved the conduct in question, 
it violated its duty in Germany itself. Perhaps the authority 
of this case may be restricted to the liability of a domestic 
firm for torts of its foreign subsidiary companies.182 
These attempts to apply the law of the forum to foreign 
happenings, as usual, confuse equitable considerations with 
national peculiarities. What seems fair or unfair at a distant 
place, may not seem so at the forum. How can a German 
court judge foreign commerce by German standards? The 
court would have done better by insisting on ascertaining 
the American law on unfair competition, of which the pub-
lished text of the decisions makes no mention. On the other 
hand, to burden the defendant with additional duties not 
owed by other merchants in the foreign market or to equip 
a national competitor with additional weapons, is contrary 
to the principles of economic equality.183 The desirable pro-
writer (DANIELCIK, JW. I936, 26I4) proclaimed that acts done abroad are 
always subject to German law if they infringe "the fealty among the fellows 
of the race" ("volksgeniissische Treupflicht"). Schmidt declares this is not 
enough; German law should be applied whenever a damage is felt in Germany. 
BEITZKE, Book Review on REu, Anwendung fremden Rechts in 66 Kritische 
Vierteljahrschrift (I938/39) 4I4, 4I7, has generalized the second of the 
theories above by suggesting that the nationality principle should replace the 
law of the place of wrong. 
182 Cf. RAAPE, D. IPR. 327 n. r. 
183 DESANCTIS, Rivista I 926, at I 34· 
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motion of mercantile ethics should be pursued along the 
international road promisingly initiated by the Union of 
Paris.184 
This question whether merchants domiciled within the 
forum are bound to the domestic rules in competing abroad, 
has not yet been raised in American cases.185 It was under 
an essentially different aspect that certain famous decisions 
examined the application of the Anti-Trust laws to for-
eign business of American firms. In American Banana Co. 
v. United Fruit Co./86 Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for 
the Supreme Court of the United States, dismissed an action 
by an American firm against an American competitor in the 
banana trade, because the Sherman Act on which the action 
was based, being primarily a penal statute, was not intended 
to contemplate acts done in Panama and Costa Rica; the 
Court, therefore, contented itself with the statement that 
under the law of the place of acting, the acts of the defendant 
were no torts at all. 181 In a later case/88 the Supreme Court 
granted relief by enjoining violations of the Sherman and 
Wilson Acts, on the assumption that the defendants had 
established a complete monopoly over the purchase and com-
merce of sisal, a product of Yucatan, obtaining excessive 
profits. The steps necessary to bring about these results were 
deliberately taken by the defendants, and the action was held 
to be based on "a contract, combination and conspiracy entered 
184 Treaty for the Protection of Commercial Property, of Paris I 8 8 3, Bruxelles 
1900, Washington I9I I, and The Hague I925 (revised London, I934) in 
force in one of its phases almost throughout the world. Under article IO his 
the states are obligated to establish efficient protection against unfair compe-
tition. 
185 This statement is supported by the discussion in the recent work, CALL-
MANN', 2 Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (I94-5) 1756-8. 
186 (r9og) 2IJ U.S. 34-7, 357· 
187 The criticism of this case by HUNTING, "Extraterritorial Effect of The 
Sherman Act," 6 Ill. L. Rev. (I 912) 34 is inconclusive. 
188 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. (I927) 274- U.S. 268,276. For other 
cases, see CALLMANN, supra n. r 85, I 754-, I 755· 
300 TORTS 
into by parties within the United States and made effective 
by acts done therein." Indeed, in the meantime between the 
two cases, the danger of international monopolies, frequently 
fostered by cartels, 189 had been realized, and the potential 
weapons offered by the anti-trust laws were used more 
consciously. Such repression of monopolistic conspiracies is 
intended to protect the domestic commerce rather than the 
individual interests involved. The forum applies its public 
law with its reflections in private spheres. This development 
is fundamentally distinguishable from the idea of subjecting 
competing domestic firms to a domestic standard of behavior 
in foreign markets. 
189 See MoLLOY, "Application of the Anti-Trust Laws to Extra-territorial 
Conspiracies," 49 Yale L. J. (1940) IJIZ. 
CHAPTER 26 
The Place of Wrong1 
I. SuRVEY OF SoLUTIONS 
THE rule that problems of the law of torts are to be decided in accordance with the law of the place of wrong presupposes a determination of the place where 
the wrong has been committed. The following illustrations 
show some of the many situations in which this problem pre-
sents difficulties. 
Illustrations: (i) A letter containing defamatory state-
ments about B, a person residing in Y, is mailed by A in 
state X and received by C in state Z. 
(ii) A in state X sends poison concealed in candy to B 
in state Y. B takes the candy to state Z where he eats some 
of it, falls ill in state M, and dies in state N. 
(iii) A, standing in state X, fires a gun and lodges a bullet 
in the body of B, who is standing in state Y. 
I. Theory of the Place of Injury (The American Rule) 
Under the traditional American rule, the wrong is con-
sidered as being done where the injury takes place. 
The Restatement has expressed this rule in the following 
terms: 
"Section 3 77. The place of wrong is in the state where 
the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged 
tort takes place." 
Applying this rule to the illustrations stated above, we 
1 RHEINSTEIN, "The Place of Wrong, A Study in the Method of Case Law," 
19 Tul. L. Rev. (1944) 4, t6s; RUDOLF ScHMIDT, Der Ott der unerlaubten 
Handlung im internationalen Privatrecht in Festgabe fiir Heinrich Lehmann 
(t937) 175· 
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are informed2 that the place of wrong is where the defama-
tory letter arrives, where the· poisoned person falls ill, and 
where the bullet meets the body. (That these answers are 
not quite obvious is a separate point.) 
Although this rule has met with some substantial criticism3 
and is contrary to the prevailing opinion of European writers, 
it thus far has commonly been taken as firmly established 
and supported by an "almost unbroken line of authority."• 
While this is written, however, Max Rheinstein in a highly 
suggestive study has undertaken to destroy the doctrine of 
the Restatement and of the encyclopedias. His detailed his-
torical analysis of the cases results in the finding that the 
rule has not been applied as ratio decidendi in all jurisdic-
tions as often as lip service has been paid to it, and that the 
formation of the rule was unduly influenced by precedents 
regarding the demarcation of ordinary jurisdiction from 
admiralty cases, criminal cases, and cases dealing with local 
actions. 5 
After this penetrating analysis, the traditional rule, ap-
plied in a mechanical way for such a long time, will have 
to stand the test of an examination according to standards 
of convenience. In the present writer's opinion, much is to be 
said in its favor, but a few modifications seem to be suggested 
by comparative considerations. 
What idea actually supports the rule in the American 
doctrine? Historically it may have originated in the field of 
interstate transportation and communication, as a simple de-
vice to identify the applicable law at the place where the 
physical impact occurs. 6 This idea seems to conform well to 
the old construction that a carrier's duty of care is not com-
2 Restatement, Note to§ 377· 
3 8TUMBERG I 66. 
4 Note, I 33 A. L. R. z6o. 
5 RHEINSTEIN (supra n. I) ; see in particular at I 7 I on the political case of 
I 8 II, Livingston v. Jefferson. 
6 This is a kind suggestion by Yntema. 
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prised in the contract of transportation without express stipu-
lation. 7 The view is exclusively focused on the time and place 
of the actual harm. The theory of vested rights found here 
an apparently suitable example. For advocates of this theory, 
such as its last (we hope) defender, Beale, it was natural that 
the injured person should acquire an indefeasible right at 
the moment in which all elements of a tort action are existent 
and hence the cause of action is born. While today the vested 
rights doctrine may be regarded as moribund, the conception 
still lingers in the mind of the courts that a tort must be 
localized at the place where its last element is added to the 
others, because then only a cause of action arises. An unlawful 
and faulty act is not a tort until it creates an injury. 
"It cannot be denied that negligence of duty unproductive 
of damnifying results will not authorize or support a re-
covery."8 
"Until all the elements are present a cause of action cannot 
arise, and the tort is considered as transpiring as a whole in 
that place where the combination becomes complete.m 
By an interesting though erroneous variant it has been 
asserted that "the locality of the act is deemed at common 
law to be the same as that of the damage.mo 
2. Theory of the Place of Acting (The Civil Law Rule) 
The great majority of the European writers/1 followed 
7 See supra Chapter 2.4 p. z88. 
8 Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Carroll (I 892) 97 Ala. u6, I I So. 8o3. 
9 ScHERMERHORN, Tennessee Annotations to the Restatement § 3 77· 
1° Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Central R. Co. (I 9 I 8) 7 8 N. H. 
553, I03 At!. 263. 
11 Institut de Droit International (Munich, 1883) 7 Annuaire (I88s) u9, 
I56; 2 BAR IZo; GIERKE, 1 Deutsches Privatrecht 234; I ZITELMANN 112; 2 
id. 480 (on ground of alleged public international law, but also the most 
elaborate writing on the practical effects of the theories in question) ; WALKER 
526; NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 48; cf. RAAPE 203 and D. IPR 325; 
2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 342 n. 2; BARTIN, 2 Principes 4I6 (place of the "fait 
illicite generateur du prejudice"; CuNHA GoN<;ALVEs, I Direito Civil 673. 
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by some courts,12 define the place of wrong as that where the 
allegedly tortious conduct was carried out by the defendant. 
In the case of a commissive tort, this is the place where the 
actor has engaged in the bodily movements resulting in the 
damage. Under this approach, in our examples, defamation 
is committed where the letter is mailed, poisoning where the 
candy is sent, and personal injury where the shooting person 
stands. 
This literature objects to the law of the "place of effect" 
that it is often difficult to ascertain, that effects may occur in 
a plurality of states, and that they may obtain at a place by 
accidental causation, to the surprise of the actor and possibly 
also of the victim. It is considered unfair that conduct should 
be subjected to a law the intervention of which could not 
be foreseen. Stated positively, the argument is that the 
actor is entitled to count on the laws of the state where he 
acts. While he has to obey these laws, he should be pro-
tected by them. The educational reasons of the laws that 
regulate human behavior and distribute the pecuniary effect 
of a damaging conduct are concerned with the acts or omis-
sions rather than the effects in individual cases. 
3· Elective Concurrence of Claims (The Reichsgericht Rule) 
The German Reichsgericht has combined the first two 
theories. This court holds that a tort is committed in both 
the place where the actor engages in his conduct and the place 
where the effects of his conduct occur. The injured person 
may choose to sue under one law or the other; in each case, 
the chosen law is applied in its entirety on the whole facts 
so as to determine all requirements of the cause of action and 
12 France: Trib. civ. Seine (May 27, 1 896) aff'd, Cour Paris (June 23, 
1899) Clunet 1901, 128. 
Germany: RG. (April 24, 1889) 44 Seuff. Arch. 257 No. 161. 
Italy: App. Milano (Sept. 19, 188 1) Clunet 1883, 73 (insertion of a libelow 
article into a new spa per) . 
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its effects. Hence, the victim is favored by being allowed to 
elect the law most advantageous to his demand, but he is 
not permitted to cumulate the benefits flowing from more 
than one law .13 
The formula employed in constant practice was first 
established in a plenary decision of the Reichsgericht in 1909, 
concerning the jurisdiction of the court at the locus delicti 
commissi, but was soon extended to choice of law: "a place 
of tort is assumed to be wherever an essential part of the tort 
has been committed."14 
Applying this approach to the illustrative cases described 
above, the defamation (i) may be localized where the letter 
has been sent or where it was read; 15 the poisoning (ii) where 
the candy was sent, where it was received, and where it was 
eaten; 16 and the shooting at both the places of acting and 
wounding. In addition, also the places where the victim 
died, and where dependent persons lost maintenance, are 
eligible for the purpose of choice of law. 
This view has been followed by the Swiss Federal Tribu-
nal/7 and in a case of unfair competition (a field in which 
also the most characteristic German actions developed) 
by the I tali an Supreme Court.18 
The arguments advanced by the Reichsgericht were pre-
carious and easily criticized by the advocates of the place of 
acting. Theoretical support has finally come forth. Neuner19 
13 RG. (Nov. 20, x888) 23 RGZ. 305; and constant practice. See MELCHIOR 
168 n. 3· 
14 RG. (Oct. 18, 1909) 72 RGZ. 41; RG. (Nov. &, 19o6) 62 Seuff. "Arch. 
No. ISO; RG. (Jan. 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 1291, 1292; RG. (Feb. I4, 1936) 
I so RGZ. 26s. 
15 Cf. 23 RGZ. 3o6. 
16 Cf. RG., JW. 19oo, 477· 
17 BG. (Nov. 6, 1896) :u BGE. II64; (March 6, 1914) 40 BGE. I&, 2o 
(sending and arrival of a deceiving letter, in a criminal case but with general 
argument). 
18 ltaly: Cass. (April2, 1927) Foro ltal. Rep. 1927 I 472 No. SI. 
19 NEUNER, Der Sinn II6; see also ScHELLING, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 866; 
RAAPE zozff. 
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remarks that a person doing a part of the tortious acts in the 
state, or acting from abroad but effecting an injury in the 
state, sufficiently deserves to be subjected to the responsibility 
established therein. A sound international distribution of the 
administration of justice allows that several states may concur 
in suppression of tort. If a state regards conduct as nontor-
tious, it ought, nevertheless, to tolerate a different view in 
another jurisdiction where a part of the facts occur. 
The same doctrine has been applied in Germany and other 
countries to criminal20 and civil jurisdiction21 based on the 
locus delicti commissi principle. 
4· Mixed Solutions 
(a) Influence of the law of the place of acting. The Re-
statement contains a section seemingly inserted against Beale's 
theoretical view, 22 which expressly refers to the place of act-
ing. Where a person is required by law or authorized by 
a privilege, to act or not to act in a state, he will not be held 
liable for the events resulting from his act in another state. 
The comment borrows an illustration from the old English 
case Regina v. Lesley22a where a shipmaster was forced by 
Chilean authorities to take a prisoner on board. The Restate-
ment suggests that the legality of the detention by the ship-
master be determined according to the Chilean law, although 
the man, by the effect of concurring circumstances, had to 
stay on the ship during the entire voyage; all other require-
ments would be gover11ed by the law of the flag (replacing the 
law of the place of wrong). 
The other illustrations speak of a health officer burning 
20 I BEALE 3I7 ns. 3 and 4; RHEINSTEIN, supra n. I, 19 Tul. L. Rev. (1944) 
196 (as to England and most American states); Italian Penal Code of 1930, 
art. 6; LILIENTHAL, Der Ort der begangenen Handlung, in Festgabe fiir 
Georg Wilhelm Wetzell, Marburg r 890; see also 72 RGZ. 43 footnote. 
21 Germany: ZPO. § 32; RG. (Jan. ro, 1936) JW. 1936, 129I, I292. 
22 § 382. See RHEINSTEIN, I9 Tul. L. Rev. (r944) at ro. 
22a (r86o) Bell C. C. 220. 
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infected rags and a sheriff shooting a fleeing murderer, so 
near the border that injuries result on the other side of the 
frontier. 
This rule has been regarded as an inadequate attempt to 
narrow down the place of injury rule.23 It may, however, 
be questioned also from the contrary view, as going too far. 
Commonly, the mistake is committed to treat on the same 
footing cases where a tort is entirely done in one territory, 
although effects occur elsewhere, and where the acting ex-
tends to more than one territory. Certainly, there is justifi-
cation for recognizing that the arrest of a man, quite as much 
as the seizure of an object/4 is no tort if it is lawful under the 
law of the place where the whole act has been done and 
completed. Any effects happening in another jurisdiction 
ought not to alter this postulate which, perhaps, may be 
generalized into an important rule involving all acts com-
pletely done in one jurisdiction and alleged to violate the 
"law": the "law" in question ought only to be that of the 
place where the act is entirely performed. While this is a 
necessary modification to any theory of the place of injury, it 
is not exactly the place of corporal movement per se that 
accounts for it; if the Restatement (illustrations 4 and 5) 
declares that someone shooting in state X and hitting a person 
standing in state Y enjoys privileges conferred by law X, this 
is a very doubtful proposition. We shall have to discuss be-
low acts extending over several jurisdictions. Nor does the 
evident equity of the postulate hold good for the entire field 
of privileges and duties to act. Suppose, for instance, that the 
Chilean law in reality did not empower the governor of the 
province to give the order to the British shipmaster. Whether 
the latter's erroneous belief that he had to obey excused him 
23 RHEINSTEIN, 19 Tul. L. Rev. (1944) at 13. 
24 See, for instance, the Netherlands: App. Leeuwarden (Feb. 6, 1929) W. 
12014, VAN HASSELT 309. 
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when he helped to deprive the plaintiff of his freedom need 
not necessarily be, and probably should not be, determined 
by the local (Chilean) law, by exception to the regularly 
applicable law of the flag. 
The inspiration received from Regina v. Lesley suggests 
some connection with the English rule that the act must be 
unjustifiable under the lex loci actus, although also actionable 
at the English forum. However, all supporting English cases 
deal with acts entirely done in a foreign country. 
Indeed, in the Lesley case it was stated as a separate offense 
that the continuing detention of the prisoner after the vessel 
left the Chilean territorial waters, constituted false imprison-
ment by application of the British law of the flag. Thus, there 
was no aftereffect of the Chilean privilege on the high seas 
to be condoned because of the Chilean law. Neither do these 
decisions fortify the theory of the Restatement, nor is their 
own theory explained by the provision of the Restatement. 
(b) Influence of the law of the place of effect. On the other 
hand, a few writers who believe in the decisiveness of the 
place of acting have made an exception in favor of the place 
where the effects of a tort appear, when the acting person 
either intends the effects in another state or recklessly does 
not care where his acts take effect. 25 
On another ground, Rheinstein has recently suggested that 
while on principle the law of the place of acting should gov-
ern, another state where the effects take place may, in virtue of 
its public policy, adjudicate a claim according to its own law of 
tort, provided that the actor could foresee that it would cause 
harm in that other state. Third states would not be, therefore, 
in a position to apply this latter law. 26 
(c) Differentiated solutions. A remarkable suggestion was 
25 HABICHT 95; RAAPE zo6 (with restriction to cases involving the state 
frontier). 
26 RHEINSTEIN, 19 Tul. L. Rev. ( 1944) at 3 r. 
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made by Meili 27 in r902 and regrettably fell into oblivion. 
He knew the difficulty of finding a good formula for all cases 
and advocated different rules for fixing the place of wrong 
in the cases of seizures, press delicts, and defamations. 
5. Differences of Policies 
Another important contribution to our topic has been made 
by pointing out that the law of torts has a threefold social 
function and that the local contact of a tort depends upon the 
function most emphasized. The three functions are said to 
be the following: 
"A primary purpose is to fix the standards of conduct of a 
person so he can know what he may do and what he may not 
do, and so that others can know what type of conduct to 
expect from him. This purpose of delimiting tort liability 
suggests that it is for the state where a person acts to deter-
mine whether his conduct and its consequences create liability. 
"Another purpose ... is to fix the measure of protection 
to which each person is entitled against his fellows. This 
purpose suggests it is for the state where the damage is 
suffered to determine whether the damage was wrongfully 
inflicted and gave rise to a right of action in tort. The recent 
extension of liability without fault with consequent emphasis 
on the protection of the injured party rather than on the 
wrongfulness of any conduct involved may indicate this 
purpose is the fundamental one in a wide part of the tort 
field.ms 
Third, the purpose to give compensation is thought to 
27 MElLI 96. Already 2. BAR I 2.0 n. 9 recommended a special rule for the 
press, pointing to the publication rather than the sending of articles. I would 
like to refer also to the (unfortunately unelaborated) observation of FEDOZZI 
760: If it is true that one who acts at a certain place must respect the pro-
visions of the localla w and incurs a liability by committing an illicit act accord-
ing to this local law, it is no less true that, for determining the damages due to 
the victim of the illicit act, the place where the harm has happened must be taken 
into consideration. On the other hand, 2. ZITELMANN 478-480 has rejected 
Bar's suggestion as unfounded, and this seems to be the general opinion. 
28 CHEATHAM, Cases 4 I 6; the authors mention as a fourth purpose "civil 
penology" which may play an additional role. 
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lead possibly to the state of the "injured person's domicil." 
Except for this third approach, which no law has followed 
and which does not appear to be commendable, these remarks 
are thought-provoking. 
Obviously, however, the bulk of the tort laws cannot be 
neatly divided into two groups, one of which, by virtue of a 
policy protecting private interests, would be appropriately 
allocated to the American rule, while the other, devoted to 
the prevention of undesirable conduct, would belong to the 
place of acting theory. Most tort laws are supported by both 
policies in an unascertainable mixture. Besides, if the same 
type of tort were to be characterized separately in each state 
according to a particular shade of policy, new difficulties 
would top the old ones. 
Nevertheless, it is quite true, there are types of tort such 
as liabilities without fault which ought to be localized in a 
specific manner. It will appear, however, that their particular 
localization is not directly due to the policy and still less to 
the interest of the state, but to the technical shape of the 
obligation, although this, of course, is conditioned by both 
policy and interest considerations. For example, a railroad 
enterprise must commonly bear the damage done to pas-
sengers in an accident on its rails without the plaintiff's proof 
that the management or the agents were at fault. The policy 
supporting such statutes is as much intended to lay a great 
part of the risk on the economically stronger party, as to ad-
just the unequal procedural situation in litigating against a 
complicated big industrial enterprise or to discourage railroads 
from negligent methods of operation. It is impossible to infer 
from one part of this policy a device for localization and not 
from the others. Yet, the purpose of the tort rule in which 
the legislatkre consideration; converge is sharply expressed 
in the technical shape of an absolute or strict liability directly 
established on the fact of the accident. This, indeed, ought 
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to be a strong reason for localizing this kind of tort. It is 
directly centered at one place through the very purpose of the 
legislator, brought to evidence by the structure of the specific 
tort. 
It will be opportune, first to analyze the significance of 
the various local contacts that may be produced by the several 
elements of a tortious liability. 
II. THE PLAC;E oF AcTING 
r. Preparatory Acts 
As in penal law, 29 preparatory acts are distinguishable 
from the elements of the cause of action. Writing a defama-
tory letter, loading a rifle, designing an imitated trade-mark, 
are outside of the essential elements of defamation, killing, 
or unfair competition, although they may constitute by them-
selves independent offenses in other categories under distinct 
regulatory provisions, e.g., possession of dangerous weapons, 
counterfeiting, industrial espionage, or make an accessory 
liable in addition to the principal tortfeasor. Acts preparatory 
to a tort do not characterize it and, hence, are unable to 
localize a tort. Where, for instance, damages are sought for 
an unfounded arrest, the place at which the defendant affixed 
his signature to the power of attorney authorizing his lawyer 
to file the petition for the arrest, is immaterial.80 
This simple truth refutes many Continental authors and a 
few European decisions advocating the place where a letter 
containing a libel or unfair competition has been written and 
mailed. It is a different case where a defamatory letter has 
been "published" according to Anglo-American conceptions, 
by dictating it to a stenographer or delivering it to a trans-
lator before posting. ~ 
29 Germany: EBERMAYER-LOBE-ROSENBERG, Strafgesetzbuch (ed. 3, 191.5) 
§ 3 n. 11.. 
30 MElLI 96. 
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2. Acts and Omissions 
(a) Omissive torts. Acting in the field of torts is ordi-
narily conceived as a physical movement, one of the muscles 
or the nerves. Thus, the health officer burning infected rags, 
in the previously mentioned example of the Restatement, 
"acts" at the place of the burning. Correspondingly, omis-
sion, as an element of a tort species, is the failure to act by 
bodily movement. On the basis of their theory referring to 
the law of the place of acting, the European writers have 
been embarrassed by the question, how to localize an omis-
sion. They agree that an omission is committed where a 
duty to act exists but disagree on the state entitled to impose 
this duty. Is it the state where the alleged tortfeasor is 
present at the time and, therefore, would be able to act 
bodily? 31 Or where he is domiciled? 32 Or, after all, that of 
the injury? 33 Or, does the criterion vary according to the 
circumstances? 
To support the third solution, the following example has 
been discussed. 34 A resident of London, the owner of a house 
situated in Vienna, is certainly liable for an injury to a passer-
by caused by a collapse of the building, according to the 
Austrian statutory provision (deriving, like many others, 
from the Roman cautio damni infecti).35 The problem cannot 
be determined by English law, which, by the way, produced 
an analogous remedy only after this discussion in 1934·36 
This type of liability is unmistakably tied to the local situation 
of the building, irrespective of the place where the owner 
31 2 ZITELMANN 490. 
32 2 FRANKENSTEIN 3 70. 
33 WALKER 527· 
34 WALKER 527; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 370; RAAPE 208. 
35 Dig. Title 3 9> 2; Austrian All g. BGB. § I 3 I9 (as of I 9 I 6) ; French C. C. 
art. q86; German BGB. § 836. 
36 Wilchick v. Marks and Silverstone [I934] 2 K. B. 56, cf. Io Z.ausl.PR. 
(I 9 3 6) 2 8o; WINFIELD, Text-Book of the Law of Tort ( ed. z, I 943) 506. 
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might have written an order for inspection or repair. The 
problem, in fact, materialized in the Belgian courts. 37 A 
Belgian company owned a building in Germany which it 
failed to repair. A Belgian citizen was killed by its collapse. 
The court applied the national law common to both parties, 
in this case an evident mistake. 
Similarly, the failure of a locomotive engineer to give 
a warning signal at a distance of three hundred yards before 
passing a street crossing, cannot be judged under any other 
standards than those offered at the place of the crossing. A 
state boundary running two hundred yards from the crossing 
cannot alter the duty. 
On the other hand, if a man advises a friend to go with 
his family to a resort where infection by scarlet fever may 
easily occur, his duty of warning him, if any, cannot be im-
posed by the state of the resort but that where the advice is 
given. The negligent counsel, not the injury, in this case is 
the only possible basis of liability. 
(b) Accomplices. A seizure of goods was sought and ac-
complished in British India on a pretended claim that later 
proved unfounded. Damages were asked in a suit against a 
firm in Bremen, Germany, and awarded under the German 
law, the construction being that this firm had caused the 
seizure by incitement.38 The German Reichsgericht likewise 
declared a German company liable, under German law, for 
unfair competition committed by its American subsidiary, 
where the German company "caused or decisively influenced" 
the conduct of its affiliate. 39 If, however, the tort committed 
by the chief actor was localized in India or the United States, 
37 App. Bruxelles (Jan. 3, 19o8) Clunet 1909, 241; Cass. Beige (Nov. 26, 
r 9o8) Clunet 1909, r 178. 
38 OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 18, 1928) Hans. RGZ. 1928 A 431, IPRspr. 1928 
r\o. 38. 
39 RG. (Feb. 14, 1936) 150 RGZ. 265. The decision enumerates other facts 
leading to a similar liability, which have been considered supra p. 298. 
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it seems evident that the liability of an accessory to the act 
should be determined according to the same law. 
3· Acting in Several States 
Two groups of situations ought to be distinguished.40 
(a) Separate torts in several countries. The conduct of the 
actor may be carried on in more states than one as in the 
following illustrations: 
(i) Defendant has inserted a libelous statement about the 
plaintiff in twenty newspapers, each of which is published 
in a different state; 
(ii) Defendant, by carrying on propaganda in several 
states, has induced a group of employers throughout these 
states to lock out their employees; 
(iii) Defendant has committed continued assault upon 
the plaintiff while he and the plaintiff were crossing a state 
line on a train. 
A common characteristic of these cases is the plurality of 
acts each of which creates a tort. By mere logic, every partial 
activity is subject to its own localization. The results, how-
ever, under any ordinary method of localization, are incon-
venient. Thus, under the place of injury theory, where a 
libelous article was inserted in a newspaper published in 
Hamburg, then a territory of Roman law, and circulated in 
various other places, the Hanseatic Appeal Court applied 
to each defamation its own local law,41 the damages being 
assessed separately for each territory. The decision would be 
the same under the prevailing approach in this country. Ob-
jections to such unsound complications are obvious.42 
40 2 ZITELMANN 486. 
41 0LG. Hamburg (June 11, 1897) Hans. GZ. 1898, Beibl. No. 146, cf. 
LEWALD 263. 
42 They are the same as in the case of a broadcast heard in several states, on 
which see infra 4 sub (d), pp. 320 ff. 
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Again, if the place of acting in its usual meaning should 
be followed, each tort is characterized by the place where 
a libelous statement has been dispatched to be published in 
a newspaper or broadcast and, similarly in example (ii), by 
that where the defendant has mailed his letters. This may 
practically simplify localization, but mailing is in fact only 
a preparatory act and, therefore, not characteristic at all of the 
tort. 
A more adequate approach ought to be found, abandoning 
both contending theories. 
(b) Single tort committed by partial acts in several states. 
In the same way as a criminal offense, an intentional tort may 
be committed by several acts connected by one volition. For 
example: 
(iv) Firm A, for the purpose of competition with B, uses 
an imitated trademark in state X, publishes untrue statements 
concerning this trademark in Y, and sues Bin a vexatious suit 
for annulment of the latter's trademark in state Z. While each 
of these acts may or may not present an independent cause 
of action, they are normally made the subject of one lawsuit 
for damages on the ground of unfair competition. 
( v) A railway brakeman negligently couples two cars in 
state X, and the train runs with the uncontrolled defect 
through states Y and Z, finally derailing. Or, a truck affected 
by engine trouble, due to the negligence of a garage employee 
of the owner firm, injures a person after passing a state 
border. No cause of action can be found unless all the elements 
of partial acting occurring in several states are added to-
gether. Where is the tort ((committed" for the purpose 
of conflict law? 
The only existing answer to this question by a legal text, 
article twenty-eight of the International Convention on the 
Transport of Passengers, in the case of death, injury, or delay-
ing of passengers, refers oracularly to ((the law of the state 
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where the fact has occurred"43-which fact, we do not learn. 
From the basis of their place of acting theory, German 
writers have discussed whether the place of acting should be 
defined as where the "most efficient part" of the conduct 
has been carried on; 44 or whether conduct carried on in several 
states should never involve the actor in liability, unless it is 
actionable in every one of such states.45 While in the United 
States the place of wrong is usually defined as the place where 
the last part of the defendant's conduct is carried on, in 
Europe the place of its first part also has been considered. 
In this country, in fact, all places of acting are generally 
disregarded. 46 In a rare attempt of justification, 47 the Missis-
sippi Court, deciding the case in illustration ( v), explained 
that the railway company is present everywhere in its net-
work of lines, and any negligence committed is felt at the 
place where the injury occurs. "The locality of the collision 
was in Tennessee. It was there, if anywhere, that the company 
was remiss in duty, for there is where its proper caution 
should have been used."48 If this means that the places of 
negligent acts or failures to act may be unknown without 
altering the liability under the law of the place of injury, 
it is convincing. If, however, a definite cause has been proved, 
as supposed in the example, it is difficult to see why the rail-
way could not be sued also under the law of the state where 
the fateful negligence was committed. 
43 Convention of Berne, of October 23, 1924, art. 28 § 1; revised at Rome, on 
Nov. 23, 1933, see HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation s68 at 579· 
44 NEUMEYER, IPR. 32; HABICHT 95· 
45 Discussed and rejected by KAHN, 30 Jherings Jahrb. I I 9, I Abhandl. no. 
46 Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Foster (I882) 78 Tenn. 35I; Chicago etc. R. Co. 
v. Doyle (I883) 6o Miss. 977; Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. McMullen (I889) 
II7 Ind. 439, 20 N. E. 287; Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Carroll (I892) 97 Ala. 
126, II So. 8o3; El Paso, etc. R. Co. v. McComas (Tex. Civ. App. I9o3) 
72 S. W. 629. 
47 The Carroll case repeats the usual argument of injuries commenced in one 
state and completed in another. 
48 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Doyle, supra n. 46. 
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It is noteworthy that the same decision added with respect 
to negligence by active conduct: "Physical force proceeding 
from this state and inflicting injury in another state might 
give rise to an action in either state." Apparently, this court 
would not entirely disapprove of the German practice grant-
ing a choice between the laws of all jurisdictions where faulty 
conduct has occurred or harm is caused. 
Among the suggestions contributed by the literature, the 
proposition deserves attention that the most characteristic 
part of the tortious activity should prevail in localizing the 
tort. More appropriately, not just some part of the corporal 
movements of the tortfeasor but the most characteristic 
element of the entire cause of action should indicate which 
is the decisive place and the law best qualified to govern. 
4· Acting at a distance49 
(a) Means of acting in foreign jurisdictions. A person is 
generally said to act where his bodily movements occur. But 
how does such an approach conform to the epoch of telephone 
and radio? Half a century ago, the German Civil Code had 
already assimilated an offer made by telephone to an oral 
offer.50 The voice may be audible only to the person ad-
dressed. Messengers were used in most remote antiquity, 
and the Roman common law, thoroughly adverse to contracts 
made by agents, i.e., acting by another free person, opposed 
no obstacle to declarations sent by a "nuntius" or, in other 
words, transmitted through a person as an instrument. A 
third equivalent situation derives from the concepts of crim-
inal law: a responsible person-"indirect actor"--commits 
a wrong by compelling another person or inciting a child or 
lunatic, to do the material act. 
49 Considerations of this sort, to my knowledge, have been only expressed by 
RAAPE 204 and D. IPR. 326; KosTERS 794, on the spur of a decision of the 
Dutch Hooge Raad, mentions acting by an instrument at a distant place. 
50 BGB. § 147 par. r. 
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In addition to the obvious, though in conflicts matters 
strangely neglected, application of these devices to tortious 
conduct, it has become fully recognized that a legal person 
may commit a tort by the act of its representative. 51 Although 
vicarious liability has been incorrectly construed on the basis 
of agency,S2 it also shows a case of liability for unlawful acts 
done by other persons. 
Hence, the theory advocating the law of the place of 
acting is entirely antiquated, if it stresses physical movements. 
Not the locality where a person operates, but that to which 
his operations are directed, is material. A person who slanders 
another over the telephone does not commit defamation in 
the telephone booth, but rather where the words are heard. 
(b) Letters. Although some older European decisions 
have favored the place where a letter is written and mailed/3 
the constant practice of the Reichsgericht,54 followed by courts 
of other nations, 55 regards both the places where the letter 
is sent and where it is received, as places of wrong. The latter 
is often identical with that where the suit is brought and 
the law of which is applied. In this country, the cases reach 
the same result upon the theory that the injury, prevailingly 
a defamation, is inflicted at the place of arrival and recep-
tion. 56 But that a sender acts through the mail as instrument 
51 Supra p. 128, cf. p. 74 n. 28. 
52 Supra p. 272. 
53 Bavaria: Oberappellationsgericht (March I6, I847) I2 Blatter fiir 
Rechtsanwendung in Bayern 287: an injurious letter was sent from a place 
under German common law to a place of the Prussian Code; the injury is 
completed at the place where the letter was written and mailed, since the sender 
was firmly convinced that the letter would reach the addressee. 
Switzerland: Cass. Ziirich (March I6, I9I2) I2 Bl.f.Ziirch. Rspr. No. 7I, 25 
Z.int.R. 296. 
54 RG. (Nov. 2o, I 888) 23 RGZ. 305 (information about credit); (Dec. 2 I, 
I9oo) 56 Seuff. Arch. 308 No. I75 (unfair competition); (Dec. 22, I9o2) 
I3 Z.int.R. I7I; (Dec. 2, I92I) 22 Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 6I (unfair 
competition). 
55 Switzerland: BG. (March 6, I 9I4) 40 BGE. I 8 (criminal deceit by letter). 
56 Restatement§ 377 note 5; Haskell v. Bailey (I894) 25 U.S. App. 99, 63 
Fed. 873; cf. HANCOCK, Torts 252 n. 3· 
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until the letter is delivered, is a construction familiar to the 
courts. Consequently, with a slight difference, we may em-
phasize the delivery rather than the reading of the letter 
and obtain a rule based on a time and place more easily evi-
denced. This is exactly what acting at a distance involves. 5 7 
(c) Suppliers. Another important example is furnished 
by the liability of suppliers to third persons without con-
tractual connection, so remarkably developed in this country 
from Cardozo's famous decision in McPherson v. Buick.58 In 
Hunter v. Derby Foods/9 fatally spoiled canned goods were 
shipped to Ohio. The court applied the advanced law of 
Ohio, the decisive place being where the victim ate and died 
and not where the distributor shipped the food; the court 
compared the case to shooting a firearm across the state line 
or owning a vicious animal which strays over the state line. 
However, in this case, the place was identical with that to 
which the seller had shipped the food. Another case is particu-
larly informative. To use the resume by Hancock: "In Reed 
and Barton v. Maas, a coffee urn, which had been defectively 
constructed in Massachusetts by the defendant was sold by 
him to a caterer in Wisconsin. The urn, while in use by the 
caterer, spilled hot coffee upon the plaintiff in Wisconsin. 
Wisconsin law was allowed to define the legal position of the 
manufacturer -defendant. " 60 
Suppose the caterer had taken the urn to Alaska or Iran 
or simply sold it to a colleague overseas. Would a customer 
injured there have an action, too, according to the local laws 
Similarly, Scotland: Evans & Sons v. Stein & Co. (I9o4) Court of Sessions, 
42 Scot. L. R. I 03, Jurid. Rev. I 905, 402. 
57 Also CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 673, an advocate of the law of 
the place of acting, teaches that defamation by a mailed letter is committed at the 
place where it is handed to the addressee. 
58 McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (I9I6) ZI7 N.Y. 38z, III N. E. 105o; 
PROSSER, Torts 673 § 83. 
59 (C. C. A. :zd I94o) IIo F. (:zd) 97o; Note, I33 A. L. R. z6o. 
60 (C. C. A. rst 1934) 73 F. (:zd) 359; HANCOCK, Torts z54. 
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of these parts? The prevailing American form of the sup-
plier's liability requires an injury to such persons as the 
supplier would expect to be in the vicinity of its probable use61 
and, thus, may prevent surprising references in conflicts law. 
In fact, the place to which the manufacturer or merchant ships 
the defective goods, marks the point where his responsible 
acting ends for the purpose of choice of law. 
Recently the English Court of Appeals considered the 
sale by a New York corporation to an English distributor, of 
a product for destroying vermin, the property passing in New 
York. The American seller supposedly should have given 
warning that purchasers should be given proper written in-
structions respecting safe use of the product. When after a 
subsale in England, a farmer suffered damage from the prod-
uct and obtained compensation from the buyer, an action for 
recourse based on tortious negligence was set aside because 
nothing had been done by the corporation in England.~2 This 
would have been a correct decision only if the warning was 
due to a person in New York itself. 
(d) Broadcasts, newspapers, and the like. Mass communi-
cation by broadcast and newspapers present analogous prob-
lems. The Restatement declares that harm to the reputation 
of a person is done at the place where the defamatory state-
ment is communicated and, in case of a broadcast, where 
the broadcast is heard by people conversant with the plain-
tiff's good repute.63 Evidently, if the broadcast is heard in 
many states, the places of wrong may be multiplied. This 
seems the more so, as "publication," a requirement of libel 
or slander, is generally held to exist wherever the defamatory 
statement is heard and understood by any third person.64 
61 2 Restatement of the Law of Torts§ 395· 
62 George Monro, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and Chemical Corp. [1944] 
K. B. 432· 
'
63 Restatement § 3 77 note 5. 
64 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts§ 577; HARPER, Torts§ 236. 
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A libelous newspaper article causes injury at the place of the 
original publication as well as at all places of circulation. 65 
European courts have decided on the same lines.66 The 
Reichsgericht has argued that communication of a news-
paper is analogous to that by a letter; the paper is sent t<. 
other places as a letter is sent. 67 But an English court, even 
with respect to assuming jurisdiction "at the place where 
a tort has been committed," has conveniently added that an 
inconsiderable circulation of a foreign newspaper in England 
may be negligible.68 
With this feeble correction, all theories converge in the 
assumption of a multitude of places of wrong and in sense-
lessly complicated procedural burdens on court and parties. 
In a few recent American cases, however, the disadvantage 
of such "checker-board jurisprudence," as Federal District 
Judge Wyzanski of Massachusetts called it, has been keenly 
felt. Asked for a decree to enjoin unfair competition by the 
use of trade-marks, he excluded "writing opinions and enter-
ing decrees adapted with academic nicety to the vagaries 
of forty-eight states."69 Likewise, Judge Learned Hand, 
in the Federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals, refused an 
injunction to safeguard the exclusive right of an orchestra 
conductor to broadcast disks of his phonographic records 
publicly sold, a right recognized only in Pennsylvania, while 
unauthorized reproductions would be lawful in the other 
states. Any injunction on broadcasting under such Circum-
stances, was considered as going entirely too far, since it 
could not be confined to hearers in Pennsylvania.70 
65 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts§ 58 I. 
66 Germany: RG. (May IS, I89I) 27 RGZ. 4I8; RAAPE 205. 
67 RG., supra n. 66, at 420, 42 r. 
68 Krach v. Le Petit Parisien [I937] I All E. R. 725, C. A. The court, of 
course, concedes that technically circulation in England has occurred, but uses 
its discretionary power to refuse an order for service out of the jurisdiction. 
69 National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co. (I 942) 4 7 F. Supp. 
499> 504· 
70 RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman (1940) r 14 F. (2d) 86. 
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What law, then, should be applied? Should it be the 
lex fori, as was the principle adopted in the first-mentioned 
case? 71 The facts of this case seem to warrant another theory 
to the same effect of applying the local law; the competition 
was evidently centered in the state. When an action was 
brought, in the same federal district court sitting in Massa-
chusetts, to enjoin unfair competition committed by un-
lawfully reproducing horse-race charts in a newspaper, the 
conflicts rule of the state court was supposed to be in favor 
of the local law, for the reason that the defendants prepared 
all their material, and the greater part of the competition 
occurred, in Massachusetts. 72 In an older leading case dis-
cussed above on unfair competition committed by the use 
of a brand which was protected as a trade-mark in the United 
States but not in Germany, the American court took juris-
diction and applied federal law, because the fraudulent con-
spiracy to affix the brand in Germany on barrels to be sent 
there, was conceived in the United States and the barrels 
were manufactured and filled here and shipped from Ameri-
can ports; 73 in fact, the most important part of the activities 
was carried out within the jurisdiction. Of particular interest 
is another case where the circuit court of appeals in Chicago 
purposefully stressed the main charge to be the misappropria-
tion of a business system, the essential of this wrong being the 
manufacture and sale of certain plates in Illinois. The circum-
stance that no tort was committed until the plates were 
actually used in a foreign state by customers, was declared 
merely incidental to the main charge and immaterial for the 
71 This has been approved in the Note, 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 298, 303. 
72 Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co. (D. C. 
D. Mass. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 198, 203. The judge was the same as in the case 
supra n. 69. 
73 Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. (C. C. D. N.J. 1907) 154 Fed. 867, 
supra Chapter 2 5 n. 17 3; see the comment in George W. Luft Co. v. Zande 
Cosmetic Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1944-) 142 F. (zd) 536, 540. 
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choice of law. 74 This consideration rather than the application 
of the lex fori as such conforms to the most desirable rule. 
The only practical and theoretically justified solution is 
furnished by centering the tort in its most characteristic 
locality. In the case of periodicals this is clearly the publishing 
house, 75 in that of broadcasting, the office responsible for the 
radio transmission. 
III. THE PLACE OF INJURY 
I. Injury and Damage 
In view of the argument popular among European writers 
that the place where a tort takes effect is a vague and un-
certain concept and that such a place may be found all over 
the world, it is opportune to note the elaborate concept pre-
vailing in the American doctrine and formulated in the 
Restatement. 76 A tort is localized at the precise place in 
which it is completed by "harm" to a person or tangible 
thing, or, in a broader term, by "injury" inflicted on a pro-
tected interest. More closely, it is the first invasion of the 
interest that counts, the intrusion upon bodily integrity, 
a personal sphere, a land or chattel. Damage may develop 
from there on in various ways. The harm may increase or 
vanish, the losses caused may vary and change by proximate 
or remote consequences, normal or extraordinary combina-
tions of cause and effect, intervening acts of the parties and 
of third parties. 
Thus, once more, the antagonistic theories, referring to 
the place of acting and that of injury, respectively, partly 
74 Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt & Mfg. 
Co. (C. C. A. 7th I94I) I24 F. (2d) 7o6, 709. 
75 This has already been advocated by 2 BAR 120 n. 9; 2 MElLI 96. 
76 Out of insufficient knowledge, RuDOLF SCHMIDT, Der Ort etc., supra n. 
I, at I 84 invokes the American example as though it supported the application 
of the law of the forum in case damage has been suffered there, 
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agree. The events posterior to the injury do not produce 
significant local connections. Only the Reichsgericht finds it 
relevant that a person, bodily injured in state X, incurs 
medical expenses in state Y, loses wages in Z, and leaves 
dependents in states L and M. This plain exaggeration has 
attracted most of the attacks that have been inadvisably 
directed against the entire doctrine of the Reichsgericht. 
The later American cases concerning railway accidents 
consistently declare immaterial at what place the death of 
the victim occurs; only the physical impact on the body 
counts. 77 A drug wholesaler in St. Louis, Missouri, sent 
ginger extract containing poisonous wood alcohol to a grocer 
in Oklahoma, who himself drank a bottle, and after having 
been removed to Missouri, died from the beverage. The 
court applied the death statute of Oklahoma according to 
principle. 78 Most other cases follow the same ,line. 79 A death 
statute is not construed as intended to apply to persons dying 
in the state, but to persons harmed there so as to succumb 
subsequently to the injury. Another consideration is fairness 
towards the wrongdoer, as his liability possibly would be 
increased if another law could be substituted after the deed.80 
However, all this is only a confirmation of the result that, 
in looking for the center of tort, we cannot find it in any 
event subsequent to the harm done. 
Strangely deviating, however, in a well-known case of 
a passenger boat sinking on the high seas because of negligent 
77 Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1899) 93 Fed. 26o; Crane v. 
Chicago, etc. R. Co. (1908) 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 222; Centofanti v. 
Pennsylvania R. Co. (1914) 244 Pa. 255, 90 Atl. 558. See moreover the cases 
cited by HANCOCK 255 n. 12. 
78 Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co. (1910) 146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S. W. 
430. Another case involving a drug is Moore v. Pywell (1907) 29 App. D. C. 
JI 2, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1078 (infra n. 97). 
79 See the Annotations to the Restatement § 3 7 7, for instance, those of 
Maryland and Minnesota. 
80 See HANCOCK, "Choice of Law Policies in Multiple Contact Cases," 5 U. 
of Toronto L. J. (1943) 133, 138. 
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navigation, it has been held that a passenger drowning in 
the ocean was not injured on the vessel but on the high 
seas and that therefore an action lay against the French 
company under the French death statute, whereas the general 
maritime law gave no action for death.81 But even if it had 
been proved that he jumped overboard to save himself, the 
injury would have occurred on the vessel. The court required 
death as the "substance of the injury," instead of regarding 
death as a mere effect of the injury, a confusion that was 
frequent in the early construction of death statutes. But if 
the court had simply applied the French law, which is clear 
on the point, it would have correctly decided on the theory 
that the harm was done on the vessel when a passenger was 
forced to leave it, and that the place of his ensuing death 
was immaterial. 82 The true rule has been expressed in an 
analogous case: "The crucial test is, where was the tortious 
act committed, not where were the damages consummated, 
... although the final injury be completed elsewhere."83 
Also, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has recognized that, 
in a suit for seduction of a married woman, the place where 
the husband suffered mental anguish is immaterial. 84 
A right of privacy is invaded where the "plaintiff's name 
and X-ray picture first became public property."85 A libelous 
letter to be sent to Switzerland produces an injury to the 
addressee as soon as it is given to a translator. 86 
Deceit. However, how can such ulterior damage be ex-
cluded from the process of localization when the tort, such 
as fraud or unfair competition, consists in the invasion of 
81 Rundell v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (r9oo) roo Fed. 655. 
82 See the correct statement by the Supreme Court on the French law: La 
Bourgogne (r9o8) 210 U.S. 95, 138. 
83 Lindstrom v. International Navigation Co. (C. C. E. D. N.Y. 1902) rq 
Fed. 173. 
84 BG. (June rs, 1917) 43 BGE. II 309, 316 sub 2. 
85 Banks v. King Features Syndicate (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 
J52. 
86 Kiene v. Ruff (1855) 1 Iowa 482,486. 
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pecuniary interests? As the writers who attack the Reichs-
gericht doctrine emphasize, in such a case the injured interest 
is not located at one place only. The assets of the plaintiff 
may be dispersed over the whole earth. "Is the plaintiff's es-
tate situated wherever there are assets, or is it at his domicil, 
following the maxim, res ossibus inhaerent?"81 
The remarkable solution suggested by the Restatemene8 
seems to furnish the answer. It concentrates the cause of action 
for fraud in the place "where the loss is sustained, not where 
fraudulent representations are made." Beale reached this 
proposition by construing the case Keeler v. Ley89 as dis-
tinguishing the place where the defendant induced the 
plantiff to sell his land from the place where he conveyed 
it/0 the latter constituting the situs of the tort. The authority 
is doubtful,91 but Beale's interpretation is consistent. The 
most characteristic fact, indeed, is that the plaintiff was 
swindled out of his property. Raape by an argument ad 
absurdum against the Reichsgericht, rhetorically asks where 
the effect of the tort should be placed when a plaintiff domi-
ciled in Berlin loses a law suit at a court in Lyons, France, 
against a Spanish firm, because of perjury of the defendant 
who was a witness. 92 The Restaters would probably not 
87 RAAPE 203. 
88 Restatement § 3 77 note 4· This section has been applied, by analogy, by 
CALLMAN, 2 Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (1945) 1749 § 1oo.2(a), 
to cases of trade-mark infringement: the wrong would take place "not where 
the deceptive labels are affixed to the goods or where the goods are wrapped in 
the misleading packages, but where the passing off occurs, i.e., where the 
deceived customer buys the defendant's product in the belief that he is buying 
the plaintiff's." But this is only the place where the deceit of the customer 
occurs and neither that of the trade-mark infringement nor of unfair com-
petition, cf. supra Chapter 25, pp. 2.95 n. 169, 2.96. 
89 Keeler v. Fred T. Ley & Co. (1931) 49 F. (zd) 8p; (1933) 65 F. (zd) 
499· On the basis of the Restatement, however, Judge Goodrich, in Smyth 
Sales v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co. (1942.) 12.8 F. (zd) 697, 699 states 
that in the instant case the sale of plaintiff's business for an inadequate con-
sideration was the loss caused by the deceit and applies the law of the state 
where the contract of sale has been executed. 
90 2 BEALE u87. 
91 RHEINSTEIN, supra n. I, I 78. 
92 See RAAPE 203. 
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hesitate to reply that the injury occurred in Lyons, while 
all ensuing damages in Spain or Germany would have no 
influence on localization. It was the mistake of the Reichs-
gericht to treat injury and damage on the same footing, a 
view that seems to be abandoned in the latest phases of deal-
ing with unfair competition. 93 
2. Injury and Acting 
The efforts of the American doctrine to localize the tort 
have another interesting side. Bodily harm is deemed to be 
suffered where "the harmful force takes effect upon the 
body," as when a bullet enters the body.94 A tort against a 
piece of land is committed at its situs and against a chattel 
at the place where it is situated at the moment of the impact.95 
These commendable solutions will in many cases be indis-
tinguishable from the result of a theory of acting at a distance. 
A slight divergence between these two theories would 
occur if poisoning were located (following Beale) "where 
the deleterious substance takes effect (that is, the poisoned 
person falls ill) and not where it is administered."96 This 
solution, apparently devoid of any case authority, is incon-
sistent with the principle and highly impractical, nobody 
being able to state exactly at which moment an already 
poisoned man falls "ill." But the court in the Darks case, 
mentioned above/7 directly declined to apply the law of the 
place where the shipment arrived, namely at the business 
place of the grocer in Missouri, and applied the law of Okla-
homa where the addressee drank from the bottle. The court 
there followed the traditional rule in express contrast to 
93 140 RGZ. 25; see supra p. 297 and RAAPE, D. IPR p6. 
94 Restatement § 3 7 7 Note x. 
95 /d. note 3· 
96 /d. note 2; 2 BEALE I z88 cites Moore v. Pywell, supra n. 78, but this 
case is anything but clear. 
97 Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co. ( 1 9 I o) I.j.6 Mo. App. 246, qo S. W. 
430; supra n. 78. 
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what we may call the law of the place of distant acting. 
Damage by aircraft. Where damage is done to a person 
or property on the surface of the earth by or from an aircraft 
in flight over the territory of a state, such as by crash landing, 
falling or thrown objects, including jettison, the place of 
wrong, if any, cannot be conveniently located except on the 
territory of the injury done.98 
IV. THE STRUCTURE oF ToRTs 
r. Liability Without Proof of Fault 
(a) Absolute liability. In a number of states, the statutory 
liability of a railway company to a person injured by an 
accident on its lines is based on the mere fact of carrying 
on a dangerous activity. That the train has a collision or a 
derailment then suffices to constitute the cause of action. 
Whether such a statute intends to protect injured persons 
rather than to impose on the railroads the necessity of es-
tablishing the safest system of equipment, organization, and 
personnel, is an academic question. Important for localizing 
the tort is the juridical isolation of the facts composing the 
cause of action from the human acts and ommissions that 
caused the mishap. Through the technical structure of these 
torts, the obligation is rendered more independent of its 
cause, more "abstract," than is an obligation written in a 
negotiable instrument and thereby separated from its source. 
The accident alone characterizes the facts of the claim; the 
harmful conduct vanishes from the picture. For this reason, 
absolute liability cannot be claimed under any statute other 
than that of the state where the injurious accident happens. 
98 The national laws, enacted in the 192o's, have been so different as to menace 
reciprocal application by considerations of public policy, see SCERNI 365. The 
unification reached by the Rome Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules relating to Damages Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, 
of May 29, 1933, HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 334 No. 329, was a necessary 
step, but left important matters to conflicts, and has not entered into force. 
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There is no serious reason, however, why the injured per-
son should not be entitled to request damages under another 
law for negligence, if this and its place are proved. It should 
be considered that laws establishing liability without fault 
very often limit the extent of recovery in contrast with the 
ordinary tort actions not so limited. In addition to well-
known American statutes embodying a similar system, inter-
national examples of the modern technique are furnished 
by the Bern Convention on the Transport of Goods by 
Rail, whereby the carrier irrespective of fault has to bear 
a limited responsibility for loss and delay while he has to 
pay full indemnity for fraud or gross negligence,99 and the 
(not yet ratified) Rome Convention of 1933, granting any 
person injured without his own fault on the surface of a 
territory. by a flying aircraft a limited amount of damage 
by virtue of the mere fact that "the damage exists and that 
it was caused by the aircraft," and sets the limit aside, if the 
damage was caused by gross negligence or wilful mis-
conduct. 100 
(b) Strict liability. Between pure liability for fault and 
absolute liability for damage, modern statutes have adhered 
to middle systems of varied degrees of requirements. Even 
at common law there are instances involving the handling 
of dangerous substances, where the defendant must prove 
that no commercially practicable precaution was omitted.101 
Such rigid liability, just as the very frequent type of statutory 
inversion of the burden of proof of negligence, is distinguish-
able from absolute liability which admits no excuse or only 
that of act of God, but practically reaches the same result 
in the great majority of cases. Accordingly, a suit against 
99 Text of 1924, art. 36, MARTENs, Recueil, serie 3, vol. 19 at 505; text 
of 1933, art. 36 (HunsoN, 6 Int. Legislation at 552). 
100 Arts. 2, 8 and 14 (a), HunsoN, 6 Int. Legislation at 336, 338, 340. 
101 See Owners of the Steamship Pass of Ballater v. Cardiff Channel Dry 
Docks & Pontoon Co., Ltd. [ 1 942] 2 All E. R. 79· 
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an innkeeper, a railroad company, a car owner, a laboratory, 
allowed to be based on a rebuttable presumption of negli-
gence, needs to be supported by the statutes of the place 
of injury. 
Whether the statutes of this place should be applied only 
to railroads operating in the state, as the New Hampshire 
court has asserted in a case as famous as unsatisfactory in 
principle, 102 may well be questioned. Sparks from a loco-
motive on the Quebec side of a frontier river set an inter-
national bridge spanning the river aflame. The court divided 
the bridge into separate halves, eliminating the Canadian 
law (which would govern under the theory of the place of 
acting) with regard to the American half, but also decided 
not to apply the New Hampshire statute as not including 
Canadian railways. Such a restrictive construction of statutes 
seems inconsistent with the theory of the place of injury. 
2. Neighborhood Relations 
(a) Flood. As illustrating the problems arising through 
vicinity of immovables separated by a state boundary, the 
case of Caldwell v. Gore103 deserves attention. The defendant 
as a landowner in Louisiana, according to the local law/04 
owed the upper owners an absolute "servitude" (better ex-
pressed, a legal bu,rden) of drainage. Contrary to this legal 
duty, he built a dam across a shallow depression through 
which water found a natural drain, and thereby flooded the 
land of the plaintiff situated upriver in Arkansas. As the law 
of Arkansas105 permitted the establishment of a dam, unless 
unnecessary damage was caused to a neighbor, the petition 
10 2 Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Central R. Co. (1918) 78 N.H. 
553, 103 Atl. 263. 
103 (1932) 175 La. 5o1, 143 So. 387, 144 So. 151. 
104 Louisiana Rev. C. C. art. 66o. 
105 Morrow v. Merrick (1923) 157 Ark. 618, 249 S. W. 369; Burel v. 
Hutson (1924) 165 Ark. 111, 263 S. W. 57· 
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for removing the dam was good under Louisiana and bad 
under Arkansas law. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, 
applying its own statute, condemned the defendant. Various 
annotators disagree: whether the p:oblem was one of prop-
erty, in which case the decision would be a proper application 
of the lex situs / 06 or one relating to tort, justifying the 
application of the law of the place of injury, that is, Ar-
kansas; 107 or whether Arkansas law should govern as the 
lex situs of the dominant piece of land; 108 or the lex fori 
should apply.109 The following approach is suggested. 
Among the landowners of the state, the Louisiana statute 
declared the building of the dam unlawful. A contravention 
would support an action for restitution of enjoyment and 
damages for the obstruction, an action seemingly based on 
the law of real ownership, after the model of the Roman 
actio confessoria, without resorting to tort principles.110 But 
even where the action for damages is construed as a tort 
action, as in most modern systems, the solution depends on 
the existence of a limitation to the ownership of the servient 
estate, which naturally is governed by the lex situs of this 
latter. 111 Hence the only problem for the court should have 
been whether the statutes gave rights also to landowners out-
side the state. This could have been reasonably denied in view 
of the lack of reciprocity by the neighboring states. Foreseeing 
such cases, Bar denied the limitation on ownership under the 
law of a state by which a reciprocal limitation would not 
be recognized.112 But the Louisiana court chose the most 
106 Note, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (I933) 269. 
101 Note, 32 Col. L. Rev. (I932) 1426. 
108 Note, 8I U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I933) 466. 
109 ROBERTSON, Characterization 228 n. 24. 
11° Cf. French C. C. art. 64o; Vidrine v. Guillory (1925) 3 La. App. 462; 
see also 6 La. Dig. (I9I8) Servitudes 692 §§ 25, 26. 
111 Restatement § 23 I; 2 ZITELMANN JI 7, 328ff. requires that both laws 
involved establish the limitation. 
112 I BAR 629 n. 14 ;2 id. 1 I4 n. I. 
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liberal construction and thereby left no room for consulting 
the law of the damaged immovable. The place of acting 
alone was decisive. Hence, in the converse case, a Louisiana 
landowner injured by changes in Arkansas land has no 
actionable cause, the defendant's act being lawful. 
(b) Mine damage. In an old case, 113 the Reichsgericht 
dealt with a mine situation in Brunswick. As an effect of 
digging a gallery shaft, the water sources of an adjacent area 
in the territory of the Prussian Mining Law were dried up. 
The two laws established different periods of limitation for 
the action for damages. The court reversed a decision apply-
ing the Prussian Mining Law and held that the acts com-
plained of were accomplished exclusively in Brunswick, under 
whose law the mine was operated, and did not go beyond this 
territory, even though damage affected land in another juris-
diction. This decision has been regarded as contradicting the 
Reichsgericht rule that allows the injured to base his claim 
on the law of the place of the injury,114 but the situation 
is special. Mine laws are strictly territorial, not intended to 
be applied to foreign mines or soil. They decide the lawful 
or unlawful nature of acts as well as the liability for risk. 
This seems to be the right decision for any country. 
3· Fault 
In contrast with liability per se, the tort action supported 
by the evidence of a faulty act has the possible double local 
contact of the act and the injury, if not several more provided 
by partial acts leading to the injury. 
(a) Intentional acts. An actor who intends to inflict 
the injury (dolus directus) or foresees the harmful effect 
as possible and approves of it in case it should occur (dolus 
113 RG. (Feb. 6, 1889) 44 Seuff. Arch. 257; followed by OLG. Koln (April 
21, 1914) Leipz. Z. 1914, 1140: damage by a Dutch mine to a Prussian 
building. 
114 RAAPE 203, but see 207 No. 5· 
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indirectus ), manifestly deserves to have his act treated as 
tortious under both the law of the place where the act is 
intended to have effect as well as at the place where it 
reaches its· effect. The law under which he physically acts 
will ordinarily cover no more than an ineffective part of 
the facts. 
(b) Negligence. If the injury is not intended, but the 
act is intended to reach another territory, such as a letter, 
a newspaper, a broadcast, a shipping of goods, the result 
should be judged according to the law of that territory. 
Doubts are possible when a negligent person does not, and 
particularly when he cannot, reasonably foresee that his be-
havior will have harmful consequences in other jurisdictions. 
However, apart from the conflicts rules on tort, it should be 
considered that in any modern municipal tort law the court 
does not assume negligence unless a prudent person in the 
situation of the acting person would regard the injury-not 
the damage '''-as lying within the normally possible con-
sequences of the act. Time and place are an essential part 
of the circumstances to be envisaged in this hypothetical 
judgment. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
The number of jurisdictions with which the facts of a 
tort may be locally connected, much extended in the opinion 
of German courts, is considerably reduced if we eliminate 
on one hand all preparatory acts, such as, in the case of 
defamation, the writing and dispatching of letters and bodily 
movements designed to affect objects at another place and, 
on the other hand, the effects of a completed injury, such 
as, in the case of personal harm, death and pecuniary losses. 
Choice of law, consequently, is limited to the contacts realized 
by: 
115 See RABEL, Das Recht des Warenkaufs 504, against GoODHART, Essays 
in Jurisprudence and the Commoh Law ( 1931) r qff. 
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(a) The completion of tortious acts; 
(b) Injury, i.e., the invasion of interests. 
The traditional American rule following the latter local 
connection is essentially nearer to this view than any other 
present conflicts law. The two places indicated, in fact, are 
in most cases identical. 
Considering, however, that these places are different in 
significant cases, it would seem desirable to stress one or the 
other local connection according to the characteristics of the 
various liabilities. We have found that tort claims based on 
the right of vicinity or on mining law ought to be determined 
by the law of the place where the physical act is done. This 
represents a group of liabilities based on local restrictions 
to the freedom of acting. On the other hand, absolute and 
rigid liabilities for damages should be exclusively governed 
by the law of the place where the injury has been suffered. 
This does not exclude, in addition, giving an injured person 
an option between the liability for risk at the place of the 
injury and a liability for negligence otherwise localized and 
correspondingly governed. 
Indeed, as a general rule, intentional torts and negligence 
are subjected most conveniently to the law of the place 
where tortious acting at a distance is completed, even when 
an injury ep.sues only at another place. The defect of an 
automobile or of a machine originating in a factory in state 
X may be the object of a tort action based on the fault com-
mitted in X, but such negligence cannot properly be said 
to have been committed in state Y, if it causes harm there. 
Nevertheless, the injury in Y may raise an action on the 
ground of mere risk under the law of Y. 
Numerous groups of torts, however, need special local-
izations, according to their most characteristic territorial 
connections. Thus, fraud has been aptly localized by the 
Restaters at the place where the deceived person delivers 
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his assets. Torts committed by press or radio should be 
governed by the law of the publishing house or the broad-
casting office directing the transmission. Unfair competition 
by misappropriation has been correctly held to be subject 
to the law of the state in which the most essential part of 
the wrongful behavior takes place. 
Giving paramount importance to the place of "injury," 
we cannot reach in all cases the same results as through this 
individualizing method. Moreover, the American theory has 
necessitated in the Restatement a separate treatment of the 
question of lawfulness. Exceptions of this kind will be easily 
avoided, when the governing law is selected more carefully 
and, under this law, the local contacts of the particular case 
are duly evaluated for judging the guilt of a defendant acting 
in the province of a foreign law. 
More individual answers to single problems would be 
desirable. The courts presumably would more readily follow 
rules appropriate to particular situations than a radical change 
which, in this country, does not seem warranted. 
CHAPTER 27 
Maritime and Aeronautic Torts1 
I. SuRVEY oF PRINCIPLES 
I. "General Maritime Law" 
ENGLAND. English courts until I862 applied the ordinary British rules of navigation to collisions of 
any ships occurring in British waters or involving 
two British ships on the high seas. They followed somewhat 
different rules of seamanship if a collision took place be-
tween a British and a foreign, or two foreign ships, on the 
high seas. The latter rules were assumed to be common to 
seamen of all nations, a "general maritime law," though ad-
ministered in special form in England.2 The duality of 
"British" and "general maritime" rules was abolished by 
the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act of I 862 pro-
viding that all ships, British and foreign, should be judged 
by British law with reference to the rule of the road and 
the extent of the owner's liability.3 Since then, the English 
statutory law is the expression of the "general" law of mari-
time torts. 4 
1 The abundant literature on collision-French ahordage, German Schiffszu-
sammenstoss, Italian urto di na<Vi, Portuguese ahalroa(;ao-contains many con-
tributions to conflicts law, of which the most useful at present are the follow-
ing: MARSDEN, The Law of Collisions at Sea (ed. 9 by Gibb, 1934) Ch. IX, 
209-224; (Anonymous) Abordage maritime, 1 Repert. (1929) 38; FRITZ 
FISCHER, Der Schiffszusammenstoss im Deutschen Int.Priv.R. (Diss. Hamburg 
1937); MARIO ScERNI, II Diritto Int. Priv. Maritimo (ed. Aeronautico 1936) 
299-308. 
Conflicts problems with respect to air navigation have been studied by 
FERNAND DE VISSCHER, "Les concours de lois en matiere de droit aerien," 48 
Recueil (I 934) II 279. "Largely conjectural rules" for English conflicts law 
have been suggested by McNAIR in Winfield, Text-Book of the Law of Tort 
(ed. 2, 1943) 197. 
2 TheDumfries (1857) Swab. 63,125. 
3 25 & 27 Viet., c. 63, ss. 54 and 57· 
4 Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Naviga-
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The persistent conception of a general maritime law repre-
sents a survival of the ancient idea that the law merchant, 
of which the maritime law is a branch, was uniform through-
out the civilized world, different interpretations by different 
courts notwithstanding. It is significant that this idea has 
survived the breaking up of the former unity of the Christian 
world for a longer time in the English speaking countries 
than in the narrow horizons of Continental Europe, where 
reminiscences are found only in famous old texts. 5 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court of the United States has made it 
very clear that "the general maritime law is in force in this 
country, or in any other, so far only as it has been adopted 
by the laws or usages thereof."6 But the rules of navigation 
on the high seas found a new and broad unification when the 
experiences of British seafaring were used throughout the 
world in laws and treaties after the British model, and 
the international conferences were reflected in the British 
enactments. 
Insofar as there remain differences, English courts apply 
British rules. The chief principle is said to consist in the 
duty of navigating vessels so as not to cause damage to the 
life and property of others.7 With respect to the obligations 
of the shipowner, his liability under English law for the 
negligence of master or crew is considered mandatory, what-
ever a foreign law of the flag may ordain.8 Moreover, in all 
cases of collision either in British waters or on the high seas, 
the limit of the owner's responsibility is regarded as deter-
tion Co. (r883) ro Q.B.D. szr, 537 per Brett, L.J.; The Belgenland (I88s) 
I I4 U.S. 355> 366. 
5 See LYON-CAEN in Clunet I88z, 6oo; DIENA, 3 Dir. Corn. Int. 425, I; 
WESTLAKE § 2.02. (a). 
6 Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (r888) 129 U.S. 
397, 444· 
7 Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson (r864) I5 C. B. N.S. 759, 779 per 
Willes, J. 
8 The Leon (I 8 8 r) 6 P.D. 148 per Sir R. Phillirnore. 
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mined by the Merchant Shipping Act, I 894, s. 503. Thus, 
it has been held that the owners of a British ship in collision 
with a foreign ship on the high seas were liable only to 
the limited extent prescribed by the statutory English law, 
and that international law was not violated, since the owners 
of any foreign vessel, too, in a similar case are entitled to 
the benefit of the Ace The British rule concerning the 
division of loss by collision is applied to all vessels every-
where.10 
United States. The doctrine of general maritime law has 
been adopted in the federal courts exercising admiralty 
jurisdiction in this country, especially in cases of collisions 
between any vessels on the high seas. Also limitation of 
liability prescribed in acts of Congress is regarded as a part 
of the "general maritime law as administered by the ad-
miralty courts of the United States."11 And in a proceeding 
for such limitation, the speed a vessel has been allowed to 
run in a fog is determined "by international usage as under-
stood and applied in the forum.m2 On the reason for pre-
ferring this part of the American law to any other law, in 
the case of The Scotland (I88I) Mr. Justice Bradley 
alluded to the situation on the high seas "where the law 
of no particular state has exclusive force, when two ships of 
different nationality collide,m3 but in I 9 I 4 Mr. Justice 
Holmes speaking for the Supreme Court shifted the em-
phasis to public policy as laid down in the federal statutes.14 
Modern writers in England/5 as well as in the United 
9 The Amalia (1864) Br. & Lush. 151, 1 Moo. P.C.Cas. (N.S.) 471. 10 This is true for Admiralty as well as the common law jurisdiction, 
MARSDEN 218 adn. (e). 
11 The Scotland (1881) 105 U.S. 24, 29; The Titanic (1914) 233 U.S. 
718, cf. 2 BEALE 1331. 
12 La Bourgogne (1908) 210 U.S. 95, II6, 140. 
13 105 U.S. at 29. 
14 233 U.S. at 733· 
15 Lushington, J., in The Milford (1858) Swab. 362,166 Eng. Re. II67; 
WESTLAKE 276; CHESHIRE 307. 
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States/6 soberly state that "there is no such law" as a general 
maritime law and that, all things considered, it is but another 
name for the lex fori, although it has grown out of a world-
wide traffic and a millennia! history. In the United States 
its scope has been somewhat narrowed. 
Collision is the historic prototype of a tort committed on 
the water. That the same problematic general maritime law 
should govern other torts also, seems to have been implied 
in an English leading case where a submarine cable (before 
the International Cable Convention and the Submarine Tele-
graph Act, I 8 8 5) was injured at the bottom of the sea by 
the anchor of a navigating ship. 17 While Dicey advocated 
this solution, 18 Cheshire contests it as unnecessarily enlarging 
the scope of English law.19 
2. Modern Principles 
The International Maritime Congress held in Antwerp in 
I 8 8 5 approved the following . conflicts rules on collision of 
ships: 
Collisions in ports and internal waters should be governed 
by the lex loci, for both formalities (such as demurrers, time 
limitations, prescription) and substantive rules, irrespective 
of the nationality of the vessels. 
The master of a ship suffering from a collision on the 
high seas may preserve its rights by observing the form and 
time prescribed (for protest or action) either by the law of his 
flag, or that of the flag of the offending ship, or that of the 
first port of refuge. 
In the case of collision on the high seas, each ship is liable 
16 2 BEALE I33I; HANCOCK 259 n. 3· See also the criticism by DrENA, 3 
Dir. Com. Int. 424 § 2 8 I ; CRouvE:s, I Repert. 42 Nos. 12, I 3· 
11 Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson (I864) IS C. B. N. S. 759· 
18 DICEY 783; approved by WINFIELD, Text-Book on the Law of Tort (ed. 
2, I943) I96. 
19 CHESHIRE 309. 
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within the limits of the law of its flag, without being entitled 
to more than this law grants.20 
These rules have been fully adopted in the Codes of 
Portugal and Bulgaria.21 The first rule has been accepted 
everywhere in civil law countries with the exception that 
certain courts have applied the law of the forum to the formal 
requisites of actions. 
On the high seas, the basic rule in civil law countries is 
in favor of the law of the flag whenever a tort can be localized 
on a vessel. In the case of collisions between two vessels of 
different flags, some courts have earnestly tried to find such 
a localization and have become resigned to the law of the 
forum only when it seemed inevitable, because the two laws 
involved appeared equally competent to govern and could 
not be meaningfully combined. 
Entirely isolated, the Soviet Maritime Law of I 929 pre-
scribes the application of the domestic law to all collisions 
wherever occurring.22 
II. UNIFICATION oF SuBsTANTIVE LAws 
Collision. The municipal law on collisions on the high seas 
has been internationally unified in important aspects by the 
"International Convention for the Unification of certain 
Rules concerning Collision" of Brussels (September 23, 
I 9 I o). 23 Before the outbreak of the second World War, the 
following countries were members: 
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Danzig, 
20 1 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 427. 
21 Portugal: C. Com. art. 674. 
Bulgaria: C. Marit. of Jan. 6, 1908, art. 189. 
22 Soviet Russia: Law of June 14, 1929, art. 4 (d); see FREUND, 95 
Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Handelsrecht (I 9 30) Beilage 70. 
23 MARTENs, Recueil, Jrd Series, VII, 7 I I ; cf. RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. ( ed. 
2) § 2063. 
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Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Dominions and 
Colonies, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway,. Poland, Portugal, Ru-
mania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay. 
Also bilateral treaties are in force between numerous 
countries. 
The Convention, however, does not apply to collisions 
involving vessels of nonparticipant states/4 including the 
United States which signed but did not ratify the Conven-
tion; does not deal with state ships; 25 and is restricted to 
the case where at least one vessel is plying on the high seas. 26 
The national laws remain for the time in force also with 
respect to liability for compulsory pilots27 and the scope and 
effects of contractual or legal provisions limiting the liability 
of shipowners to persons on board. 28 In all these respects, 
there exist conflicts problems, but they often are mitigated 
by the strong influence of the Convention on recent legis-
lation. 
Navigation. On the other hand, the navigation rules have 
followed a vigorous trend of unification. International regu-
lations of r897, r905, and r927, largely adopting the ex-
periences of Great Britain, have succeeded in attaining a high 
degree of uniformity. 29 
Aerial law. Parallel to the endeavors of the Comite 
Maritime, the Comiti International Technique d'Experts 
Juridiques Aeriens (ciTEJA) has succeeded in obtaining 
24 Art. 1 2 par. 2 ( 1 ) • 
25 Art. 1 I. 
26 Art. I. 
27 Art. 5· 
28 Art. 4 par. 4· See also the reservation in art. 7 par. 3· 
29 At present, see in particular Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
Annex II, to the Convention of London, May 31, I929, on Safety of Life, 
HuosoN, 4 Int. Legislation 2825; and the British Merchant Shipping (Safety 
and Load Line Conventions) Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. s, c. 9 Sched. I. 
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a few very useful, though fragmentary, conventions. The 
conventions of Warsaw, October 12, 1929, on transport,S0 
in which the United States participates, and of Rome, May 
29, 1933 (not yet ratified), on damage done to third parties 
on the surface of the earth, 31 unify a part of the liability 
problems. But the remaining conflicts are even more im-
portant and less well worked out than the traditional mari-
time questions. The Warsaw Convention itself simply 
envisages the application of the lex fori to the treatment of 
contributory negligence, the possibility of paying periodical 
amounts of damages, the concept of gross negligence, and 
other problems.32 
III. ToRTS DoNE WITHIN A STATE TERRITORY 
I. Torts in Territorial Waters 
The territory of a state, according to the predominant 
opinion, includes in addition to ports, rivers, and channels, 
"a belt of sea,"33 the coastal seas of a certain mileage. 
· (a) Rule. The universally settled rule calls for the appli-
cation of the law of the state to which the waters belong.34 
In England, this rule is not unequivocally settled with respect 
to foreign waters, but seems now to prevail over the doctrine 
of "general maritime law.na5 
3° Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules regarding International 
Air Transport, HuosoN, 5 Int. Legislation 100, U.S. Treaty Series No. 876. 
Great Britain: Carriage by Air Act, I 9 3 2, 2 2 & 2 3 Geo. 5 ., c. 3 6. 
31 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Damages 
Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 
334· 
32 Arts. 2I, 22, 25, 28, 29. 
33 Articles provisionally approved at the Hague Conference on International 
Law, I930, see Am. J. Int. Law I93o, Supp. 239. 
34 United States: 'Smith v. Condry (I843) I How. 28; The Albert Dumois 
(I 900) I 77 U.S. 240; Restatement § 404. See citations infra n. 40. 
35 This has been concluded from the dicta of Brett, then L. J., in Chartered 
Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation Co. (I883) 
Io Q.B. 52I, 537 (C.A.) and Mellish, L. J., in The Mary Moxham (I876) 
I P. D. 107, III, II3. See MARSDEN 2I5; CHESHIRE 305. 
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Illustration. After the English Pilotage Act, 1913, came 
into force, in which the liability of a shipowner for fault of 
a compulsory pilot was recognized (and no longer considered 
to be against public policy, as it was deemed to be in The 
Halley 36 ), a suit was dismissed in the case of a foreign 
pilot whom the ship was compelled to take on but for whose 
fault the shipowner was not responsible under the local 
law. 37 
The territorial law governs the wrongs committed on 
board a vessel, 38 as well as those inflicted through faulty 
navigation/9 and has its particular and oldest application 
in cases of collisions of ships in territorial waters.40 
36 See supra pp. 242, 276. 
37 TheArum [r921] P. I2. 
38 Uravic v. Jarka Co. (I93I) 282 U.S. 234, opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes 
(a stevedore killed on board a German vessel in New York harbor); cf. HAN-
COCK 262. 
39 Restatement § 407. 
40 United States: Restatement§ 409; The Albert Dumois (I9oo) I77 U.S. 
240 (domestic waters) ; Royal Mail Stearn Packet Co. v. Cornpanhia de 
Navegaco Lloyd Brasileiro (D. C. E. D. N.Y. I928) 3I F. (2d) 757; Standard 
Oil Co. of New York v. Tampico Nav. Co. (D. C. E. D. N.Y. 1921) 21 F. 
(2d) 795 (foreign waters). 
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law ( r 889) art. ti; text on Com-
mercial Navigation (I94o) art. 5· 
Codigo Bustamante, arts. 290, 291. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Nov. 21, I884) Pasicrisie I885.2.39 and many 
other cases (domestic waters); Trib. com. Antwerp (March 4, 1853) Jur. 
Port Anvers, I857.1.267 and many other cases, see I Repert. 73 Nos. I72-I74 
(foreign waters); Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 23, I936) 36 Revue Dor (1937) 158, 
Jur. Port Anvers I936, I97· 
Bulgaria: C. Marit. of Jan. 6, I9o8, art. I89. 
Denmark: Trib. Marit. Copenhague (May 3I, I9o5) Clunet I9o7, 1I78. 
Egypt: Trib. civ. Alexandria (Feb. 2, 1926) I7 Revue Dor 328; see also 
Trib. com. Alexandria (March 4, I929) 20 Revue Dor 237· 
France: Cass. ( civ.) (July I 8, 1 89 5) S. I 895·1.30 5, Clunet I 8 96, qo; 
Cass. (req.) (Feb. 15, 1905) S. 1905.I.2o9, Revue 1905, rr4, 128, Clunet 
1905, 347i App. Rouen (June 26, 1907) Clunet 1908, 776. The cases refer to 
domestic waters only, because the courts refuse jurisdiction as to foreign waters. 
The rule, however, is recognized to extend to these in the literature, see 6 LYON-
CAEN et RENAULT 192 §§ ro48 to IOSI (despite personal opposition); 
RoLIN, 3 Principes § ro71; PILLET, z Traite § 551; r Repert. 67 No. 143. 
Germany: RG. (May 30, r888) 21 RGZ. 136; (Feb. r8, 1929) IPRspr. 
1930 No. 59 (domestic waters); (July 12, I886) 19 RGZ. 7; (June zs, July 
9> r892) 29 RGZ. 90 (foreign waters); OLG. Hamburg (April 17, 1907) 
Hans. GZ. 1907, HBl. No. 73· Cf. RG. (July r, r896) 37 RGZ. r8r (fluvial 
waters). 
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According to universal custom, usually followed also 
in the United States, the rule does not cover, however, the 
internal management and discipline of a ship which, instead, 
is governed by the law of the flag the vessel flies. 41 The 
idea is that torts, like contracts creating obligations between 
the owner, the shipmaster, the officers and the crew, are 
subject to the individual law of the vessel. Ordinarily, port 
authorities also refrain from taking jurisdiction in such 
matters.42 
Through this important restriction on the local legal order, 
the troublesome question regarding the subjection of foreign 
warships to the private law of the territory is to a large 
extent eliminated. For the rest of the problems, the ordinary 
rules on immunity from territorial jurisdiction are ob-
served. 43 The liability of state vessels, employed in the 
transport of passengers or cargoes, has been defined by an 
international convention/4 in which the United States does 
Italy: As in France, Cass. (July 19, 1938) Foro Ital. 1938 I 12r6, 7 Giur. 
Comp. DIP. 307 No. 16r. Jurisdiction is not taken as to foreign vessels in 
foreign waters, Cass. (Jan. 16, 1939) Giur. Ital. 1939 I 1264. 
The Netherlands: H.R. (June 2.4, 192.7) W. II704, 17 Revue Dor 52.2., Rb. 
Rotterdam (Feb. 8, 1939) W. 739· 
Norway: S. Ct. Christiania (Dec. 15, 1905) Clunet 1907, 852., 2.3 Revue 
Int. Dr. Marit. 12.8 (Canal of Kiel, German law). 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674. 
41 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wright (C. C. A. zd 192.8) 2.1 F. (zd) 814, 8rs; 
see for other cases Restatement § 405; 2. BEALE r p8 § 405.1; HANCOCK 2.64 
n. 7 who notes, however, a few contrary decisions. An exception has been re-
cently made by majority vote in a case where a Greek seaman signed on a 
Greek vessel in a United States port and was injured in United States territorial 
waters, Kyriakos v. Goulandris (C. C. A. zd 1945) 1945 Am. Marit. Cas. 1041; 
Judge Learned Hand (at rop) dissenting, urged the long list of precedents. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law of r889, art. zo; text on Com-
mercial Navigation of 1940, art. 2. r. 
42 Treaty of Montevideo, Draft on Commercial Navigation of 1940, arts. zz, 
2.3. Preparation for an international convention on penal and civil jurisdiction 
in the matters of navigation and collision was started by the International 
Maritime Committee; instructive reports have been printed in the Publications 
of the Committee, Nos. 98-roz. 
43 Cf. BALDONI, "Les navires de guerre dans les eaux territoriales etrangeres," 
65 Recueil (1938) III r85. 
44 Convention concerning the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, Brussels, 
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not participate. That the Soviet Russian State acting 
through its commercial agencies is not exempted from lia-
bility has been declared in several countries.45 Commercial 
vessels chartered by a state but not commanded by a captain 
appointed by the government, are not held exempt from 
attachment and still less is the owner free from action for 
damages.46 
(b) Exceptions. By analogy to the preference given in 
some quarters to a national law common to plaintiff and 
defendant in tort actions, it has been assumed in a few in-
stances that the law of a flag flown by both vessels involved 
should govern torts even in territorial waters.47 
The contrary opinion, however, prevails universally. It 
is supported by the territorialism obtaining in tort matters, 
as well as by the fact that the shipowners are not the only 
interested persons; passengers, affreighters, and insurers of 
ship or cargo or passengers share the risk/8 German courts, 
however, inconsistently have resorted to the common national 
law in the case of two German vessels colliding in foreign 
waters.49 
2. Collision of Aircraft Flying over State Territory 
By no means a matter of course, it has nevertheless been 
of April ro, 192.6, and Additional Protocol of May 24, 1934, 176 L. of N. 
Treaty Series 199, HUDSON, 3 Int. Legislation 1837 and 6 id. 868. 
45 See French Cass. (req.) (Dec. rs, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 7IO; cf. in 
general, Cass. (req.) (Feb. 19, 1929) S.I9JO.L49 and Note, NIBOYET; cf. for 
contracts, Ital. Cass. (Aug. 3, 1935) Giur. Ital. 1936 II 109, Rivista 1935, 
372.. See later cases in Annual Digest 1938-40, 237, 246£., 249· 
46 RG. (May r6, 1938) 157 RGZ. 389 explaining Continental, British, and 
American concepts. 
47 France: VALERY§ 979 n. 2. 
Norway: s. Ct. (192.3) cited by CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. sh No. 187. 
C6digo Bustamente, art. 2 8 9, Convention of Brussels, supra n. 2 3, art. r 2 
par. 2. (2). 
48 See ARMINJON, 2 Precis§ u2.. 
49 OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 7, 1913) HansGZ. 1913, HBl. II? No. 52.; (March 
19, 1915) id. 1915, HBl. 139 No. 69; see also (Nov. 12, 1906) id. 1906, 
HBI. 312 No. 154 (river boats). 
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categorically recognized by the international conventions 
on air navigation "that every state has complete and exclusive 
sovereignty over the air space above its territory and terri-
torial waters."50 It follows that collisions between two air-
planes occurring in the air over a state territory are subject 
to the law of this state. 51 
That damage done by an aircraft to third persons on the 
surface of the earth is governed by the law of the territory 
has been noted earlier.52 
IV. ToRTs oN THE HIGH SEAs 
1. Torts on Board One Vessel 
According to a universally settled rule, a tortious act done 
on board a vessel on the high seas, whereby only persons 
or property on board are injured, is governed by the law of 
the flag the vessel flies. 53 This rule covers personal injuries 
sustained by seamen on the high seas, 54 including American 
seamen on foreign-owned vessels.55 Hence, a Yugoslav sea-
man on a Yugoslav vessel, even during the wartime occupa-
tion of that country, could not ask for relief under the Ameri-
can Seamen's Act for injury he suffered on board.56 
In England, it is discussed whether the analogy of wrongs 
50 Pan-American Convention on Commercial Aviation, of February 2o, 1928, 
art. 1. HUDSON, 4 Int. Legislation 2354, 2356; conforming to Convention of 
Paris (19I9) art. I; lbero-American Convention of Madrid (1926) art. 1; 
preamble to the British Air Navigation Act, I 920. 
51 SCERNI 367 and cited authors, rejecting the exception made by others in 
favor of the national laws common to hath aircraft. 
52 Pan-American Convention on Commercial Aviation, of Feb. 20, 1928, 
art. 28, HUDSON, 4 Int. Legislation 2365. Supra p. p8 and n. 98. 
53 United States Federal Death Act, 1920, 4I Stat. 537 c. I 11 § 4, 46 U.S. 
Code (1934) § 764 (summarizing the conflicts rule); Restatement § 406; 
The Titanic (1914) 233 U.S. 718. 
54 Petter Lassen (D. C. N.D. Cal. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 938: Norwegian fire-
man on Danish vessel time-chartered to an American company, Danish law. 
55 Hogan v. Hamburg American Line (1934) 152 N. Y. Misc. 405, 272 
N. Y. Supp. 69o. 
56 Radovcic v. Prince Pavle (D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 15. 
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done in a foreign country must be followed by requiring 
that a maritime tort be actionable by English law.57 
Aircraft. It is an open question whether the rule should 
be transferred to tortious acts committed on an aircraft flying 
over the high seas or such territories as the North Pole. 
Although it is well settled that aircraft, too, have nationality, 
Fernand de Visscher has pointed out that in actual practice 
the commercial airlines of many nations use the same fields 
and the parties dealing with them do not care about the 
flag, except in the case of contractual obligations subjected 
to the law of the flag by express stipulation. As the Warsaw 
Convention on Air Transport confines lawsuits to either the 
principal business place of the carrier or the place of destina-
tion, at the election of the victim, de Visscher thinks it would 
be in the spirit of the Convention to apply the law of the 
forum of the court seized.58 In the United States, courts 
have been able to apply the Federal Statute concerning Death 
on the High Seas by Wrongful Act to airplane accidents on 
the high seas.59 
2. Collision 
Where two vessels flying the same flag collide on the 
high seas, most courts apply the law thus common to the 
vessels. so As in this case no other law is in co.mpetition, this 
57 In contrast to DrcEY 778, CHESHIRE 306 hypothetically denies the re-
quirement. For the latter view HANCOCK 269 invokes the precedent of The 
Halley, supra p. 242. 
58 FERNAND DE VISSCHER, 48 Recuei\ (1934) II at 335· 
59 46 U.S. Code§§ 76df.; Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co. (1941) Am. 
Marit. Cas. 1941, 483; Wyman v. Pan-American Airways, Inc. (1943) 181 
N. Y. Misc. 963, 43 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 420. 
60 Restatement§ 410 (a); The Eagle Point (1906) 73 U.S.C.C.A. 569, 142 
Fed. 453; dicta in The Scotland (r88I) 105 U. S. 24, 31; The Belgenland 
(r88s) 114 U.S. 355, 369. 
Bulgaria: C. Marit., art. 1 8 9· 
France: RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. 21 § 2074; 6 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 
§ 1050. 
Germany: RG. (Nov. r8, rgor) 49 RGZ. r82 (holding that Danish and 
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principle is the best possible and has appropriately been 
extended to vessels whose flags are different but whose laws 
are essentially the same. 61 
English courts, however, apply their "general maritime 
law" also in this case.62 
The case where two vessels, flying the flags of different 
countries, collide on the high seas, is desperate. None of the 
familiar contacts is suitable when no territory is affected 
and the connections established by the flags neutralize each 
other. Among the innumerable strained attempts to reach 
a solution, the following have been supported by various 
authorities: 
(i) The Montevideo Treaty of 1889 on Commercial Law 
provided that the law of the flag more favorable to the 
defendant should be applied. 63 
(ii) Another opinion distinguishes whether both vessels 
have violated the rules of navigation or only one of them 
is to blame. In the latter case, the law applicable would be 
that of the vessel at fault. 64 Where both are found to be 
guilty of fault, opinions are divided; each vessel should 
pay 50 per cent of the damages to which it would be liable 
Norwegian laws are essentially the same); RG. (Nov. n, 1932) 138 RGZ. 
243 at 245. 
Italy: BoLAFFIO, C. Com. 931; DIENA, 2 Prine. 354· 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674 No. 2. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law ( x 8 89) art. xz, sent. I; Codigo 
Bustamente, art. 292. 
61 United States: Dicta in The Scotland (1881) 105 U. S. 24, 29; The 
Belgenland (r885) 114 U.S. 355; The Presidente Wilson (D. C. D. Mass. 
1929) 30 F. (2d) 466. 
Germany: 49 RGZ. I 82, supra n. 6o. 
62 Brett, L. J., in Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India 
Steam Navigation Co. (I88J) xo Q.B.D. 521, 537· 
63 Art. xz sent. 2; probably this is also the meaning of the Treaty of I 940, on 
Commercial Navigation, art. 7· 
64 Congress of Genoa (1892) art. 7, see 8 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. r8r. 
France: PILLET, 2 Traite § 551; CREMIEU, 5 Repert. 493 No. 2 x. 
Germany: RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46; overruled (Nov. u, I932) 
138 RGZ. 246, infra n. 7I. 
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under its own law and 50 per cent of those imposed by the 
other vessel's law/5 or liability is divided ex aequo et bono,66 
or the law of the forum is applied.67 
(iii) More generally, as a consequence of the allegedly 
general principle that the national law of the debtor or the 
defendant should prevail, it has been advocated that each 
vessel's liability should be determined in accordance with 
the law of its own flag. 68 
(iv) In I 8 8 5, the Institute of International Law and the 
Congress of Antwerp advocated the rule that a vessel should 
be liable only when it would be liable under both laws con-
cerned. 69 This rule has found a following. 70 
( v) The German Supreme Court, in a recent decision, 
has attempted to apply to collisions on the high seas the 
theory of that court that every place where a substantial 
element of a tort occurs is a place of wrong. Thus, since the 
vessel whose crew is guilty of fault as well as the vessel 
which has been damaged through such fault, are places of 
65 C6digo Bustamante, art. 294· 
66 Congress of Genoa (1892) art. 7· 
61 See below n. 76. 
68 United States: Judge Learned Hand in The James McGee (1924) 300 Fed. 
93; Note, 25 Col. L. Rev. (1925) 96; The Aquitania (1924) Am. Marit. 
Cas. 1924, 1440; Powers v. Cunard S. S. Co. (1925) 32 F. (2d) 720. 
England: Davidson v. Hill [1901] 2 K. B. 6o6. 
France: App. Rennes (Dec. ZI, 1887) Clunet 1888, 8o, affirmed on other 
questionable grounds, Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 4, I 891) Clunet I 89z, 15 3; Cass. 
(civ.) (Nov. 7, 1904) 20 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 517. The courts decide the 
question of fault under French law reputed to be universally good and in the 
case of fault apply varying tests. 6 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT roso, 1op. 
Germany: RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46. 
Greece: App. Athenai (1933 No. roSs) 45 Themis z68; approved by 
FRAGISTAS, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 643. 
Italy: Cass. Torino (April 17, 1903) 19 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 478. 
69 Inst. Dr. Int. (Lausanne, r888) 10 Annuaire (r88g) 152; Congress of 
Antwerp (I 8 8 5) supra n. zo, art. 8 sent. z. 
70 Bulgaria: C. Marit. art. I 89. 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674, No.3· 
Treaty of Montevideo, draft of 1940 on Navigation, art. 7. Recently ScERNI 
308 resigns himself to this solution. 
DIENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. 432 called this view the only one based on solid 
legal principles. 
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wrong, the owner of the damaged vessel has the choice of 
suing under that law which is more favorable to him. 71 
This latter view may encounter the objection once raised 
by Fedozzi72 that the delict has been committed not on but 
by a commercial vessel. Moreover, we have often been 
warned not to take too seriously the fiction that a vessel 
is a floating part of a territory.73 However, looking for the 
least inappropriate local connection, American courts, with 
their traditional localization at the place of the injury, could 
well apply the law of the vessel which, or on board of which 
life or property, is injured. Occasionally, in fact, this view 
seems to have been floating through the mind of a court. 74 
(vi) The law of the forum is applied, either as repre-
senting a maritime custom of world-wide application, 75 or 
as a last resort in all cases/6 or where one of the vessels 
71 RG. (Nov. rz, I9J2.) 138 RGZ. 243, 246; IPRspr. I9J2. No. 6o; 2.8 
Revue Dor 45; Nouv. Revue I935, 74; I Giur. Comp. DIP I77 (English 
steamer Henry Stanley). Contra: RAAPE, D. IPR. 32.9· 
72 Opinion, in the matter of the Lotus case, Revue de Droit International 
(Lapradelle I928) 36I; cf. SCERNI 306 n. 3· 
73 
'See the argument of CHESHIRE 309. 
74 2 BEALE I33I n. 4 mentions with hesitation La Bourgogne (I9o8) 210 
U.S. 95, q8, and The Saginaw (1905) 139 Fed. 906. 
75 England: The Leon (I88I) 6 P. D. 148. United States: The Windrush 
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1922) z86 Fed. 2_p, aff'd (C.C.A. 2d I924) 5 F. (2d) 
I425; but cf. HANCOCK 279, and against him, CooK, Book Review, 5 U. of 
Toronto L. J. (I943) I92. 
76 Belgium: Older practice, see CRouv.Es, I Repert. 7 3 No. I 7 5 and Trib. com. 
Anvers (July 23, I892) id. n. 2. 
Denmark: S. Ct. (May 10, I9o4) cited by CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 225 
No. 89. 
France: I Repert. 67 No. I44: the parties by bringing their suit to French 
jurisdiction, implicitly submit themselves to French law, including all provi-
sions and prescriptions of the French Commercial Code! AssER et RIVIER, 
Elements § I 13; VALERY § 978; ARMINJON, 2 Precis§ I22. 
Germany: Older practice: Oberapp. Ger. Lubeck (Jan. 30, 1849) 4 Senff. 
Arch. No.4 (The General Washington). 
Prussia: Obertribunal (Oct. 25, I859) I4 Seuff. Arch. No. 197 (The Colum-
bus, British ship). RG. (Nov. 10, 19oo) cited and restricted by RG. (Nov. I8, 
1901) 49 RGZ. I82, 187 (case of "Kong Inge") and RG. (July 6, I9Io) 74 
RGZ. 46 (case of "Seine"). Return to lex fori has been advocated by REIN-
BECK, "Schiffszusammenstosse auf hoher See etc.," Hans. RGZ. I933 A, 337, 
345· 
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belongs to the forum. 77 
3· Other Torts 
English writers have discussed the case of two whale 
fishers of different nationality contending about the same 
whale. 78 The English case of an injury done to a submarine 
cable on the bottom of the high seas, 79 and the American 
case of the Titanic's collision with an iceberg80 are other 
examples. Should an analogy be drawn from torts done on 
board only one vessel, or from collision? This is just a nice 
question for law students. 
v. SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
r. Rules of Navigation 
It is recognized in the United States that if the responsible 
persons of a vessel on the high seas observe the sailing regu-
lations of the government shown by the flag, they are not 
to be blamed. 81 The case has become rare that regulations 
are different, but the doctrine should be adopted abroad. 
That local port and coast regulations ought to be complied 
with by all ships is settled beyond need of proof. 
2. Extent of Damages 
The old European customary rule that an innocent ship-
owner may exclude his personal liability for maritime tort 
by surrendering (abandoning) the ship, or what is rescued 
Greece: 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 2.64 n. 2.3. 
Italy: Codice della Navigazione (1942.) art. 12.. 
U.S.S.R.: See supra n. 2.2.. 
77 This result is reached by a few recent writers, such as FISCHER, supra n. 
1, and SCERNI, supra n. r, 307. 
78 Supra ns. 1 8, r 9· 
79 Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson (r864) 15 C. B. N. S. 759· 
80 (1914) 2.33 U.S. 718. 
81 See 2. BEALE§ 408.1; 15 C.J.S. I?§ 3· 
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from it, to the injured party,82 has not been transferred to 
the common law countries, but the United States, in the 
Act of I 8 5 I, introduced by statute a remedy conferring on 
the shipowner the election between abandonment and limited 
pecuniary damages.83 Great Britain and some other countries 
have a different system of limiting the amount of damages 
to certain maxima computed upon the tonnage of the vessel. 84 
Certain features of this system have recently been adopted 
in the United States.85 The variants within the groups are 
considerable. 
British courts, being bound by the Merchant Shipping 
Acts since I 862,S6 and those of the United States87 apply 
the domestic method of reducing damages, irrespective of 
the place of tort and of the nationality of the ships. The 
usual British argument is the long since refuted classification 
of measures of damages as relating to the remedy rather than 
to the right. The United States Supreme Court, however, 
made it clear that at the bottom of the reasoning lies a plain 
consideration of public policy.88 
Kuhn has wondered why resort should be had to American 
law to limit the liability of a foreign vessel for injuries to 
American citizens on the high seas. 89 Also a law review 
note90 declared it "difficult to see why the principle of the 
82 The rule is still in use in France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Ru-
mania, Spain, Egypt; cf. NEUHAUSER, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch I93· 
83 Congressional Act of March 3, 1 8 51, with amendments, Rev. Stat. §§ 
4983-89,46 u.s. c. A.§§ I83-189. 
84 Great Britain: Merchant Shipping Act, I 894/t 932, s. 503. The Nether-
lands: C. Com. art. 541. 
85 Congressional Acts of August 29, I935 and June 5, 1936, 46 U.S.C.A., 
Supp. I944, § 183, 49 Stat. 96o, 49 Stat. 1479. 
86 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 503. 
87 Restatement § 411; Oceanic S. N. Co. v. Mellor (The Titanic) (I 9I4) 
233 u.s. 718. 
88 Bradley, J., in The Scotland (I 8 81) 105 U.S. 24 at 3 3; Holmes, J., in the 
case of The Titanic (I9I4) 233 U.S. 7I8 at 733· 
89 KuHN, Comp. Com. 308. 
90 27 Mich. L. Rev. (1929) 2o6. 
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lex loci should be departed from merely because the case 
came up in admiralty" and recalled the former leading case, 
Smith v. Condry/1 where the lex loci was applied rather 
than the lex fori. In fact, the majority of the Continental 
European courts without hesitation apply that law which 
in their view governs the tort claim as a whole.92 As the 
French courts observe, one could not, in fact, juridically 
conceive that consequences of one sole act, the compensation 
of the same damage, be appreciated according to different 
laws and rules. The German Reichsgericht grants the owner 
of a ship damaged on the high seas the choice between the 
laws of both ships involved; he may recover the amount 
of damages determined by the law stating the higher maxi-
mum limit.93 
Does it indicate a serious doubt that in a recent English 
case the High Court judge reserved for judicial decision 
the question whether the total loss of an Argentinian ship 
in a collision in the Parana River should free the shipowner 
91 (I843) 1 How. z8, II L. Ed. 35· 
92 Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (June 26, I89o) 7 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 
s82; App. Bruxelles (May 26, I905) 2I Revue Int. Dr. Marit. II4 (both 
speaking in general terms). 
France: Unanimous. The only question raised in this respect has been whether 
a foreign defendant may use the right to abandon the ship to his maritime 
creditors as according to the French law of the forum. In the approved opinion 
he may not, except when French law governs the collision. See Cass. (civ.) 
(Nov. 4> I89I) Clunet 1892, I 53> r6Iff.; cf. FISCHER, supra n. I, 3I-33· 
Germany: 29 RGZ. 93; 37 RGZ. I 82. 
Italy. App. Genoa (Dec. Io, 1894) Clunet 1896, 907; Cass. Torino (April 
I7, I903) Clunet I9o6, 508; BoLAFFIO, 8 c. Com. (I9Z3) 932; DtENA, 3 
Dir. Com. Int. 354 n. 1. 
The Netherlands: H.R. (June 24, I927) W.JI704, N.J. (I927) 129 (Swed-
ish and German vessels colliding in Belgian territorial waters; Belgian law); 
Hof s'Gravenhage (Feb. I4, I935) W. 12895 (Belgian shipowner, territorial 
Dutch waters); id. (Dec. 28, I935) 35 Revue Dor. (I937) 359 (two Dutch 
vessels, Argentine waters). 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 5 82 No. I 8 5 (law of the flag). 
The Scotch Court of Sessions in Kendrick v. Burnett (I897) 25 R. 82, 35 
Scot. L. R. 62, adjusted the ordinary English double law rule in the absence of 
a lex loci delicti to the effect that the measure of damages has to be agreeable 
to the domiciliary laws of both parties. 
ea r 3 8 RGZ. 242, 246. 
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according to Argentine law, or English law should apply? 94 
3. Public Policy 
The requirements under which the action must agree 
with the domestic law, as in England and in a certain respect 
in Germany, have been applied to maritime torts.95 
4· Formal Requirements of Suit 
The position of a plaintiff is difficult, if the court where 
he finally is able to sue makes relief dependent on his having 
complied with the prescriptions of the law of the forum de-
manding protests or notices and limiting the time of bringing 
action. The Antwerp Congress gave him a broad option 
(supra p. 339 ), while the Brussels Convention simply 
abolished all formalities. 
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court of the United 
States has liberally declared a foreign vessel excused from 
observing the American formal provisions, 96 while various 
courts in other countries have clung to their local laws.97 
94 The Madrid [I 9 3 7] P. 40, [I 9 3 7] I All E.R. 2 I 6. 
95 See for England supra n. 57· 
Germany: EG. BGB. art. I2; ScHAPS, Das Deutsche Seerecht (ed. 2) § 485, 
n. 29. 
96 The Scotland (I88I) I05 U.S. 24, 33· 
97 France: Lex fori as to the time granted for bringing the suit: Cass. (civ.) 
(March 6, I89I) S. I892.1.I93, also published in I Repert. 67, Note (Cura~ao 
waters); App. Rennes (Jan. 7, Igo8) Revue I9o8, 395 (Danish waters). 
Contra: in case of collision on the high seas, App. Aix (Dec. 2 3, I 8 57) 
D.I858.2.39; and in a broad survey, LYON-CAEN, Notes, S. I89J.I.I93· 
In Belgium the courts have been divided, see CRouv.Es, 1 Repert. 72 Nos. 
I67, 169; likewise in the Netherlands, see VAN HASSELT 366. 
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In this part, the following articles published in law reviews will 
be cited in abbreviated form: 
Beale, "What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract," 23 Harv. 
L. Rev. (19Io) 260. 
Cook, Walter Wheeler, "An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical 
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," 3 7 Ill. L. Rev. (I 94 3) 
4 I 8; also published under the title, "The Logical and Legal Bases 
of the Conflict of Laws, An Unpublished Chapter: In Conclusion," 
2I Can. Bar. Rev. (I943) 249· 
Lorenzen, "The Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Re-
gards Form in The Conflict of Laws," 20 Yale L. J. (1911) 427. 
-id., "Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 
30 Yale L. J. (I92I) 565,655. 
---id., "The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 32 Yale 
L. J. (1923) 3I 1. 
-id., "Uniformity between Latin America and the United States 
in the Rules of Private International Law relating to Commercial 
Contracts," I5 Tul. L. Rev. (194I) I65. 
Nussbaum, "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Re-
Gtatement," 51 Yale L. J. (1942) 893. 
CHAPTER 28 
Choice· of Law by the Parties 
(Party Autonomy) 
THE term, contracts, is taken hereafter in the narrow sense, restricted to agreements creating obligations, in which it is used at common law. This excludes 
agreements disposing of family or property relations. Also, 
conventions modifying or terminating existing obligations 
need separate treatment. Nor are unilateral declarations 
directly involved. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN LAW 
The conflicts law concerning contracts is known as a source 
of difficulties, particularly in the United States. Commonly, 
the authorities are declared to be in great confusion and 
full of contradictions,· and to be inconsistent in the same 
court.1 The courts are said to choose without discernible 
coordination among at least four approaches, namely, 
r. The law of the place where a contract is made (lex 
loci contractus), 
2. The law of the place where the contract is to be per-
formed (lex loci solutionis), 
3· The law intended by the parties to be applied (party 
autonomy), 
4· The law which upholds the validity of the contract. 
The Appellate Division of New York declared in 1936 
1 See with particular regard to the validity of contracts, 2 BEALE I 077; 
GOODRICH § 107; STUMBERG 200-2I5; McCLINTOCK, "Conflict of Laws as to 
Contracts, Minnesota Decisions," I o Minn. L. Rev. (I 926) 498, 499, 507; I I 
Am. Jur. (I 937) 397, Conflict of Laws, Contracts § I I 6; I 7 C. J. S. (I 939) 
Contracts § 12. 
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that, in determining which law governs the validity of a 
contract, the cases in that state variously regard as decisive: 
the place where the contract was made, the place of per-
formance, the intention of the parties, or the grouping of 
the various elements which have gone to make up the 
contract. 2 The court in the case at bar employed all four 
methods, resulting in the same conclusion. Thus, not even 
that important state can be classified in one of the various 
alleged systems. 
The leading authors have been in no greater harmony, 
except in stating the uncertainty. Recently, in interpreting 
the prevailing tendencies of the courts, four or more propo-
sitions have been set forth. Beale, who very vigorously 
preferred the law of the place of contracting for determining 
the validity of a contract, believed that his theory had be-
come victorious.3 Lorenzen has been a most influential sup-
porter of an opposite opinion favorable to the law of the place 
of performance and the law tending to validate the contract. 4 
In Bati:ffol's view, the great majority of cases actually apply 
the law of the place of performance whenever there is a 
point in so doing. 5 Nussbaum is the only writer to deny 
that there is confusion; he thinks that the decisions in reality 
exemplify a method of individualizing the facts and selecting 
the law most appropriate to the intention of the parties. 6 In 
the present writer's opinion, there is a strong old school 
tradition establishing as a basic or subsidiary rule, the law 
of the place of contracting; a second powerful theoretical 
current toward the law of the place of performance; and 
2 Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1936) 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp. 
4; CHEATHAM, Cases 478. 
3 BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1909) 1, 8; 2 BEALE 1096, 117I. 
4 LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 655, 673. 
5 BATIFFOL §§ 96, 97· 
6 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 223; id., 51 Yale L. J. (1942) 892, 919; id., Prin-
ciples I 77ff. 
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side by side, very many cases following mechanically one 
of these scholastic approaches, and very many others thought-
fully seeking a suitable law by some method or other. No 
single rule can be rested on the wealth of cases, but none 
is alien to all of them. 
Again, if, according to certain methods used by Beale, 
the American jurisdictions were believed to be bound by 
conflicts rules prevailing traditionally in the courts of indi-
vidual states, the picture of interstate affairs would be il-
lustrated by this following example. 
A merchant in Massachusetts (which is said to adhere to 
the rule of lex loci contractus), by intervention of a New 
York agent, enters into a transaction with a resident of Cali-
fornia (where the lex loci solutionis is prescribed by statute), 
performance being due in Connecticut (a state clearly follow-
ing the theory of intention of the parties). The requisites 
of a valid contract are established: in the Massachusetts 
courts by the law of New York;'in the courts of California 
by the law of Connecticut; in the Connecticut courts according 
to the circumstances of the case; and how in New York, 
nobody knows. 
Parties wanting to secure their transaction against the 
possible legal intricacies of the unknown governing law, 
would be made more helpless by the assertion popular in 
the literature that they cannot escape imperative rules of the 
governing law by agreeing on the applicable law. 
May it be allowed, for present purposes, to abandon the 
fatalistic passivity with which either the condominium of 
the several rules has been taken as an existent and unavoidable 
evil or one of the rules has been perforce erected as the 
present law? What the desirable method should be, has 
been rather well defined in the last development of the world 
literature. Although none of the existing legislations in 
either hemisphere has reached the visible goal and scholarly 
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efforts are inchoate, we are able at least to visualize the way 
to be followed and the gigantic mass of prejudices that must 
be cleared away. 
II. THE THEORIES 
It has earlier been submitted in this work7 that conflicts 
law may allow the parties to a contract to select the applicable 
law. However, opinions are still divided into three main 
groups. 
1. Theory Negating Choice of Law by the Parties 
Reading the Restatement or certain Latin-American codes, 
one might feel that the parties are entirely unable to influence 
in any way the law governing their obligations. But the fact 
that for centuries most courts throughout the world have 
allowed the parties a very broad field of decision, has im-
pelled the innumerable theoretical adversaries of "autonomy" 
to conceive a more moderate view.8 In this view, every con-
tract rests upon one predestined municipal law called to its 
function by the rule of conflicts without regard to the inten-
tion of the parties in the individual case. For instance, the 
law of the place where the parties make the contract, is im-
posed authoritatively on them. To the extent that this law 
permits the replacing of its own provisions by stipulations of 
7 Vol. 1, p. 83. 
8 The founder of this theory was BAR, see 2 BAR 4· In the United States: 
MINOR 401; BoRCHARD, "Contractual Claims in International Law," 13 Col. 
L. Rev. (1913) 457; LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 565, 655, 658; 31 id. 
(1922) 53; BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1909) 260 and Treatise§ 332.2; GooD-
RICH 278. Lists of continental writers have been given by CALEB, Essai sur le 
principe de l'autonomie en droit international prive (1927) who has revived 
this theory; NIBOYET, "La theorie de l'autonomie de la volonte," Recuei11927, 
I, 5 (the most energetic advocate); see also lists by MELCHOIR soon. 1; GuTZ-
WILLER 1 6o6. On the adversaries of this theory, see Vol. 1 p. 85 n. 66. Adde the 
able article by GERHARD MAYER, "Zur Parteiautonomie als Kollisionsnorm," 
44 Z.int.R. (1931) 103; FEDOZZI-CERETI 690 § 2; KosTERS in Conference de 
la Haye, Actes de la sixieme session, 351. 
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the parties, they may, instead of inventing new provisions, 
quote or cite or copy a section of a foreign statute. By such 
shorthand reference, they never do more than incorporate 
the foreign provision as a term of their agreement/ which 
remains controlled by the one invariably preordained law. 
German and Italian writers, among whom Zitelmann has 
grounded this doctrine on scientific considerations, distinguish 
this reference permitted by the governing municipal law, 
under the term of "contractual reception" or "materiell-
rechtliche V erweisungmo (reference based on the substantive 
law), from the forbidden reference pertaining to conflicts 
law. 
Although language in not a few English and..t\merican 
decisions alludes to the embodying of particular legal terms 
or rules in a contract, and such a provision may be said to be 
a mere stipulation rather than a reference to foreign law,11 
it would seem that a consistent distinction as in German 
writings is not made by common law lawyers, and correctly 
so. 
12 Indeed, whatever the merits of this learned distinction 
may be when the question is whether a contract must be 
divided under two laws/3 it is unsound to treat the reference 
9 CooK, Legal Bases 399, has used the same words to refute or tranquilize 
"the critics of the 'intention' theory," who oppose the proposition that foreign 
law as suclt should control as a consequence of the agreement. Yet, a little later 
Cook seems fully to accept the intention theory in its true meaning. 
J.O The first term is used by PERASSI, Rivista I 92 8, 5 I 8. The second term 
seems to have been formed by ZIMMERMAN, 44 Zentralblatt (1926) at 883 
and was popularized by HAUDEK, MELCHIOR, and M. WoLFF. 
11 See, for instance, DICEY (ed. 3) 6x, General Principle No. VI, cancelled 
in ed. 5; Judge Learned Hand in Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson S. S. ( 19 30) 43 
F. (2d) 824, 827i German Reichsgericht (Sept. 2I, 1899) 44 RGZ. 3oo, 302; 
and see infra ns. I JO-IJ2. 
J.
2 Infra at n. 134. It was different when the Lords in I 703, Foubert v. Turst, 
r Brown Par!. Cas. 3 8, 42, rP.cognized the Custom of Paris of I 5 8o, declared 
applicable in the contract, "as if the custom had been distinctly specified," 
which "by no means (involved) an attempt to introduce foreign laws." Foreign 
laws at that time were never applied in English courts. Cf. M. WoLFF, Prir 
Int. Law 425. 
J.
3 See this Chapter, infra sub Ill pp. 368 ff. 
CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
to a foreign legal rule in the same manner as when the parties 
refer to former arrangements or "to a work of Bentham" (as 
some writer has textually suggested). Reference to a foreign 
legal rule is necessarily always based on conflicts law. 
The purpose of the described theory is to demonstrate that 
the parties are unable to transcend the margin of freedom 
left them in the particular primary legal system. Under this 
system, all stipulations except those which they may establish 
in the domestic field, they are forbidden to enter into also 
in the international realm. The so-called "imperative" pro-
visions, jus cogens, of the predestined law are clamped down 
on all transactions-they cannot be evaded.14 
Illustration. A citizen of New York entered in New York 
into an agreement with a German domiciled in Germany, 
without consideration as required by New York law. Under 
German law it was a valid contract. Could the parties decide 
that German law was to apply? Under§ 332 (c) of theRe-
statement the answer is strictly no, the same as given by the 
majority of American, French, and Latin-American writers. 
The German Supreme Court had no objection to the agree-
ment.15 The Supreme Court of the United States declared 
a contract under similar circumstances (without agreement 
on the applicable law) valid under the Louisiana law of the 
place of performance. 16 
The problem is alike as respects capacity, formality, mu-
tual consent, fraud and error, illegality, and any other vitiat-
ing factor. As a practical consequence, the allegedly inevitable 
primary legislation must be ascertained in every particular 
case, although this can be done authoritatively only by the 
court adjudging the case when the matter becomes litigious, 
a court unknown at the time of contracting and following 
14 BRANDL, "Der Parteiwille in der Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichtes," 
Leipz.Z. 1925, 816, 821; BEER, 18 Z.int.R. 358. 
15 RG. (April 6, 191 1) JW. 1911, 532, 24 Z.int.R. 305. 
16 Pritchard v. Norton (1882) 106 U.S. 124. 
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its own laws and lights. If we believe some of these writers, 
it is not even just one law from which all "imperative norms" 
are to be gathered, "but the law applicable varies according 
to the elements of the obligation and the transaction in ques-
tion. It is precisely this variety and this multiplicity of 
effective laws that makes the matter of obligations in private 
international law so complex and so difficult.m7 
"Autonomy," however, endeavors to obviate the unpre-
dictable findings of unforseeable tribunals and to consolidate 
the contract under one law while negotiation is in course. 
2. Proper Law Theory 
Increasingly and with few interruptions, during four 
centuries from Rochus Curtius and Dumoulin to the rise of 
the learned opposition in our century and ever since, un-
ruffled by all objections, courts have followed an all-inclusive 
doctrine of intention of the parties covering the entire field 
of obligatory contracts. The parties may expressly declare 
which law should govern their obligations; or they may 
tacitly choose this law; or the judge has to ascertain the law 
they may have contemplated in contracting. These three 
possibilities of express, tacit, and presumed or cchypothetical" 
intention are the only devices for localizing any contract, 
although the courts have developed certain criteria for con-
struing unexpressed intentions. 
The purest form of this doctrine appears in England18 and 
is known as the doctrine of the proper law. As last formu-
lated by Lord Atkin: 
"The legal principles which are to guide an English Court 
on the question of the proper law are now well settled. It is 
1> 2 ARMINJON (ed, 2) 327 § I I I. 
18 That Lord Mansfield's theory in Robinson v. Bland (q6o) 2 Burr. 1077 
is directly traceable to HUBER, has been emphasized by LLEWELYN DAVIES, 
"The Influence of Huber's De Confiictu Legum on English Private Interna-
tional Law," r8 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 193 7) 49, 54, 62. 
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the law which the parties intended to apply. Their intention 
will be ascertained by the intention expressed in the contract 
if any, which will be conclusive. If no intention be expressed, 
the intention will be presumed by the court from the terms 
of the contract and the relevant surrounding circumstances.m9 
And Lord Wright, speaking for the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council, stated: 
"It is now well settled that by English law the proper 
law of the contract is the law which the parties intended to 
apply. That intention is objectively ascertained, and, if not 
expressed, will be presumed from the terms of the contract 
and the relevant surrounding circumstances. " 20 
The peculiar character of this traditional approach should 
be well noted. The phases of choice of law according to the 
intention of the parties are three also in the modern opinion, 
but not identical with the above-mentioned traditional dis-
tinction. In the German view, for instance, the parties may 
have agreed on the applicable law; the judge may try to 
conform to the presumable will of the concrete parties; ~r 
the judge may seek a law conforming to the empirical inten-
tion of average parties. It is entirely characteristic of the 
genuine proper law theory that no such distinction is made. 
From the beginning of the English doctrine, when Lord 
Mansfield emphasized that the parties at bar had a view to 
the laws of England,21 the courts assumed that the parties 
always contract with a certain law in mind, either "with an 
express view" to it, as in Lord Mansfield's case, or tacitly. 
1 9 Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders Aktien-
gesellschaft [1937] A. C. 5oo, 5z9. The most recent expression of the proper 
law theory, in Duke of Marlborough v. Att. Gen. (Dec. n, 1944) C. A. 
[1945] 1 All E. R. 165, 171 refers back to Lord Watson's dictum in Hamlyn 
v. Talisker Distillery [1894] A. C. 2oz, 212. 
20 Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A. C. 277, z89. 
21 Robinson v. Bland (q6o) 2 Burr. ron, ro78; cf., e.g., Warrender v. 
Warrender (1835) z Cl. & Fin. 488, 535: "The parties in a contract like this 
must be held emphatically to enter into it with a view to their own domicile and 
its laws." 
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The court only discovers this view. The Swiss Federal 
Tribunal, which generally applies the law of the place of 
performance to the effects of all contracts, insists upon the 
statement that this is done, only because and to the extent 
that this law corresponds with the presumable intention of 
the parties in the particular case. 22 In the very large domain 
practically covered by this idea, no distinction is made among 
an agreement, an existent volition, and a merely supposed 
intention. 
While eminent continental writers of the I 9th century 
continued to accept the doctrine, 23 in more recent times the 
bulk of the literature went the other way. But quite recently, 
a few scholarly attempts have been made to support this 
all-inclusive intention theory of the courts,24 in straight oppo-
sition to the anti-autonomy doctrine prevailing thus far. The 
most energetic theoretical foundation of the broadest concep-
tion of party autonomy has been undertaken by Batiffol.25 
In developing a suggestion by other writers/6 he teaches that 
the parties never really select the law, not even when they 
expressly agree on choice of law. They merely localize the 
contract. The court, then, determines the law, following their 
22 BG. (MJ.y 9, 1923) 49 BGE. II zzo, 225; BG. (Sept. 26, 1933) 59 BGE. 
li 355, 361. Cf. ROMBERGER, Obl. Vertrage 43; NIEDERER, 59 Z. Schweiz. R. 
(N.F.) 239. 
23 E.g., r FoELIX § 94; 1 FIORE § 112; DESPAGNET § 2 94; ASSER-RIVIER, 
Elements 71. 
More recently, in Argentina, ALCORTA, z Der. Int. Priv. 240; RoMERO DEL 
PRADo, 2 Manual 321. 
24 MELCHIOR 50df. for German law; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. § 34, esp. at 221; 
NUSSBAUM, Principles I 61. 
25 BATIFFOL § I 7 and pp. 44ff. 
26 M. WoLFF, IPR. 86 par. 2, 88, and in "The Choice of Law by the Parties 
in International Contracts," 49 Jurid. Rev. (I 9 3 7) II o, explains party au-
tonomy by the assumption that the parties may constitute one of the existent local 
contacts of their contractual relationship as the decisive point of gravity. But it 
appears from his recent book, Priv. Int. Law 42.2.ff., 435ff., that Wolff's own 
theory is not really much different from that proposed here. 
Related theories, however, have been advanced by Italian authors, such as 
PERASSI, Rivista 1928, 516; BETTI, id. I930, I5i BALDONI, id. I932, J51j 
FEDOZZI-CERETI 697. 
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lead. The conflicts rule approves the law of the place where 
the contract has its center of gravity. The parties influence the 
latter by establishing locally connected obligations, or more 
directly, by selecting among several local contacts that one 
which in their own eyes is the closest or the most convenient. 
As they must know best about this center of gravity, the con-
flicts rule relies on their choice. Batiffol claims by this con-
ception to conform to many modern needs and, at the same 
time, to rescue the traditional practice. 
However, irrespective of results which must be reached 
under any approach, such a harmonization jars with the facts 
at both ends. An agreement of the parties to subject their 
contract to New York law, is itself a perfectly serious contract 
that cannot be degraded into a mere "localization" or dis-
posal of the center of gravity. Why should this contract be 
a simple element for the finding by a court, 27 instead of a 
binding transaction legalized by the conflicts rule, as all 
recognized contracts are sanctioned by law? Again, in the 
unquestionably prevailing cases, the parties do not agree on 
the applicable law and have no law in mind, or else each 
party thinks of a different law. In all these cases, choice of 
law cannot be based, as it must be in the first case, on an actual 
will of the parties. 
Moreover, were it true that choice of law is bound to 
follow the distribution of local connections, besides fatal con-
sequences that have been inferred to these connections re-
specting the pretended territorial limits of party autonomy,.28 
the contract would be necessarily split into segments, each 
governed by a local law, a proposition justly abhorred by 
the very authors mentioned. 29 
27 BATIFFOL 1 56 § q6 and often; cf. the authors cited infra n. 30. 
28 See infra Chapter 29, p. 4o6 n. 56. 
29 BATIFFOL 69 § 77• 
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3· Theory Permitting Agreement of Parties on the Appli-
cable Law 
Despite some resistance by writers, there is practically no 
doubt that the parties to a contract have a right to determine 
by agreement the law applicable to their contractual relation-
ship. Only the limits may be controversial. 
Such agreement is a true contract, 30 having all require-
ments of a contractual engagement, but auxiliary to the main 
contract. A subtle controversy as to the law by which this 
accessory stipulation itself is governed,S1 offers more academic 
than practical interest. No case is known in which the law 
agreed upon would not be suitable for determining also the 
validity of the additional stipulation, provided that the 
forum has no specific objection. 
An agreement may be declared expressly or by implication 
(tacitly, by conduct) as any other informal act. Implied 
agreement is closely related to, and often hardly distinguish-
able from, presumed intention, but in theory, at least, it is 
distinctly characterized. The parties are not presumed but 
positively assumed to have agreed on, not only thought of, 
the legal system to be applied. For instance, when an inter-
national loan debenture, written in English, follows the 
American legal terminology, appoints a bank in Manhattan 
as trustee in the American fashion, expresses the money 
amounts in dollars and makes the capital repayable in New 
30 HAUDEK 88ff.; RAAPE, D.IPR. '-55· Contra: MELCHIOR 519 n. 3; BATIF-
FOL 46 § 5'-; M. WOLFF, 49 }urid. Rev. (1937) qo; RHEINSTEIN, Book Re-
view, 37 Col. L. Rev. (1937) 330. These authors include implied intention 
and therefore think of "a coinciding view of the parties" rather than of a 
contract. 
31 See, for various views, WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (191.9) 8oz; HAUDEK 91; 
MELCHIOR 5ZO; RAAPE, D.IPR. Z70; NIEDERER, 59 z. Schweiz R. (N. F.) 
'-49· Application of the law agreed upon to the problem of the conditions for 
consent to the agreement, as in the text above, has also been suggested by the 
special committee on conflict of laws concerning sales of goods (1931) art. z 
par. 3, 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 957· 
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York-no one should doubt that the parties themselves have 
selected the law of New York, even though they omitted to 
say so in a clause.32 Or, when it is stipulated in an American 
sales contract that it should be deemed to have been made 
at the domicil of the vendor,33 this means as much as to refer 
directly to the law of that domicil. 
Where only a "presumed" or "assumed" intention is ascer-
tained, the applicable law is selected by the court rather than 
the parties. But that courts and enactments so often have 
treated all these categories on the same footing, may rest on 
practical wisdom. Tacit agreement of the parties, their prob-
able ideas, and the efforts of a judge to find the law most 
appropriate to the contract made by them, are closely re-
lated and somewhat overlapping categories. To treat these 
groups by essentially divergent rules, increases the difficulties 
inherent in the matter. 
III. THE PRESENT SYSTEMS 
r. Outside the .United States 
Autonomy recognized. Most codes recognize either irt a 
complete formula "the law to which the parties expressly or 
tacitly intend to refer,na4 or "the intention of the parties,"35 
or establish divergent provisions, only "if nothing else ·has 
been agreed upon.m6 In British common law since Lord 
32 RABEL, IO Z.ausl.PR. (I936) 492,496. 
33 Case of Montreal Cotton & Wool Waste Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Maryland (I927) 26I Mass. 385, I58 N. E. 795· 
34 French Morocco: Decree of Aug. u, I 9 I 3, art. I 3 par. I. 
Spanish Morocco: Dahir of I9I4, art. 20 par. I. 
Montenegro: C. C. art. 792. 
35 Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. 2 5. This was also the theory of the Supreme 
Court, decision No. IJI, I932, 43 Themis 449· 
36 Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ 36, 37 (hut see pp. 369£.). 
Belgian Congo: Decree of Feb. 20, I 89 I, art. I I par. 2. 
Brazil : C. C. art. I 3 par. I (hut see pp. 3 7 I f.) . 
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 23 par. I. 
Italy: Disp. Prel. (I865) art. 9 par. 2; Disp. Prel. (I942) art. 25. But as 
to the former art. 58, C. Com., see Cass. (Jan. 2I, 1928) Rivista I928, 514. 
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 7· 
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Mansfield's famous dictum37 and in the great majority of the 
other countries/8 the courts firmly hold the same view, which 
also has been shared by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals39 and 
-so far as the cases required solution-by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice.4{) 
Austrian Civil Code. Parallel to the broad reservations 
for the law of the forum which the Austrian Civil Code and 
its followers in Latin America have established with respect 
to the capacity of nationals, 41 they have restricted the principle 
of party autonomy in favor of the law of the forum. The 
Austrian Code provides: 
Quebec: C. C. art. 8. 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 4· 
37 England: Lord Mansfield's obiter dictum in Robinson v. Bland ( 1760) z 
Burr. Io77, I W. Bl. 234, cf. z BEALE I093; formally declared In re Missouri 
Steamship Co. (I889) 42 Ch. D. 32I. 
Australia: McClelland v. Trustees Executors and Agency Co., Ltd. (High 
Court of Australia I936) '55 Commw. L. R. 483 at 493 opinion per Dixon, J. 
38 Belgium: POULLET § 297· 
Bulgaria: See MAKAROV, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 66o. 
Egypt: SzA.szy, Droit international prive compare (I 940) 55 9· 
France: Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, I9Io) S. I9I I.I.IZ9, Revue I9I I, 395, Clunet 
I9I2, II56; Cass. (req.) (March 3, I924) S. I924.1.252; Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 
27, I93I) S. I933·I.4I (tacit agreement); Cass. (Nov. z, I937) Nouv. Revue 
I937, 766. On the history of the cases see BATIFFOL § 32; see also NIBOYET 
799· 
Germany: "In an overwhelming number of decisions," see MELCHIOR 50 I 
§ 355, and for the cases from I869 to I892 see NIEMEYER, Positives Intern. 
Privatrecht 92 § I 77· 
Hungary: See SzA.szy, II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) I68, I7I· 
The Netherlands: H. R. (June 13, I924) W. II28I, N.J. (I924) 859; H. R. 
(April 8, I927) W. u664; App. Rotterdam (Jan. 3, I9J5) N.J. (I935) 
865, cited (with regret) by HIJMANS I75· The confusing view expressed by 
MuLDER I64 that the decision of June I3, I924 makes an end to the principle 
seems to be entirely unfounded. 
Rumania: See JuvARA, Actes de la 6eme Conference de la Haye 336; PLAS-
TARA, 7 Repert. 7 5 No. 248. 
Spain: See TRiAs DE BEs, "Conception de droit international prive etc.," 
Recueil I93o I 657; 6 Repert. 257 No. I24. 
Sweden: ALMEN, I Das Skandinavische Kaufrecht (I 922) 50. 
39 Mixed Arb. Tribunals: See for cases GUTZWILLER, 3 Int. Jahrb. Schieds-
gerichtswesen (I 93 I) 1 34ff. 
40 Judgments in the cases of the Brazilian and the Serbian Loans, Publications 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, of July u, I 929, Series A, Nos. 
zo and 2I, at 4I, Clunet I929, 977, Iooz. 
41 See Vol. I, pp. I I 7-u 9· 
370 CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
§ 36. If a foreigner in this country enters into a bilaterally 
obligatory transaction with a national, it shall be governed 
by this Code without exception; provided that he concludes 
it with a foreigner, the same applies only in case it is not 
proved that, in contracting, consideration was given to another 
law. 
§ 37· If foreigners enter into transactions abroad with 
foreigners, or with subjects of this State, they are to be judged 
according to the laws of the place where the transaction was 
concluded; provided that in contracting another law has not 
evidently been taken as a basis .... 
The Austrian courts also apply whatever they consider 
imperative rules of their law to any contracts made abroad 
in which an Austrian participates. 42 Apparently, the prin-
ciple ordained in status matters that a contract by an Austrian 
national purporting to cause effects in Austria is governed 
by Austrian law(§ 4), is sometimes applied to other matters, 
too.43 
Latin America. In general, it does not appear that party 
autonomy is entirely denied in Latin America, but according 
to numerous codes, in certain cases the law of the forum pre-
vails. The Civil Code of Chile (I 8 55) inaugurated this 
trend by the provision that: 
The effects of contracts made abroad and to be performed 
in Chile are determined by the Chilean laws. 44 
Appearing as the third paragraph of a section dealing with 
abienes," that is, probably meaning to indicate immovables/5 
situated in Chile, the provision would seem to refer exclu-
sively to contracts concerning domestic real property, which 
class of transactions is expressly excepted from party au-
42 WALKER 409 ns. 5 and 6; I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ § 2. 7 n. 1 o. 
43 See 1 EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ ibid. 
44 Chile: C. C. art. 16 par. 3, to which provision C. Com. art. 1 13 expressly 
refers. 
45 On the doubts existing with respect to movables, see CLARO SoLAR, I Ex-
plicaciones de Derecho Civil Chilena ( 1 8 9 8) 1 2. 5 § 2. 1 5. 
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tonomy in the Brazilian Code.46 Expressly under this nar-
rower conception, the provision was adopted in the Codes of 
Colombia and Ecuador.47 However, the Codes of Honduras, 
Panama, and El Salvador have reproduced the entire section 
without modification.48 The Supreme Court of Chile49 not 
only refers it to all objects but extends the law of the place 
of performance to the effects of all contracts. A Chilean place 
of performance would imperatively call for the Chilean 
law, while a contract to be performed abroad would be sus-
ceptible of an agreement in favor of a different law. 
This double rule has been adopted in numerous other 
Latin-American laws, notably in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico/" although only the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916 
made it really clear that the parties may choose a law in 
general, but may not do so if the place of performance is in 
the country. The Argentine Code contains a maze of mys-
terious provisions. 51 
The Brazilian Code added the prohibition of an agreement 
of the parties as to "obligations entered into in a foreign 
46 Brazil: Ill trod. Law (I 9 I 6) art. I 3 § unico, sub III ("transactions relating 
to immovables situated in Brazil"); sub IV ("transactions referring to the Bra-
zilian tnortgage system"). 
47 Colombia: C. C. art. 20 par. 3· 
Ecmdor: C. C. art. I5 par. 3· 
48 Honduras: C. C. art. I4 par. 3· 
Panama: C. C. art. 6 par. 3. 
El Salvador: C. C. art. I6 par. 3· 
49 Chilean S. Ct. (June 8, I911) Hoffman v. Fisco, 9 Revista Der. Jur. y 
Ciencias Soc. (I 9I4) I, 358; (Jan. 5, I 933) Artola V. de Achav. v. Compafiia 
Huanchera de Bolivia, 90 id. (I933) I, 373, 384 (shares of a Bolivian com-
pany possessed in Chile). 
50 Argentina: C. C. art. I 243 (I 209). 
Brazil: lntrod. Law (I9I6) art. I3 § unico, sub I ("contracts made abroad 
but to be performed in Brazil") ; Introd. Law (I 942) art. 9 § 1. On several 
controversial questions, see 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA I87, I9I. 
Mexico: C. C. (I 928) art. IJ; the former code (I 8 84, art. 17) had expressly 
allowed transactions made by a foreigner abroad concerning movables to be 
submitted to another law. 
51 Argentina: Are art. 8 (8) and I243 (I2o9) imperative? The answer is 
difficult because nobody knows which of the many sections involved includes 
the main principle. See the attempt to disentangle this complex by 3 VICO I 22 
§ I37· 
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country by Brazilians,"52 thus achieving four extensive reser-
vations for the lex fori. The new Brazilian law, however, 
has replaced all restrictions to the agreement of the parties 
by one provision in favor of Brazilian formalities for contracts 
performable in the country. It would seem that thereby party 
autonomy is tacitly restored in all questions of substance. The 
comments, known thus far, proclaim this view, excepting, 
however, the "imperative" provisions of the law of the place 
of contracting. 53 
Another provision in favor of the domestic law was still 
more extraordinary. Peru and Guatemala seemed to allow 
a party agreement exclusively in favor of their own laws; but 
this may be obsolete. 54 
Authoritative writers have, often enough, manifested their 
dissatisfaction with the described nationalistic tendencies/5 
which, however, have never received, as a whole, the public 
rejection they deserve. To the contrary, the exorbitant theory 
that the state is entitled to dictate the lex obligationis to its 
subjects has been seriously maintained by a reputed writer. 56 
While certain codes omit any provision/7 their silence may 
52 Brazil; c. c. art. I 3 § unico sub II. 
53 Brazil: Introd. Law (I94Z) art. 9i EsPINOLA, z Lei Introd. s68; SERPA 
LoPES, z Lei In trod. 3I6ff.; TENORIO, Lei In trod. zog-z II advocates restric-
tion to the autonomy allowed by the lex loci contractus; contra: SERPA LoPEs, 
ibid. 
54 Peru; C. C. (I8sz) art. 40 sent. z, omitted in C. C. (1936) Tit. Prel., 
art. VII. 
Guatemala: The provision of the Law on Foreigners, 1894, art. I6 sentence 
z has been reformed and appears in the Law on Foreigners, 1 9 3 6, art. 2.4 sent. 
3 restricted to external requisites in case the act or contract is to be performed 
in the country. However, MATOS 453 n. 1 § 327 does not stress or even mention 
this article. 
55 See, among others, recently, BEVJLAQUA (I938) 368, although he seems 
(365ff.) to understand the Brazilian rules as mere presumptions; FuLGEN-
CIO, Synthesis de Direito Internacional Privado (1937) I45 § Z99· Contra: z 
PONTES DE MIRANDA I9Iff. 
56 PONTES DE MIRANDA, 39 Recueil ( I932.) I at 649. 
57 The C6digo Bustamante is enigmatic. BusTAMANTE, La comisi6n de juris-
consultos de Rio (Habana I92.7) 1I9 § I4I declared that his draft recognized 
express and tacit intentions of the parties, but his added restrictions are based 
on the theory of a predestined national law or lex loci contractus. 
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appear ominous to the permissibility of agreements on the 
applicable law, in view of a recent discussion during the de-
liberation of the new text of Montevideo. The Argentine 
delegate, Vico, proposed that the intention of the parties be 
recognized with respect to the effects of contracts, where it 
is not in contradiction to prohibitions of the law of the place 
of performance; in other words, he followed the French 
theory rejecting true party autonomy. To the same effect, 
the present text of the Treaty was interpreted in the com-
mission, in which, as is reported, the principle "of general 
and affirmative character triumphed that denies autonomy of 
intention any legitimacy for setting up a regulatory norm 
of private international law."58 The Uruguayan delegate, 
Vargas Guillemette, proposed a round denial, and in fact, a 
clause was inserted into the Additional Protocol of the Con-
ference declaring that "jurisdiction and law applicable ac-
cording to the respective treaties, cannot be modified by the 
intention of the parties, except to the extent that this law 
authorizes them so to do."59 It seems that all these formula-
tions amount to the rule that the law of the place of per-
formance or the other laws prescribed in particular cases by 
the treaty govern the freedom of the parties. 
Other jurisdictions rejecting party autonomy. According 
to a very short report, the courts of Denmark and Norway do 
not recognize choice of law by the parties except within the 
domestic sphere of the competent law, which, however, does 
not seem defined with certainty.60 The same is declared in a 
section of the Civil Code of the Soviet Union.61 
58 Institute Buenos Aires, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano, at 285; Republica 
Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano, at I 6 7. 
59 Republica Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano 211. 
6° Conference de Ia Haye, Actes de la sixieme session (1928) 276 (UssiNG, 
Denmark) and 337 (ALTEN, Norway); BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 224 No. 
8o (Denmark). 
61 The question is declared controversial, see STOUPNITSKI, 7 Repert. I 14 No. 
1 6o; but see MAKAROV, Precis 3ooff. 
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2. United States 
Until recently, the opinion dominant among the European 
scholars was fully shared by the leading American writerS.62 
The most radical form of this doctrine, denying not only 
desirability but existence to a choice of law by the parties, 
has been adopted by Beale and is evident in the perfect silence 
of the Restatement on everything connected with party au-
tonomy. 
A few, very few, cases, reflecting this principle denying 
party autonomy, are best represented by Judge Learned 
Hand's formulation: 
"People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another 
place; they may of course incorporate any provisions they 
wish into their agreements-a statute like anything else-and 
when they do, courts will try to make sense out of the whole, 
so far as they can. But an agreement is not a contract, except 
as the law says it shall be, and to try to make it one is to pull 
on one's bootstraps. Some law must impose the obligation, 
and the parties have nothing whatever to do with that; no 
more than with whether their acts are torts or crimes."63 
Textbooks and encyclopedias, however, readily admit that 
regard to the intention of the parties is one of the approaches 
which an American court may use.64 Beale himself recorded 
in I9IO as in 1934 that it appeared in the second most nu-
merous group of cases.65 The Supreme Court of the United 
States has most frequently followed this theory,S6 starting 
62 In addition to BEALE: LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 655 and passim; 
GoODRICH 278; previously FooTE 397; MINOR 401. See CooK, Legal Bases 
389. 
63 Gerli & Co., Inc. v. Cunard S. S. Co., Ltd. (C.C.A. 2d 1931) 48 F. (2d) 
II 5, 117; accord, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hyde (C.C.A. 2d 1936) 
82 F. (zd) 174. In both cases the decision was not dependent on the dictum. 
64 STUMBERG zoo, 209. 
65 BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1910) z6o; 2 BEALE 1172 still mentions 13 
states, as against 21 states allegedly following the lex loci contractus, but see 
infra Chapter 30, p. 451. 
66 See STUMBERG 209 n. 42; LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) at 579; 
NusSBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (1942) at 919. 
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from a dictum by Chief Justice Marshall in I 8 2 5, 67 and has 
purposefully remarked that this is the general rule "con-
cisely and exactly stated before the Declaration of Indepen-
dence by Lord Mansfield."68 It has been said that: 
"The situs of contracts is one of the troublesome problems 
of private international law, but one rule stands forth clearly: 
That the intention of the parties as to the law they desired 
to apply will govern, if such selection be made in good faith, 
and be not opposed to the public policy of the forum.'169 
The courts of New York have clearly followed the same 
view. In 1935, the New York court of last resort has ex-
plicitly restated the principle: 
"The intention of the parties, express or implied, generally 
determines the law that governs a contract."70 
However, the courts, compelled to find their way against 
the hostility of the leading scholars, have been increasingly 
prone to indecision and inconsistency. The doubts whether 
parties may determine their law at all, may have been aug-
mented by Beale's influence, although they do not seem to 
have taken strong roots. Also, the unreasonable belief that 
parties can choose only between the law of the place of con-
tracting and that of the place of performance, seems to have 
increased as an effect of Beale's teaching. 71 The confusion of 
the cases, so often deplored, would have been relieved in 
part, if the courts had always been told in no uncertain words 
that it is not at all in their discretion and free decision to 
67 Wayman v. Southard (U. S. 1825) 10 Wheat. 11 cited in Pritchard v. 
Norton (188z) 106 U. S. 124 as a precedent, cf. KuHN, Comp. Corn. 28o. 
68 Mr. Justice Gray in Liverpool and Great Weste!Jl Stearn Co. v. Phenix Ins. 
Co. (1888) 129 U.S. 397, 447· 
69 O'Toole v. Meysenburg (C.C.A. 8th 1918) 251 Fed. 191, 194. 
7° Cornpafiia de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank 
of Finland (1935) 269 N.Y. 22, 26, 198 N. E. 617. 
71 According to LEE, "Conflict of Laws relating to Installment Sales," 41 
Mich. L. Rev. ( 1942) 445 1 468, most courts share in this belief. This may be 
doubted, however. 
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apply a law which the parties agreed to apply. The most 
recent writers have claimed the theory of intention to be 
existent in all American courts. 72 It should be so in any case, 
and this would give, as Cook has said, as much security as 
the rules of the Restatement. 73 
3· Express Agreements 
Stipulations concerning the law applicable to a contract 
are not so rare as some writers believe. Of course, compared 
to the constant flow of millions of interstate and international 
transactions, a small percentage are provided with appropriate 
clauses. But world commerce, advised by trade organizations 
and counsel, has been using such stipulations in ever increas-
ing types of contracts. It is true, the trend is much less strong 
in the United States, a fact obviously connected with the 
prevalence of interstate commerce based on federal statutes 
and a critical attitude of courts. The British standard forms 
with their reference to English law and London arbitration 
have aroused countermeasures in the United States as well as 
in Central Europe. Also, it happens that the arbitration 
clauses in their large progress are powerful competitors, 
since they tend toward decisions discarding legal considera-
tions. Arbitrators of the type of ccamiable compositeurs" or 
"de facto arbitrators," have no duty to observe rules of law, 
and where there is such duty, frequently no sanction is stated. 
The situation is different in England, some British dominions, 
and some American states, where the courts retain a con-
siderable function, and to some extent in other countries in 
which arbitrators are presumed to apply the local state law.74 
72 See (in various limitations) CooK, Legal Bases 418; BATIFFOL 31 §§ 
36-38; id. 58 §§ 63-68; NussBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (r9p) 919. Cf. infra 
Chapter 29 p. 403 n. 46. 
73 CooK, 21 Can. Bar Rev. (1943) 249,253 No.8. 
74 For all details, see the instructive article by E. CoHN, "Commercial Arbitra-
tion and the Rules of Law, A Comparative Study," 4 U. of Toronto L. J. 
( 194 I) I, 
CHOICE OF LAW BY THE PARTIES 377 
But growing opposition to the arbitrariness of lawless arbitra-
tion on legally material questions ought to bring express 
stipulations on the applicable law to renewed significance. 
Traders of bulk merchandise have used for many decades 
standard forms influenced by British habits and institutions. 
Thus, in the grain trade from America to Europe, the La 
Plata Grain Contract of the London Corn Trade Association 
subjects the parties to London arbitration and English law. 
A frequent clause providing in lengthy caution for the de- • 
termination of arbitration suits, begins with the following 
words: 
"Buyer and seller agree that, for the purpose of proceed-
ings, either legal or by arbitration, this contract shall be 
deemed to have been made in England and to be performed 
there, any correspondence in reference to the offer, the ac-
ceptance, the place of payment or otherwise notwithstanding, 
and the Courts of England or Arbitrators appointed in Eng-
land, as the case may be, shall, except for the purpose of 
enforcing any award made in pursuance of the Arbitration 
clause hereof, have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes 
which may arise under this contract. Such disputes shall be 
settled according to the law of England whatever the domi-
cile, residence, or place of business of the parties to this 
contract may be or be~ome .... ms 
In another, app~rently now prevailing, form, only arbitra-
tion is stipulated: · 
"All disputes from time to time arising out of this contract 
shall be referred to two Arbitrators ... or to an Umpire .... " 
"All Arbitrators shall be governed by the provision of the 
Arbitration Act for the time being in force in England, except 
so far as the same may be modified by or be inconsistent with 
the foregoing provisions." 
"The Arbitrators or Umpire appointed shall, in all cases, 
reside in the United Kingdom, and at the time of their ap-
75 See for a list of German, French and Italian cases dealing with this form, 
HAUDEK 102 n. I. 
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pointment shall be themselves members of the London Corn 
Trade Association Ltd ... . " 76 
In a comparable way, brokers of any place will in certain 
contracts with customers refer to the rules of the exchange 
and the law of the state where the order is to be executed. 
For instance: 
"All orders executed in New York or any New York 
Stock Exchange or Curb Exchange shall be executed in ac-
cordance with the laws of New York and the rules and 
regulations of the said exchanges prohibiting fictitious and 
illegal transactions, contracts and agreements, and it is under-
stood and agreed that the validity of all transactions ... 
executed on any New York Stock Exchange or New York 
Curb Exchange shall be controlled and determined solely by 
the laws of New York."77 
References to English law are to be found also in the con-
tract forms of the London Rubber Trade Association, In-
corporated Oil Seed Association, London Rice Brokers As-
sociation, London Copra Association, London Cattle Food 
Trade Association, Liverpool Cotton Association, and refer-
ences to German law in the general conditions of such or-
ganizations as those of the German carriers78 and maritime 
insurers.79 Moreover, particular banks~ underwriters, mari-
time carriers, and certain large merchants have stipulated 
for their own law by stereotyped cla~ses in Germany, 8Q and 
16 La Plata Grain Contract, form No. 41. Parcels for Continent. Rye Terms. 
(March I9J8) clause II (excerpt). In the so-called North American contracts, 
certificates of inspection being declared final as to quality, the disputes subject 
to arbitration are such as might arise from other causes than quality of the 
shipment. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce, General Legal Bulletin of March 2. 8, I 9 3 6, 7. 
77 Used by a Boston broker and declared valid in Weisberg v. Hunt (I 92.1) 
2.39 Mass. I9o, I98, IJI N. E. 471, 474· See also Cisler v. Ray (I931) 82. 
Cal. Dec. 396, 2. Pac. (zd) 987, annotated in 2.0 Cal. L. Rev. (I9J2.) 97: sub-
jection "to the rules, regulations and customs of the exchange or market (and 
its clearing house, if any) where executed." 
78 See, e.g., Duncan, Fox & Co. v. Schremp£ & Bonke [1915] 1 K. B. 365. 
79 HAUDEK 102.. 
80 HAUDEK 1 o 1. Example: "Place of performance for both delivery and pay-
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probably in many countries.81 Passenger tickets of British 
ships, 82 bills of lading regarding vessels leaving English, 
Dutch, and Belgian ports for America have been traditionally 
referred to "the common law of England, to wit, general 
maritime law," or to British law.83 More recently, it seems 
more usual to declare that the contract shall be governed 
by the law of the flag of the ship carrying the goods. 
In maritime insurance policies, reference has often been 
made to the English Insurance Act of I 906 and the con-
ditions and usages of English Lloyd policies. A clause in a 
contract between two Dutch companies "as if the policy were 
signed in London," has been treated as an express reference 
to English law by the Appeal Court of the Hague.84 
Aircraft transport consignments regularly provide for the 
national law of the carrier,85 insofar as international con-
ventions do not yet regulate liabilities. International loans 
have often contained86 but sometimes omitted a clause ascer-
taining the applicable law, and drafters will probably be 
ment, as well as jurisdiction for both parties, is in Kiel. The contractual rela-
tions are governed by German law." (Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft Aktien-
gesellschaft, Kiel-Gaarden, conditions of delivery to foreign countries, published 
in MDLLEREISERT, Allgemeine Lieferungsbedingungen (1932) 109). 
81 Belgium: Societe Coloniale Anversoise, contracts, see HELLAL'ER, Kauf-
vertrage in Warenhandel und lndustrie (1927) 189. 
Japan: Ferncliff (1938) Am. Marit. Cas. 206, 219: bill of lading to be 
construed in accordance with the law of Japan. 
82 E.g., in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (1925) 9 F. (2d) 724. 
83 E.g., in the Canadian cases: Mathys v. Manchester Liners (1904) 25 Que. 
S. C. 426: "All disputes regarding the bill of lading to be settled according 
to common English law"; Can. Sugar Refining Co. v. Furness Withy & Co. 
(r9o5) 27 Que. S. C. 502: "the contract shall be governed by the common 
law of England, to wit, the maritime law of England"; Vipond v. Furness (S. 
C. of Canada 1916) 35 D. L. R. ( 1917) 2 78: "Any claim or dispute arising on 
this bill of lading shall, in the option of the ship owner, be settled with the 
agents of the Line in London according to British law, with reference to which 
this contract is made to the exclusion of proceedings in any other country." 
Similarly, Hart & Son v. Furness, Withy and Co. (r9o4) 37 N. S. R. 74· 
84 Hof s'Gravenhage (May 17, 1923) W.rxr7r. On the decision of the Su-
preme Court in this cause, see infra n. 128. 
85 FERNAND DE VISSCHER, in 48 Recuei! (1934) II 325· 
86 See for list of judicial cases, HAUDEK r o 5 n. r. 
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experienced enough, by now, not to forget one. The same 
is true for agreements between banks. 87 In many American 
contracts of finance corporations, insurance policies, and 
other agreements,S8 the place of the main office of the com-
pany is indicated as the place where the contract is made, 
frequently with the express addition that the law of this 
place shall govern. This is a tribute paid to the historical role 
of the lex loci contractus. Again, to comply with the idea that 
the place of performance governs the contract, in German 
form blanks or general conditions, producers and sellers 
almost invariably state that "place of performance and ex-
clusive jurisdiction" are to be at their own domicil.89 This 
clause is regularly regarded, as if the law of this place were 
expressly stipulated.90 Although foreign exclusive jurisdic-
tion is not easily conceded by American and many other courts 
in suits of residents against nonresidents, agreement on a 
87 See for an example, Schering Ltd. v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank Aktiebolag 
(I943) [I944J Ch. D. I3. 
88 E.g., oil lease, WILLISTON, 7 Contracts 579I; Montreal Cotton & Wool 
Waste Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland (I927) 26I Mass. 385 (sale 
of goods). Conditional sales contract, Rubin v. Gallagher (I94o) 294 Mich. 
I24, 292 N. W. 584 (the court recognizes a subjective right created by the 
clauses); Stern v. Drew (App. D. C. I922) 285 F. 925; Craig & Co., Ltd. v. 
Uncas Paper Board Co. (I926) I04 Conn. 559, I33 Atl. 673, in which cases 
the clause has been discarded by the court and by LEE, supra n. 7I, at 471. 
89 
"Smaller enterprises and firms with widespread patronage usually provide 
at least for exclusive jurisdiction to be at the place of their management; in the 
industry and big trade it is very common to exclude in the general conditions 
state jurisdiction in favor of private arbitration." RAISER, Das Recht der all-
gemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen (I935) 4I. The Industry and Commerce 
Chamber in Berlin, however, advised not to use any clauses modifying the legal 
provisions on the place of performance and jurisdiction, see ROHL, Juristischer 
Anschauungstoff, Heft I (I93I) 20. 
The custom is widespread. For instance, in a contract between an American 
and a Danish firm, the stipulation that the place of performance and of juris-
diction should be in London, was recognized by the Admiralty and Commercial 
Tribunal in Copenhagen (Dec. 2o, I938) Ugeskrift for Retsvaesen I939> 238, 
4I Bull. lnst. Int. (I939) 52 No. Io762. 
90 Usage of merchants and practice of the courts are comprehensively treated 
in LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort und Schuldort, I 66ff.; id. I 83ff. Of course, the 
clause may intend only advantages of private and procedural law, STAUB-
HEINICHEN in 3 Staub 54 7, An hang zu § 3 7 2 n. 6a. 
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law in the form of determining the place of making or per-
formance should be respected on principle. Certainly, it 
should also be out of question to invalidate the American 
clause determining the place of contracting as fictitious, as 
eminent judges have occasionally done.91 An English court 
had no difficulty in enforcing the following clause in a con-
tract made in New York between a citizen of Ecuador, who 
never had an English domicil, and a Canadian company, re-
specting certain mineral rights in Ecuador: 
"While for convenience this agreement is signed by the 
parties in the City of New York, United States, it shall be 
considered and held to be one duly made and executed in 
London, England."92 
American life insurance companies doing business in Europe 
have been compelled to settle for the jurisdiction and law 
of the country of their branch.93 
In ordinary American business agreements extending over 
several states, stipulations determining the applicable law 
are by far not so frequent as they should be. But remarkable 
91 Especially Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dodge (1918) 246 U.S. 357· 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Italy, Cass. (July 26, I929) Rivista I93I, 
406. 
To the contrary effect, e.g., England: British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg 
(192I) 66 Sol. J. I8. 
France: Cass. (req.) (Aug. 6, I867) D. I868.1.35, S. I867.1.40o and con-
stantly, see BATIFFOL 43 n. I. 
92 British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (I 92 I) 66 Sol. J. I 8. 
93 Thus Czarist Russia prescribed submitting of insurance policies issued in 
Russia to Russian law. After the intervention of the Soviet decrees affecting the 
insurance contracts, two conflicting decisions of the New York Court of Appeals 
resulted, namely, Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co. (I927) 244 N.Y. 482, 
I 55 N. E. 749, and Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (I934) 266 
N. Y. 71> I93 N. E. 897. In the first case the court disregarded, in the second 
case the majority of the court, against the vote of Judge Lehman, respected, 
the stipulation of submission to the Russian law required by the Russian statute, 
cf. Note, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I940) at 986. However, the problem of the 
cases was the situs of the obligation rather than the applicable law; cf. RABEL, 
"Situs Problems in Enemy Property Measures," I I Law and Cont. Probl. 
(I945) II8, IJI. 
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negative references occur, a kind of clausulae salvatoriae, to 
save as much of the contract as the various statutes possibly 
involved may allow. Thus, in combination with a general 
reference to the law of Michigan, contracts of the Detroit 
automobile industry, with its many thousands of dealers in 
the world, state that any provisions contravening the laws 
of any country, state, or jurisdiction shall be deemed not a 
part of the agreement. In conditional sales contracts, clauses 
are to be found such as follow: 
"If the law of Tennessee [where the contract is made] 
does not apply to and govern the contract between the parties, 
their rights and remedies, then the laws of Ohio or Arkansas 
apply." 
"It is the express intention of the parties hereto that this 
agreement and all the terms hereof shall be in conformity 
with the laws of any state wherein this agreement may be 
sought to be enforced, and if it should appear that any of the 
terms hereof are in conflict with any rule of law or statutory 
provision of any such state, then the terms hereof which may 
conflict therewith shall be deemed inoperative and null and 
void in so far as they may be in conflict therewith, and shall 
be deemed modified to conform to such rule of law."94 
By an analogous method, an automobile policy provides 
that: 
"Any and all provisions of this policy which are in conflict 
with the statutes of the state wherein this policy is issued are 
understood, declared, and acknowledged by this company 
to be amended to conform to such statutes.m5 
94 Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works (1943) 180 Tenn. 137, 172 S. W. 
(2d) 812, recognizing these clauses and apparently inferring the intention of 
the parties that the state of enforcement should furnish the applicable law; the 
decision is understood to this effect also in the Note, 148 A. L. R. (1944) 375, 
376. 
See also HOAR, Conditional Sales (1937) App. B, Forms, p. 438. 
95 Form used by Central Mutual Ins. Co. of Chicago and procured for me by 
the kindness of Att. Edgar H. Ailes, Jr., Detroit. The stipulation continues to 
the effect that nevertheless the liability of the company should not be increased 
but the assured should reimburse the company for any loss, costs, or expenses 
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and that: 
"Any stipulation therein in conflict with or contrary to the 
laws of the state or province (of Canada) where the liability 
arises shall be considered as not written, and the law of such 
forum shall apply." 
and moreover: 
"If any condition of this policy relating to the limitation 
of time for notice of accident or for any legal proceeding is 
at variance with any specific statutory provision in the State 
in which the accident occurs, such specific statutory provision 
shall be substituted for such condition."96 
A company appointing a branch manager usually inserts 
in the employment contract a clause restraining him from 
engaging in the particular trade during a certain period after 
the termination of the contract. Such clause may expressly 
refer for construction to the law of the place of performance, 
meaning the state in which the branch is situated,97 because 
the legality of the clause would presumably be judged by 
the courts according to this law. 
The most notable similar clause in the international field 
was introduced to safeguard maritime affreightment contracts 
against the danger of contravening the American Harter 
Act. 98 At present an analogous so-called "clause paramount" 
is ordered by many enactments in connection with the Hague 
Rules to be inserted in bills of lading99 and in addition often 
voluntarily adopted. The clause states that the contract of 
transportation shall be subject to the Convention of Brussels 
of I 924 that sanctioned the Hague Rules, or to a sea carriage 
exceeding the scope of the policy. A similar clause is concerned with the exigen-
cies of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law of the state or province 
in which the policy is (eventually deemed to be) issued. 
na Duncan v. Ashwander (D. C. D. La. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 829, 832.. 
97 Form drafted by Mr. Thomas G. Long in Detroit. 
98 See infra Chapter 2. 9, p. 424 n. 135. 
99 Thus in the United States: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, of April r6, 
1936, c. 229 § IJ, 49 Stat. 12.12, 46 U.S. C. A.§ 1312. 
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of goods act embodying these Rules, and that any contrary 
stipulation shall be null and void. The clause is "paramount" 
to all other stipulations. 1M 
During war times, the United States Government in con-
tracts with firms undertaking comprehensive works, often 
assumed its direct liability for the obligations undertaken 
by the contractor to a subcontractor in a subcontract made 
by him; to secure the subcontractor independent rights as a 
beneficiary in all courts, this agreement is declared to be 
governed by the laws of the District of Columbia.101 
On principle, despite Beale, there cannot be the slightest 
doubt that all the mentioned agreements are held valid in 
all countries, including the United States, with the possible 
exception of a few Latin-American jurisdictions. The courts 
recognize reference to sister states as well as to foreign coun-
tries.102 Only the limits have to be discussed. 
4· Implied Agreements 
Parties agree tacitly to the application of a particular 
law when their behavior shows their obligations to be in-
tentionally connected with the private law of a certain coun-
try. If they have only a law "in mind" but do not express 
their intention at least by conduct, there is no case for a 
tacit stipulation. But, for instance, parties having in their 
former transactions agreed on the application of a certain 
law, may well be supposed to intend a similar submission in 
making a new contract. 
10° For the interesting particulars, see the informative article in 40 Revue Dor 
(1939) 169. 
101 For this information, too, I am indebted to Mr. Thomas G. Long. The 
situation existing without such a clause has been described by GRASKE, War 
Contract Claims (WILLISTON, 9 Contracts, 1945) § tp .. 102 For instance, Italian law: Mittenthal v. Mascagni (1903) 183 Mass. 19, 
66 N. E. 4z5. 
Canada: M.A. Kennedy v. Fiat of Turin (19z3) z4 0. W. N. 537: "all 
controversies shall be referred to the Turin Law Court to be dealt with accord-
ing to Italian law." 
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In addition to the cases of international loans and sales, 
another typical example free from doubt is a transaction at 
a stock or commodity exchange. Every participant knowingly 
submits himself to the regulations and usages of the exchange 
as well as to the state law in force at the place. Even an order 
to a broker in ZUrich, to be performed at the local exchange, 
has been considered an intentional subjection to the usages 
of ZUrich and to Swiss law.103 
Assuredly, the border line between tacit and presumed in-
tention is often dubious. Where the parties by agreement 
submit to the jurisdiction of a certain country, some decisions 
have taken for granted that the agreement extended to the 
municipal law of that country.104 The English House of 
Lords declared this inference so sure that no one could 
doubt. 105 Others, more cautiously, only infer a presumable 
intention to submit to this law.106 But it seems settled that 
the court or board of arbitration to which the parties have 
submitted, would apply, if not its own municipal law, cer-
tainly its own conflicts rules. 107 
In the English courts, also a clause of submission to English 
arbitrators is regularly deemed to imply reference to 
English law.108 Analogous inferences, although with more 
103 Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1942) 68 BGE. II 22o; but this is a contro-
versial matter. 
104 Germany: RG. (F<!b. 22, 1881) 4 RGZ. 242 and in constant practice; 
see also IPRspr. 1926-27 No.3; 1931,63, 78; 1933, 19, 40; Bay.ObLG. (May 
1 6, I934) IPRspr. 1934, 44· 
105 England: N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. James Finlay 
& Co., Ltd. [I 927] A. C. 6o4, 6o8, 6o9 (H.L.) per Lord Dunedin and Lord 
Phillimore. 
106 Canada: See 3 JOHNSON 449· 
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II at 302 and precedents cited; 
cf. (June 9, 1936) 62 BGE. II 125. 
107 See arbitration, Hamburg, Hans. RGZ. ( 1931) B 4I 9, 42 I. 
108 Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery [ 1894] A. C. 202; Spurrier v. La Cloche 
[ 1902] A. C. 446 (P. C.); Sanderson & Son v. Armour & Co. (1922) 91 L. J. 
(P. C.) 167 (H.L.); N. V. Kwick Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. Finlay 
&[ Co. [1927] A. C. 6o4 (H.L.); Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. 
I939] A. C. 277. 
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dependence on the circumstances, occur elsewhere.109 Arbitra-
tion, however, in this country110 and in many others, at present 
very often entails decisions without reference to any particular 
private law. But such a clause has been said to influence con-
flicts law by excluding the ordinarily applicable law.111 
Much discussion has been devoted in Switzerland to the 
case where both parties in court plead application of a certain 
law to the litigious contract. Can the parties agree on choice 
of law even as late as in court? Party autonomy can hardly 
be pushed so far, except where there is a clear-cut new con-
tract modifying their relation.112 However, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal previously was inclined to consider statements of 
counsel on the applicable law as a conclusive argument for 
a tacit agreement in contracting.113 At present, the Swiss 
and German highest courts regard such statements only as 
one among other clues for assuming a hypothetical inten-
tion.114 That the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals were only too 
glad to encounter consonant declarations of the parties per-
109 Germany: RG. (June 19, 1906) JW. 1906, 45Zi (July 8, I913) Hans. 
GZ. 1913, 282 and others. 
France: See conclusions by BATIFFOL § 152. 
Switzerland: BG. (May 18, I9I7) 43 BGE. II u8; Cass. Zurich (April 8, 
1 924) Bl.f.Ziirch.Rspr. 248, 2 Int. Jahrb. Schiedsgerichtswesen (I 92 8) 35 2. 
Contra: Germany: RG. (Oct. 14, I913) Warn.Rspr. I9I4, 42; (Nov. 19, 
1929) JW. 1930, 1862; (June 10, I933) IPRspr. 1933, 44· 
Contra: The Netherlands: Hof s'Gravenhage (Feb. 10, I9II) W.9I6t; Rb. 
Amsterdam (March 3, 1911) W.9208. 
The great majority of governments, in their answers concerning the sales 
of goods (Sixieme Conference de la Haye, Documents 460), denied that even 
in the intention of the parties the designation of arbiters was in strict connec-
tion with the application of the national law of the arbiters. 110 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts § I 9 24; ISAACS, "Two Views of Commercial 
Arbitration," 40 Harv. L. Rev. (1927) 929, 937· 
111 The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (May 3, 1934) N.J. (I935) 958. 
112 Cf. BG. (June 9, I 936) 62 BGE. II 125, denying any force even to a 
novatory agreement, if not foreseen in the contract; German OLG. Hamburg 
(Oct. 21, 1901) II Z.int.R. 443 regarded the party disposition binding on the 
court. 
113 See 43 BGE. II 228 and for the history of the practice, FRITZSCHE, 44 
Z.Schweiz.R. (N.F.) 232a; NIEDERER, 59 Z.Schweiz.R. (N.F.) 249-252. 
114 49 BGE. II 225; 62 id. II 125; 63 id. II 307; RG. (April 4, I 928) 
IPRspr. 1929 No. 31; RG. (April 27, 1932) 86 Seuff. Arch. 299, IPRspr. 
1932 No. 32; RG. (June Io, I933) ISI RGZ. 193, 199. 
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mitting them to avoid entanglement with two or more con-
flicts laws,115 is well understandable. It seems that most courts 
believe themselves to be entitled to accept the pleading of 
both parties based on the law of the forum, without further 
investigation. This may be legitimate when it conforms to 
the procedural rules, which is not self-evident. Foreign law 
is not really a mere fact. 
In conclusion, agreements on the applicable law, made 
otherwise than by words, are not very frequent, but should 
by no means be over looked in the search for the applicable 
law. 
5. Scope of the Agreement 
(a) Problem of renvoi. All writers seem to agree that 
parties stipulating for an applicable law intend to apply the 
municipal law without renvoi.116 
(b) Nullity by choice of law. Some adversaries of party 
autonomy have ridiculed the consequence that a contract 
should be void because the law referred to by the parties 
prohibits it. Savigny countered this objection by suggesting 
that the reference should be construed as not meant to in-
clude the provisions that would nullify the contract.117 How-
ever, nullity in this case is a sound and natural consequence 
of the rule, as well as of the more or less considered will of 
the parties concerned, and this is the victorious opinion.118 
110 E.g., Recueil trib. arb. mixtes: Vol. 4, 36o, szo, 534, 6z7; Vol. 5, 
563. 
116 MELCHIOR 238. 
117 SAVIGNY § 374• 
118 England: See BENTWICH in WESTLAKE 303-304. 
Germany: RG. (May 10, 1884) 12 RGZ. 34 rejected Savigny's opinion, 
no presumption of submission being required; OLG. Braunschweig (Feb. 
7, 19o8) IJ ROLG. 362. 
France: "Less characteristic, but the possibility of annulling a contract even 
in case of conflict of laws is clearly admitted," BATIFFOL 51 n. 1. 
The Netherlands: Hof Haag (May 17, 1923) W.II171: marine insurance 
having reference to English law; the clause that the policy should be the only 
evidence of the interest, makes the contract invalid under the Life Assurance 
Act, 17741 and Marine Insurance Act, 1906, s. 4 (2-b). 
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IV. CHOICE OF SEVERAL LAWS 
I. Special References 
The economic interests of parties to a contract sometimes 
require that certain phases of their relation should be gov-
erned by particular laws, as when, for instance, examination 
of goods sold is subjected to the local law of the place where 
the goods arrive for inspection.119 Accordingly, it is well 
settled also that the parties may refer a part of the contract 
to a specific law different from that governing the rest of the 
contract.120 As choice of law is a matter of agreement, the 
Supreme Court of the United States says, "the agreement 
may select laws and also limit the extent of their applica-
bility."121 
Contractual provisions for a certain law, virtually different 
from that intended for the contract in general, are frequent 
in such matters as mode of performance and particularly 
currency questions, exemption from liability of common car-
riers by reference to section 3 of the Harter Act or similar 
laws, reference to the Antwerp York rules for general average 
in maritime contracts, or clauses concerning land securities 
to be subject to the lex situs. 
119 Cf. BAGGE, Recueil I 928 Vat 167. 120 England: DICEY 649; CHESHIRE 257; Adelaide Electric Supply Co. v. 
Prudential Assurance Co. [1934] A. C. u2, 145, 151; Hamlyn v. Talisker, 
Kwick Hoo Tong v. Finlay, see supra n. 108. 
France: Cass. (civ.) (June 12, 1883) 8.1884.1.164; (Dec. 4, 1894) 
D.I895·I.526; (Dec. 5, 1910) S.I911.1.129, Revue 19I1, 395, Clunet I912, 
ll56. 
Germany: RG. (June 23, 1927) II8 RGZ. 370, 374; (Nov. 14, 1929) 
126 RGZ. I 96, 206; obiter dictum I 22 RGZ. 3 I 6. 
Italy: Cass. (Nov. 28, 1927) and (Jan. 21, 1928) Giur. Ital. I928 I 647, 
Rivista 1928, 5I4, 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 587. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (June 13, 1924) N.J. (192,4) 859, 861. 
Perm. Court of Int. Justice (July 12, 1929) Series A, Nos. 20, 21; Clunet 
I 929, 977· 
121 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill (1904) 193 U. S. 551, per Mr. Justice 
Brewer; literally followed in Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Minehart 
(Ark. I9o4) 83 ·s. W. JZ3· 
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A series of disputes has arisen about the scope of these 
references, because of the widespread indifference with which 
standard contract forms used in interstate and international 
commerce often contain inconsistent mixtures of old and new 
clauses. Thus, American insurance policies, for instance, have 
referred to the law of New York to control the contract gen-
erally and in another clause stated a waiver by the insured 
of notice preliminary to forfeiture, although New York law 
unconditionally prescribes the notice. In such a case, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has construed the general 
reference as restricted by the special clause; the law of New 
York could not extend its imperative force to a contract 
made in another state and subjected to this law only by stipu-
lation.122 
Similar combinations in bills of lading or affreightment 
contracts have been decided in an analogous manner, when 
feasible. 123 Reference to the Harter Act has been held in 
Germany to be restricted by a simultaneous broad exemption 
clause based on German law.124 In a charter party made in 
New York and expressly subjected to American law, the 
parties inserted a clause exonerating the shipowner from 
liability for negligence, contrary to the Harter Act, but valid 
under French law obtaining at the port of discharge in Guade-
loupe. The Court of Cassation in Paris recognized the ex-
1 22 Mutual Life v. Hill, supra n. I 2. r. 
123 In Ocean Steamship Co. v. Queensland State Wheat Board [I94,] I K. B. 
402., the hill of lading contained two clauses, the first referring to the Aus-
tralian Sea Carriage of Goods Act, I92.4 (instead of the provisions of the 
schedule only) and declaring anything inconsistent null and void, and a second 
subjecting the contract to the law of England. The second clause was held 
void because s. 9 of the Australian Act provided that the parties would be 
deemed to have intended to contract according to the law in force at the place 
of shipment and any stipulation or agreement to the contrary should be null 
and void. 
124 OLG. Hamburg (July 7, I905) Hans. GZ. I905, 2.2.7; (July 5, 1907) 
Hans. GZ. 1907, 2.44. In another case where the "Holland clause" (referring to 
Dutch Law) was inserted, it was declared compatible with the added exemp-
tion clause, OLG. Hamburg (Feb. u, 1936) Hans. RGZ. 1936 B 2.43 No. 70. 
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emption as valid under the assumption that the parties in-
tended to submit themselves to French law known by them 
as validating the clause.125 It would have been simpler to 
admit that the special stipul~tion limited the general refer-
ence.1211 This argument was used, in fact, by the Appeal Court 
of Brussels when general reference to English law conflicted 
with an express reference to the Canadian Water Carriage 
of Goods Act, corresponding with the Harter Act.127 
It might be argued, however, that the Hague Rules, now 
replacing the just-mentioned laws and adopted in the most 
important countries, require a stricter application. So far 
as they reach, they exclude party autonomy. Stipulations in 
the bill of lading inconsistent with the Rules may be generally 
understood as nullified. 
A Dutch marine policy referred to the English Marine 
Insurance Act, 1906, and the conditions and usages of Lloyd 
policies "as if the policy had been signed in London," but 
contained a clause that payment would be due without further 
proof of interest than the policy itself, which clause would 
have made the insurance contract void under the English 
Act. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands decided that 
the reference to English law was restricted by the clause, 
basing this clause on Dutch law.128 
The same view has sometimes been taken with regard to 
loan debentures under which amounts are due at one of 
several places, at the option of the bondholder, in the money 
of the place, the parties agreeing that the law of the country 
selected by the bondholder should determine the amount and 
method of payment. In this view, American law governing 
the currency of payment in New York should be construed 
125 Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, 1910) S.I9II.1.129, Revue 19ri, 395, Clunet 
1912, IIS6. 
1211 See also BATIFFOL 67 n. 3· 
127 App. Bruxelles (Nov. rs, 1922) 6t Jur. Port Anvers 66x. 
128 H. R. (June 13, 1924) N. ]. (1924) 859, r VAN HASSELT zo6. 
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as an exception, for example, to English law determining 
other phases of the obligation.129 
2. Nature of Special References 
Courts of various countries examining the scope of special 
references, often assert that they have to construe agreements 
only, not laws. Lord Esher said: "the parties introduce the 
words of the Harter Act which I decline to construe as an 
Act but which we must construe simply as words occurring 
in this bill of lading."130 The language of American judges131 
and foreign courts132 is sometimes similar. Evidently, in this 
connection, there is no question of a reference to foreign law 
valid only when it merely embodies words of foreign laws 
in the contractual stipulations.1313 But does this kind of ex-
pression yet acknowledge a difference between reference to 
foreign law on the basis of conflicts law and a mere transfor-
mation of foreign law into ordinary stipulations? German 
scholars, in fact, have stressed this alleged diff~rence and, 
although recognizing both types of reference as binding, have 
preferred to presume that the law generally governing a 
contract extends to these stipulations, because this interpreta-
tion promotes the unity of law governing a contract.134 Admit-
129 This has been contended in criticizing the House of Lords decision in Rex 
v. International Trustee etc. [I937] A. C. soo, by the anonymous writer in 
I 8 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I 93 7) 220. 
130 Dobell & Co. v. Rossmore S. S. Co. [I895] 2 Q. B. 408-C. A. Cf. Ocean 
Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Queensland State Wheat Board [I94r] I K. B. 4021 4I2 1 
4I5. 
101 See, e.g., Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Minehart (Ark. 1904) 83 
S. W. 323: reference to New York law does not.mean that the statutes of New 
York are in force but only that they are a part of the contract. See also the 
language of CooK, Legal Bases 399· 
132 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 4, I 936) Clunet I 936, 967: the pro-
visions of the State of New York, by being referred to in the stipulations, 
changed their character from legal to conventional. 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (March 17, I9I3) Hans. GZ. I9I3 1 HBI. I57 1 
158, aff'd, RG. (Jan. 28, 19I4) Hans. GZ. 1914, HBI. 108: the Australian 
Sea Carriage Act of I904 had become part of the contract. 
133 Supra p. 360. · 
134 See HAUDEK 38; MELCHIOR 523 § 384; WoLFF, IPR. 88. This view 
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tedly, however, average parties are not at all aware of this 
subtle contrast, nor are the courts prepared to observe it.135 
They, definitely, presuppose a plurality of laws whose border 
line only needs analysis. By the above language, the courts 
seek to emphasize only that the scope intended by the 
specially invoked law is not binding, even though it is in-
tended to be compulsory; that the court is free to assume to 
what extent the parties have referred their obligations to 
that law; that the reference is to be reasonably interpreted 
and restricted. 136 
If the courts were to follow the suggestion mentioned they 
would have to favor the more general reference at the cost 
of the special clause. But the judicial inclination is just to the 
contrary. Courts profess that the special clause derogates 
from the general one. 
In addition, a mere incorporation of a foreign rule in stipu-
lations would have the result that, if the rule is changed sub-
sequent to the contract, the obligation would not be affected. 
This, as said earlier, is an undesirable effect. 
But it may be asked, instead, whether parties are per-
mitted, if they so intend, to limit the reference to the un-
changed text of a certain legal rule. The question came up 
on the occasion of the American loans in the nineteen-
seems to be shared by KAHN-FREUND, Annual Survey of English Law (1940) 
254. For a different distinction, which I believe to be the correct one, see infra 
Chapter 32, II, 3, p. 534· 
135 In RG. (Nov. 24, 1928) 122 RGZ. 316 cited by MELCHIOR 522 n. 3 for 
his thesis, the court expressly stated that a particular stipulation may be subject 
to a separate law. This was not altered by the correct decision in the case at 
bar that the litigious question of who has to bear extraordinary costs in a sea 
carriage, was covered by the main reference to English law. In RG. (Nov. 14, 
1929) 126 RGZ. 196, 206 (cited by MELCHIOR 522 n. 4) it was stated that 
the presumptive intention of the parties, decisive according to German, not the 
Austrian, conflicts law, excluded the Austrian law from the question of effects 
exercised by Austrian decrees. 
136 See, e.g., Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hill, supra n. ur, at 557: "· .. the 
laws of New York are controlling in any respect only because the parties have 
so stipulated, and, as we have indicated, the stipulation in respect thereto is to 
be harmonized with the other stipulations in the contract." 
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twenties to European governments, cities, and corporations. 
Interest and capital were payable in gold dollars. When by 
the Joint Resolution of Congress in 1933 recovery in gold 
coins as well as in gold value was prohibited, bondholders 
attempted to save their claims by contending that a reference 
made in the contract debenture, and possibly in the bond, 
to the law of New York, was not intended to include the 
unforseeable American dollar depreciation. The German 
Reichsgericht replied that "one cannot select a national law 
and exclude its imperative rules. Only an unrestricted sub-
mission assures that the contract be disciplined, if necessary, 
against egoistic purposes of the economically stronger party 
or even both parties, considering the general interests in 
changing times .... m37 
There was no doubt about the correct interpretation of 
the individual loan agreements. None of them could be under-
stood otherwise than as taking the Joint Resolution in its 
stride, since the alternative would have been the complete 
lack of an applicable law, an impossible result.138 In theory, 
however, the problem of conditional references to a legal 
rule is new and unsettled.139 
137 RG. (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058; cf. 1o Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 385. 
138 RABEL, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 509, 5!3· 
139 For the negative solution, see WoLFF, 49 Jurid. Rev. (1937) at 124; 
for the affirmative, NussBAUM, "Comparative and International Aspects of 
American Gold-Clause Abrogation," 44 Yale L. J. (1935) at 83; for reasons 
of doubting, DUDEN, 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 625. 
CHAPTER 29 
Theories Restricting Party Autonomy 
M ANY objections have been raised against the right of parties to select their law. Often overlapping and elusive, they may be distinguished according 
to their main ideas. 
I. DocTRINES oF GENERAL ScoPE 
1. Doctrines Reserving Imperative Rules 
(a) Imperative rules of a predestined law. As mentioned 
before, in the majority opinion of the scholars, every con-
tract is born into a certain law, the "imperative rules" of 
which it cannot escape. That is, any rules of this law which 
parties cannot modify by contracting in a purely domestic 
sphere, they do not avoid by an agreement that another law 
should govern.1 
Although the numerous followers of this doctrine are 
categoric in asserting that imperative rules are inescapable, 
they strongly disagree in determining what rules are impera-
tive. The learned reporter of the Institute of International 
Law, Baron Nolde, sternly warned against the frequent tend-
ency of the literature2 to reduce these norms to a small 
number of secondary problems identical with what is properly 
called "ordre public." These concern such classic examples 
as wagering, usury, smuggling, or social protection. Im-
1 The arguments have been expounded with particular authority by LoREN-
ZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) s6s; NIBOYET, Recueil 1927 I, IJ, J6, 53, 6z; 
PILLET, Principes § 227; AuDINET, 1 Melanges Pillet 65. 
2 As a recent example, see the convincing demonstration by EsMEIN in 6 
Planiol et Ripert, Traite Pratique 646 that provisions of domestic law, pro-
tecting the weaker parties or the interests of society in general or good morals, 
can not simply be transposed into the international field. 
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perative rules, on the contrary, according to the reporter's 
energetic assertion, cover a "vast and normal domain," in-
cluding formation and validity of contracts, the principle 
of freedom of contracting, the clausula rebus sic stantibus, 
rescission on the ground of nonperformance, the effect of 
contracts on third persons, assignment, plurality of subjects 
of obligations, "many" of the rules concerning discharge of 
obligations, and a "very great number" of rules dispersed 
in the codes including those on collective bargaining.3 Thus, 
not much remains for agreements of parties, nor is it easy 
to see exactly what their sphere may be. 
This entire theory has influenced a few recent legislative 
texts/ but it has been opposed at least by Anzilotti5 in the 
Institute, and more recently thoroughly refuted by English, 
French, and German writers.11 It has no real background in 
any of the significant court practices. 
Nevertheless, in a new variant, the predestined law has 
taken the form of the locally "most closely connected law," 
pretending to decide whether the parties may submit to 
another law. 7 Discussion may be deferred until we meet the 
problem of territorial limits to autonomy (infra p. 403). 
(b) Lex loci contractus necessarily governing validity. 
The idea that every contract necessarily depends on the law of 
the place where it is made and, hence, is in an intimate and 
3 32 Annuaire (I925) 52-57. 
4 Supra PP· 372-373. 
·' 32 Annuaire (I925) 512. 
6 See Vol. t, pp. 83-87. The last committee draft on the conflicts rules for 
sales of goods (I 9 3 I) satisfied the opinion expressed by the great majority of 
governments in extending party autonomy to the "imperative rules." Art. 2 
par. I says simply: "The sales contract is governed by the internal law of the 
country indicated by the parties to the contract," and par. 3 expressly includes 
"the conditions relating to the consent of the parties." See 7 Z.ausl.PR. (I 9 3 3) 
957; the committee report by JULLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE has been printed 
as confidential. 
7 MoRRIS, "The Proper Law of a Contract in the Conflict Laws," 56 Law 
Q. Rev. (I940) po, 337· 
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inseparable conjunction with this law, is old. It goes back to 
Bartolus8 and was revived by the scholars believing in vested 
rights. 9 Modern writers added their perennial fear of a cir-
culus inextricabilis: party autonomy would determine the 
law which itself permits party autonomy.10 It is also argued 
that the essential requisites of contracts are regulated by 
"imperative" rules where the contracts originate/1 thus re-
suming the thesis mentioned before. 
The old doctrine has undoubtedly left some vestiges. In 
the nineteenth century, even in the French courts, it preceded 
the revival of the principle of autonomy12 and, in its applica-
tion to such contracts as transportation, seems to have retained 
much vigor.13 Remnants in this country are even more note-
worthy in Beale's works,14 but they have. their securest domain 
outside of conflicts law proper, in defining the power of a state 
to subject contracts to its domestic law notwithstanding the 
due process clause.15 
At present, Switzerland is the only important jurisdiction 
following this idea in its proper meaning, that is, making the 
lex loci contractus exclusively applicable without any possi-
8 BARTOL US, ad I. Cunctos Populos § I 3, infra p. 444· 
9 See, among many others, AUDINET, I Melanges Pillet 67; RoLIN, I 
Principes § 310; STRISOWER and NEUMEYER, cited by NOLDE, Revue 1926, 
448; MINOR 401; BEALE, Summary§ 2 and 23 Harv. L. Rev. (I9Io) at 270. 
10 E.g., NIBOYET, I Repert. 248 No. 37; Judge Learned Hand's "boot-
straps" theory, supra p. 374 n. 63. Contra: see WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 
791; HAUDEK 64; BATIFFOL § 386; MAYER, op. cit. (supra Chapter 28 n. 8) 
III,I3I. 
11 NIBOYET, I6 Recueil (1927) I 35ff. Contra: WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 
8os. 
12 See BATIFFOL 27-29 § 32· 
13 Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 23, r864) 8.1864.1.385; BATIFFOL 258 § 284. 
14 A decision influenced by the Restatement, Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue v. Hyde (C. C. A. 2d I936) 82 F. (2d) 174 understands the clause of a 
trust made in France that it was "to be construed and interpreted by the law 
of New York" as not including the validity but only the meaning and effect 
of the terms. In the argumentation of the court, the intention of the parties 
is not supposed to be that they would withdraw the question of validity from 
the lex loci contractus-"nor would such intention, if expressed, be controlling." 
15 See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Ind. Accident Comm. (1935) 294 U.S. 532, 
and STUMBERG 6o. 
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bility for the parties to change the rule. The Federal Tri-
bunal in constant practice applies the law of the "place of 
contracting" to all legal requisites of validity, such as offer 
and acceptance, consent, permissibility, significance of error, 
fraud or duress.16 The parties may determine the law govern-
ing the "effects" of a contract, but not that concerning its 
"validity." 
The Restatement pronounces a similar rulet on the back-
ground, however, of a total exclusion of party choice. 
(c) Illegality under lex loci contractus invalidating the 
contract. One of Dicey's influential exceptions to the proper 
law theory states that validity of a contract under the proper 
law is of no avail if the making of the contract is unlawful 
under the lex loci contractus. 18 
This statement, distinguishable from its probable mother 
rule, above sub (b), precariously reposes on Lord Halsbury's 
well-known opinion. Although terming untenable the propo-
sition that a prohibition by the lex loci contractus could always 
prevent us from enforcing a contract/9 he added: 
"Where a contract is void on the ground of immorality 
or is contrary to such positive law as would prohibit the 
making of a contract at all, then the contract would be void 
all over the world and no civilized country would be called 
on to enforce it." 
Such a contract regarded as illegal, that is, "criminal" at the 
place where it is made, would be regarded all over the world 
as obnoxious to public policy and therefore void, though not 
illegal. As a result, the House. of Lords in In re Missouri 
minimized the force of the Massachusetts statute prohibiting 
16 See BGE.: 23 I 8z:z; 32 II 415; 38 II 519; 44 II z8o; 49 II 73· 
17 Restatement § 332, cf. § 358. 
18 DICEY 655 exception (z) to Rule 16o; FooTE 402. See for criticism 
MANN, "Proper Law and Illegality in Private International Law," 18 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1937) 97> 103; CHESHIRE 278. 
19 In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 42 Ch. D. 321, 336; accepted as 
the law by Greer, L. J., in The Torni [193:1.] P. 78, .88. 
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exemption from carrier's liability. Its violation, hence, was 
not a case of a "criminally" or morally tainted foreign offense 
that would move an English court. The distinction was made 
in remembrance of a curious old contrast between mala in se 
and mala prohibita, which a judge in I 822 had declared 
"long since exploded.mo 
More recently, Lord Wright in his turn, in the Vita Food's 
case, 21 has commented on Lord Halsbury's dubious dictum 
in another questionable way.22 The fact is, however, that in 
all these cases and others, the judgment for validity was 
based purely on English law considered as governing the con-
tract, despite the law of the place of contracting. 
Only one English case, The Torni/3 is apparently consist-
ent with the alleged rule, but its well-considered reason lies 
elsewhere/4 and has been rejected by the decision in the 
Vita Food's case. 
The conclusion had been reached even before the last-
mentioned decision that invalidity under the law of the place 
of contracting as such is simply immaterial in English 
courts.25 Legality is determined by the proper law, except that 
enforcement may be refused also on the ground of the public 
policy of the forum. 
Apart from academic theses, in this country obiter dicta 
may be found, such as in a supreme court decision, that 
parties outside of the state of New York may make the laws 
of this state controlling upon both parties, 
"Provided such provisions do not conflict with the law or 
public policy of the State where the contract is made."26 
20 Best, J., in Bensley v. Bignold (1822) 5 Bar. & AI. 335> 341 noted by 
MANN, supra n. x8, 104 n. x; cf. WILLISTON, 6 Contracts soo6 § 1764. 
21 Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A. C. 277, 297, 
P. C. 
22
'See CooK, Legal Bases 4:z.xff. 
23 [I9JZ] P. 78. 
24 Infra P· 4:1.7. 
25 CHESHIRE ::.78. 
26 Mr. Justice Brewer in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill (1904) 193 U. S. 
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This general formula is hardly more than a tribute to school 
reminiscences. In no other country is there any sizeable fol-
lowing of this theory. 27 
(d) Prevailing rule. All versions of a predestinated law 
have been abandoned by the present jurisprudence of mer-
cantile countries. The English view is beyond any doubt. 
French and German courts definitely apply the law upon 
which the parties agree, with all its implications, and do not 
apply another law solely because it would be applicable in the 
absence of a party intention.28 
Illustration. In a case decided by the Mixed Anglo-German 
Arbitral Tribunal in 1922, a contract entered into by ,corre-
spondence between an English and a German member of the 
Liverpool Cotton Association, made subject to the Rules 
of this Association and thereby to the jurisdiction of the High 
Court of Justice and the law of England, was held valid 
under this law. It was immaterial which law would have 
55 r. Similarly, a few Massachusetts decisions concerning insurance statutes, 
infra n. 83. 
2
' The only exception known to me is a surprising contention by NussBAUM, 
D. IPR. 244 repeated in 51 Yale L. ]. (194z) 9o8, Principles 176; against 
which see GUTZWILLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 656; MANN, supra n. x8, 
at 103, and Book Review, 7 Modern L. Rev. (1944) 17z; RAAPE, D. IPR. 
25 3; STAUB-HEINICHEN in 3 Staub 556 n. II a. For the dominant view that 
illegality arising out of making the contract is treated like other questions of 
validity, see STUMBERG Z42 n. 33· 
zs England: It suffices to refer to the opinions of the Privy Council in the 
Vita Food's case, supra n. 2. 1. 
Belgium: PouLLET 3 72 § 299 n. z reproaches the Belgian courts since 
they do not distinguish between supplementary and imperative rules. 
France: The court decisions ought to be discussed at the proper places, but 
even ARMINJON, z Precis (ed. 2) 257 n. I § 79, cites only one decision, Cass. 
(civ.) (Jan. 8, 1913) S.19IJ.I.243, as being reluctant to admit all conse-
quences of party autonomy. The decision refuses to recognize that an arbitra-
tion stipulated in the contract may judge the question of fraud, because French 
courts give effect only to conventions freely consented. Thus freedom of con-
tracting is a ground for public policy overriding the conflicts rule which in 
itself is not contested. 
Germany: See the stringent documentation by MELCHIOR 5o6ff. 
Portugal: VEILJA BEIRAO, draftsman of the C. Com., commented on art.+ 
to the effect that every rule may be changed by the parties, except that on 
capacity. Only the subsequent doctrine introduced the "imperative" rules. See 
EsPINOLA, 8 Tratado 538. 
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governed without this submission and whether the contract 
would have been unenforceable under the German prohibi-
tion against dealing in futures. 29 
In the United States, the questions involving validity of 
the contract are decided in a majority of states according to 
criteria other than the law of the place of contracting, and 
often according to the intention of the parties. The dogma 
postulated by Beale exists nowhere. 
2. Evasion 
(a) Fraudulent evasion. The French doctrine of "fraude 
ala loi," although slowly vanishing, in certain cases has been 
applied, under an apparently broad formula, to stipulations 
in favor of a foreign law, when a contract was both made and 
to be performed in France.30 However, the nucleus of these 
cases consisted in c.i.f. sales contracts on overseas grains, made 
between Frenchmen in France under the standard forms of 
the London Corn Trade Association and similar to those 
under which the seller had bought the goods overseas. That 
nullity of such agreements violated the interests of inter-
national commerce, was recognized by the Court of Cassation 
itself. Moreover, it is characteristic of the crude method pro-
tecting some true or imagined domestic public interest by the 
theory of fraud, that in most cases the required evidence of 
"fraudulent" evasion could not be produced. 31 
(b) Contracts without foreign elements. The German 
Reichsgericht once nullified a stipulation of choice of law in 
an isolated case. An agreement with a matrimonial agency 
29 Gruning & Co. v. Gebr. Fraenkel (Feb. 6-I 7, I 922) I Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 726. To the contrary effect, for instance, the Czechoslovakian Supreme 
Court (March 2, 1934) 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) r68: action for the balance 
arising out of a grain transaction, dismissed on domestic standards. For this ap-
plication of public policy, see infra Chapter 33 pp. 568 ff. 
M Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 19, 1930) and (Jan. 27, 1931) S.I9JJ.I.4I; and cases 
mentioned by BATIFFOL 63 n. 4· 
31 BATIFFOL § 70. 
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was made and to be performed in the Kingdom of Saxony, 
both parties being resident there. The contract referred to 
Prussian law which, in contrast to the Saxon, considered valid 
a promise of award given to a matchmaker.82 
Here, indeed, the transaction belonged, personally and 
substantially, to one jurisdiction, lacking all and any foreign 
elements; the parties referred to a foreign law exclusively 
for the purpose of evading a prohibition intended to maintain 
good morals. The case deserves to be noted in this respect 
but has often given rise to exaggerated conclusions. 
(c) Lex fori in imperative role. The Austrian and several 
Latin-American Codes have gone so far as to make the law 
of the forum imperative in large groups of cases, such as those 
where the contract is performable in the country or where 
nationals of the country contract abroad. 83 A similar pro-
vincialism occurs in sporadic cases throughout the world, 
when a court for the protection of a resident believes itself 
entitled to apply its domestic statutes without justifying a 
stringent public policy of the forum. 
(d) American law. The American position is not simple 
to state. It appears that repeatedly stipulations of choice of 
law have been disregarded, for varying reasons or sometimes 
almost without justification, evidently on the ground of a 
belief such as that expressed by Beale that the parties have 
no right to select a law. However, these cases are a small 
minority. Furthermore, they belong, with isolated exceptions, 
to certain groups which we shall have to discuss hereafter 
(sub II and III). Anticipating the result, we may note that 
the cardinal rule, also in this country, particularly at present, 
is the acknowledgement of the right of the parties to de-
32 RG. (Sept. zr, r899) 44 RGZ. 300. 
33 E.g., Argentina: C. C. art. IZ43 ( rzo9). 
Mexico: C. C. art. 13· 
See for more details supra Chapter z8, pp. 370-372. 
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termine the law, and all exceptions that can seriously be sus-
tained simply :flow from public policy. 
3. Requirement of Substantial Connection 
In a current of dicta, English and American authorities 
have required as a matter of course, that the intention of the 
parties to select a law must be confined within certain limits. 
American courts have said that an agreement of the parties to 
choose a law should be "made with a bona fide intention,"34 
not "fictitious,na5 based on "a normal relation"36 or a "natural 
and vital connection."37 ~nglish decisions have declared that 
the chosen law ought to have "a real connection with the con-
tract,ms or that the intention expressed should be "bona fide 
and legal."39 Also, the German Supreme Court has sometimes 
mentioned that the parties may stipulate a law in material 
connection with the obligation,40 and similar views are likely 
to occur in other courts.41 Some theoretical backbone was 
sought for all these propositions in the doctrine of Westlake: 
"That the law by which to determine the intrinsic validity 
and effects of a contract will be selected in England on sub-
stantial considerations, the preference being given to the 
34 2 WHARTON 1210 § szo (o) is cited for this requirement in Seeman v. 
Philadelphia Warehouse (I928) 274 U. S. 403, 408. 
35 Crawford v. Seattle etc. R. Co. (I9IS) 86 Wash. 628, I50 Pac. 1155· 
36 Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse (r928) 274 U.S. 403, 408; Brierley v. 
Commercial Credit Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. I929) 43 F. (2d) 724, aff'd, id. 730. 
37 2 WHARTON 12IO § sro (o); Green v. Northwestern Trust Co. (I9I4) 
128 Minn. 30, ISO N. W. 229 (usury). 
38 South African Breweries v. King [I899] 2 Ch. 173, aff'd [I9oo] I Ch. 
273· 
39 Lord Wright in Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [I939] 
A. C. 277 at 290. 
40 RG. (Julys, I91o) 74 RGZ. I7I, I73i (July 8, I9Io) Recht I9IO No. 
3358; (April 4, I928) IPRspr. I929 No. 3I; (May .z8, 1936) JW. I936, 
2871. 
41 France: App. Rennes (July 26, I926) Clunet I927, 659, Revue 1927, 
s23, reversed by Cass. (civ.) (Feb. I9, I93o) Clunet I93I, 9o, Revue I930, 
282. 
Switzerland: BG. (July I6, I898) 24 BGE. II at 544, cf. ROMBERGER, Obl. 
Vertrage 45· 
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country with which the transaction has the most real con-
nection, and not the law of the place of contract as such."42 
It should be noted that this famous passage in an excellent 
formulation advocates an objective construction of the applic-
able law, in criticism of the traditional mechanical application 
of the law of the place of contracting. Whether the idea was 
latent in Westlake that a law to be selected by the parties 
must have some connection with the contract, is not clear.43 
Certainly, he did not pretend that the parties have to choose 
just that law which a judge would think to be in the closest 
connection-as recent English writers propose.44 
In fact, other writers/5 with whom Cook apparently asso-
ciated himself, 46 conclude that choice by parties is limited to 
those countries with which the contract has a "substantial" 
connection. Hence, in the cases of multiple local connections, 
the parties may select any one of these contacts, if it is not 
merely accidental; they are not bound to select the one con-
tact which a judge would assume to be the most vital. Other-
wise, the axiom would indeed abolish autonomy altogether. 
But even so, we notice at once that this establishes a broad 
theory against evasion which nevertheless does not prevent 
the parties from choosing a foreign law having some "sub-
stantial" connection with the contract but rejects claims of 
the forum grounded on a much closer connection. Such a 
42 WESTLAKE 2. I 2.. 
4
" Cf. WESTLAKE 2.87 and the note by BENTWICH in WESTLAKE 289; cf. 
DICEY 965. 
44 MoRRIS, 56 Law Q. Rev. (I 940) po, 3 3 7, CHESHIRE being cosigner 
of the article. 
45 HAUDEK 39; MELCHIOR so6 j ScHLEGELBERGER, Die Entwicklung des 
Deutschen Recht in den letzten fiinfzehn Jahren (I930) 133, see 4 Z.ausl.PR. 
4I7i M. WOLFF, IPR. 86, id. in 49 Jurid. Rev. (1937) 119, 121, and in Priv. 
Int. Law 42.4 (where he contends that this is the prevailing continental opinion; 
I doubt this contention); BATIFFOL 52§ 57· 
46 CooK, Legal Bases 42. 3, unaware of the continental discussion, developed 
his views very cautiously and rather ambiguously; he expounded them more 
firmly, however, in his last article, 2.1 Can. Bar Rev. (1943) 249, 2.53· 
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theory is unable to replace that of public policy. What, then, 
is its value? And why can the forum not tolerate a for-
eign law not "connected" at all with the contract, when not 
harmful to its public policy? With these questions in mind, 
we shall register what further information can be gained. 
The Polish Law on private international law has preferred 
another approach. It enumerates the law open to choice as 
follows: 
The parties may submit an obligation to the law of the 
national state, the law of domicil, the law of the place of 
making the transaction, the law of the place of performance, 
or the law of the place of situs.47 
In Beale's system the question is nonexistent, but the places 
of contracting and performance are the only ones he recog-
nizes at all as contacts.48 
Feeling that the familiar formulas include much obscurity, 
Lord Wright, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council in the much discussed Vita Food's case, has had 
the merit of attempting clarification. On the rule that the 
ascertained intention of the parties is conclusive, he observes: 
"It is objected that this is too broadly stated and that 
some qualifications are necessary .... But where the English 
rule that intention is the test applies, and where there is 
an express statement by the parties of their intention to select 
the law of the contract, it is difficult to see what qualifications 
are possible, provided the intention expressed is bona fide 
and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding the 
choice on the ground of public policy."49 
Again, this comment needs supercomment. What does 
"bona fide" and "legal" mean? 50 Had the court in mind 
47 Art. 7· See against this attempt of regulation, HAUDEK 44· 
48 2 BEALE 1127 n. 8, 1159 n. 4, II66 n. 6. Contra: see BATIFFOL 53 n. 3 
and 4· 
49 [1939] A. C. 277 at 290. 
50 See Note, 55 Law Q. Rev. (1939) Jl3, Jl5· 
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evasion under qualifying circumstances? Yet Lord Wright 
was prepared to give effect to a most obvious escape from 
Newfoundland to English law, in a case of an affreightment 
beginning in Newfoundland, "even where the parties are 
not English and the transactions are carried on completely 
outside England." 
As mentioned earlier, a citizen of Ecuador who had no 
ties with England and a Canadian corporation contracting in 
New York could validly submit to English law in the eyes of 
an English court. 61 
There is more reason for wonderment. Apart from fre-
quent references in the American usury cases, which are a 
special matter, when courts mention the requirement in ques-
tion/2 they quite regularly do so in order to state that in the 
case at bar the contract does have a sufficient connection with 
the chosen law. This is true for most American as well as for 
all English and German decisions, 53 and this is only natural. 
In regular commerce, parties never select a law having "no" 
relation to their obligations. 54 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, however, in the 
case of an employment contract, once made serious use of the 
alleged rule that questions of validity and construction cannot 
be referred by the parties to the law of a state in which the 
contract is not made nor to be performed. 55 For some reason 
51 British Controlled Oilfields ~- Stagg (I 9:z I) 66 Sol. J. I 8, supra p. 3 8 I 
n. 91. 
52 Out of I 8 cases considered in the note, "Validity and effect of stipulation 
in contract etc.," I I :z A. L. R. I :z4 to I 30 (left), only three are not concerned 
with usury. One trust case is without significance. On the two others, namely, 
Gerli v. Cunard S. S. Co., involving bills of lading, see supra p. 3 74 n. 63, 
and on the principal case, Owens v. Hagenbeck, see below n. 55· 
53 For the American cases see BATIFFOL 4I n. 1. In England, the decision 
in "The Torni'' is no counter-instance and its main argument has been chal-
lenged in the Vita Food's case. The German decisions cited supra n. 40 have in 
each case approved of the stipulation. 
54 See MELCHIOR, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I9Z9) I79· 
55 0wens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co. (R.I. I937) 192 Atl. I58, 
aff'd, 464, I I :z A. L. R. 1 I 3· 
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unfortunately not revealed in the case, the employing circus 
enterprise, whose permanent address was Chicago, localized 
the contract in Sarasota County, Florida. Counsel for the firm 
adduced dubious evidence for his plea that under the Florida 
decisions the plaintiff could be dismissed practically at the 
defendant's pleasure. The court, quite evidently moved by a 
strong feeling of social equity, rejected the plea by refusing 
the express reference to Florida law, allegedly not substan-
tially connected with the contract, and simultaneously elimi-
nated as not proved, the law of Indiana where the contract 
in fact was executed. Massachusetts, where the defendant 
gave written notice and where the circus was held until the 
expiration of the term for dismissal, was not further men-
tioned. Thus, the Rhode Island court seized of the suit during 
a brief performance in Providence, believed itself entitled 
to apply the law of its own state, which had no connection 
whatever with the contract. This happened in the name of the 
requirement of close connection. An arbitrary use of conflicts 
rules, once more, had to lead, on an easy though incorrect 
way, to an equitable decision. 
Of course, there is a practical question involved. Originally, 
the writers seem to have believed that choice by the parties 
is geographically limited,S6 and the Polish list of permitted 
contacts reaches the same result. In international relations, 
however, there are many cases in which a contract ought to 
follow the legal fate of another agreement. When a grain 
shipment under a form of the London Corn Trade Associ-
ation, arriving from Argentina to Bordeaux, is resold by the 
French buyer to another Frenchman in France, this is a 
"contra! de suite." The middleman in this frequent situation 
is in dire straits if he is liable to his successor on warranties 
~6 Clearly so, HAUDEK 39, rejecting (4o n. 3) my opinion (infra n. 57) with 
the contention: when goods sold do not touch English territory, the interest of 
the parties in English law which they select, is not based on the international 
structure of the contract but is only personal to the seller. 
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not covered by his rights of recourse against the Argentine 
vendor.57 As early as 1909, a German appeal court ex-
pressly denied the existence of a public policy precluding two 
German merchants in grain from submitting to London arbi-
tration and English law.58 French courts, haunted by their 
fear of "fraude ala loi," could not satisfy this need, but their 
mistakes will probably not be repeated anywhere else.59 Nor-
mal economic interests of those engaged in international trade 
must be as well safeguarded as trade within a territory. 
Other examples of "entailed contracts," which should con-
veniently be adjusted to the law that governs another con-
tract, have been adduced, such as a bond for a foreign debt, 60 
reinsurance, and subsequent insurance for merchandise in 
transitu on a vessel.61 Analogous reasoning would quell 
doubts, when a debt guaranteed by mortgage in one state, 
is expressly subjected to the law of the situs, even though no 
other contact with it existed.62 
A reference to English law will not be rejected by English 
or German courts whenever a certain type of contract is in-
ternationalJy unified according to English commercial cus-
toms, irrespective of the individual parties to the contract.63 
International commerce, indeed, must escape the narrow 
margins of any formula binding the parties to one or the 
other of their domiciliary laws and look for unified usages 
and stipulations. 
'
7 RABEL, 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 417 followed by WoLFF, IPR. 87; RABEL, 
1 Recht des Warenkaufs 53; BATIFFOL 54 § 59· 
'
8 OLG. Rostock (Feb. zz, I 909) 65 Seuff. Arch. No. I, zo Z.int.R. 92. 
"' Sttpra p. 400. 
<hl BATIFFOL 56; M. WoLFF, IPR. 87 and in 49 Jurid. Rev. (I9J7) I2o. 
01 Cases brought to attention by HAUDEK 41. 
"
2 In American Freehold Land & Mortgage Co. v. Jefferson (18gz) 69 
Miss. 770 the parties stipulated for the law of Mississippi where the land 
security was. The court held the stipulation to be void (infra n. 73) whereas the 
case is suitable to demonstrate the need of a clear recognition of such agree-
ments. 
63 See CLAUGHTON ScoTT, Conference de la Haye, Actes de la Sixieme Session 
zg6; M. WOLFF, 49 Jurid. Rev. (I9J7) I20 and Priv. Int. Law 428 § 4oz. 
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It has been conceded, moreover, that parties may select a 
law for the reason that they know it well or because it is 
competently elaborated.64 For this reason, English courts 
seem always to recognize the reference to English law. Why 
should they not? Why, indeed, should an American court not 
allow residents of the Philippines and Australia to agree in 
a contract on the application of the law of California? 
Finally, as is well known, English courts are inclined to 
accept submissions to English law without any qualification. 
This has recently been advocated in generalized form as a 
privilege for the lex fori of all countries.'65 But in a reasonable 
international private law, it should not be so significant which 
forum is seized of the case. 
It seems after all that the alleged general rule limiting 
the choice of law by the parties to a determined number of 
legislations, does not and should not exist. Its possibly more 
serious purpose is sufficiently defined through the old concept 
of evasion of some law; but this purpose must be pursued on 
the basis of its own merits-which are very small. 
II. SPECIAL AMERICAN DocTRINES 
The following topics cannot be treated without anticipating 
in some respects the conflicts rules existing in case the parties 
have not determined the applicable law, but such discussion 
is needed for a final judgment on the limits of party au-
tonomy. 
1. Usury Statutes66 
In regulating the rate of interest in loan contracts, the 
various jurisdictions employ different methods and permit 
varying amounts. With respect to a contract fixing interest 
64 Such a situation evidently occasioned the party agreement in British Con-
trolled Oilfields v. Stagg (1921) 66 Sol. J. 18; BATIFFOL 55§ 6o. 
65 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 428 § 403. 
66 No comparable doctrine exists abroad. 
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without an additional stipulation for the applicable law, 
former divergent conceptions have been finally superseded 
by a habit of maintaining the stipulated rate, provided that 
it is agreeable to some law connected with the contract, such 
as the law of domicil of either party, or that of the place of 
payment, or sometimes that of the situs of a land seeurity.87 
Thus, if a loan is made by a Pennsylvania corporation to a 
resident of New York, who even pledges certain property 
in New York as security, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has declared the agreement lawful, although it would 
have been void under New York law. Mr. Justice Stone said: 
" ... We think it immaterial whether the contract was 
entered into in New York or Philadelphia .... Respondent, 
a Philadelphia corporation having its place of business in 
Philadelphia, could legitimately lend funds outside the 
state and stipulate for repayment in Philadelphia in accord-
ance with its laws and at the rate of interest there lawful, 
even though the agreement for the loan were entered into 
in another state where a different law and a different rate of 
interest prevailed."68 
In this group of cases, we find in fact a combination of two 
tendencies that have been generalized in the literature. One 
idea is that several state laws are connected with the contract 
and the judge may choose among these but no other laws.t~9 
The other impulse is given to favor the law upholding the 
stipulation. Thus, this entire doctrine does not serve as a 
limitation but as a favor to the contract. 
As a third feature of the cases, however, the connection 
has to be "real," not "fictitious." The North Carolina court, 
finding that payment under a contract was arranged to be 
made in another state solely for the purpose of avoiding the 
67 See STUMBERG zu; GoODRICH § I o8; 2 BEALE § 34 7·4; cf. also 6 Banks 
and Banking (Michie I9JI) I99 and Supp. (I945). 
68 Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. ( I927) 274 U. S. 403. 
69 Arnold v. Potter (I 867) 22 Iowa I 94· 
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usury statute of North Carolina, applied the latter.70 In this 
sense, the stipulation of interest must be covered by the law 
of one of the places bona fide involved in the case. Bona fide 
seems to mean that the place should not be intentionally se-
lected for the purpose of evasion. 
Stipulation for a law. It is in this light that we must regard 
the approximately twenty-six decisions dealing with stipula-
tions on the applicable law.71 
Of fourteen usury cases holding such stipulation void, 
eleven invalidate it because it refers to a foreign law conflict-
ing with that of the forum. 72 Only one old Mississippi case 
protests against the advantage taken of its own usury statute 
in a contract made in either New York or Tennessee; it is 
a singular case also in the respect that the situs of the mortgage 
in the state, for most courts one of the most vital contacts, 
is disregarded. 73 Another case, in a lower court, disregarding 
the reference to Virginia law because the contract has more 
relation to the District of Columbia, concerns a loan corpora-
tion chartered in Virginia but operating in fact in Washington, 
D. C. The judge observes that if the payment had been stipu-
lated to be in Virginia, the stipulation would have been 
proper.74 
70 Meroney v. Atlanta National Building and Loan Ass'n (1893) II2 N.C. 
842, I7 S. E. 637; Ripple v. Mortgage and Acceptance Corp. (I927) I93 
N.C. 422, I37 S. E. I56. See also infra ns. 74 and 75· 
71 I am much indebted to Mrs. Oberst, formerly Elizabeth Durfee of Ann 
Arbor, for her excellent contribution in establishing the list of these cases and 
the conclusions to be inferred from them. 
72 Falls v. U.S. Savings, Loan and Bldg. Co. (1893) 97 Ala. 4I7; Meroney 
v. Atlanta Building and Loan Ass'n (I895) II6 N.C. 882; U.S. Savings & 
Loan Co. v. Scott (I 896) 98 Ky. 695, 34 S. W. 235; Locknane v. U. S. Savings 
& Loan Co., (I 898) IOJ Ky. 265; Fidelity Savings Ass'n v. Shea (I 899) 6 Ida. 
405; Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Dakota v. Bilan (1899) 59 Neb. 458; Snyder v. 
Fidelity Savings Ass'n (1901) 23 Utah 29I; Floyd v. National Loan & 
Investment Co. (I 90I) 49 W. Va. 327; United Divers Supply Co. v. 
Commercial Credit Co. (C. C. A. 5th I923) 289 Fed. JI6; Brierley v. 
Commercial Credit Co. (C. C. A. 3d I93o) 43 F. (2d) 730, cert. denied, 282 
U.S. 897; Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co. (193I) 200 N.C. 5II. 
73 American Freehold Land & Mortgage Co. v. Jefferson (I 892) 69 Miss. 
770, supra n. 62. 
74 Stoddard v. Thomas (1915) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. I77, 18I. 
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It is impressive that nine of these fourteen cases were prior 
to I 902. In the few others, the principle that any law having 
a substantial connection with the contract suffices, is expressly 
adopted. In the four last cases (of 1923, 1930, and 1931), 
the place of incorporation of the lending Delaware company, 
different from its principal place of business, is discarded, 
but the rate stipulated in the contract is nevertheless saved 
by judicial choice of another law validating the contract.75 
Twelve decisions, from 1865 to 1937, agree in applying 
the stipulated law, which in half of the number was that of 
the borrower and in the rest that of the lender. 76 A Kansas 
decision holding a stipulation for Colorado law valid, since 
many elements of the contract related to Colorado, refuted 
the contrary opinion, as. follows: 
"The position assumed by some courts in reference to 
this matter, when considering building and loan association 
cases, can scarcely be regarded as anything less than the 
result of a tour de force." 71 
Thus, the courts in this matter are not satisfied with the 
mere fact that the parties have signed the agreement. They 
analyze the facts in order to see whether enough elements 
support the stipulated localization, with the alternative that 
the parties are deemed to have intentionally evaded the usury 
laws of some other state. 
75 See the last three citations, supra n. 72, and Manufacturers Finance Co. v. 
B. L. Johnson & Co. (1931) 15 Tenn. App. 236. 
76 Townsend v. Riley (1865) 46 N. H. 30o; Dugan v. Lewis (1891) 79 
Tex. 246; Smith v. Parsons (1893) 55 Minn. szo; Lanier v. Union Mortgage, 
Banking & Trust Co. (1897) 64 Ark. 39; Ashurst v. Ashurst (1898) 119 
Ala. 219; Midland Savings & Loan Co. v. Solomon (1905) 71 Kan. 185; 
Steinman v. Midland Savings & Loan Co. (1908) 78 Kan. 479; Goode v. 
Colorado Investment Loan Co. (1911) r6 N. M. 461, 117 Pac. 856; LeSueur 
v. Manufacturers' Finance Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1922) 285 Fed. 490; Castleman v. 
Canal Bank & Trust Co. (1934) 171 Miss. 291; Merchants' & Manufacturers' 
Securities Co. v. Johnson (C. C. A. 8th 1934) 69 F. (2d) 940, cert. denied 293 
U. S. 569; Armstrong v. AlLiance Trust Co. (C. C. A. sth 1937) 88 F. (2d) 
449· 
77 Midland Savings & Loan Co. v. Solomon (1905) 71 Kan. 185, 191, 79 
Pac. 1077. 
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In summary, although it remains not quite certain which 
combination of elements will satisfy a court/8 it seems that 
the stipulation is likely to be accepted when it refers to the 
law of a state in which one of the parties is effectively domi-
ciled and in which at the same time either the contract is 
deemed to be made, or to be performed, or the land security 
is situated, or payment is to be made. 
Hence, the usury doctrine of the American courts, also in 
its extension to express agreements on the applicable law, is 
a remarkable specialty, suggestive of ideas, but by no means 
susceptible of simple generalizations. It rather demonstrates 
the usefulness of an elaborate approach to individual prob-
lems. 
2. Insurance Statutes 
In "a few instances,"79 courts of this country have disre-
garded express contract stipulations determining the place of 
the contract and thereby the applicable law.80 It seems that 
all these decisions were rendered in Massachusetts and Mis-
souri. The latter state has waged a long and gallant legislative 
78 In U. S. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Lanzarotti (I929) 47 Ida. 287, 274 
Pac. 63o, 632, with no express reference to a law, the agreement that the note 
should be paid in Montana at the domicil of the lending corporation, was re-
jected as not supported by innocent intent. If facts of the case were better known. 
the true motive of the court would be clearer. 
79 CoucH, I Cycl. of Insurance Law (I929) 441. These cases, it seems to 
me, have impressed BATIFFOL 6o n. I by far too much; but, it is true, CARNA-
HAN, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts (I942) 95, 562 also 
voices the impression that choice of the law of the home office of the insurer 
is ineffectual. Regrettably, he does not substantiate this thesis. 
80 Massachusetts: Albro v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (I 902) I I 9 Fed. 629, 
aff'd (I904) I27 Fed. 281; Dolan v. Mutual Res. Fund Life Ass'n (I899) 
I 73 Mass. I 97, 53 N. E. 398. 
Missouri: Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1899) I48 Mo. 583,50 S. W. 
5I9, aff'd (I9oo) 178 U.S. 389; Horton v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1899) 
I5I Mo. 6o4, 52 S. W. 356; Haven v. Home Insurance Co. (1910) I49 Mo. 
App. 29I, IJO 'S. W. 73; Saunders v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 
I923) 253 S. W. I77; Hoffman v. North American Union (Mo. App. 1933) 
56 S. W. (zd) 599; Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (Mo. App. 
I 934) So S. W. (2d) 272. 
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battle, with repeated reverses in the Supreme Court of the 
United States, to protect its residents against forfeiture clauses 
and other contractual deteriorations of their insurance in 
New York companies.81 Certainly, if an insurance contract 
has all the characteristics of a Missouri contract, stipulations 
inserted in the policy providing, for example, for a different 
rule of computation from that prescribed by the statute or 
for waiver of surrender value, forbidden by the statute, 
would be recognized as ineffectual at present as it was in I 8 9 I 
with the approval of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.82 If in such a case of an insurance contract belonging 
to the law of one state, the law of another state is stipulated 
for, it is a question of public policy whether the statutory pro-
hibition should be maintained nevertheless. A court, then, 
may qualify the agreement as an ineffectual attempt at evasion 
within the sphere of the prohibition. This, indeed, seems to 
be the view taken for a long period in Massachusetts in certain 
cases of violations.83 The agreement, however, ought not to 
be considered void as a whole. The Missouri court exagger-
ated by asserting that the interpretation and effect of the 
terms of insurance are governed by Missouri law when the 
contract is deemed to have been made there, despite a clause 
referring to New York law.84 
However, the vastly prevailing doctrine respecting insur-
ance contracts is summarized in the leading encyclopedia to 
81 Instructive: Missouri Annotations to the Restatement 14-2 § 332· 
82 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Clements (1891) qo U. S. 226. I 
cannot agree with the conclusion by LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (I 92 I) at 
5 79 n. 7 3 from this decision that the intention of the parties is not permitted 
to violate the statutes of the lex loci contractus. 
83 Dolan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (I899) I73 Mass. I97, 53 
N. E. 398; Millard v. Brayton (1901) 177 Mass. 533, 537; 59 N. E. 4-36. 
84 Pietri v. Seguenot (1902) 69 S. W. 1055, 1057. Kerner, J., in New 
England Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass. v. Olin (C. C. A. 7th 194-o) 
114- F. (zd) IJI, 137, despite his similar sweeping dictum in an otherwise 
correct opinion, certainly wanted to say only that the contract and the agree-
ment involved were made in fact in Indiana, and therefore the nonforfeiture 
statute of Indiana prevailed over the stipulation for Massachusetts law. 
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the effect that, "if the policy or certificate does expressly pro-
vide that a specific state shall be the place of contract, the law 
of the state agreed upon as governing controls the nature, 
validity, interpretation, and effect of the contract, whether 
the specified state be the state wherein the contract was made, 
or a foreign state or country and notwithstanding the insured 
resides, or the property is located, in another state."85 
This being the settled rule, all justifiable exceptions are 
fully explained by the operation of a specific public policy, 
a viewpoint needing separate discussion. 
The constitutional limits of public policy to be exercised 
by a state, have been illustrated in New York Life Insurance 
Company v. Dodge. By a contract undoubtedly made in Mis-
souri, a resident of that state was insured in a New York 
company. The insured concluded a collateral agreement with 
the company under the stipulation that the agreement should 
be deemed to have been made in New York, although most 
elements of its conclusion pointed to Missouri. The Supreme 
Court of the United States denied the state of Missouri the 
constitutional power to enforce its prohibitions against this 
agreement, thus rejecting the argument sustained by Mr. 
Justice Brandeis in a dissenting vote that the individual's 
right created under the Missouri contract was not susceptible 
of being disposed of by contracting anywhere.86 However, on 
85 CoucH, 1 Cycl. of Insurance Law 440 § 199; see also Note, 112 A.L.R. 
qo and 44 C. J. S. (1945) 516 § 54 n. 86. Cf. Trexler,]., in Stoddard v. 
Thomas ( 1915) 6o Pa. Super, Ct. 1 7 7 at 1 81 where a stipulation for the law 
of the domicil of a finance company was invalidated, supra n. 74: "No one 
questions the right of a corporation, such as an insurance company for example, 
to provide that its policies although issued to a person in another state, shall 
be governed by the Ia ws of the state of its residence." 
It is agreed that where the law of the insurer's domicil is more favorable to 
the claimant, express provisions in its favor are readily recognized. See, for 
instance, CARNAHAN, supra n. 79, 252 n. 85. 
86 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U. S. 357, 375 (opinion 
of the court); 377, 382 "(dissenting vote) among other arguments probably 
not equally prominent in Mr. Justice Brandeis' mind. 
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this question there is a long line of federal as well as state 
decisions which it is difficult to reduce to a summary.81 
In addition, courts have approved the claim of states to 
govern insurance policies issued to residents by foreign com-
panies licensed to do business in the state. 88 In the case of in-
surance, indeed, states are entitled to the exercise of greater 
control, unless new restrictions are to follow from extending 
the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution to in-
surance business. 
III. EXEMPTIONS FROM LIABILITY 
Municipal laws and unifications.89 While no debtor can 
effectively stipulate that he should not be responsible for his 
own fraudulent conduct, 90 gross negligence is treated on the 
same footing only in part of the legislations. Moreover, many 
courts traditionally view stipulations lessening the extent of 
liability with disfavor and construe them punctiliously, al-
though at present in most commercial cases insurance may 
replace such liability.91 Finally, in certain cases, liability for 
lack of ordinary care (negligence, culpa levis), either of the 
debtor himself or also of his agents, may not be contracted 
out under modern views, the strictest of which are to be 
found in this country. Thus, in contrast to British and German 
laws, the Supreme Court of the United States has proclaimed 
that common carriers by land and sea could not exempt them-
selves from liability for loss or damage arising from negli-
gence of their servants, "and that any stipulation for such 
s
7 See CARNAHAN, supra n. 79, 7I:ff., 554, 574-586, 589:ff. 
88 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens (I9oo) I78 U.S. 389; Great Southern 
Life v. Burwell (I926) u F. (2d) 244, cert. denied 27I U.S. 683; Owen v. 
Bankers' Life Ins. Co. (rgog) 84 S.C. 253,255, 66 S. E. 290. 
89 Cf. HoLLANDER, 3 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 534· 
90 PAULUS in Just. Dig. 2, 14, 27, 3: Illud nulla pactione effici potest, ne 
dolus praestetur. 
"'See a similar observation by GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, 7 Modern L. Rev. 
(I 944) 7 5, I 54 commenting on a new English decision. 
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exemption was void as against public policy."92 The declared 
reasons for supporting this thesis were the economic prepon-
derance of big enterprises, not giving customers fair oppor-
tunity to bargain for conditions, and the educational purpose 
of severe rules of behavior. 93 Later, stipulations for foreign 
laws favorable to the carriers were disregarded, because fre-
quently the party submitting thereto has no actual intention 
to do so and there is no freedom of contracting. 94 The federal 
legislation regulating interstate communication and carriage 
by land and sea was inspired by these views. With respect to 
maritime affreightment-which has created the outstanding 
international problem in this field-the Harter Act of I 893 
and subsequent congressional acts95 have established liability 
of the shipowner for certain occurrences without possibility 
of exemption, while no liability exists in other cases. Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand have enacted laws following this 
model. 96 A variant of the same method was pursued in the 
Hague Rules of I 92 I 97 and, on their basis, by the Brussels 
Convention of I 924, ratified by many states, 98 which has 
also been incorporated into English and, recently, American 
92 Mr. Justice Gray in Knott v. Botany Mills (1900) 179 U. 'S. 69 at 71; 
Clark v. Southern R. Co. ( 1918) 69 Ind. App. 697, 119 N. E. 53 9· 
93 New York Central R. Co. v. Lockwood (1873) 17 Wall. 357> 379· 
94 0ceanic Stearn Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (1925) 9 F. (2d) 724, 727: 
"The customer cannot afford to higgle or stand out"; Phillips v. The Energia 
(1893) 56 Fed. 124; Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. (1941) at 668. 
95 Act of Feb. 13> 1893> c. 105, 27 Stat. 445> 46 u.s. c. A.§§ 190•192; 
Law of Sept. 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 728. 
96 Australia: Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1904. 
Canada: Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1910 (9 & 10 Edw. 7> c. 61). 
New Zealand: Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1908. 
97 Hague Rules of the International Law Association, 1921, see 3oth Report 
(1922) 2, 260. 
98 Convention on the Unification of certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading 
for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Brussels, August 25, 1924, HUDSON, 2 Int. 
Legislation 1344, U. S. Treaty Series No. 931, 51 U.S. Stat. 233, 120 L. of 
N. Treaty Series 155, 157, 183, ratified by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Great Britain and many British dominions and dependencies, Hungary, Italy, 
Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, 
United States. For a full list see KNAUTH, Ocean Bills of Lading (ed. 2, 1941) 
75-8o. 
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1aws.99 France and Italy diverge only in certain significant 
particulars.100 
Land transportation rules of civil law countries have been 
largely unified by the conventions of Bern on the carriage 
of goods, 101 and a similar convention on carriage of pas-
sengers has been signed.102 The latest endeavors have been 
devoted to air transportation, in which field regard for the 
weak position of private customers has seemed to be counter-
balanced by the desire of many states to develop a young 
and costly industry. Nevertheless, in conventions,103 numer-
ous laws/04 and cases/05 comparative severity has prevailed, 
although the standard of liability maintained in this country 
against maritime carriers considerably surpasses the risks im-
posed on air carriers under the Warsaw Convention.106 
More isolated legislation in particular countries has dealt 
with restrictions on liability in employment contracts, agree-
ments of attorneys and notaries, and others. Differences, 
however, still exist in all fields, some of considerable weight. 
99 E.g., England: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924. 
United States: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, of April r6, 1936, 49 Stat. 
1207-IZIJ, 46 u.s. c. A.§§ IJOO-IJI5· 
Canada: Water Carriage of Goods (Hague Rules) Act, 1936. 
Australia: Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1924. 
Also the maritime part (Book II) of the Netherlands' Commercial Code, 
revised in r 924 and r 926, is strongly influenced by the Convention. 
German HGB., amended by Law of August ro, 1937, RGBl. I 89r. 
10° France: See DEMOGUE, 5 Obligations 462-501; JossERAND, Les trans-
ports (ed. 2) 6o9 § 627ff.; ESMEIN in Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite Pratique 560 
§ 4ooff.; DAN JON, 2 Droit Marit. § 845ff.; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. § r 7 3 7ff. 
Italy: The principles concerning maritime affreightment have been sum-
marized in Cass. (Feb. 27, 1936) Foro !tal. 1936.I.297• 35 Revue Dor (1937) 
291. 
101 Convention on the Transport of Goods by Rail, of Oct. 23, 1924, arts. 
2.6-39, MARTENS, Receuil, XIX, 3d Series, 476. 
102 Convention on the Transport of Passengers and Luggage, of Oct. 2.3, 
1924, arts. 28-39, id. 558. 
103 Convention of Warsaw for the Unification of Certain Rules regarding In-
ternational Air Transport, of Oct. 12, 1929, HuDSON, 5 Int. Legislation roo. 
104 ALLEN, "Limitation of Liability to Passengers by Air Carriers," z Journal 
of Air Law (1931) 325· 
105 For the United States, see Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. ( r 941) at 666. 
106 ROBINSON, Admiralty 560. 
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To appreciate the varieties and the merit of the unifications 
obtained, the background of policy must be remembered. The 
variety of maritime liability has now largely been ended by 
successful unification, but forms a memorable chapter of 
history. Shipping in England and Germany and marine in-
surance in England have had an eminent function in the 
public economy; it was often thought a national interest to 
maintain their power of competition at low rates, whereas 
affreighters and passengers were supposed to cover their 
risks by insurance. In the authoritative French opinion, effi-
cient prohibitions on exemption clauses have always been 
believed impossible except by international convention, lest 
French shipping be sacrificed to foreign competition.107 Also, 
the various rules of liability and nonliability combined by the 
Harter Act, though largely influenced by the desire to protect 
American cargo shipping which at that time was mostly 
carried on foreign lines, were also designed to facilitate the 
carrying trade in order to aid incipient American shipping 
competition with foreign rivals. Certain liabilities of the 
general maritime law were considerably lessened and the 
bargaining position of the American companies was im-
proved by imposing the same conditions on foreign vessels 
leaving, or even headed for, American ports. These circum-
stances influenced a series of conflicts cases, which have re-
mained the leading cases on the entire matter in discussion, 
although the domain of possible conflicts of laws in sea 
carriage of goods is greatly narrowed at present. We must 
therefore concentrate on this classic topic. 
Conflicts law.108 There is no doubt about the principle that 
the law governing a contract also determines the permissi-
bility of agreements releasing or restricting the obligor's 
107 See RIPERT, 1. Droit Marit. 761, 773· 
108 On the American interstate conflicts remaining since the federal enact-
ments, see Note, "Limitations of Carriers' Liability and the Conflict of Laws," 
54 Harv. L. Rev. (1941) 663. 
THEORIES RESTRICTING PARTY AUTONOMY 419 
liability, even though this law may be called for by another 
stipulation.109 With regard to carriage of goods by sea, this 
has been recognized not only in the English,110 German,111 
and Italian courts,112 but also in the United States.113 Where 
an English vessel takes on a cargo in Liverpool for transpor-
tation to Cuba, both the stipulations referring to English law 
and exempting the shipowner from liability for negligence 
of the mate, have been held valid.114 
Conflicts arise, of course, when a vessel sails from Liver-
pool to Baltimore; the English courts definitely claim that 
its contracts of transportation are determined by English 
law,115 while the American courts since the Harter Act subject 
it to American law.116 Other conflicts are caused by the absten-
tion of the Brussels Convention from regulating transporta-
tions agreed upon without issuing a bill of lading and from 
including the periods of time before the goods are loaded 
on and after they are discharged from the ship (art. I b and 
e); and particular divergences arise out of the unregulated 
methods of implementing the Convention, which may be 
10n Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Smith (1913) 38 Okla. 157, 
13 2 Pac. 494 should not be excepted; the decision validates a waiver of liability 
printed on the back of a free railway pass, in application of the law of the 
forum deemed to be the law of the place of performance, although favor for 
the law more favorable to the stipulation (i.e., the waiver) is also expressed. 
110 In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 42 Ch. D. J21. 
111 RG. (May 251 1889) zs RGZ. 1041 107; (Jan. :z, 191I) 75 RGZ. 95· 
11
" Italy: App. Venezia (March 11 1935) Schiaffino v. Capano, 112 Foro 
Ital. Rep. 1935, 1363 ns. 43-46; Giur. Ital. Rep. 1935, 6o1 ns. 4-7, applying 
English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 19241 manifestly upon reference to Eng-
lish law. 
11.1 Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1889) 12.9 
U. S. 397 (American law applied on the ground of presumed intention); 
The Oranmore (D. C. D. Md. 1885) 24 Fed. 922 1 aff'd, 92 Fed. 396 (stipula-
tions of English law and exemption valid). 
114 The Miguel di Larrinaga (D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1914) ::.17 Fed. 678 (Eng-
lish law stipulated, English vessel from Liverpool to Cuba); and see Note, 35 
Yale L. J. (1926) 997· 
115 In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 4:7. Ch. D. 3:u, 330, cf. DICEY 65o 
n. (m). 
116 Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1889) u9 
U.S. 397; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, § 13· 
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done by ratifying and sanctioning it as a whole, or by ratifying 
it and reproducing it more or less exactly in separate laws 
(Protocol of Signature, par. 2), or else by adopting a part of 
it in an independent law.:r17 
The only problem, however, presenting itself at this junc-
ture, concerns the nonapplication of an exemption clause 
stipulated under a law selected by the parties. Decisions deny-
ing effect to such clauses must be regarded as exceptions to 
the rule and need justification by strong public policy on the 
ground of a sufficiently close relation of the case with the ter-
ritory of this policy. In fact, the laws and courts are far from 
giving an exclusive role to the lex loci contractus. 
Dealing with the Harter Act, the American courts have 
interpreted the Act as including, in all its provisions, foreign 
vessels118 leaving or arriving119 in American ports. In all 
these cases, a clause of exemption contrary to the Act is in-
valid, although it may be valid under the law of the place 
where the contract is made or the law agreed upon.120 This 
has been laid down very distinctly in section I 3 of the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936. Dutch law prescribes, like-
wise, that reference to foreign law is not generally able to 
restrict liability of shipowners, but recognizes stipulations 
if valid by the law of the place where the goods are loaded/'21 
at least in the case of foreign vessels. 122 Argentina, Brazil, 
117 This fact has been deplored by Bateson, J., in The St. Joseph [1933] P. 
119, 134. The divergences of the French Law of April z, 1936 from the 
Brussels Convention (ratified by France according to the Law of April 9> 
1936 by Decree of the President of March zs, 1937) are reviewed in the 
Note, S.1936.s.I65ff. 
l 18 The Silvia (I898) I7I U.S. 462; The Chattahoochee (I899) I73 U.S. 
540> sso. 
119 Knott v. Botany Mills (I 900) 179 U. S. 69. 
To an analogous effect, Belgium: C. Com. art. 9 I as amended by Law of 
Nov. z8, I928, art. I, discussed in The St. Joseph [I933] P. I19, 121. 
12° Knott v. Botany, supra n. I 1 9· 
121 The Netherlands: C. Com. (I838) arts. 470, 47oa, 517d, cf. szot. 
122 Rh. Rotterdam (June 15, 1938) W. 1939, 6I7 restricts art. 517d to 
foreign vessels. 
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and Chile, as well as the former Italian Commercial Code 
according to a certain interpretation, have declared imperative 
the force of their rules concerning affreightment upon foreign 
vessels if (or insofar as) the contract is to be performed in 
the country.123 These are outstanding examples of the most 
extended policy which evidently governs the exception to 
the conflicts rule on affreightment and not the rule itself. 
The American courts have never doubted, before and after 
the Harter Act came into being, that they applied it compul-
sorily on the ground of public policy, not on account of some 
obscure dogma. The acts declaring exemptions from liability 
to passengers invalid expressly impose the prohibition as 
public policy. Of course, the Supreme Court has construed 
an affreightment made in the United States on an English 
vessel for a journey from an American port to England as an 
American contract so as to apply the Harter Act as a part of 
the governing law rather than to restrict the governing 
English law by an exception of American public policy. But 
this was expressly done, "unless the parties (to the contract) 
at the time of making it have some other law in view."m The 
principle, until recently, appeared well settled that there 
had to be a particular interest of the United States, if Ameri-
can public policy should be invoked against a foreign law 
governing the contract. 125 
A divergent conception, however, was developed in matters 
123 Argentina: C. Com. art. I 09 I. 
Brazil: C. Com. art. 6z8 (these both speaking of contracts wherever stipu-
lated but performable in the country). 
Chile: C. Com. art. 975 par. z (speaking of the part of the contract con-
cerning discharge of the vessel or other act to be made in the country). 
Italy: Cass. (Oct. IS, 1929) Riv. Dir. Com. 1930 II SZ9; SCERNI 223 n. z; 
but the intention of the parties has been considered in App. Venezia (Jan. zz, 
193I), The "Stylianos," cited and criticized by SCERNI ZI7. 
124 Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (I889) 12.9 
U. S. 397, 458ff. 
125 Distinctly to this effect, The Fri (C. C. A. zd 1907) 154 Fed. 333: 
exemption clause under the stipulated law of Colombia for transportation from 
Carthagena to Cienfuegos valid. 
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not covered by the Harter Act in the New York federal and 
state courts. It started in a case26 where the British White 
Star Line contracted with American excursionists who were 
represented by a tourist agency in Boston for passage from 
Montreal to Liverpool. The contract expressly referred to 
English law and required the passengers in case of injury to 
give notice to the company within three days after landing. 
On the journey to England, a school teacher from Indiana 
was grievously hurt by inexcusable negligence of a steward 
and, after landing, was brought from the ship's hospital to a 
hospital in Liverpool where she had to stay for months. To 
the claim for £so,ooo damages, the line defended on the 
ground of omission of notice. The New York court, com-
paring the American law which would grant a reasonable 
time for giving such notice27 with English law allowing a 
shorter time to be fixed, found the former applicable by public 
policy against the expressed intention of the parties. The 
argument, in the words of Judge Rogers was that "the con-
tract of exemption, being made in the United States, was void 
by the law of the place where it was made." Hence, even a 
Canadian travelling from Canada to England, would be pro-
tected by American law, if he contracts through an American 
agency. This extension of public policy, in the clothes of lex 
loci contractus, has been authoritatively criticized as extrava-
gant.128 Evidently, reasons of fairness prompted the result 
which the court seemingly felt unable to sustain otherwise, 
viz., by a restrictive construction of the clause. It would make 
126 Oceanic 'Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (C. C. A. 2d 1925) 9 F. 
(2d) 724. 
127 The Kensington (1901) 183 U.S. 263. 
128 CooK, Legal Bases 4o8; see also Notes, 35 Yale L. J. (1926) 997; 10 
Minn. L. Rev. (1926) 530. To the contrary, RoBINSON, Admiralty 559 asserts 
that the contract would be void under the federal statute of June 5, 1936, 
c. 521 § 2, 46 U. S. C. § 183 c; but since this statute is also limited to ves-
sels from and to ports of the United States, I cannot see the basis of this asser-
tion. 
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sense to dispense with formal notice of claim to the ship com-
pany in the case of a passenger treated by the ship's physician 
and brought ashore on a stretcher to a hospital by the crew. 
But also the recent federal legislation maintains formality in 
this respect. 
However, the New York Court of Appeals has continued 
its way. In 1930 Judge Learned Hand in a dictum confirmed 
that the lex loci contractus governs a contract of carriage even 
though the parties expressly stipulate for another law.129 In 
another case130 dealing with no personal injury at all, but in-
volving a cargo of silk, the shipowner was declared liable for 
loss from theft, despite a stipulation to the contrary and sub-
mission to British law in the bill of Jading, and although the 
bill was issued in Shanghai, British Crown Colony, for car-
riage to Vancouver, British Columbia, and the theft in ques-
tion occurred on this stage of the voyage. The only contacts 
with the forum were the facts that the bill of lading covered 
also the railroad transportation from Vancouver to New York 
and that the destination was a firm in New York. The court 
knew that no federal policy applied; it developed state policy 
of an intransigent character. Further, the exemption clause in 
a passenger transportation by airplane was invalidated under 
New York law because of booking and beginning of the trans-
port at the airport of Albany, New York.131 A federal district 
court in New York has finally concluded that release of a 
common carrier from liability for his own negligence is held 
illegal and void in New York, evidently under all circum-
stances.132 In this case, indeed, the passenger's ticket was is-
12
n Louis-Dreyfus et al. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (I93o) 43 F. (zd) 82.4, 
826. 
13° F. A. Straus & Co., Inc. v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (I93o) 254- N.Y. 4-07, 
173 N. E. 564; criticized in Notes, 31 Col. L. Rev. (I93x) 495; 79 U. of Pa. L. 
Rev. (193I) 635. 
131 Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc. (I 935) z66 N. Y. 244-, I 94-
N. E. 692. 
132 Barndt v. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab, The Venus (1938) 28 F. 
Supp. 815, 1939 Am. Marit. Cas. 1564. 
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sued in the state, but the journey was to be made between 
Bergen, Norway, and Newcastle, England, and Norwegian 
law was stipulated. That the court, in addition, resorted to 
admiralty law, supposedly overruling the stipulation for an-
other law, is another ground for astonishment. 
It is difficult to reconcile this chain of cases with otherwise 
established rules. It approaches rather closely such fighting 
radicalism as is shown in the Italian Aviation Law, of August 
20, 1923, declaring all clauses of exemption void irrespective 
of the law governing the contract. Opposing doctrines pre-
vail. For instance, the Dutch Supreme Court has recognized 
an exemption clause regarding an air flight of a Dutchman 
from the airport in Bangkok on a plane of the Royal Dutch 
Aviation, valid under Siamese law but contrary to Dutch/33 
the Canadian courts conceive that prohibitions of waiver of 
liability by the Railway Act of Canada are inapplicable so 
soon as the transport leaves the Canadian border,134 and so 
forth. 
Extraterritorial effect. The Harter Act has been regularly 
applied abroad, if the contract of affreightment was con-
sidered governed by American law or when reference to it 
was inserted by the very wide use of an appropriated clause.135 
In the latter case only, restrictions to its application may re-
133 The Netherlands: H. R. (March IS, I938) W. I939 No. 69 with a 
critical note by Meyers approving of the decision on other grounds. 
134 Ontario: McDonald v. Grand Trunk R. Co. ( 1 896) 3 I 0. R. 663. 
135 England: Do bell & Co. v. Rossmore S. S. Co. [I 8 9 5] 2 Q. B. 408 (C. A.) ; 
Rowson v. Atlantic Transport Co. [1903] 2 K. B. 666 (C. A.). 
Canada: Jas. Richardson & Sons v. The Burlington [1931] S. C. R. 76: 
American ship from American port to Canadian port, with a clause of exemp-
tion held to be visibly inspired by the Harter Act. 
Argentina: Pratt y Cia. v. Munson Steamship Line (Cam. Fed., Oct. zo, 
I922) 9 Jur. Arg. 523 and other decisions, cited and criticized because of 
wrong application of the Act, by DE LAS VEGAS, Note, 75 Jur. Arg. (1941) 
233> 2J4. 
France: App. Rouen (July 31, I895) Clunet 1895, Io88; Cass. (civ.) 
(Dec. 5, 191o) S.19I I.I.I29, Clunet I912, 1156, Revue I9I I, 395 (express 
stipulation for American law recognized although with restriction by exemp-
tion clause); Cass. (req.) (Nov. 12, r9I8) S.I920.1.29 with note listing many 
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sult from added clauses. of exemptions, earlier discussed.136 
The same treatment has been given to the Australian Act 
of I904137 and the Dutch Maritime Law.138 
International needs. In such important international mat-
ters as the Hague Rules, a normal international situation 
would be guaranteed, if the peculiar public policy of each 
state were limited to certain cases. For example, in the 
majority of countries prohibitions on exemptions in 
maritime affreightment are imperatively imposed only on 
vessels loading the goods in a port of the prohibiting country, 
or, as it is usually put, issuing the bill of lading in such a 
port. Economically or politically justifiable extensions such 
as the American application of the domestic law to vessels 
arriving in American ports, are at least neat enough to be 
taken account of in contracts. A vessel travelling from Per-
nambuco to New York may adjust its bills of lading to both 
laws. But such practice as that of the New York courts is 
exorbitant when it insists on protecting all residents, or all 
persons booking in the state, wherever the journey begins 
other cases. See also on the clause: "weight unknown," RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. 
735 § 1782. 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg in 20 Hans. GZ. (1899) HBI. 122; 26 id. 
(r9o5) HBI. 227, 27o; 28 id. (1907) HBI. 244; cf. RG. (Sept. 24, 193o) 
Hans. RGZ. 1930 B 707. 
The contract being considered governed by German law, the Harter Act was 
rejected: RG. (May 25, 1889) 25 RGZ. 104, 107. 
Egypt: App. Mixte Alexandria (Jan. 25, 1939) 40 Revue Dor (1939) 231 
(goods shipped from San Francisco; insurance clause invalid under Harter 
Act). 
136 Supra pp. 3 8 8 ff. 
137 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (March 17, 1913) 24 Hans. GZ. (1913) 
HB!. 157 No. 74, aff'd, RG. (Jan. 28, 1914) Hans. GZ. (1914) HBI. 108 
No. 52. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Dec. 15, 1926) W. 12048, 21 Revue Dar 
447 (Australian Act of 1904 declared to have been agreed upon with force 
against the special clauses for exemption!). 
138 England: The Roberta [1937] 58 Ll. L. Rep. 159; [1938] 6o id. 84 
(implicitly). 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Feb. u, 1936) Hans. RGZ. (1936) B 243 
No. 76. 
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and ends. If other countries were to reciprocate this claim, 
there would be chaos again. On the other hand, the Eng-
lish courts are generally believed to be too much inclined 
to accept a reference to English law, irrespective of geog-
raphy. The Vita Food's case has given new force to this repu-
tation inasmuch as an exemption under English law pre-
vailed in the court, although the vessel departed from New-
foundland to the United States. However, in this case the 
material point was simply whether the omission of the 
"clause paramount" nullified the bill of lading-which ques-
tion was negatived primarily under English and, more cau-
tiously, under Newfoundland law-whereas the exemption 
clause itself was as good under the Hague Rules adopted in 
Newfoundland as under those adopted in England. Hence, 
at least, the Privy Council did not detract from the inter-
nationally acquired ground of the Hague Rules. These are 
the painfully won result of long negotiations among ship-
owners, a:ffreighters, maritime agents, exporters, and in-
surers of the greater part of the world. The compromise 
was so delicate that the legal experts at the Brussels Con-
ference did not dare to reform the naYve drafting, and that 
opposition is still flaring in some quarters. It would be 
irresponsible for any court even of countries not partici-
pating in the Convention to jeopardize its operation by a 
unilateral public policy applied to vessels on foreign voy-
ages. The more so should courts of member states recognize 
the prohibitions prevailing at the place where the bill of 
lading is issued irrespective of the distinction whether the 
Hague Rules are adopted at this place by ratification or 
only by independent enactment.139 
Similar considerations may come to the rescue of the much 
criticised decision of the English Court of Appeals in The 
139 Such a distinction is made, however, by KNAUTH, The American Law of 
Ocean Bills of Lading (ed. 2, 1941) r2o probably on the ground of a literal 
interpretation of art. r o of the Brussels Convention. 
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T orni.140 The vessel carried oranges from Jaffa in Palestine 
to Hull in England. The Palestine Ordinance, which had 
adopted the Hague Rules was concerned with bills of lad-
ing issued in Palestine, while the analogous British statute 
was confined to bills of lading issued in Britain. By stipulat-
ing for English law, the bill of lading issued in Palestine 
consequently would have allowed clauses of exemption pro-
hibited by the Hague Rules, despite both laws adopting 
them. The court acted wisely in depriving this stipulation of 
such force. The technical arguments of the judges, it is 
true, are easily challenged. The presumptive intention of 
the parties was a weak support; general recognition of any 
illegality provided by the lex loci contractus is untenable; 
and a bill of lading is not void, without an express and in-
advisable legal sanction, solely because the "paramount" 
clause is omitted. But regard for the law of a friendly na-
tion may very well prevail precisely in this subject. 
IV. CoNCLUSIONS 
Contrary to many assertions, the leading conflicts laws 
do not recognize any imperative rules governing a priori 
(supra I, r). Equally, the often repeated general postulate 
that the parties can select a law only if it has a substantial 
connection with the contract, has proved a fallacious idea 
(supra I, 3). It is true, the use of this idea in more recent 
American usury cases has produced a unique and specially 
elaborated compromise among the regulations of interest on 
loans in the various sister states (supra II, I). This may well 
serve as a model to solve other particular conflicts, restrict-
ing rather than freely allowing the public policy of the forum 
in its opposition to a stipulated foreign law. However, a 
general rule confining the choice of law by the parties to a 
certain number of legislations is impracticable; the transfer 
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of the American interstate policy in usury cases into the field 
of international commerce would be disastrous. 
In a somewhat different manner, also the American cases 
concerned with insurance contracts testify to a struggle be-
tween the clauses for application of foreign law and public 
policy of the forum. Here, outstanding local interests in pro-
tecting citizens and supervising intrastate business have found 
a basis in the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court 
(supra II, 2). The last word has not been spoken, however, 
and general inferences drawn from this delicate subject would 
be highly adventurous. 
The important topic of exemptions from liability shows 
another similar strife (supra III). If it is borne in mind 
that any resort to domestic prohibitions must be justified by 
stringent public policy claiming to dominate the contract, 
courts will refrain from imposing the policy of their states 
upon prevailingly foreign relations. On the other hand, in-
ternational commerce should be restricted as well as pro-
tected by common compromise rather than one-sided dic-
tates. 
Excluding the dubious exception of public policy> there 
is only one tangible leading idea emerging from the mani-
fold confused attempts to restrict party autonomy. This is 
the desire to obviate evasion of law. But we have found 
merely one situation in which in the universal opinion a 
law is not permitted to be avoided, that is, when a contract 
by all (not only by some) substantial connections belongs 
to one sole jurisdiction and, thus, is devoid of all consider-
able foreign elements. The claim of any state exclusively to 
govern contracts entirely radicated in its territory is well 
enough founded to justify its recognition by all other states. 
While in the case just mentioned the parties are pre-
cluded from selecting a foreign law against imperative do-
mestic rules on an objective basis, the theory of fraus legi 
facta disapproves always and only the evident purpose of 
THEORIES RESTRICTING PARTY AUTONOMY 429 
evasion in an agreement. The French and also some Ameri-
can courts are inclined to favor this idea. It is well known 
how difficult is the proof that the main purpose of an obliga-
tory agreement was intentionally to avoid the application of 
a law. On the other hand, what may be regarded as evasion 
from the angle of one country, may be recognized elsewhere 
as legitimate resort to another law, particularly in the state 
whose law is adopted. If a contract has more than one terri-
torial connection, there is no reasonable background for its 
compulsory attribution to one state just because this state is 
hostile to the contract and the parties feared frustration by its 
law. 
The entire problem, therefore, reduces itself to two ques-
tions involving contracts with multiple local connections. 
First, what is the public policy on the ground of which 
courts may react against the choice of a foreign law? 
Second, under what conditions should the overriding 
policy of one state be recognized by the others? 
While public policy as a unilateral means of barring the 
play of conflicts rules is an old subject of discussion, the 
mutual respect for internationally significant policies is in 
its very first development. 
Deferring both questions to the following chapters, we 
may conclude by urging that party autonomy should not be 
wantonly discarded for the sake of local policies. A minimum 
requirement for any court should be a solicitous analysis of 
the extraterritorial value of state policy in relation to inter-
state and international needs. Never should it be forgotten 
that party autonomy is the least dangerous method of bring-
ing certainty into the agitated problems of international 
private law, and thus, helps to produce that "swift and 
certain rule"141 so important to merchants. 
141 Celebrated words, see the citations by HIRAM THOMAS, "The Federal Sales 
Bill etc.," in z6 Va. L. Rev. (1940) 542. 
CHAPTER 30 
Rules 1n Absence of Party Agreement 
A. JuDICIAL CHOICE oF LAw 
I. INDIVIDUALIZED CHOICE OF LAW 
1. Presumed Intention of the Parties 
A CCORDlNG to their basic proper law theory, English fi courts, in the absence of an agreement of the parties, 
will analyze the stipulations and circumstances of a 
contract, to ascertain the law the parties had "in mind," "in 
view," "in contemplation," "upon which they acted." This 
method taken at its face value presupposes that there was a 
certain law in the background of the negotiations, although 
the parties did not even tacitly adopt it. Such things happen. 
When, for instance, an irrevocable power of attorney was 
declared to be granted in a document executed in New Y ark, 
by a resident to another resident, for the purpose of cashing 
the debt of a German debtor, the natural assumption was 
that New York law should determine whether the power 
could be revoked, although as a rule authority of an agent is 
governed by the law of the place where he acts.1 The inten-
tion presumed here is implied rather than merely supposed 
and may be closely associated to the cases of agreement by 
conduct.2 
Usually, however, the parties do not even realize that 
there may be a question of the applicable law. In this vast 
majority of cases, the task of the courts is more adequately 
defined by the question which law the parties probably would 
1 German RG. (Oct. 24, 1892) 30 RGZ. 122; see RABEL, 7 Z.ausl.PR. 
(I 934) 807. 
2 Cf. loan debentures of New York banks, see supra p. 367. 
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have chosen if they had been conscious of the conflicts prob-
lem-their so-called ((hypothetical intention," formulated 
as: 
"The intention which would have been formed by sensible 
persons in the position of X and A if their attention had been 
directed to contingencies which escaped their notice" (Di-
cey) ; 3 
"What the parties would have determined in reasonable 
and fair consideration of all circumstances" (the German 
Reichsgericht); 4 
"The law which the parties reasonably could and should 
have expected to be applied"; 5 or "the law which the parties 
would have declared applicable if they had thought at all 
of stipulating on the question" (the Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal) ;6 
The law upon which the parties "might be supposed in-
stinctively to rely," the variant of a judge of the High Court 
of Australia, aptly explaining the net result of the English 
rule.7 
This has been the usual approach of all European courts 
during the last century, and in part until today. 
The inquiry of the court, thus postulated, is essentially 
concerned with each individual contract. The choice of law 
is "a matter of construction of the contract itself, as read by 
the light of the subject matter and of the surrounding 
circumstances."8 It is true that certain types of circumstances 
have acquired traditional weight. The writers have dedi-
'DICEY 666. 
4 RG. (Dec. q, 1929) 126 RGZ. 196, 2o6. 
Similarly, the Dutch courts, looking for the law agreeable to the sup-
posed fair intention of the parties, see VAN HASSELT 175. 
5 BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 300; see also (Dec. q, l9JZ) 58 
BGE. II at 435 citing previous cases; (June 19, 1935) 61 BGE. II at 182. 
6 BG. (March 2, 1937) 63 BGE. II 42, 43; (May 26, 1936) 62 BGE. II 
140, 142 and cited precedents. 
7 McClelland v. Trustees Executors and Agency Co., Ltd. (1936) per Dixon, 
J., 55 Commw. L. R. 483, 493; 42 The Argus Law Reports 405, 409. 
8 Bowen, ]., in Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais (x884) u 
Q. B. D. 589, 6oo. 
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cated great care to gathering and analyzing these "indicia" of 
the supposed will, and to classifying their significance. Most 
elaborate is the list recently given by Batiffol with regard to 
the United States, England, France, and Germany.9 The 
criteria include domicil and, in Europe, the nationality of any 
party; the situation of an immovable or enterprise; the cur-
rency of a money debt; use of a standard form or a public of-
fice; the language; reference to a law or terms of a legal 
system; the domicil of the party w-ho had the contract or 
form drafted; the situation of collateral guarantees; sub-
mission to arbitration or jurisdiction (where this is not con-
sidered equivalent to an express agreement); the conduct of 
the parties after contracting and in pleading. None of these 
single instances is conclusive by itself/0 and there is in re-
ality no effective difference of rank among them; any one 
may prove decisive. 
Instead of going into the debatable details of the list, we 
may illustrate the method by the arguments of outstanding 
courts in a few cases representing what has been called ac-
cumulation of contact points.n 
The Supreme Court of the United States in a case deemed 
to be fundamental, considered the facts of a carrier's contract 
as follows: "The bill of lading for the bacon and hams was 
made and dated at New York, and signed by the ship's agent 
there. It acknowledges that the goods have been shipped 'in 
and upon the steamship called Montana, now lying in the 
port of New York and bound for the port of Liverpool,' and 
are to be delivered at Liverpool. It contains no indication 
that the owners of the steamship are English, or that their 
principal place of business is in England, rather than in this 
country. On the contrary, the only description of the line 
of steamships, or of the place of business of their owners, 
is in a memorandum in the margin, as follows: 'Guion Line. 
9 BATIFFOL 69-154. 
10 DICEY 648 n. (f). 
11 HARPER and T AI NTOR, Cases r 7 5. 
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United States Mail Steamers. New York: 29 Broadway. 
Liverpool: I I Rumford St.' No distinction is made between 
the places of business at New York and at Liverpool, except 
that the former is named first. The reservation of liberty, 
in case of an interruption of the voyage, 'to tranship the goods 
by any other steamer,' would permit transhipment into a 
vessel of any other line, English or American. And general 
average is to be computed, not by any local law or usage, 
but 'according to Y ark-Antwerp rules,' which are the rules 
drawn up in I864 at York in England, and adopted in I877 
at Antwerp in Belgium, at international conferences of repre-
sentatives of the more important mercantile associations of 
the United States, as well as of the maritime countries of 
Europe. Lowndes on General Average (3d ed.) Appendix Q. 
"The contract being made at New York, the ship-owner 
having a place of business there, and the shipper being an 
American, both parties must be presumed to have submitted 
themselves to the law there prevailing, and to have agreed 
to its action upon their contract. The contract is a single one, 
and its principal object, the transportation of the goods, is 
one continuous act, to begin in the port of New York, to be 
chiefly performed on the high seas, and to end at the port 
of Liverpool. The facts that the goods are to be delivered 
at Liverpool, and the freight and primage, therefore, payable 
there in sterling currency, do not make the contract an 
English contract, or refer to the English law the question 
of the liability of the carrier for the negligence of the master 
and crew in the course of the voyage.m2 
High Court, Chancery Division, South African Breweries, 
Ltd. v. King [I899] 2 Ch. I73, rn, per Kekewich, J. The 
contract of employment was executed and intended, though 
not exclusively, to be performed in the South African Re-
public. "That, however, is not all. Many other considerations 
require attention." The defendant, an Englishman, had been 
and was residing in Johannesburg, and intended it to be his 
place of business, and therefore of residence. The successive 
12 Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (t888) 129 
U.S. 397, 458; see also Pritchard v. Norton (t88z) 106 U.S. 124; Grand v. 
Livingston (1896) 38 N. Y. Supp. 490, aff'd (1899) 158 N. Y. 688, 53 
N. E. I 125. 
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employers of the defendant were English companies, resident 
in England. Nevertheless, "it is not according to sound ideas 
of business, convenience, or sense to say that a company 
having a registered office with directors and secretary in 
England, not, however, otherwise carrying on business here, 
but carrying on business in South Africa, must be treated 
as resident in England for the purpose of ascertaining whether 
a contract entered into by them respecting their business in 
South Africa was intended to be governed by English law or 
the local law of that part of South Africa .... The stipulation 
in question (restricting the defendant's business engagements 
on the termination of the contract) has reference to South 
Africa and not to England, where the defendant is free to 
carry on business as he pleases. . . . This contract was not 
intended to be governed and is not governed by English 
law." Affirmed (I900] I Ch. 273, 275, per Lindley, M.R.: 
It is doubtful whether the defendant had to act as brewer 
and conduct his business in Natal or elsewhere in South 
Africa besides Johannesburg. "However, be that as it may, 
Johannesburg is the primary place to which this contract 
refers .... That being so, and having regard to the fact that 
the defendant was settled there at the time and that this 
contract was entered into between him at Johannesburg and 
the company's representative at Johannesburg, I think that 
clause 8 (the stipulation in question) cannot possibly be 
independent of the Transvaal Law." 
German Supreme Court (October 29, I 92 7) II 8 RGZ. 
282, IPRspr. I928 No. 6o. The author of a play, the com-
poser of the music and the writer of the stage direction, 
all conveyed their copyrights to an editor in Stuttgart, Ger-
many. All three at the time of the contract clearly were 
domiciled in Vienna, where they had also to perform their 
own contractual obligations according to the purpose and 
nature of the latter, and all arising legal disputes had to be 
decided by the Viennese court. But the documents of the 
contract showed only Stuttgart as the place of making, which 
was also the domicil of the publisher, and the only place 
of his performance. The royalties due to the authors are 
all expressed in German currency. It is of particular weight 
that in the present lawsuit both parties from the outset, 
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without expressing any doubt, invoked German law and 
presently discussed the provisions of the German law on 
literary property. Pondering these grounds of doubt results 
in the assumption that the application of German law agrees 
with the presumable intention of the parties to the contract; 
it would be, in addition, the appropriate choice of law, if 
the arguments pro and contra completely balanced each 
other.13 
Swiss Federal Tribunal (September 23, 1941) 67 BGE. 
II 215. By an agreement with a New York bank, heading 
a New York syndicate, the defendant Hungarian bank guar-
anteed that a certain credit granted by the syndicate to a 
firm in Budapest would be repaid. The Federal Tribunal 
declared the law of New York to be exclusively applicable, 
on the following argument. As the Hungarian bank received 
a commission, no emphasis is to be placed on the domicil 
of the promisor as would be done in case of a surety. By 
assuming a share in the risk of the transaction, the defendant 
entered into close association with the New York syndicate. 
The presumption is strong that the parties, and particularly 
the bank leading the syndicate, intended to subject all in-
ternal relations to one uniform law rather than to the different 
laws of the various domicils of the participant firms. Such 
a consideration must have seemed only natural to the de-
fendant, an expert participant in international credit business. 
Furthermore, the contract of guaranty is written in English. 
The place of performance for the defendant's obligation 
is New York, since the debtor had to pay in New York, 
and so had the guarantor. Finally the money sums, through-
out the transaction, are expressed in United States dollars.14 
Courts in most other countries use the same method.15 
13 See also e.g., 68 RGZ. 205; 73 id. 388; 120 id. 72; 126 id. 206. The 
individual decision in I I 8 RGZ. 282 has been criticized by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 
I 76 n. I 79, and BATIFFOL I 8 3 n. 2. 
14 See also 6I BGE. II I 82. 
15 See for Belgium: App. Liege (June 21, I9o5) S.I9o7·4.2I, 23. 
France: Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, 19IO) S.I9II.I.I29> Clunet I9I2> II56; 
(May 3I, I9J2) D.1933·I.169; (May I5, 1935) Nouv. Revue I935> 34I; 
Cass. (req.) (Nov. 2, 1937) Nouv. Revue I937, 766. 
The Netherlands: Kg. Amsterdam (Oct. I9, I9I5) W. 9937; Hof den Haag 
(Dec. Io, I92o) N.J. (I92I) 1089. 
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2. "Objective" Theory 
In most contracts, there is no agreement of the parties on 
choice of law. Insofar, in fact, "intention is a misnomer.))1'6 
As the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which has repeatedly 
professed its inclination to follow the law intended by the 
parties/7 has stated: 
"In a search for the actual intent of the parties when 
none is expressed, there is an element of legal jugglery. 
Usually parties to transactions ... , referable to one state 
or another, or in part to one state and in part to another, 
have no unexpressed but actual intent as to the law which 
shall control. The question of what law governs does not 
suggest itself to them.ms 
What courts in reality look for, is a suitable local connec-
tion of the contract with a country. Presumed intention is no 
actual intention. Westlake has contributed much to this view 
by advocating that a contract should be governed by the law 
with which it has the most real connection.19 However, the 
contrast between this objective and the subjective method 
should not be exaggerated. Also, the inquiry required by both 
opinions follows strikingly similar methods, though the ob-
jective approach does not purport to read the minds of the 
parties on "contingencies which escaped their notice,"20 but 
seeks the law suitable to their stipulations. The above ex-
amples of reasoning may be read without any substantial 
change also in this sense. 
The German Reichsgericht has sometimes consciously 
lent the "objective" approach its proper color by using the 
16 STUMBERG 2 I I n. 49· 
17 Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer (I893) 52 Minn. 174, 53 N. 
W. I1J7; cf. McCLINTOCK, 10 Minn. L. Rev. (1926) 498 at 503. 
18 Green v. Northwestern Trust Co. (I9I4) Iz8 Minn. 30, 36, I 5o N. W. 
229, 2JI. 
19 WESTLAKE § 2 I 2. 
20 DICEY 666. 
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term familiar to German jurisprudence, "suppletive con-
struction" of the contract, which is approximately the same 
as the method of implying stipulations.21 While pure "in-
terpretation" attempts to discover the true meaning of an 
existing declaration, constructive analysis may add by impli-
cation to an incomplete declaration what the parties would 
or should have agreed, being honest and prudent people, or 
what an ordinarily prudent man would have declared upon 
reasonable and fair consideration of all circumstances. 
3· Rationale 
Although at present the literature seems to prefer the 
"objective" approach, a distinguished author22 defends the 
subjective formulation because of its suggestive power; it. 
reminds the judge that he should distinctly envisage the two 
concrete persons at the time of contracting. No doubt also 
American courts by visualizing the parties and their situa-
tion, are aided in the effort to overcome stereotyped rules 
such as that of the lex loci contractus. Other writers, however, 
have pointed to the danger of judges disregarding, in a 
strained search for individual mentalities, the type of the 
contract so important in the eyes of businessmen.23 
We may set aside such imponderables and also disregard 
positive legal complications, such as those occurring when in 
Germany the Supreme Court reviews a statement by the 
lower court of an objective rule but not of a presumed inten-
tion because the latter is a mere fact.24 
What it means that the parties "contemplated" a certain 
law in making the contract, should not be difficult to under-
21 RG. (July 5, 1910) 74 RGZ. 171, 174. Suppletive construction of a con-
tract should serve to fill a gap in the contract, not to enlarge the scope of the 
contract, 87 RGZ. 2 r r; 136 id. 176, 185; r6o id. 187. 
22 M. WOLFF, IPR. 89. See also HAUDEK ro6. 
23 RAAPE, D. IPR. 258. 
24 RG. {Jan. 27, 1928) 120 RGZ. 71, 73; MELCHIOR 513. 
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stand, as parallels are numerous. Anglo-American common 
law makes the seller of goods liable for "special" damage 
caused by his failure to perform, to the extent that the parties 
"contemplated" or could foresee the circumstances causing 
the damage. The seller has to compensate the buyer's loss of 
gain by resale, if resale was contemplated in contracting, that 
is, if both parties would have affirmed this liability, had they 
been asked during negotiations. The pertinent question in 
such a case is whether, at the time of the making of the con-
tract, it must have been in the contemplation of the parties 
that the goods contracted for might be25 resold by the buyer. 
To this method of inquiry, it has been objected that parties 
making a contract think of performance rather than of breach 
of contract. To this the celebrated author of the British Sales 
of Goods Act replied: 
"But the answer is this. The liability to pay damages for 
breach of contract is an obligation annexed by law in-
dependently of the volition of the parties, and the criterion 
is necessarily an objective one. What the parties themselves 
may have contemplated is immaterial. The question is what 
a reasonable man with their common knowledge would 
contemplate as a probable consequence of the breach if he 
applied his mind to it. The same result will be arrived 
at if the supposed contemplation of the parties be wholly 
eliminated. " 26 
This is practically identical with the provision in the Re-
statement of the Law of Contracts: 
"In awarding damages, compensation is given for only 
those injuries that the defendant had reason to foresee as a 
probable result of his breach when the contract is made .... " 27 
Indeed, the Restaters, very accurately, have pointed out 
25 Hall, Ltd. v. Pim Jr. and Co., Ltd. (1927) 33 Com. Cas. 324-H. L. 
2~ CHALMERs, The Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 54· 
27 § 330. See Mr. Justice Holmes in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton 
Oil Co. (1902) 190 U. 'S. 54o, 543· 
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that the requirement of foreseeability does not really de-
pend on a previous consideration of a possible violation of 
contract, or on a tacit promise of compensation for it, but on 
the construction of the contract.28 In this purified form, the 
common law principle is able to become the basis of a satis-
factory general theory deriving the obligations of the parties 
from the purpose of the contract.29 
In the same manner, the judicial standard for selecting 
the law is that of a man of average intelligence and knowl-
edge such as is required in the profession or commerce of 
either party, who weighs the relative importance of all sur-
rounding circumstances and the stipulations adopted. 
The usual formula may mislead a judge into substituting 
the purpose of one party for the purpose of the contract. Or 
the inquiry into the probable inten'tion of the parties may 
fail because each party is supposed to have differently con-
ceived of the legal background. Frequently, in our day, one 
party prevails and drafts the contract or dictates the use of a 
blank. The Continental doctrine realistically concludes that 
the law at the domicil of this dominant contractant may be 
deemed to be chosen. Courts in this country are instinctively 
reluctant to increase his predominance by favoring his law. 
The latter view rests on considerations of public policy alien 
to our present problem; but, similarly, if a court applies the 
law of a carrier, bank, or mail-order house rather than that 
of the customer, this choice of law does not depend on any 
contemplation of the individual parties, but on the social and 
economic circumstances. 
Another dubious feature in the traditional approach is 
the emphasis laid on too many "criteria" or "indicia." The 
judge is induced to consider a mass of irrelevant details-
what bearing, after all, has the use of English language in 
28 Restatement, Law of Contracts§ 510. 
29 RABEL, 1 Das Recht des Warenkaufs 484, 495:ff. 
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a contract written in New York? He is beset by unnecessary 
doubts and tempted to weigh mechanically the various ele-
ments, rather than to ascertain the most characteristic local 
contact. 
Conclusion. In conclusion, the task of the court is this: it 
has, in the absence of an agreement, first, to state whether 
the individual facts of the contract are colored by a certain 
law; if not, second, whether the contract belongs to a class 
typically centering in a certain country. This inquiry has to 
be done in full consideration of the circumstances personal 
and economical, but without inferring judicial or state poli-
ctes. 
II. GENERAL RULES 
1. Prima Facie Rules 
The English proper law theory has developed certain 
presumptions or prima facie rules, ordinarily in former times 
in favor of the lex loci contractus, and in specific types of 
cases in favor of the lex loci solutionis, or the law of the flag, 
or the "most effective" law. 80 Similar methods prevail on 
the Continent in case investigation into the circumstances 
fails to reveal a presumable intention. In France and many 
other countries, the presumption for the law of the place 
where the contract is made, continues stronger than in Eng-
land. In Germany and numerous other jurisdictions, follow-
ing Savigny, the parties are presumed to have in view the 
law of the place of performance. In some countries, the fact 
that the parties have a common nationality or domicil con-
stitutes a presumption prevailing over all others. 31 
The "presumption" in all these cases is meant as a guide 
for the judge, as a starting point and a subsidiary help. The 
3° CHESHIRE 259-269. 
31 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 (common domicil). 
C6digo Bustamante, art. I 8 6. 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 7 par. I (common nationality). 
RULES IN ABSENCE OF PARTY AGREEMENT 4-4-1 
court may or may not resort to it. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court has once, facing an inflexible conception of lex loci 
solutionis, declared that the presumption is rebuttable 
through clear, though not necessarily direct, evidence to the 
contrary. 32 But the danger is great that the easy way of the 
presumption may be followed in neglect of the purpose of 
the individual contract. As a matter of fact, in many juris-
dictions the presumption has slowly turned into a rigid, 
though merely subsidiary, rule. 
It is wise, therefore, always to remember how artificial 
all these presumptions are. As Lord Wright has recalled for 
English law: 
"English law in deciding these mattet:s has refused to treat 
as conclusive rigid or arbitrary criteria such as lex loci con-
tractus or lex loci solutionis and has treated the matter as 
depending on the intention of the parties to be ascertained 
in each case on a consideration of the terms of the contract, 
the situation of the parties and generally on all the surround-
ing facts.m 3 
2. Rigid General Rules 
Rigid general rules have developed, as by transformation 
from original presumptions, also in the absence of an ascer-
tainable intention, or when party autonomy was entirely re-
pudiated. The most pronounced instance of all-inclusive gen-
eral rules without any regard to party intentions appears in 
the Restatement. 34 The same system may also be regarded as 
dominant in the Scandinavian countries35 and most Latin-
American jurisdictions. 36 
32 D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (1914) 155 Wis. 54'' 544, 
'45 N. W. 372., 373· 
33 Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and General 
Mutual Life Assurance Society, Ltd. [I 9 3 8] A. C. 2.2.4, 2.40. 
34 §§ 332., 333· 
35 Sweden; 7 Repert. 136 No. 105. 
Norway; 6 Repert. 578 No. 147· 
36 See supra pp. 3 7off. 
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Such rigidity deprives the courts of the flexibility enjoyed 
by American courts under the proper law theory, when they 
want to escape an inherited lex loci contractus, and by Ger-
man courts, when feeling the need of a corrective to the 
lex loci solutionis. 
3· "No Rule" 
In opposition to the mechanical working of conflicts rules 
purporting to include all obligatory contracts, a few writers 
have proclaimed that no fixed principle should govern con-
tracts in general.37 It has been replied that this proposal it-
self contains a general principle/8 viz., that of an individual-
ized choice of law.39 This principle comes near in effect to the 
English doctrine of proper law, which avoids tying a court 
"down to any rigid presumption."40 
4· The Most Characteristic Connection 
Looking back on the tortuous development of doctrine, we 
see distinctly that Savigny's main principle, in the form given 
to it by Westlake and modernized again in our times, has 
gained supremacy. The Swiss Federal Tribunal, improving 
its older formulas, has formally declared that the effects of 
contracts should be governed by the law having the closest 
local relation with the contract.41 In the frequent case of sev-
eral substantial or even vital local connections of a contract, 
the degree of proximity may be hard to analyze. But it should 
always be possible to discover the most characteristic connec-
tion of an individual contract and, certainly, that of the usual 
types of business contracts. 
37 See Draft, RocuiN, Actes de la 3eme Conference de la Haye ( 19oo) 62 
art. 5 par. 3; JrrrA, 2. La substance des obligations (1907) 509, 515. 
38 NOLDE, 32 Annuaire (1925) n9. 
39 See among others, 2 BAR 23; RoLIN, 32 Annuaire (1925) 96, 117, 513; 
LEWALD 197 No. 257; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 221, 226; BATIFFOL 73 § So; 
RAAPE, D. IPR. 263. 
40 Words of DICEY 962. 
41 BGE.: 6o II 3oo; 63 II 385; 67 II 179, 181 ("constant practice"). 
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This, in the opinion of the writer, is the direction in which 
all efforts ought to be concentrated. 
We are now prepared to survey the main contacts se-
lected either on the strength of a presumption or in virtue of 
a specific rule. That their importance as general devices is 
entirely questionable, is a foregone conclusion from the pre-
ceding discussion. The particulars, however, are significant. 
B. CoNTACTS 
I. HISTORICAL NOTE 
The statutists, in the manner of their time, exploited a 
few fragments of Justinianus' Digest. The "lex contraxisse'' 
was the text most frequently cited:-
D. 44, 7, 2r, Julianus I. III. ad Minicium. Contraxisse 
unus quisque in eo loco intellegitur, in quo ut solveret se 
obligavit. This is commonly understood as meaning: every 
one is deemed to have contracted at the place where he 
should perform according to his promise (and not: where 
he promised the performance). 
The jurist did not speak of the applicable law but probably, 
as other passages do, of jurisdiction in the case of bankruptcy 
proceedings which were alternatively at the domicil of the 
debtor or at the place where he had failed to satisfy the 
creditor.42 Whether generally a creditor was entitled to sue in 
contract at the forum solutionis, as is commonly believed/3 
seems not certain. 
Another basic text of the statutists, the "lex si fundus,'144 
42 See LENEL, Palingenesia Juris Romani, sub: J ulianus 8 62; Dig. 42, 5, 
r and 3 (Gaius 23 ad ed. prov.); Gaius Inst. 3, 79· Other texts are mentioned 
by SAVIGNY 211 § 370 n. (c); LENEL, 27 Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung, 
Romanistische Abteilung (19o6) 74· 
43 BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, 2 Zivilprozess (1865) n6ff.; L. WENGER, ln-
stitutionen des Romischen Zivilprozesses (1925) (Engl. trans!. (1940) Institutes 
of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure) § 4 n. 6o. 
"Dig. 21, 2, 6 (Gaius 10 ad ed. prov.); cf. Dig. so, 17, 34 (Ulpianus 45 
ad Sabin urn). 
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refers exclusively to the interpretation of a sale of land, and 
states that the obligation of warranty is that customary in 
the region. 
It is interesting to note that the Romans in reality did not 
consider the problem and that the confusion clouding the 
matter was started by the earlier statutists.45 Bartolus him-
self knew of the two kinds of "locus contractus," ever since 
in the mind of writers, and understood both fragments men-
tioned as referring to the place where the promisor has obli-
gated himself, that is, where the contract is made, locus ubi 
est celebratus contractus, while locus in quem collata est 
solutio, the place of performance, figures in a rule which 
he deduced from other passages. To harmonize these con-
flicting rules, he distinguished the rights deriving from the 
contract at its origin (quae oriuntur secundum ipsius con-
tractus naturam tempore contractus), from the effects of sub-
sequent events, such as the consequences of nonperformance 
or default (quae oriuntur ex postfacto propter neglegentiam 
et moram). 
The first were to be governed by the law of the place where 
the contract was celebrated; the second by the law of the spe-
cific place of performance, because the default occurred there; 
or if this place were not specified, by the law of the forum. In 
the fifteenth century, Paulus de Castro46 added a basic argu-
ment for the law of the place of contracting: 
Quia talis contractus dicitur ibi nasci ubi nascitur, et, sicut 
persona ratione originis ligatur a statutis loci originis, ita 
et actus. 
The law under which a contract is created, is its natural 
statute, quite as a person is bound by the law of the place of 
his origin! 
45 BARTOLus, 1. I C. deS. Trinitate I.I, §§ IJ-I8; cf. WAECHTER, 2.5 Arch. 
Civ. Prax. (184-2) 4-2; I LAINE 135. 
4
" Paul. de Castro ad 1. Si fundus, Dig. 21, 2, 6. 
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These conceptions were maintained, developed, and modi-
fied by subsequent generations of jurists and reappear aston-
ishingly well preserved in the doctrines of Beale. 
II. LAW OF THE PLACE OF CONTRACTING 
I. To Govern the Entire Contract 
By logical necessity. Canonists as early as about 1200 
A.D., and statutists from the fifteenth century, have re-
garded the law of the place where a contract is "celebrated" 
as naturally governing.47 The variants of this school became 
numerous, and Anglo-American conflicts law has experienced 
the tenacity of that radical branch of opinion conceiving a 
contract "born" in and created by the sovereign of the ter-
ritory where the parties agree. It is well known that in the 
Virginia Convention, when a member asked which state de-
termines a contract, Marshall replied that this was decided 
according to the laws of the state where the contract was 
made, and those laws only/8 In a celebrated English case of 
I 86 5/9 the rule of lex loci contractus was still based on the 
thesis that domiciled persons are subjects of the territorial 
compulsory power of the sovereign and temporary residents 
also owe him allegiance. For a long time writers of inter-
national law have invoked Ulric Huber's deduction from 
the principle of territorialism, that the lex loci contractus is 
endowed with extraterritorial authority.50 The axioms of 
Dicey and Beale stemmed from the same roots. 
47 NEUMEYER, 2 Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung 84, 135ff.; WAECHTER, 25 
Arch. Civ. Prax. ( 1842) 42. 
48 ELLIOT, 3 Debates on the Federal Constitution (ed. 2 Philadelphia r866) 
ss6. 
49 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (r86s) 3 Moo. 
P. C. Cas. (N. S.) 272, 290. 
50 HUBER, De conflictu legum XV, cf. v (in SAVJGNY, tr. Guthrie, srs, 
510); see WHEATON, International Law (ed. Carnegie Endowment 1936) us 
§ 90; TAYLOR, International Public Law (r9ol) § 170. 
CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
By presumed intention. Although, in the doctrine of Du-
moulin, Boullenois, and Bouhier, the law of the place of 
contracting lost its leading role which was taken by the in-
tention of the parties, the same result still obtained in the 
absence of contrary evidence by general presumption.51 
At present, the lex loci contractus, as a general rule by 
virtue of a rebuttable presumption de facto, continues to apply 
in France/2 Belgium,S3 Argentina/4 Spain/5 and other coun-
tries, 58 while the Dutch courts 57 are as much divided as the 
American. It is also sometimes claimed that it remains the pri-
mary contact in England, where no other law is intended 
or presumed, and this seems true in the Dominions.58 But 
it may be doubted whether the law of the place of perform-
51 See DICEY 885; 2 BEALE I09o:ff.; BATIFFOL 22, 35· 
52 Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, I9Io) S.I9I1.I.I29. 
53 Trib. com. Anvers (Dec. I5, I904) Revue I907, 97o; Trib. civ. Anvers 
(May I41 1926) Jur. Port Anvers I926, 1321 136; PouLLET 372 § 299· 
M Argentina: C. C. art. 1205 (1239) regarded as representing the principle, 
see 3 VICO 122 § 137; ROMERO DEL PRADO, 2 Manual 343 notes that the 
codifier has followed STORY §§ 2421 28o. 
55 Spain: TRiAs DEBEs, 6 Repert. 257 No. 124 par. 2. 
56 Denmark: As a limited rule, see BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 224. 
Italy: For civil contracts on the basis of Disp. Pre!. I865, art. 9 § 2: App. 
Trieste (Jan. 71 1937) Riv. Dir. Com. 1937 II 547; Disp. Pre!. I942, art. 
25, which are probably to be understood to apply a factual presumption. 
C6digo Bustamente, art. I86, at least nominally speaks of lex loci contractus, 
if the parties are of different nationalities, as a presumption; it seems, however, 
that no counterproof is allowed, see art. 184 par. 2, which substitutes the criteria 
of art. I 86 for the tacit intention of the parties. 
57 The Netherlands: 'See for the cases, VAN HASSELT 176 and Supplement 45· 
The attempt by KOSTERS 774 to base the lex loci contractus rule on art. 1382 
of the Civil Code prescribing construction of contracts according to the local 
customs, has been abandoned by the author himself in Themis I9261 48o; cf. 
E. M. MEIJERS, Note inN.]. (1927) 323· 
58 England: CHESHIRE 26I principally alleges Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Shand (I865) 3 Moo. P. C. Cas. (N. S.) per Turner, L. J., 
272, 290 and another case, both of which, however, deal with transporta-
tion. 
Canada: The principle is confirmed in Bondholders Securities Corp. v. Man-
ville (Sask.) [1933] 4 D. L. R. 699; Comm. Corp. Securities, Ltd. v. Nichols 
(Sask.) [1933] 3 D. L. R. 56 (bills and notes); see also 3 JOHNSON 457 n. I 
and the Digests. 
South Africa: De Wet v. Browning (I930) S. A. L. R. Transvaal Prov. 
Div. 409 (sale of land, laesio enormis). 
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ance has not in fact won precedence in the favor of the Eng-
lish courts. 69 
By fixed conflicts rule. On this historical background in 
many countries the lex loci contractus has become the law 
generally applicable to contracts, either as a subsidiary rule 
in the absence of contrary intention of the parties or even 
with higher pretensions. The list of codes thus providing is 
long.60 
That this favor has been so tenaciously granted to a device 
of very difficult application, must have been aided by the uni-
versal acceptance of the same law to control the formalities 
of contracts. In Lorenzen's opinion, the American law has 
never adopted that distinction between form and substance in 
contracts, by which in the Continental doctrine the old adage, 
locus regit actum, was confined to formalities.61 A modern 
59 See RABEL and RAISER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 66; BATIFFOL 90 § 99· 
60 Georgia: C. Ann. (I937) § Io2-I08 (8) first sentence. 
Austria: C. C.§§ 36, 37 with exceptions. 
Belgian Congo: C. C. art. I I par. 2. 
Brazil: C. Com. art. 424, replaced by Law No. 2044, of Dec. 3I, I9o8, art. 
47; fur bills of exchange, generalized by the doctrine, see BEVILAQUA (ed. 
3) 365; C. C. Introd. (I9I6) art. I3 par. I; while Introd. Law (I942) art. 9 
is silent, the rule is considered maintained, see EsPINOLA, 8-C Tratado I 8 I I 
§§ I48, ISO. 
Bulgaria: See MAKAROV, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 66o. 
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 23 par. x. 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 7 par. x. 
French Morocco: Int. Priv. Law, art. I 3 par. 2. 
Guatemala: Law of Foreigners of I936, art. 24 sent. x. 
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (I86s) art. 9 par. 2; (I942) art. 25; former C. Com. 
art. 58. 
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 7 par. 2. 
Panama: C. Com. art. 6 (I) not altered by C6digo Bustamente in relation to 
the United States, see EDER, I5 Tul. L. Rev. (I94I) pi at 524 n. 283. 
Peru: C. C. (I936) art. VII. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 Nos. I, 2. 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 4 § I. 
Quebec: C. C. art. 8. 
Soviet Russia: Codes of Civil Procedure, art. 7, cf. STOUPNITSKI, 7 Repert. 
I I4 Nos. I 56, I 57; RASHBA, "Settlement of Disputes in Commercial Dealings 
with the Soviet Union," 45 Col. L. Rev. (I945) 530, 552. 
Spanish Morocco: Int. Priv. Law, art. 20. 
61 LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 655 at 664. 
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writer has directly accused the rule prescribing the law of the 
place of contracting for all contracts as arising out of a con-
fusion between form and content. 62 
The Soviet codes of civil procedure prescribe with very 
cautious words that the court should "consider" the law of the 
place in a foreign country where contracts and documents 
have been made. The more recent Ukranian version is more 
categoric on this point. But writers have seen in this hint 
not a conflicts rule but an advice that Soviet law is controlling 
in every single case. 63 
2. To Govern the Making of Contracts 
The old doctrine expressed by Bartolus has produced var-
ious theories, splitting the problems of contracts into origin 
and subsequent events.64 Story65 and Savigny,S6 however, 
repudiated these efforts by adopting an all-inclusive law of 
the contract and in this respect were followed by the great 
majority of scholars. Nevertheless, some writers in the nine-
teenth century returned to the method of dividing contracts 
into two parts.67 The formulas were varying, but none was 
in precise terms. The leading idea seemed to be that the 
local law of the place of contracting should govern the legal 
62 RocurN, Actes de la 3eme Conference de la Haye {I goo) 62. 
63 KELMANN, Int. Jahrb. Schiedsger. Wesen (I928) 84 n. 34; MAKAROV, 
Precis 299 (slightly more optimistic in assuming resemblance to a conflicts 
rule). 
64 BuRGUNDUS, Tractatus 4 Nos. 7, Io, 29; BouLLENOIS, Traite de la 
personnalite et de la realite des loix (I 766) Vol. II, 45 I; CASAREGIS, Discursus 
legales de commercia, Disc. I 79 §§ 56ff. P. VoET, De statutis eorumque 
concursu, sect. 9 cap. II No. 12 (SAVIGNY, tr. Guthrie, 490); Prussian All-
gemeines Landrecht I, 5 § 256ff. 
For refutation: WAECHTER, 25 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1842) 4I; GuTZWILLER 
1610. 
65 STORY § 28o, as he thought, in conformity with the Roman law. 
66 SAVIGNY § 372, tr. Guthrie 225, although his method of treating the Roman 
sources is not approved at present. 
67 I FOELI:X § 109; VALERY 987 § 685; I FIORE§§ II9, I2I and in 2o 
Annuaire (I904) I76; in Spain: MANRESA, I Comentarios Cod. Civ. Esp., art. 
II §IX; VALVERDE, I Trat. Der. Civ. (ed. 3) 129; FOELIX's doctrine has 
impressed PHILLIMORE, 4 International Law §§ 709ff. 
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effects naturally arising from, and inherent in, the contract, 
or believed to be positively intended by the parties. This rea-
soning still clung to the belief that these "effects" necessarily 
grow out of the local law. These are contrasted with ''suites" 
of the contract, i. e., the influence of more remote or un-
foreseen events, such as acts of God, new legislation, insol-
vency, illness, impossibility, or any cause of nonperformance, 
including the problems of fault, default, and damages as well 
as the ratification of a void contract. These ulterior in-
fluences on the contract are deemed subject to the law of the 
places either where performance was due, or where the 
eve'nts occur. Again, this theory has been decisively criticized. 
"Consequences, effects, suites: these three words appear 
synonymous to us."es But strong remnants of the old bisec-
tion are to be found in court decisions and in the teachings 
of Minor and Beale.69 The Restatement, unfortunately, has 
solemnly proclaimed this very approach (§ 332). 
While American courts, however, pay no more than lip 
service to this theory, in Switzerland the original idea has 
been fully received by the Federal Tribunal. This court 
subjects, by imperative rule, all problems connected with 
the creation of contracts to the law of the place where they 
are made. 70 The "effects" of the contract are left to the in-
tention of the parties and subsidiarily to the law of the place 
of performance. The Swiss literature is divided on this ques-
tion.71 
68 AssER-COHN 46; AssER-RIVIER 8 I § 3 7 (sometimes erroneously cited as 
follower of FOELIX); SUR VILLE 355, 357; HARBURGER, I 9 Annuaire (I 902) 
137; ROGUIN, id. (I904) 77; ROLIN, id. (I9o6) I99; DESPAGNET 897 § 303; 
NOLDE, Revue I 926, 448. 
69 MINOR 401; 2 Beale I 199 § 346.1. Contra: see BATIFFOL 69 § 77· 
70 Supra pp. 396-397. For the purpose of the special case concerning the 
extent of authority of an agent making the contract, the Federal Tribunal 
expresses the rule in the form that the conflicts rule of the place of contracting 
determines whether the contract is perfected. BG. (Dec. 14, I92o) 4 6 BGE. 
II 490, 494· 
71 FRITZSCHE, 44 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (I925) 229a, 245a, 257a; 
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Illustration. Where a dye firm in Milan sent an agent 
to ZUrich to buy dyes, the Federal Tribunal determined 
under Swiss law the question whether the firm or the agent 
was the party to the contract, and under Italian law whether 
the buyer was entitled to reject the merchandise.72 
It is true that the Supreme Court of the United States once 
also, in I 8 7 5, pronounced the rule that the formation and 
validity of contracts follow the lex loci contractus while mat-
ters regarding performance are subject to the lex loci solu-
tionis.73 This leading case has had some following but has 
been regularly disregarded by the Supreme Court itself. The 
German Reichsgericht has occasionally used arguments of 
this kind in case of a mistake made in applications for in-
surance.74 
Impracticability of the division. While the various ap-
proaches resulting in bisecting the development of the con-
tract produce somewhat different disadvantages, their com-
mon idea is inadequate. A conflicts rule concerned with 
validity or formation must include the extent of the obli-
gation created, as Beale has conceded. But there is no con-
sistent dividing line possible between the extent of a con-
tractual obligation and its performance. Both together form 
the purpose of the contract and are its very core. Whether an 
event making performance impossible or onerous frees the 
debtor from his entire duty, or only from paying damages, 
or not at all, is determined by the distribution of effort and 
risk implied in the contract. 75 
SAUSER-HALL, id. 298a, 319a; 0SER-SCHOENENBERGER, Allg. Einleitung LIV 
§ 51; SCHNITZER (ed. 2) 522 (strongly disapproving); HANS-WERNER 
WIDMER, Die Bestimmung des massgeblichen Rechts irn int. Vertragsrecht 
(Zurcher Studien zurn Int. Recht, Heft 9) ( 1944) 102 (disapproving). 
72 BG. (March s, 1 923) 49 BGE. II 70. See also the proposals by LAPAJNE, 
4 Bl. IPR. (1 929) 65. 
73 Scudder v. Union National Bank (1875) 91 U.S. 406. 
74 RG. (Dec. 4, 1926) JW. 1927, 693; (Dec. 23, 1931) IPRspr. 1932, 
61 No. 30. 
75 For consequences, see infro pp. 531, 537, 542, 576-577· 
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This is true of the civil law systems, in which specific per-
formance is the object not only of the obligation but also of 
the judgment in case of breach. It is equally true in common 
law, although merely the duty to pay damages for non-
performance is enforced. For it is always the contractual 
promise that creates the primary object of the obligation.76 
3. American Law 
Surveys covering cases in the United States are unanimous 
in stating that validity of contracts is tested in the courts by 
varying criteria.77 In Beale's own statistics of I9IO, only a 
minority of six states professed to follow the place of con-
tracting rule. 78 In I 934, he claimed that under the influence 
of the Restatement drafts the number of these states had in-
creased to eleven certain and eleven other dubious states/9 
but these statements have been criticized in several respects.80 
On the basis of recent observations, we ought to be aware of 
the fact that the cases in which courts have resorted to this 
rule, pertain to at least four groups. 
(i) In the majority of the cases, no problem is presented, 
particularly when the place of contracting and that of per-
formance, or the former and the domicil of the parties are 
situated in the same jurisdiction, and no other connection 
competes in significance.81 
(ii) In other cases the contract is made in a jurisdiction 
where also some other element considered determinative 
7~ See BucKLAND, "The Nature of Contractual Obligation," 8 Cambr. L. J. 
(I 944) 24 7, against Holmes. 
77 See 2 BEALE I 077; GOODRICH § 107; STUMBERG 2.00-215; RoBERTSON, 
Characterization 176; IS C. J. S. Conflict of Laws (1939) §II; II Am. 
Jur. (1937) 397 § xx6. 
78 BEALE, 2.3 Harv. L. Rev. (r9ro) 194 at 2.07. 
79 2 BEALE I 172. and I I 73 with respect to a doubtful presumption for this 
law in New York. 
80 See in particular BATIFFOL 87 § 96; NussBAUM, sx Yale L. ]. (I942.) 
892., 901ff. 
81 MUJ;;LLllR, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 888. · 
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occurs, although performance and domicil of one, or even 
of both parties may be elsewhere. For instance, contracts of 
carriers are ordinarily subjected to the law of the place where 
the contract is made and the transport begins. 82 
(iii) Not infrequently, lip service is paid to the place of 
making rule, while in fact a quite different law is applied. 83 
(iv) The rule is mechanically applied without appre-
ciable discernment in a considerable number of cases. More-
over, it is not the habit of the courts when they apply the 
law of the place of contracting to a problem of validity, to 
decide whether the same law would apply also to other 
contractual problems. And conflicts respecting validity are 
in an overwhelming majority in this country, a phenomenon 
obviously caused by the differences of statutes in such mat-
ters as statute of frauds, usury, exemption from liability, or 
Sunday laws, in contrast to the uniformity of the common law 
rules on performance. 
All this warns strongly against Beale's statistical estimates. 
Not only is the exclusive force of his validity rule incon-
sistent with the existing law but its significance for the de-
velopment of the practice is greatly overestimated. Scholars 
of such intimate knowledge of the decisions as Lorenzen and 
Bati:ffol conclude that, wherever the choice between con-
tracting and performance has become material, the latter has 
been emphasized by the courts.84 
4· Determination of the Place of Contracting 
Where is the place of contracting? Which law has to gov-
ern this question? We do not share the opinion of an old 
Canadian case that "the question as to what country is the 
82 BATIFFOL 239 § 267. 
83 Cf., e.g., infra pp. 45 8£., 461. 
84 LORENZEN, JO Yale L. J. (1921) s6s at 578; BATIFFOL § 96. We shall 
have to make our own remarks at a later juncture. 
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locus contractus in each particular case is not a question of 
foreign law, it is a question of fact."85 Without exhausting 
the much debated matter, we ought to mention a few deli-
cate points. 
Contracts between absent persons. The present municipal 
laws are notoriously in disagreement on the question at 
which moment a contract in the making by correspondence86 
emerges from preliminary negotiations. At common law, a 
contract is considered executed as soon as the addressee of 
an offer dispatches his acceptance (theory of expedition, mail--
box-theory, 0 bermittlungs-T heorie). Civil law countries are 
divided in their adherence to the following views: that ac-
ceptance must only be declared (theory of declaration, A eus-
serungs-Theorie); or must arrive at the offeror's address 
(theory of arrival, Zugangs-T heorie); or must be received 
by him (theory of reception, Empfangs-Theorie); or must 
come to his knowledge (theory of information, V erneh-
mungs-T heorie). It is by no means settled that all these views 
of the time when negotiations arrive at the stage of binding 
force, justify conclusions on the question at what place a con-
tract is made. But generally this seems to be taken for 
granted. If so, it is important which law is decisive to answer 
the question where "the place of contracting" is. (There 
arises, of course, the other problem whether a contract is 
created at all, but this will be discussed later.) 
Illustration. In I9I3, when Trieste was Austrian, an in-
surance company domiciled in that city concluded contracts 
by a general representative in Tunis, on the basis of "gold 
francs." In r 934, after the various currency depreciations, 
Italian courts having to decide on the amount of the insurance 
So Cloyes v. Chapman (1876) 27 u_ c. c_ P. zz, 31· 
86 For comparative law, see RABEL, 1 Recht des Warenkaufs 69-108; Institut 
International de Rome pour !'Unification du Droit Prive, De la formation des 
contrats entre absents_ Etude Preliminaire (mimeographed) S- d. N.-U. D. p_ 
1935, Etude XVL 
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claim, followed the conflicts rule of the Austrian Civil Code 
(§§ 36, 37) which refers to the law of the place of con-
tracting. Although the construction of these provisions is 
doubtful, it was assumed that a contract is concluded under 
Austrian civil law by information to the offeror and under 
Austrian commercial law sometimes by information and 
in other cases by expedition of the acceptance, while it was 
believed that under French law applicable in Tunisia, decla-
ration of acceptance was decisive (which is doubtful, too). 
The Italian courts, for the purpose of applying the Austrian 
place of making rule, attempted to ascertain the location of 
this place under the lex fori, which meant in this case the 
Austrian Commercial Code and, consequently, held the con-
tract to have been perfected by delivery of the policy through 
the agent in Tunis. Therefore, French municipal law was 
to govern the money problem.87 
The method, hence, is the same as that used in ascertaining 
jurisdiction. Supposing a court has jurisdiction to judge a 
breach of contract only if the breach occurs in its district, an 
ordinary simple case is decided as follows: 
Plaintiff resided in Ontario but carried on business in 
Montreal. He sold this business to the defendant; the 
agreement was executed by plaintiff in Toronto, sent to 
defendant in Montreal, and signed by him there. The 
Ontario court held that the execution in Montreal completed 
the contract, hence the Quebec law applied to the effect that 
the place of payment was at the domicil of the debtor. There-
fore, the breach of contract took place in Quebec, and the 
Ontario court had no jurisdiction.88 
This astonishing game of lawyer's niceties may, in this 
case, rest on the unexpressed background that an Ontario 
court does not want unnecessarily to interfere with the sale 
of a business in Quebec. This, in fact, would furnish a wise 
87 App. Trieste (Jan. 25, 1934) 2 Recueil general relative au droit interna-
tional (ed. Lapradelle) 1935·3·101. 
88 Phillips v. Malone (1901) 3 0. L. R. 47, af/'d (1902) 3 0. L. R. 492 
(D. C.). 
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rule. But embarrassment is the daily characteristic of the 
prevailing approach. 
Every court using this method applies its own domestic 
theory. An English court will stress the place where the 
letter of acceptance is posted. 89 A Canadian will do likewise, 
provided that this letter reaches the o:fferor.90 It is true that 
a merely casual mailing on a voyage need not necessarily be 
accepted as decisive.91 The conflicts laws of Japan and China 
provide for the same solution.92 Belgian, Italian, and Swiss 
courts employ their own theories of reception93 or informa-
tion/4 and the French courts, being divided in the municipal 
domain, follow each its usual view.95 
89 Benaim and Co. v. Debono [I924] A. C. 5I4, 5I9; Muller & Co. v. 
Inland Revenue Commissioners [I927] I K. B. 78o, aff'd [Ig:t8] A. ('. 
40-H. L.; WESTLAKE § 224. 
90 Magann v. Auger (I9oi) 3I S.C. R. I86 applied to these problems, see 
cases in 3 JOHNSON 670 n. I; Charlebois v. Baril [I 927] 3 D. L. R. 762. 
91 CHESHIRE 263; 3 JOHNSON 473; MANN, I8 Brit. Year Book Int. Law 
(I 9 3 7) (supra p. 3 9 7 n. I 8) at I 04. CooK, Legal Bases 42 5 regards casual 
places of mailing ruled out by the real meaning of the place of contracting, 
which he does not explain, however. French courts resort to interpretation of the 
intention of the parties; see, for instance, Trib. civ. Seine (Julys, I939) Revue 
Crit. I939, 450, Note, id. 456: agreement between three German refugees in 
a hotel room in New York, German law common to all applied. Compare 
the refusal to apply the lex loci contractus in the case of a Sunday contract made 
in a hotel room of New York, Brown v. Gates (I904) I2o Wis. 349, 97 
N. W. 221, infra Chapter 33, p. 564 n. 36. 
Switzerland: BG. (July 12, I938) 64 BGE.II 46. 
92 Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9· 
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 23. 
93 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (March 14, I924) Jur. Com. Brux. I924, I46; 
Trib. com. Liege (Nov. 19, I926) Pasicrisie I927 III 69; Trib. com. Brux-
elles (Dec. I7, I936) Jur. Com. Brux. 1937, 93; noted Clunet 1938, 359· 
Italy: (C. Com. art. 36): App. Milano (Dec. II, I888) Clunet I892, 512; 
(Disp. Prel (I865) art. 9): Trib. Trento (June Io, I926) Monitore I926, 
62o, and with respect to taking jurisdiction at the place where obligations 
originate, Cass. (Aug. 3, I935) Rivista 1935, 372, 374 (place where the 
offeror acquires knowledge of the acceptance). Where no answer is requested, the 
place of acceptance is decisive, App. Genova (Nov. 27, I9o6) Clunet I907, 
II99; Cass. Napoli (Sept. r8, I9I4) Clunet I9I5, 703. The new Civil Code, 
art. I 32 6 par. r requires knowledge of the acceptance. 
Switzerland: HaMBERGER, Obl. Vertrage 53; ScHNITZER 282; NIEDERER, 
59 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 247· 
94 KosTERS 763, 766. 
95 SURVILLE 340 n. 2, 34I; BACCARA, 5 Repert. 223 No. 26 (distinguishing 
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If the internal systems involved agree, some writers pre-
sume an implied agreement of the parties in favor of the law 
thus indicated.96 
Proposals flowing from awareness of the international 
purpose of conflicts law have either radically discarded the 
role of "contracting" in case of correspondence,97 or have 
pointed rather to the place from which the first offer is sent, 
the offer deserving preference over the acceptance as the 
initial step and the basis of the contract.98 
United States. Characterization according to the lex fori 
has recently been advocated also in this country.99 However, 
thanks to the fairly uniform doctrine of contracting in the 
United States, the problem does not present itself with the 
same acuteness. The Restatement had no difficulty in provid-
ing on principle that the place of contracting is the state from 
which the acceptance is sent (§ 326, b), parallel, though not 
in necessary conjunction, with the principle that a contract 
is made at the time when the last act contributing to the 
consent is done, as formulated in the Restatement of Con-
tracts, § 64. But it is not clear whether this proposition, which 
is specifically American, applies to a contract made by cor-
four systems); App. Rennes (Dec. IS, I89I) Clunet I892, 912 (theory of 
declaration of the acceptance); App. Colmar (March II, I925) Clunet I926, 
4II (arrival of the letter of acceptance; possibly following the German view). 
116 KOSTERS 7 6 8. 
97 See the authors cited supra n. 3 7. 
98 To this effect the old writers cited by WAECHTER, supra n. 64, at 45; 
in modern times, SURVILLE, in Clunet I89I, 36I, cf. I028; DIENA, I Dir. 
Com. Int. 478; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 449 § 360; WALKER in I Klang's 
Kommentar 3I8 and authors cited; Institute of Int. Law, resolutions of I9o8, 
art. 4, 22 Annuaire (I9o8) 99, 285, 291. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. I sent. 3: where the offeror receives the 
acceptance of the offer. 
TreatyofMontevideoonint.CivilLaw (I889) art. 37; (I94o) art42.:law 
of the place of dispatching the offer. 
Brazil: In trod. Law (I 942) art. 9 § 2: law of the place of residence of the 
offeror; EsPINOLA, 8-C Tratado I8II § I48 Note (p), wonders why the 
domiciliary test, ordinarily basic for the new law, is discarded. 
99 2 BEALE I 046 § 3 II.2; Restatement § 3 I I ; House v. Lefebvre (I 942.) 
303 Mich. 207, 6 N. W. (zd) 487. 
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respondence between persons in San Francisco and Mexico 
City, 100 or New Y ark and Paris. If so, the lex fori doctrine of 
the other countries is followed with the identical disastrous 
effect, that different places of contracting will be stated in 
the courts concerned, and thus different results are produced 
under the same conflicts rule. 
Binding force of offers. An analogous problem arises out 
of the diverse effects of offers. 
Illustration. Renfrew Flour Mills in Ottawa, Ontario, 
offered to Sanschagrin, limitee in Trois-Rivieres, Quebec, 
40,000 bags of flour with the proviso that "the contract must 
be entered into within eight weeks, otherwise this offer is to 
be withdrawn." Before the end of the time, however, the 
offer was retracted. Under Quebec law, the offer, strangely 
termed a cccontrat unilateral," was considered binding. 
Ontario law does not recognize a transaction without con-
sideration. The court applied Ontario law without squarely 
facing the problem.101 
Various cases treated in the Restatement. The Restate-
ment devotes twenty-one sections to the determination of the 
place of contracting. Some of these provisions are highly 
questionable. For instance: 
"A, in state X, writes to the M company, a mail-order 
house in state Y, ordering a stove from M's catalog and 
offering to pay the catalog price. M in response to the letter 
procures the shipment of the stove from its factory in state 
Z. The contract to pay for the stove is made in Z." (§ 323, 
illustration 5 ). 
This type of contract, termed in the Restatement an "in-
formal unilateral contract," at common law has not been 
absorbed into the ordinary concept of sales contracts. A's 
promise of payment is made under the condition that B send 
100 Mexico: C. C. art. r8o7 requires reception of the acceptance by the 
offeror. 
Hll Renfrew Flour Mills v. Sanschagrin, limitee ( r 92 8) 45 Que. K. B. 2 9· 
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the stove.102 Therefore, obviously the Restatement draws an 
analogy between mailing a letter of acceptance and expedi-
tion of the stove. But it forgets that business letters conclud-
ing a sale are usually posted at some place of management 
and not sent from a mere manufacturing plant situated in 
another state. Reasonably, the place of shipment may deter-
mine the applicable law, if an individual stove is bought and 
the buyer knows of its location in Z, or if the catalog states 
that delivery shall be made at the factory or warehouse in 
Z. In the given example the solution is inadequat~.103 
If the Restatement localizes rights arising from tort at the 
place where the last act completing an injury is done, this is 
a tolerable solution because the lex delicti commissi is closely 
connected with territorialism. But the two questions when 
and where a contract is concluded, ought not to be indiscrimi-
nately identified. The time of completion is of great im-
portance for many problems of substantive law in which the 
place is of none.104 Again, in private international law, lo-
calization should be subordinated to foreseeability by the 
parties and other considerations of convenience. 
Another striking illustration to the same section ventures 
the following bizarre solution: 
A father in state X promises his son $ r o,ooo if he marries 
M. The son marries M in state Y. The contract for pay-
ment of the money is made in Y. 
The mistake of confusing the making of a conditional 
promise with the fulfillment of the condition underlies also 
§ 3 r2 stating that: "when a formal contract becomes effective 
on delivery, the place of contracting is where the delivery is 
made." This rule would mean that not the place of making 
102 Restatement of the Law of Contracts §§ u, 55· 
103 CooK, Legal Bases 3 84, observes that the cases are directly contrary to the 
illustration given in the Restatement. 
104 RABEL, 1 Recht des Warenkaufs 93· 
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but that of performance governs. The same is true if a 
guarantee for future credits is localized at the place "where 
the credit is given in reliance upon the guarantee" (§ 324).105 
Whether these rules are sound in themselves, is another 
matter. 
Discretionary assumptions. This survey would be incom-
plete without noticing that the uncertainty included in the 
principle of lex loci contractus is sometimes welcomed by 
the courts. When a proposal is sent from one state to another, 
or an agent intervenes in transmitting an order, an applica-
tion, an insurance policy, a note, prepared here and sent there 
for approval and signature and then forwarded again to a 
third state-a court may sometimes manage an equitable de-
cision concerning the capacity of a married woman or the vio-
lation of a usury statute, by purposefully locating the place of 
contracting in the desirable jurisdiction. It is a process simi-
lar to the stating of an individual's domicil so as to reach a 
final judgment seeming sound, both tricks that may appear 
satisfactory so long as the conflicts rules are not. 
Contracting in another state. Finally, the lex fori theory 
encounters another obstacle. As will be remembered, it has 
been urged that a court should not assume domicil (like na-
tionality), to exist in another state, contrary to what is as-
sumed in that state itself. It is not less strange that states X 
and Y should each locate an individual contract in the ter-
ritory of the other, and in this way obtain opposite results as 
to validity or effect. Such a negative conflict of conflicts rules 
is particularly queer in view of the traditional support of lex 
loci contractus by the idea that the contract is dominated by 
the state of its origin. The truth of the matter is that the le:( 
loci contractus is a fallacious device wherever the making of 
a contract is substantially connected with two states. 
105 This section has been already criticized by NussBAUM, Principles 171. 
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5· Rationale 
Critical appraisal of the lex loci contractus has been so 
frequent and thorough that only a short resume is called for. 
Once, the law of the place of contracting was deduced from 
some idea of sovereign power over the persons doing acts in 
the territory, and simple facts were faced such as a sale in 
an open market, or a deed solemnly executed in an official's 
room, the latter a case still enjoying a privileged place in 
some otherwise poor conflicts codifications. Of all the theories 
of sovereignty, territorialism, and vested rights, none has 
survived criticism. Lex loci contractus is no logical necessity 
for any problem. This much has become a commonplace 
despite Beale and the Swiss courts. 
Respecting arguments of convenience, the place of con-
tracting has lost its obviousness in all those modern situa-
tions in which either there is no one such place or the place 
of creating the contract has no significance for the purpose of 
the contract. 
Followers of this inherited approach, it is true, never grow 
tired of assuring us that it is the most certain place, best known 
to the parties who therefore can easily ascertain the appli-
cable law. Hence, the rule should at least serve well as a gen-
eral subsidiary precept.106 The adversaries, from Savigny to 
Wharton, Dicey, Lorenzen, and innumerable Continental 
writers, point to the accidental nature of this place in our 
epoch of travel, the indifference of most parties to the local 
law, or for that matter, to any law, and the difficulties in-
herent in contracts by correspondence.107 All international 
draft proposals have rejected the lex loci contractus/08 
106 Most recently, CAVERs, Book Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) at 1173, 
claims usefulness of the Restatement rule, because it provides ready answers. 
107 LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 565, 655; id., 31 Yale L.]. (1921) 53· 
108 See RocuiN, Actes de la 3eme Conference de la Haye ( x 900) 62; DE 
VrssCHER, 48 Recueil (1934) II 354-356; NoLDE, 32 Annuaire (1925) 62-64; 
STUMBERG zo6; BATIFFOL §§ 83-85. 
RULES IN ABSENCE OF PARTY AGREEMENT 461 
The solution ought to depend on the facts. When a con-
tract is concluded in a state where both parties live, or in an 
international market, or in a cash and carry operation between 
a resident and a transient, all practicable theories agree on 
the law of this state as a subsidiary rule. But the real prob-
lems begin beyond this circuit. The rule is a device insufficient 
in itself, because it needs supplementary facts to operate, and 
is inadequate in many cases. It defies common sense every 
time when it makes the fate of a contract dependent on the 
legalistic finesses determining at what place the deal was 
completed in the juristic sense. 
Under this angle, it is regrettable that even some advo-
cates of the law of the place of performance take refuge in 
the law of the place of contracting as such, when the former is 
uncertain or insignificant. 109 This seems rather to prove the 
defective nature of all schematic rules for contracts in 
general. 
Courts adhering to this venerable but unreliable tradition, 
have often turned the tables on it. Sometimes the old quid 
pro quo of the Pandectists has been used, calling the law of 
the place of performance the lex loci contractus,110 or confus-
ing lex loci contractus, that is, the law in force at the place 
where the contract is made, and lex contractus, that is, the 
law governing the contract as a whole.111 These artifices have 
been censured.112 Again, as early as I 892, lex loci contractus 
has been referred by a sensible American court "to the place 
of the seat of the contract as distinguished from the place 
109 BATIFFOL 87. 
110 Dig. 44, 7, 21, supra n. 42; DICEY, Appendix Note 5 p. 885; Pritchard v. 
Norton (1882) 1o6 U. S. 124, per Matthews, J.; Johnson County Sav-
ings Bank v. Walker (r9o8) So Conn. 509, 69 Atl. 15; Blandi v. Pellegrini 
( 1915) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 552. 
111 See 15 C. J. S. 88o. French writers often use lex loci contractus in this 
sense and term the law of the place of contracting lex loci actus, a misleading 
terminology. 
112 See NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 113 against Clunet 1891, roz6. 
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where it may casually happen to have been signed."113 Fi-
nally, the rule very often has been rendered meaningless by 
asserting the lex loci contractus to be the general rule and, in 
the same breath adding that when performance is due in an-
f lH Th. other state, the law o the latter state governs. 1s 
amounts to a pure recognition of the lex loci solutionis. 
III. LAW OF THE PLACE OF PERFORMANCE 
I. Historical Note 
Savigny and his school115 substituted the law of the place 
where the contract is to be fulfilled for that where it is 
concluded. They believed that the Roman jurists agreed with 
their view, and argued that in contrast with the accidental 
nature of the locality of contracting, the parties carefully de-
termine the details of performance. It is true, indeed, that 
business stipulations, in connection with usage, make it or-
dinarily clear where goods or services are to be delivered and 
received. This place, the authors emphasize, is of paramount 
importance for the structure of the contractual relationship, 
and foremost in the interest and "expectation of the parties." 
Story had paved the way to this consideration. Although 
he upheld the tradition that "the validity of a contract is to 
be decided by the law of the place where it is made(§ 242), 
which proposition he based on the presumed intention of the 
parties, he added: 
"But where the contract is either expressly or tacitly to 
be performed in any other place, there the general rule is, 
113 Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer (I893) 52 Minn. I74, I79> 53 
N. W. II37> II38, quoted by McCLINTOCK, IO Minn. L. Rev. (1926) 498, 
50 I. 
l'14 STORY§ 28o; cf. LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (I92I) 667; infra this page. 
115
'SAVIGNY § 370; z BAR 9; UNGER, I System I79i DERNBURG, I Pandekten 
I o 5 j REGELSBERGER, Pandekten I 7 3 ; Saxony C. C. (I 8 6 3) § I I j report by 
ENNECCERUS and resolution, 24 Deutscher Juristentag, 4 Verhandlungen 83, 
nz, I27. 
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in conformity to the presumed intention of the parties, that 
the contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation and inter-
pretation is to be governed by the law of the place of per-
formance." (§ 280). 
2. Countries 
Under these influences the lex loci solutionis has become 
the firmly established subsidiary test of all contractual obli-
gations in Germany,116 and certain American and other juris-
dictions.117 Sometimes it is the test only for the "effects" of 
contracts, 118 and in some countries, it is imperative when 
contracts are to be performed within the forum.119 
In British courts, this law is not an exclusive but a favorite 
device.120 
In the countries applying the law of the place of contract-
116 RG., 6th Civil Chamber, in 6r RGZ. 343; 6z RGZ. 379 under ZITEL-
MANN's influence applied the domiciliary law of the debtor; overruled by RG. 
(Sept. 25, 1919) 96 RGZ. 262, (Sept. 2.9, 1919) id. 270. The fifth chamber left 
the question open in RG. (Dec. r8, 1920) ror RGZ. 141, but agreed with the 
law of the place of performance (Dec. 7, 192.1) in 103 RGZ. 259; (June :z., 
1923) 107 RGZ. 44; (Oct. 3, 192.3) 108 RGZ. 2.41. The subsequent decisions 
are collected by LEWALD 2.24 No. 28rff.; MELCHIOR, }W. 1925, 1574 n. 38. 
117 California: C. C. § I 646. 
Montana: C. C. (1895) art. :uii, Rev. C. (1935) vol. 3 c. 108 § 7537· 
Chile: C. C. art. 15 § r (if this :place is in Chile). 
Greece: Formerly, C. C. (1856) art. 6. 
Liechtenstein: Sachenrecht of Dec. 31, 1922, art. 17 par. r. 
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VI, 14. 
Spain: CoRDOVA, "El Derecho Interregional," 107 Revista Gen. Legis!. y 
Jur. ( 1905) at 20; CAST AN ToBENAS, r Derecho Civil Espafiol, Comun y Foral 
(ed. 6, 1943) roo. 
Montevideo Treaty on Int. Civil Law (r889) arts. 32, 33; ( 1940) arts. 36, 37· 
Saxony: Formerly, C. C. § II. 
Czarist-Russian law, see 14 Z.int.R. 31, 35· 
118 Louisiana: C. C. (in all editions) art. 10 par. 2. 
Switzerland: (As to the "effects") BGE.: 32 II 268; 341I 648; 36II 6; 37 
II 6o1; "constant practice" recognized in 47 II 541; 49 II 22.5; 59 II 361; 
cf. ROMBERGER, Obi. Vertrage 41; NIEDERER, 6o Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 
(1941) 275a. 
119 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 23, 1930) 16 Arch. Jud. s, 99 Revista Dir. 
287, based on C. Com. art. 628. On the literature, see 2 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 
192ff. 
Argentina, Chile, Mexico and others, see supra Chapter 28 n. 43 and Chapter 
29 n. 33· 
120 WESTLAKE 300 § 2.II; DICEY 673; BATIFFOL § 99· 
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ing on the basis of a presumption, such as France and Italy, 
counterevidence is allowed to prove that the intention of the 
parties veered to the law of the place of performance. 
United States. In striking contrast to the Restatement, 
Lorenzen has concluded from the cases that "most of them 
apply the law of the place of performance when it differs from 
that of the place of contracting, without reference to the 
other surrounding circumstances.m21 In a recent inquiry the 
French scholar, Batiffol, confirms this view. He thinks the 
American courts have given Story's text an adequate and 
successful interpretation by adopting the lex loci solutionis, 
if at the time of the contract the place of fulfillment was 
already determined in the mind of the parties.122 Such state-
ments, of course, provide us merely with a starting point in a 
complicated inquiry. 
3· Mode of Fulfillment 
Irrespective of the law applying to the rest of the con-
tract, the law of the place of performance is firmly entrenched 
as governing the "mode and incidents,m23 or "modalities" 
of payment or other performance, if no contrary intention 
is proved.124 This universal rule includes the application of 
the lex situs to the transfer of real or personal property as 
object of an obligation, and of the local law to the precise 
place, time, and manner of tender and delivery. Judge 
121 LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. }. (1921) 565, 578. 
1
"
2 BATIFFOL 89. 
123 Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais (I884) 12 Q. B. D. 589, 
604 per Bowen, L. J.; Lord Wright in Adelaide Electric Supply Co., Ltd. v. 
Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd. [I 9 34] A. C. I 2 2, I 5 1 ; Auckland City Council 
v. Alliance Assurance Co., Ltd. [I937] A. C. 587, 6o6. 
124 BoULLENOIS, 2 Traite de Ia personnalite et de Ia realite des loix (I 766) 
500; I FoELIX 233; 2 BAR 2I, 88; WEISS, 4 Traite 387; FooTE 399> 477; 
and all other writers with the only exception of PILLET, 2 Traite 18I § 486. 
Austrian Allg. BGB. § 905: "With regard to measure, weight and kind of 
money, the place of delivery is determinative." Former Italian C. Com. art. 58, 
as commonly construed, see, e.g., Cass. (June 8, I933) Foro Ita!. I933.I.938. 
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Learned Hand once25 took opportunity to enumerate Ameri-
can cases applying this rule with respect to a moratorium,126 
payment upon a forged endorsement,127 delivery of a note 
as payment/28 payment in one currency or another/29 the 
question who is the proper payeeao or consignee,131 and time 
of grace on commercial papers.132 The international literature 
and practice agree in subordinating to this law: the tender of 
goods and services, the duty of the creditor to deliver a re-
ceipt, the currency in which a money debtor may be com-
pelled to pay the amount due, for example what "franc" or 
"pound" means if it is also a money unit at the place of per-
formance, 133 and like questions of weights, measures, working 
days, and business hours.134 
Illustration. Two merchant firms in Capetown arranged 
with a bank of the same city credits for buying flour in the 
United States. The bank promised to honor the seller's 
draft upon them at its New York branch, provided that the 
bills of exchange were accompanied in one case "by bill 
of lading and insurance policy," and in the other "by full 
set of shipping documents including marine and war risk 
125 Louis-Dreyfus et al. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (I93o) 43 F. (:zd) 
824, 827. The following citations have been adduced by Judge Hand himself. 
126 Rouquette v. Overmann (1875) to L. R. Q. B. 525· 
1 n Kessler L Armstrong Cork Co. (C. C. A. 2d I907) I58 Fed. 744; Belestin 
v. First Nat'l Bank (I9I4) I77 Mo. App. 300, I64 S. W. I6o. 
128 Tarbox v. Childs (I896) I65 Mass. 408, 43 N. E. I24; Gilman v. 
Stevens (I 896) 63 N.H. 342, I Atl. 202. 
129 Anonymous (I784) I Brown Ch. C. 376; Benners v. Clemens (I868) 58 
Pa. 24. 
130 Graham v. First Nat'l Bank of Norfolk (I88I) 84 N.Y. 393, 38 Am. 
Rep. 528. 
131 Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (I 92 3) 
I23 Wash. 387, 212 Pac. 564; rehearing, 2I6 Pac. 851. 
132 Bowen v. Newell (I855) I3 N.Y. 290, 64 Am. Dec. 550. 
133 See Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and 
General Mutual Life Assurance Society, Ltd. [I938] A. C. 224-P. C., per 
Lord Wright, and in case of a stipulation to the contrary effect, De Bueger v. 
Ballantyne & Co. [I938] A. C. 452-P. C. 
134 In Germany the Ia w of the place of performance is applied to these ques-
tions as incident to its general scope, see 6 RGZ. IJ2; 96 id. at 272; I o6 id. at 
6I; RG. (April 22, I922) Warn. Rspr. I922, No. 57· 
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policies for merchandise shipped to Capetown." The South 
African court presumed that the parties intended to have 
American law govern the question what documents the 
bank was obliged to tender with the drafts in performance 
of the contract.135 
The exact scope of this minimum application of the lex 
loci solutionis, however, will need investigation by detailed 
discussion. It is a mistake to extend the lex loci solutionis 
when it is not the law governing the entire contract to the 
currency problems determining the quantity of money to be 
paid.1u This is a part of the substance of the contractual obli-
gation, and the same should be recognized as to the persons 
by whom or to whom performance shall be made, sufficiency 
of tender, and excuses for nonperformance. The Restate-
ment ( § 3 58) assigning these problems to the law of the place 
of performance, although it forcibly subjects the nature and 
extent of the duty for the performance and the time of 
performance to the lex loci contractus, has established a 
unique and untenable proposition. 
4· Several Places of Performance 
Savigny conceived that a contract may embrace several 
duties each to be fulfilled at a separate place. He meant to 
apply the law of each place respectively.131 Windscheid138 and 
Bar139 formed their own variants of this theory which has 
since been consistently observed by the German Supreme 
Court.140 In particular, where bilateral contracts are not by 
135 Standard Bank of South Africa, Ltd. v. Efroiken and Newman (1924) 
s. A. L. R. App. D. I7I, 176, 178, 196. 
136 See for the present, z ZITELMANN 396; LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort und 
Schuldort 9z; MELCHIOR § 19z; MANN, The Legal Aspects of Money ( 1938) 
zso. 
137 SAVIGNY zoo, 202, § 369. 
138 WINDSCHEID, x Pandekten § 35 No. 3· 
139 2 BAR 15· 
14° Cases collected by LEWALD 246-z56. 
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intention assigned to some unitary law, the obligation of either 
party is determined by the law of the place where he is 
obliged to perform. A part of the writers have been resigned 
to this splitting of the contract/41 The Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal espoused the theory, 142 and Dicey extended his advo-
cacy of the lex loci solutionis to this application of two sub-
stantive laws.143 
To exemplify the effect of this "splitting theory" or "two 
laws system" on the most important contract, sales of goods, 
in the absence of a presumed intention of the parties, the ob-
ligations of seller and buyer are to be distinguished, as well 
as their several duties. A separate place of performance may 
exist, and hence a different law apply to the seller's duties 
to deliver the goods, to be liable for warranties and condi-
tions/44 or default,145 and to replace defective merchandise.146 
Again, the existence and effect of the various duties of the 
buyer depend on the laws at the places where he has to pay 
the price and accept the goods,147 accept a substitute,148 ex-
amine the goods, and give notice.149 But also the remedies 
141 See LEWALD 246. Also the writers advocating the law of the nationality 
or domicil of the debtor are satisfied with a similar bisection, see infra n. r 7 5· 
Switzerland: BECKER, 5 Gmiir 294 § 312. V n. 20; 304 §§ 319-362 II n. 2. 
142 BG. (Oct. 31, 1908) 34 BGE. II at 648; (Oct. 22, 1915) 41 BGE. II 
at 594; RoMBERGER, Obi. Vertrage 48; Reports to the Swiss Lawyers' Ass'n, 
bv NIEDERER, "Die Spaltung des Vertrages," and KNAPP, "La division des 
effets du contrat," etc., 6o Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1941) 22ra-354a. 
143 DICEY 675. 
144 RG. (Oct. 21, r899) JW. 1899, 751; OLG. Hamburg (April 14, 1905) 
12. ROLG. 58, 16 Z.int.R. 322. 
145 RG. (Jan. 21, 1908) Leipz. Z. 1908, 308; (Apr. x, 1930) 84 Seuff. 
Arch. 252; OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 24, 1912.) Hans. GZ. 1913, HB!. No. 2o; 
(Jan. 4, 1918) JW. 1918, 380. 
146 RG. (April 19, 191o) 73 RGZ. 379, Revue 1911, 403. 147 RG. (Nov. r8, 1899) JW. 1900, 12. No.5; OLG. Jena (Dec. 31, 1917) 
JW. 1918, 380 No.5, stressing the local connection of each litigious obligation; 
cf. 55 RGZ. 423; 65 id. 332.· Similarly, as to the portions to which each of 
several buyers is obligated, OLG. Jena (June 30, 1897) 8 Z.int.R. 335, Clunet 
r 899, 6o8. 
148 RG. (Oct. 13, 1894) 34RGZ. 191. 149 RG. (April 28, 19oo) 46 RGZ. 193, 195; (April 19, 191o) 73 RGZ. 
379; (Feb. 4, 1913) 8r RGZ. 273, 275; for details, see LEWALD 254 ff. Accord-
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a buyer has on the ground of defects150 and nondelivery,151 
have been subordinated to the law determinative of the obli-
gation to pay. 
These and other scholastic and unsound results have been 
harmful to the reputation of lex loci solutionis.152 
German courts themselve; have become uneasy of this 
artificial play and admittedly try hard to avoid it in particular 
cases by presuming an intention of the parties in favor of an 
all-inclusive law.153 The Swiss Supreme Court seems to deny 
to the adopted principle almost any practical influence.154 
In fact, this principle is based on the mistaken conception 
that a bilateral contract can be reasonably partitioned into two 
unilateral obligations. This conception may be excused in 
earlier stages of Roman and English jurisprudence; it was 
largely superseded by the late Roman law, and has been en-
tirely abandoned in modern law. The very nature of a synal-
lagma is ignored when a sales contract is torn up into halves 
belonging to different legislations. No wonder that recent 
criticism has discovered a number of contradictions and incon-
veniences, and has stated that rescission of a contrace55 and 
risk for fortuitous loss of the goods156 cannot be classified 
properly, and that in truth the alleged law of one party was 
applied to both.157 
ing to OLG. Miinchen (Feb. r6, 19:z.8) IPRspr. 192.8 No. 33, the duty of 
notice is subject to the law of the domicil of the buyer. 
1
.so RG. (June r6, 1903) 55 RGZ. 105; (April 26, 1907) 66 RGZ. 73; 
(May 25, 1932.) IPRspr. 1932. No. 33· 
151 RG. (May :z.7, 1924) IPRspr. 19:z.6/:z.7 No. 43· 
152 See citations infra n. r 69. See also FIORE § 12.0; PILLET, 2 Traite 263 
(against Savigny's emphasis on the place where jurisdiction will be taken); 
ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 314; MATOS 457 § 330. For other difficulties, see 
LEWALD § 284. 
153 RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 2o3, 207; (Jan. z7, 192.8) 120 RGZ. 72.. 
154 NIEDERER, 6o Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1941) :z.6oa-265a; see also 
GUTZWILLER, id. 415a; adde BG (Oct. 21, 1942) 68 BGE. II :z.2o, 223. 
155 To this effect already ROHG. (Dec. 9, 1875) 19 ROHGE. 132. 
156 See NEuNER, :z. Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 12.1; LEWALD 249 No. 309; RABEL-
RAISER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (192.9) 77· 
157 NEUNER, id. 12.3. 
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The Anglo-American courts seem never to have thought 
of such consequences of the place of performance theory, and 
with the exception of Dicey/58 no writer has entirely fol-
lowed the German example. 
If, however, we become aware that not the several duties 
but the whole contract is to be connected with the law of 
some state, it must also be realized that by making the "place 
of performance" the determinative concept, we are far from 
meaning the domestic concept bearing the same name. In-
deed, in progressive suggestions the whole of the contract 
has been localized at the place where the typically159 prevail-
ing, or principal,'60 contractual duty should be discharged.161 
It has also been suggested that a new uniform concept of 
place of performance should be established for the entire 
contract rather than for the duties created by it.162 But even 
this may turn out to be too narrow a formula. Another step 
farther, Strisower has advocated that the place of perform-
ance should be deemed to be found, not at the place where 
performance ought to be made in fact but the place where, 
according to the nature of the obligation, the "social sphere 
is centered in which the obligation is to be discharged."163 
More simply we should say that the center of the obligation 
rather than the place of its discharge is the adequate contact 
for choice of law. 
To take an example, it is an excellent rule that employ-
ment contracts should be governed by the law of the place 
where the employee is expected to do his work. This rule is 
158 See supra n. 143· 
159 ROMBERGER, Obl. Vertrage 49. so; BG. (Oct. :u, 1941) 67 BGE. II 
I 8 I. 
160 NOLDE, 32 Annuaire (1925) 504; LEWALD 248; for other literature, see 
BATIFFOL 83 and infra p. 472 n. 169. 
161 In the opinion of BATIFFOL 87, this is the existent rule in the United 
States. 
162 NEUNER, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 130; followed by NIEDERER, 6o Z. 
Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 242 a; OsER-SCHOENENBERGER p. LVII No. 57· 
163
'STRISOWER, 32 Annuaire (1925) 507. 
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amenable to the theory emphasizing the place of perform-
ance of the outstanding obligation established in such a con-
tract. But whoever would be satisfied with this aspect of the 
rule must be embarrassed by the case of a traveling sales-
man visiting a dozen states according to the varying instruc-
tions of his employer. Again, there is prevailing agreement 
that in this latter case the law of the employer's domicil 
governs. In both cases, however, the selected localizations 
are convenient for determining the center of the particular 
type of contract. 
5. Lack of a Certain Place of Performance 
It does not often happen in normal commercial sales, 
loans, or bailments that the parties are unable to ascertain at 
the time of contracting at what place the duties are perform-
able. When, however, insurance payments or life rents are 
made payable at the domicil of the creditor, his changes 
of domicil are decisive. Bonds may be payable in any of sev-
eral countries at the option of the bondholder. Goods may be 
shipped to a destination to be declared during the carriage. 
Or a vessel, plying on the ocean, is bought with the stipula-
tion that it should be conveyed to the purchaser at its next 
port of call.164 As mentioned before, in such cases it has been 
suggested that as a measure of despair, the lex loci contractus 
may be applied. Resorting to a more logical method, courts 
regarding the lex loci contractus as starting point, sometimes 
will say that where there is no one place of performance, the 
court cannot do better than fall back on the general rule that 
lex loci contractus governs. 165 The I 940 draft of Montevideo 
(art. 40), expressly provides that if the parties cannot, at the 
164 Case referred to by 2 BAR xo n. 9· 
165 See for instance, Morgan v. New Orleans M. & T. R. Co. (1876) 2 
Woods 244, 17 Fed. Cas. 754 No. 9804; Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co. 
(1941) 388 Ill. 447, 58 N. E. (zd) 46o. The main advocate of this rule at 
present is BATIFFOL 85 § 94· 
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time of contracting, determine the place of fulfillment, the 
contract is governed by the law of the place of contracting. 
All these are makeshift constructions. 
6. Characterization 
Courts have been taught to determine the place of per-
formance according to their lex fori. The German Reichs-
gericht strictly observing this method, considers neatly two 
successive phases, first inquiring where the German munici-
pal law166 locates performance, in order to find the applic-
able law; and when this law is found, inquiring where per-
formance is due under this law, in order to decide the 
claim.167 
Illustration. D in Zurich, Switzerland, owes money to 
C in Berlin. Under the German Civil Code, § 270, the 
debtor has to send the money at his own cost and risk to 
the creditor, but nevertheless ZUrich is his "place of per-
formance." This means that if the mail is delayed en route, 
he is not in default ( 78 RGZ. r 40). But applied to the 
conflicts matter, it means that Swiss law governs the debt. 
Consultation of the Swiss Code of Obligations will result 
in finding that the place of performance is with the creditor 
in Berlin. Therefore, by delayed mail the debtor is in default 
after all, therefore liable for interest and in certain cases 
for rescission, although not for other damage. (C. Obl. art. 
7 4 (I), I 06 ff.) 
The Swiss Federal Court, professing the same method, if 
consistent, must reach the opposite result in favor of German 
law. 168 This is a wonderful example to demonstrate Bartin's 
166 BGB. §§ 269, 270. Many German writers following LEONHARD, Erfiil-
lungsort und Schuldort ( 1907), however, refer these sections directly to conflicts 
law. MELCHIOR 171 virtually concludes from this view that the courts have 
no choice other than to apply them. 
167 ROHG. (x875) 17 ROHGE 292; (1877) 22 iJ, 296; RG. (March 11, 
1919) 95 RGZ. 164, and constant practice, see MELCHIOR 172 n. x, 173 n. 2. 
168 The Swiss Fed. Trib., in fact, resorting to lex fori for defining the place 
of performance in its decision (Oct. II, 1918) 44 BGE. II 416, •1-17 applied the 
law of the creditor's Swiss domicil, but applied the domiciliary law of the 
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thesis that harmony is impossible. But more and more, we 
may wonder whether any "place of performance" can fulfill 
its pretended function. 
7. Rationale 
The opinion is well-reasoned that performance has in many 
cases more significance in the eyes of parties to a contract 
than the locality where they declare their consent, if such a 
common locality exists. However, the former enthusiasm for 
this variant of the old doctrine has not stood up against 
accumulated criticism.1119 The place of performance may hap-
pen to be as accidental or insignificant for choice of law as any 
other place involved; as when an English and an American 
merchant engage in a transaction to ship meat from Argen-
tina to Egypt; or Americans agree with one another for sea 
carriage to Venezuela; or when a traveling salesman is 
hired to go to distant countries. 
Such fruits of the theory of place of fulfillment resulting 
in bisection of bilateral contracts are particularly objection-
able. They cannot be removed by a fictional pretension that 
a contract producing two main obligations of different loca-
tion, has only one place of performance. The relations be-
tween creditor and debtor are often necessarily localized at 
more than two places. Conflicts law cannot schematically 
rely on such a device.110 
Lex loci solutionis without more qualification, ts as Ill-
sufficient a test as the lex loci contractus. 
debtor, being again Swiss law in BG. (July 3, I9o9) 35 BGE. II 473, 476, 
20 Z.int.R. I02. Thereby it managed both times to apply the law of the forum. 
169 See 2 BAR I I; 2 MElLI 8; 2 ZITELMANN 3 72; RocuiN, Actes de la 
3eme Conference de la Haye (I 900) 62; ALMEN, 1 Skandinav. Kaufrecht 5 z; 
LEWALD 226, 1.27. 
17° F. LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort und Schuldort I23 has very well noted this 
point. 
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IV. LAW OF THE DEBTOR'S DOMICIL 
A subsidiary rule based on the nationality of the debtor, 
postulated on a priori axioms/11 has been commonly re-
jected.172 But the law of the domicil of the debtor functioning 
as a general rule, has found increasing favor with writers.173 
The principal arguments are that a debtor cannot be pre-
sumed to have promised more than his habitual law makes 
him liable for, and that his domicil is the place where he may 
be sued and his assets are legally concentrated, according 
to the most fundamental principles of jurisdiction and en-
forcement. That in most cases he is in fact sued at that forum 
and the domiciliary law then coincides with lex fori, is 
claimed to be another advantage. 
Adversaries174 object that the domicil of the debtor has 
no title to govern acts of performance in another country, and 
that there is no reason why the domicil of the debtor should 
be of more significance than that of the creditor. The dis-
memberment of a bilateral contract seems even more diffi-
cult to avoid with this than with the doctrine of the place of 
performance; the advocates of the personal law realize this 
and approve of the splitting.175 Where a buyer refused pay-
ment, while another buyer paid the price in advance, and 
both rescind, there develop curious differences between the 
applicable laws, because the second purchaser has changed 
171 2 ZITELMANN 372; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 126. 
172 RG. (March ll, I9I9) 95 RGZ. 164; (Oct. 3, 1923) to8 RGZ. 243; E. 
Is . w, 14 Z. f. Volkerrecht (r928) 254. 
173 2 BAR r 2; REGELSBERGER, Pandekten § 44 n. 4; HARBURGER in 22 
Annuaire (r9o8) 114; NEUMEYER in 32 Annuaire (I925) 99 No.3; 
STR!SOWER in id. 9I, cf. 135; GUTZWILLER 1608 n. I; LEWALD 230 No. 287; 
FRITZSCHE, 44 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 254a; RAAPE, D. IPR. 263 (regarding 
this theory as probably dominant in the German literature); ALMEN, I 
Skandinav. Kaufrecht 54 n. 68 citing other Swedish followers. 
174 See LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) at 667; BATIFFOL Ioo. 
175 It has been adopted by 2 ZITELMANN 405; MITTEis, 4 Verhandlungen 
des 24. Deutsch en Juristentages 98; 2 FRANKENSTEIN I 90, 295ff.; NEUMEYER, 
IPR. (1929) 27; BAGGE, Conference de la Haye, Actes de la sixieme session, 
at 2.89. 
474 CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
his position from debtor to creditor.176 
In legislation177 and courts,178 this approach has not had 
much following. Lacking the historical background of the 
leges loci contractus and loci solutionis, it has no better ra-
tional justification than these for dominating by itself all 
contracts. 
It is another matter that the domicil of a party, being the 
basis of his status, has been said to furnish a last resort, if 
the requirements of all other conflicts rules fail. In this re-
spect, we shall discuss179 cases such as that of a merchant who 
sends out a catalog intending, under his domiciliary law, to 
invite customers to make offers, while at the places of re-
ceipt the catalog is regarded as an offer; or cases concerning 
the different appreciation of silence as acceptance or denial 
of an offer. 
V. THE LAW MOST FAVORABLE TO THE CONTRACT 
Inspired by earlier theories, the Austrian Code of I 8 I I 
has a special rule referring to the personal law of a for-
eigner making a gift within the country, if the gift is valid 
under such law rather than under the otherwise applicable 
lex fori. 180 Argentina181 and Nicaragua182 conversely provide 
for application of their own laws, when they are more fa-
176 ALMEN, I Skandinav. Kaufrecht 5 s, vainly tries to justify this difference. 
177 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 (as to unilateral contracts); applied to 
loans, Polish S. Ct. (Nov. I8, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop. R. (N. F.) (1937-38) 380. 
178 German-Rumanian Mixed Arb. Trib., Negreanu v. Meyer (June I6, 
I925) 5 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes (1927) zoo, 2I3; Anglo-German Mixed 
Arb. Trib., Biisse v. Brit. Mfg. Stationary Co. ( 192 7) 7 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes (1928) 345, JW. 1928, 2047; cf. RABEL-RAISER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 
62. 
, Denmark: Supreme Court, Norsk Retstidende 1928, 646 and 8z6, id. 1934, 
I52; see 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 946, 942; IO id. 632; see also BORUM-MEYER, 6 
Repert. 224 Nos. 78, 79· 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 578 No. I46. 
Sweden: MALMAR, 7 Repert. IJ6 No. IOS. 
179 See infra Chapter 3 z, p. 52 2 n. I 9· 
180 AUg. BGB. § 35; cf. Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht I 5 § II 3 (applied 
by RG. (March 15, I9oo) 46 RGZ. 230 to the form of a gratuitous discharge). 
181 Argentina: C. C. art. 14 ( 4). 
182 Nicaragua: C. C. art. VIII No. 4· 
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vorable to the validity of transactions than the foreign laws 
called for by the conflict rules. In England and America, 
Lord Phillimore's words have often been repeated that "the 
parties cannot be presumed to have contemplated a law which 
would defeat their engagements"-an application of the 
maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat.183 Mr. Justice Mat-
thews speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States 
appropriated this consideration as 
" ... a circumstance highly persuasive in its character of the 
presumed intention of the parties and entitled to prevail 
unless controlled by more express and positive proofs of 
a contrary intent.m84 
The illustrative English cases using this argument involve 
an arbitration clause, valid under English law at the place 
of making, invalid under the Scotch law of the place of per-
formance, 1185 and clauses exempting a ship company from 
liability.186 Similar stipulations of carriets187 and of some in-
surance companies188 have been treated to the same effect in 
this country. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
applied it to a bond void for lack of consideration where 
made but valid where to be performed.189 One case con-
cerns the capacity of a married woman, 190 two others, oral 
183 4 PHJLLIMORE § 654; followed by WHARTON§ 429; obiter dictum in 
South African Breweries, Ltd. v. King [r899] :z. Ch. 173, r8r. 
184 Pritchard v. Norton (r88z) ro6 U.S. 124,137. 
185 Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery [r894] A. C. :z.o:z.; 6 R. r88-H. L. 
186 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (r865) 3 Moo. 
P. C. Cas. (N. S.) 272., 290; In re Missouri Steamship Co. (r889) 42 Ch. D. 
J:Z. I. 
187 Hazel v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. (1891) 8:z. Iowa 477, 48 
N.W. 9:z.6; W. A. Ryan & Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (r885) 65 Tex. 
13 (citing numerous precedents); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. 
Smith (1913) 38 Okla. 157, 132 Pac. 494· 
188 Coffin v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co. (192.8) 2.7 F. (zd) 616. Ar-
kansas cases, cited by Lefl.ar, Arkansas Conflict of Laws 213 n. 48. 
189 Pritchard v. Norton (1882) 1o6 U.S. r:z.4. 
190 Greenlee v. Hardin (1930) 157 Miss. 229, 127 So. 777, 71 A.L.R. 741; 
as a most subsidiary argument in Hauck Clothing v. Sophie Sharpe (1899) 83 
Mo. App. 385. 
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transactions. 191 The argument has more often been used in 
usury cases, 192 although even there in less than twenty-five 
per cent of the cases/93 and occasionally with respect to other 
causes of illegality. 194 A few instances of analogous reasoning 
exist in decisions of other countries.195 
On the other hand, neither in England1'96 nor in this 
country197 can any consistent judicial doctrine be stated in 
this sense. Often the argument was unnecessary and served 
to support the escape from lex loci contractus198 or lex loci 
solutionis.199 In the cases concerning capacity, favor of va-
lidity would seem adequate but has hardly ever been openly 
and decisively granted. 
Nevertheless, it provokes thought that the preference of 
the more favorable law has found considerable support in 
the literature, particularly in this country.200 What can thea-
191 Hubbard v. Exchange Bank (C.C.A. :z.d 1896) 72. Fed. 2.34, cert. denied 
'63 U. S. 69o (verbal acceptance of a bill of exchange); D. Canale & Co. v. 
Pauly and Pauly Cheese Co. (1914) 155 Wis. 541, 145 N. W. 372.· 
192 Supra p. 409· 
193 This has been stated by BATIFFOL , 98 § zzz; see (n. , ) his revision of cases 
cited by 2 BEALE 1157 n. 2. 
1~4 Exemption of liability of railway: Atchison, Topeka & Santa FeR. Co. v. 
Smith (1913) 38 Okla. 157, 132 Pac. 494, but the argument is unnecessary, 
supra p. 4 r 9· Intention of the parties is the main reason, as in Coffin v. 
London & Edinburgh Ins. Co. (D.C.N.D. Ga. 192.8) 2.7 F. (2d) 6r6 (in-
surance). 
195 E.g., RG. (March 13, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 1. 
196 CHESHIRE 269 cites Maritime Assurance Co. v. Assecuranz-Union von 
r865 (1935) 52. Ll. L. Rep. r6. 
197 BATIFFOL 139 §§ 157, 158. [Adde the thoughtful observations by PAUL 
A. FREUND, "Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws," 59 Harv. L. Rev. 
(1946) 12.Io, 12.12.-12.18.] 
198 E.g., Hubbard v. Exchange Bank, supra n. r 91; Brierley v. Commercial 
Credit Co. (1929) 43 F. (zd) 724. 
199 E.g., Canale v. Pauly, supra n. 191. 
200 LORENZEN, 31 Yale L. J. (192.1) 53: the contract is valid if the law 
of any state with which the contract has substantial connection is complied 
with and execution is not prohibited by some stringent policy of the place of 
contracting and performance is legal at place of performance. (On these three 
provisos see supra Ch. 29); STUMBERG 212., 2.14: "To apply the law which 
will uphold the contract, if the contract has some bona fide substantial connec-
tion with the place of that law, would, it is believed, in carrying out the 
purpose which the parties had in view in their negotiations, better serve business 
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retically justify such a view? How could it be formulated? 
In its nature, distinctly emphasized by the English writers, 
the selection of the validating law has been dependent upon 
the assumed intention of the parties. Indeed, the argument: 
demands not only a so-called presumptive intention but a real, 
though tacit, agreement of the parties; by stipulating as they 
did, they wanted to adopt the law under which the stipulation 
would be valid. But this reasoning is frustrated by the doubt-
less correct thesis that where the parties agree on a certain 
law, this law applies even though it nullifies the contract.201 
Batiffol, who seems to refer the doctrine in question to the 
hypothetical intention of the parties, is only prepared to 
regard it legitimate, where, at the time of the contract or 
at least before one of them invokes nullity, the parties knew 
that one law annuls and the other validates their stipulation, 
and expressed their knowledge by their conduct. 202 But the 
cases state at most that the parties may be supposed to have 
known the law. Cheshire has abandoned the whole idea.203 
If the proper law theory is rejected, what should be the 
idea, or the content, of the rule? We have seen that no rule 
exists prescribing that a contract is void, if it is contrary to 
any one of several laws "substantially" connected with it. 
On the other hand, could a rule be really acceptable, which 
says that whenever a contract is connected with several juris-
dictions, we cannot hold it void except when its nullity is 
assured by all of them? Certainly not. 
In reality, the casual popularity of the law upholding the 
contract in the American courts is very closely related to 
their unprincipled conflicts practice. On the one hand, rules 
are allegedly traditional and fixed; a court believes to a 
convenience by making their acts legally that which they purport to be; i.e., 
an enforceable promise." 
201 Infra Chapter 32· 
202 BATIFFOL q8 § 156. 
2<1s CHESHIRE 269, as compared with ed. r, r96. 
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certain extent in the lex loci contractus or in another device. 
On the other hand, nothing is really certain; the courts ex-
periment; they are benevolent to a party who appears to 
deserve protection; they do not want, in particular, to allow 
a right to be frustrated by a local statute, either outmoded 
or having no reasonable claim to govern exclusively an inter-
state transaction. Very clearly, the courts in general do not 
favor the peculiarities of state provisions on Sunday contracts, 
statute of frauds, usury, or the formalities of insurance 
policies. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, speaking of a sale 
made in its own territory without a memorandum in writing, 
discards the law of the place of contracting and its rule of 
unenforceability, stating there is "nothing inherently bad 
about such convention, despite our statute of frauds," and 
the contract is declared valid under the foreign law of the 
place of performance.204 The usury cases, a very particular 
phenomenon, are inspired by mutual tolerance as there are 
many ways to solve the problem. The courts desire to free 
legitimate business from dispensable local impositions. A 
finance corporation has carried on its loan business for fifteen 
years, has used the same type of stipulations as other com-
panies, for customers in all jurisdictions. Why should such 
a usual and standard form be stigmatized as fraudulently 
evading the law of the debtor's domicil or the law of the 
forum? 20:; The courts manifestly think that one system of 
regulating the rates of interest is as good as another. They 
weigh and compare the needs and policies. Their final choice 
is not so much meant to favor the validity of the contract 
as to encourage the reliance of trade and commerce on inter-
state protection. The solution would be strictly contrary, if a 
prohibition were violated comprising a basic requirement 
in a state to which the contract should exclusively belong. 
204 Canale v. Pauly, supra n. I 91. 
205 Manufacturers Finance Co. v. B. L. Johnson & Co. (1931) 15 Tenn. App. 
Z36. 
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These considerations include several particular circum-
stances, which do not often occur in international transactions 
and even in the relations among the American sister states 
strongly restrict the application of the principle in question. 
Equivalence and comparative unimportance of local policies 
is one of these considerations. Another is the equivalence of 
various conflicts rules to be used at pleasure. A third is the 
neglect of party choice by both courts and parties, and a 
fourth the replacement of one determined applicable law 
by a number of laws among which any one may be selected. 
This orbit of legal systems is circumscribed by the fortuitous 
connections the parties establish. But to prevent the parties 
from too much arbitrariness, it is required that they observe 
some limits which, in general, are not defined more closely. 
Only one limit has been settled in the usury cases: the law 
of the charter state of the lending corporation is excluded, 
if the actual place of business is elsewhere. Hence, if a court 
should find that the system of differentiated rates of interest 
in the charter state is superior to the statutes of the debtor's 
domicil as well as to those of the actual business place and 
the situs of a mortage, it still would not be allowed to apply 
that law even though the parties may have expressly stipu-
lated for it. 
After all, it is not incidental that the principle of the up-
holding law has not seriously been applied to the bulk of 
the American contracts cases, not to speak of the international 
practice. 
In the opinion of the writer, the advocates of this principle 
seem to feel quite correctly that something is needed, in 
the chaos of uncertain and unsatisfactory conflicts rules, to 
obviate the sacrifice of honest commerce. The spontaneous 
inclination of courts to safeguard contracts from local prohi-
bitions serves as an excellent emergency device, and as such 
is to be recommended. If every type of contract were to be 
endowed with a stable subsidiary conflict rule adequate to 
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the nature of the contract, and if the parties were plainly 
permitted and encouraged to select the governing law, with 
assurance that it will be applied, neither the parties nor the 
courts would be in need of such subterfuges; and the legisla-
tures would not have to tolerate them. 
VI. RENVOI 
If a court presumes that the parties have had a certain 
law "in view," it is reasonable to think that this law is a 
substantive, municipal, law.206 But also if judges are supposed 
to choose a law amenable to the character of the contract, it 
seems a useless detour to select a conflicts law instead of 
a municipal law.207 Only in case a mechanical rule points 
to the law of a certain place whereas the court of this place 
would instead apply a third law, does renvoi have its usual 
significance. This is the reason why German courts have 
repeatedly resorted to references from the law of the place 
of performance to another law/08 or in suits for carriage by 
sea, from the law of the port of discharge to the law applied 
at this port. 209 In a case where two Austrian nationals living 
in Turkey entered into a contract of employment, the Italian 
Supreme Court applied their common national law and, by 
transmissive renvoi from the Austrian conflicts rule, the 
law of Turkey. 210 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Specialized Rules 
The negative result reached by some modern authors is 
unimpeachable. No one conflicts rule can serve for all obliga-
20e MELCHIOR 239, citing OLG. Kolmar (May 19, 1893) 4 Z.int.R. 151. 
207 See MELCHIOR, }W. 1925, 1571 and HAUDEK 94 against LEWALD 206. 
208 RG. (Jan. 23, 1897) 38 RGZ. 140, 146; (Oct. 11, 1907) 19 Z.int.R. 
22.2, 2.2.4, and others, see MELCHIOR 2.39 n. 2.. 
209 RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 203, 210 (incidentally). 
21° Cass. (Dec. 29, 1937) 9 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1937) 228, see Vol. 1 
p. 8o ns. 38 and 39· 
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tory contracts. A wrong method had developed when writers, 
enactments, and judicial decisions tried to apply either always 
the law of the place of contracting, or always the law of the 
place of performance, or always the personal law common 
to the parties, or that of the debtor, or always to connect the 
making of the contract with one place and its effects or 
performance with another place. All these doctrines have 
thoroughly failed. 
A more attractive method is that of carefully investigating 
and following up the presumable intention of the parties. 
But where a real, though tacit, agreement of the parties is 
lacking, such quest turns into a search for the most appropriate 
connection between the dispositions of the parties and a 
territory. Clues hinting at the law the parties might have 
had in mind, are certainly not negligible; yet they have to 
be integrated into the entire circumstances. 
What, however, is the positive gain of this dispute? If all 
mechanical rules are repudiated, does this mean that the 
circumstances of every single contract should be examined 
to find the most closely connected law? Some authors, led 
by their regard for the hypothetical intention of the parties, 
come near to such a view. Others want to recognize every 
substantial territorial contact. In the United States, a place 
has been sought where the law is most favorable to the va-
lidity of any obligation. Each of these suggestions contains 
valuable material. But at the same time, the viewpoint of 
the practical lawyer has been recently stressed by Griswold's 
opposition to Cook's apparently unlimited dissolution of 
fixed conflicts rules211 and Cavers' doubt whether the negative 
criticism on Beale's rigidly dogmatic rules does not leave 
judges helpless.212 
211 See the reply by W. W. CooK, 21 Can. Bar. Rev. (1943) 249 and in 
37 Ill. L. Rev. (1943) 418. 
212 CAVERS, supra n. 106. 
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This reaction is sound, not implying a reproach to the 
necessary clarification, but a suggestion for future policy. 
If we could do no better than refer the courts to their own 
estimates of what is in every single case the most closely 
connected law, or what is appropriate to the case at bar, the 
judges would soon fall back on their formulas. 
A margin of judicial discretion, of course, must remain 
so as to do justice to peculiar forms of contracts and individual 
mentalities of parties. But roughly speaking, we need a 
developed system of conflicts rules on contracts, rather than 
just one or two rules, and we have to build it not on rules 
so vague as to abandon the judge regularly to his worry 
or fancy, nor on specifications so tight as to omit important 
kinds of agreements. This program requires comparative 
research in the municipal laws and in commercial practice 
with respect to each single type of contract, a work so far 
only partially started. Experience, however, seems to show 
that commerce is served by a number of standard forms, 
with newly devised clauses rapidly imitated throughout the 
world. In the vast domain of sales of goods, differences in 
stipulations are caused much more often by the natural 
differences of merchandise sold than by local or national 
predilection. Insurance, banking, carriage of goods contracts 
may be distinguished in analogous groups under rational 
rather than local criteria. For this and other reasons, it may 
be less difficult than appears at first sight to resolve the local 
attachments most characteristic of the individual groups of 
contracts. 
However, that not inconspicuous pains must be taken, can 
be seen in the quick defeat of the proposed special rules for 
various contract types, in the Institute for International Law. 
Divergences of opinion were declared too profound, and, 
indeed, many members were devoted to the principle of 
nationality and hostile to party autonomy, prejudices which 
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in themselves could wreck any international enterprise. In 
addition the Institute stated that the matter was immature 
and deferred discussion for an indefinite time. 213 Lists as 
sketched in the reports to the Institute, in the Polish law, 
or in the Montevideo Treaty are the unconvincing product 
of divination rather than inquiry. Comparison of the actual 
choice of law decisions in the Anglo-American, French, and 
German courts, meritoriously begun by Bati:ffol, gives some 
very valuable suggestions but no comprehensive certainty. 
On the other hand, the successive drafts of conflicts rules 
determining sales of goods elaborated in the International 
Law Association and committees of the Sixth Hague Con-
ference/14 show remarkable progress. The work to be done 
is indeed vast. The present writer, in fact, does not believe 
himself able, in a lonely study, to do more than to point out 
a few examples and to suggest some methods of research. 
2. The Law of the Contract 
The task ahead will be to aim at ascertainment, in case the 
parties do not themselves choose their law, of what the main 
local connection is under given conditions, or to express it 
shortly: 
In what jurisdiction a certain type of contract is centered. 
If the elements of the contract in question allow it, its 
connection with one law is very desirable. Almost all modern 
writers are agreed on this point. To split the incidents in 
the manner of the Restatement and the Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal, or in that of the German Supreme Court, is a grievous 
mistake, as was shown and will appear again later. That 
various obstacles that have been raised in the literature to 
the application of a unique law to this or that incidental 
problem are unfounded, will be discussed in Chapter 32. 
213 33 Annuaire (r9z7) III 224ff. 
214 See the last draft in 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 957· 
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Formalities, it is true, should be treated with some liberality 
(Chapter 3 r), while capacity should not be distinguished. 
In the conviction that "depefage," division, is bad and unity 
of contract is precious, we have been confirmed by a powerful 
Jesson received from comparative research. The various legal 
systems operate with different terminologies and techniques, 
but in the hands of fair judges they usually work out all 
right and to strikingly similar ends. To maintain such satis-
factory machinery, however, we have to leave to one system 
the entire living situation. Mixing several municipal pro-
visions is quite likely to jeopardize justice.m 
Of course, there are certain types of contracts, such as, for 
instance, international loans with separate issues of "tranches" 
in several countries and "payable" at several places, with 
respect to which it would be a forced method to ignore the 
several laws involved. There are also certain incidents such 
as the examination of goods sold and delivered, or the time 
and manner of payments, which are conveniently governed 
by special laws.2J,6 Hence, it is generally the lex contractus, 
or as we shall term it, the law of the contract, that must be 
found. By exception we have to recognize either more than 
one law of the contract, or in addition to this law, a special 
law. 
215 See Ed. WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 782. 
216 In continental Europe called statut special, Nebenstatut. 
CHAPTER 31 
Form of Contracts1 
I. THE RuLES 
I. Lex loci contractus 
THE original doctrines of the statutists included in the validity of a contract form as well as substance. Hence, the law of the place of contracting, whether 
considered as governing the entire contract or at least its 
validity, covered the formalities for completing a valid 
agreement, and it may be inferred that this very application 
has always given the principle of lex loci contractus its most 
convincing aspect. This ancient doctrine has retained its full 
vigor in the basic American conflicts rule which, to believe 
Beale, still prevails. According to the Restatement (§ 331, 
b), the law of the place of contracting determines the validity 
of a promise, as in other regards, also with respect to "the 
necessary form, if any, required to make a promise binding." 
2. Locus regit actum 
In the main development of the statutist doctrine, the 
significance of the maxim, locus regit actum, from the six-
teenth century on was reduced to the problems of form. 2 The 
idea that an obligation originates in the territory of a sov-
1 (The form of negotiable instruments will not be included in the following 
chapter, except by occasional mention, since this topic warrants a separate dis-
cussion.) 
EDOUARD SILZ, Du domaine d'application de la regie "locus regit actum" 
(Paris 1 9 3 3) ; RHEINSTEIN, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 3 6o-3 71 ; L. I. 
BARMAT, De regel "locus regit actum" in het internationaal privaatrecht 
(Amsterdam 1936). 
2 On the history of the rules concerning formalities, see WAECHTER, 2 5 Arch. 
Civ. Prax. (1842.) 368, 405; SAV!GNY § 382.; 1 BAR 337; NEUMEYER, 2. 
Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung 84, 87, 135; E. M. MEIJERS, Bijdrage tot de 
geschiedenis van bet int. privaat- en strafrecht (1914) passim. 
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ereign and therefore depends on the conditions imposed 
there, retained greater force inapplication to the exterior con-
ditions of contracting than for the capacity of the parties. 
Others deduced the maxim from voluntary submission of the 
parties, or from a general customary law. But finally, writers 
have emphasized reasons of convenience, viz., that parties are 
in the best position to learn what formalities the local law pre-
scribes and can readily adjust themselves to these; that they 
are not interested in other forms for their own sake; and may 
well be uncertain with which law they should otherwise 
comply.3 
(a) Compulsory rule. The theory that a contract is "born" 
in a territory drew with it the logical necessity that the local 
prescriptions govern the form. Hence, locus regit actum 
acquired compulsory force. Whatever law may govern the 
contract in other respects, the law of the place where it is 
made always determines whether any formalities are obliga-
tory, and if so, which are required. In this shape as imperative, 
the rule was recognized for a long time in England/ and 
appears in a number of countries.6 The French courts, until 
3 See LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 273 § 243; BATIFFOL 363ff. §§ 424, 425. 
4 Alves v. Hodgson (1797) 7 T. R. 241; Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez 
[1927] 1 K. B. 66g, 691, both leading cases concerning the want of a stamp 
locally required at a foreign place; WESTLAKE 281 § 209; DICEY 641 Rule 
I59(2); FooTE 388. 
Canada: Former Quebec practice: Furniss v. Larocque (r886) 2 Montreal 
L. R. S. C. 405 (erroneously cited by DICEY 642 n. 2 as existing law). 
5 Argentina: C. C. art. 12 and art. 916 (new 95o), cf. 2 VIco 280-285, 
§§ 346-348, and cases collected by 2 Romero del Prado 306-31 o. 
Bolivia: C. C. art. 3 6. 
Brazil: In trod. Law ( 1916) art. I I; but see infra n. 1 o. 
Chile: C. C. art. 17. 
Colombia: C. C. art. 2 1. 
Cuba: C. Com. arts. 5 I, 52. 
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners, 1936, art. 24 sentence 2. 
Honduras: C. C. art. 16. 
The Netherlands: Allg. Bepalingen (x829) art. ro according to the domi-
nant opinion criticized by ]ITTA 138; KosTERS 185; OFFERHAUS, "The Private 
International Law of the Netherlands," 30 Yale L. ]. ( 1920) I x6, but 
historically grounded, see BARMAT, supra n. 1, I57· The Supreme Court, H. 
R. (Dec. 6, I928) N. ]. (192.9) 465 avoided a direct answer. 
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I 909, were divided on the question. <a 
Transactions before consuls in foreign countries, of course, 
follow the forms provided by the domestic law of the consul's 
state. 
(b) Optional rule. In a part of the old literature/ how-
ever, and in the course of the nineteenth century under 
Savigny's influence/ the rule was more and more regarded 
merely as a favor to the parties, as a permission to use the 
local formalities or formlessness. 
In a first variant expressing the rule, the lex loci contractus 
was still given first place. The contract, as was said, should 
be valid also if complying with the law governing the contract 
as a whole.9 Later, this order was reversed. The German 
Introductory Law in I 896 formulated the rule thereafter 
prevalent: 
Art. I I (I ) The form of a transaction is determined by 
the laws governing the legal relation that constitutes the 
subject of the transaction. It is sufficient, however, to observe 
the laws of the place where the transaction is made. 
( 2) The provision of paragraph I, sentence 2, shall not 
Peru: C. Com. art. 52. 
Portugal: C. C. art. 24; C. Com. art. 4 (3) (doubtful). 
Puerto Rico: C. C. art. I I ; C. Com. art. 8 3 n. z. 
Rumania: Some decisions, see PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 77 No. 255. 
Spain: C. C. art. 11 par. 1 (for public acts) generalized in the literature, see 
TRiAs DE BEs, 6 Repert. 245 No. 65 and Revue I927, 23, 27 who recognizes 
only certain exceptions. Accord, CASTAN ToBENAS, 1 Derecho Civil Espana! 
(I943) IOI. 
Switzerland: All problems of validity are governed by the lex loci contractus, 
see supra p. 397 n. I6. 
On the scope of some of these provisions, see infra n. 35· 
6 For imperative character: Cour Paris (May 25, 1852) S. I852.2.289, 
aff'd, Cass. (req.) (March 9, I853) S. I853.1.274, D. I853.I.216 and 
others, cited by NIBOYET 676 § 553· 
In Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 13, r889) Pasicrisie 1889.2.170. 
7 See the learned report by the Procureur General Baudouin, in the case, 
Gesling v. Viditz, infra n. ro, Clunet I 909, 1097, r I 13; cf, STORY§ 262, notes. 
8 SAVIGNY § 381 note (p) with references to older authors. 
9 Saxony: C. C. (I863) § 9· 
Italy: C. C. (I86s) Disp. Prel. art. 9· 
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apply to a transaction by which a real right 1s created or 
disposed of. 
In other words, the "lex causae'' is considered as govern-
ing in the first instance; but if its formal requirements are not 
fulfilled, validity is saved by compliance with the local law. 
This optional or permissive function of locus regit actum 
has been adopted in the vast majority of modern doctrines 
and enactments.10 It has also been claimed to be the existing 
law in England.11 
If we say that the parties are permitted to use the local 
form, this does not necessarily require that they actually 
know the differences of formal prescriptions or intentionally 
1° Canada, Quebec: C. C. arts. 7, 776, as construed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, Ross v. Ross (1893) zs Can. Sup. Ct. 307. 
Austria: OGH. (Nov. zo, I894) GIU. No. I5JOI; I EHRENSWEIG-KRAINZ 
I09i WALKER 233· 
Brazil: Former In trod. Law (I 9 I 6) : prevailing interpretation. See C. 
BEVILAQUA, I C. C. Com. 133, obs. 1; BEVILAQUA 258; 1 PONTES DE MIRANDA 
528; EsPINOLA, 8 Tratado 584ff.; CARVALHO SANTOS, I c. c. Interpret. I54 
and others (against a small minority of writers); and the great majority of 
court decisions, see more recently, App. Fed. Distr. (Sept. I4, I933) 28 Arch. 
Jud. 473; App. Sao Paulo (Jan. I6, 1941) 130 Rev. Trib. Sao Paulo 655· 
lntrod. Law (I942) art. 9 § I, as commented upon by EsPINOLA, 2 Lei 
Introd. 586; SERPA LOPES, 2 Lei Introd. 347· Contra: TENORIO, Lei Introd. 
2I9· 
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 1.6. 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 8. 
France: Cass. (civ.) (July 2o, 1909) Gesling v. Viditz, D. 19II.I.I85, S. 
I915.I.I65, Clunet I9o9, 1097, Revue I9o9, 9oo, recognizing validity of a will 
under the testator's national law, but this is extended in the literature to all 
contracts (NIBOYET 677 § 553, LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 277 § 246) and to 
every lex causae (BATIFFOL 366-367 § 429 against other writers); App. Alger 
(May 26, I9I9) Revue I92I, II7, Clunet I9zo, 24I (will); Trib. civ. Seine 
(Feb. 23, I92I) Revue I922, 621.. 
Germany: EG. BGB. art. I I; similarly, the former German common law: 
App. Rostock (Nov. u, I866) 24 Senff. Arch. No. I85; RG. (April 27, r88l) 
37 Senff. Arch. No. I; RG. (July 7, I883) I4 RGZ. I83. 
Hungary: See ScHWARTZ, 40 Z.int.R. (I9z9) I99· 
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (I942) art. 25. 
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8. 
Norway: See CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 571 No. 85. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 5· 
Soviet Union: Probably, MAKAROV, Precis 25 3· 
Sweden : See MALMAR, 7 Repert. I 35 § roo. 
11 CHESHIRE 247, 248 terms it a fair conclusion. 
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prefer the usages at the place where they happen to be. Al-
though there were statutist writers who explained the rule, 
locus regit actum, by self-subjection of the parties to the 
consuetudo loci, 12 it is well settled everywhere, excepting 
a recent ill-advised English decision/3 that the rule in any 
version operates independently of the intention of the 
parties.14 
In either variant, at present, the scope usually is extended 
to all transactions of private law with definite exceptions. 
Thus, the German provisions except transactions modifying 
the title to property, subjecting them to the lex situs. How-
ever, agreements to convey property, including immovables, 
in modern law generally follow the rule, locus regit actum/5 
But the Polish law and the Swiss doctrine and others also 
refer to the lex situs obligations entered into to transfer or 
to constitute rights in immovables situated in the forum. 
These are rather regrettable rules, inviting conflicts to the 
detriment of the parties acting in good faith. 
Most codes, moreover, contain special rules for marriage, 
adoption, wills, negotiable instruments, and other acts, which 
are not included in the discussion here. 
Illustration. Rhea agreed orally in South Dakota, for a 
consideration of ten dollars, to convey his land situated in 
Iowa to Meylink. The statute of frauds in South Dakota 
"struck," as the Iowa Court expressed it, at the contract itself 
and did not admit an exception in case of partial payment. 
Under the Iowa statute, only the question whether the 
contract was provable depended on a written document and 
the payment of the ten dollars made the sales agreement 
12 See, for instance, PAUL VOET, De statutis eorumque concursu, Sect. IX Cap. 
z § 9 (to be found in SAVIGNY 4-88, tr. Guthrie) refuted by STORY § z6x. 
13 In re Priest, Belfield v. Duncan [194-4-] I All E. R. p, per Bennett,]., 
criticized by KAHN-FREUND, 7 Modern L. Rev. (Nov. I 94-4-) z 3 8. 
14 Nice peripheral questions arising when parties temporarily dwell in a 
foreign country have been treated by RAAPE 186. 
15 This is also the well-known rule of English law, see DICEY 588, CHESHIRE 
542. 
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enforceable. The Supreme Court of Iowa applied this, its 
own, law on the ground that lex situs governed the entire 
contractual relation.16 
As we are not concerned now with the transfer of real 
property, we shall set aside this construction and consider 
the configurations arising if the obligatory contract to sell 
an immovable is sharply separated and construed on its own 
merits, as Mr. Justice Holmes once did,11 and many laws 
do, following the advanced Roman system. 
(i) Lex causae imperative. If the court had thus separated 
the problems of obligation from those of title, it could have 
nevertheless reached the same result, by application of the 
Iowa law either as lex loci solutionis or as the law presumably 
intended by the parties, assuming it to govern the entire 
contractual relation.18 
(ii) Lex causae optional. German courts recognize an 
agreement orally made in Germany by persons of any nation-
ality, creating the obligation to transfer ownership, for 
instance, of an Italian immovable, according to Italian law/9 
although the German Civil Code, § 313, requires that an 
agreement to transfer land be embodied in an instrument 
drawn up by a court or notary.20 (EG. BGB., art. I r, para-
graph r, sentence r, supra p. 487) 
(iii) Lex loci contractus optional. Conversely, where two 
Germans in Austria agreed by simple written contract on 
16 Meylink v. Rhea (I904) I23 Iowa Jio, JII, 98 N. W. 779> 78o. The 
case is taken as an illustration only. We shall discuss sales contracts with re-
spect to immovables in a special chapter in Volume III. 
17 Polson v. Stewart (I897) I67 Mass. 2II, 2IJ, 45 N. E. 737, 738. 
ts See Note, "Conflicts of laws as to contracts in relation to real property," 
L. R. A. I9I6A, IOII, I02.Iff. 
19 Written form is sometimes claimed to be required by Italian C. C. art. 
IJI4 (new IJ5o), also for the obligatory contract; but see FEDOZZI 251. 
20 RG. (March 3, I 9o6) 63 RGZ. I 8 states the rule. Accordingly, OLG. 
Miinchen (Feb. 7, I912.) 2.6 ROLG. 2.46: formless promise in Germany of a 
trousseau valid although the governing Austrian law required notarial form, 
see Law of July 2.5, I87I, RGB!. No. 76. 
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the sale of a German immovable, the Austrian law of the 
place of contracting sufficed to validate the act even before a 
German court.21 (EG. BGB., art. I I, paragraph I, sentence 
2, supra p. 487) 
(iv) Lex loci contractus obligatory. Under the doctrine 
as it was formerly settled in England, compliance with the 
formalities of lex loci contractus was necessary, hence all 
solutions discussed above, except sub (iii), would be excluded. 
The contracts in South Dakota and Germany would be un-
enforceable. It is very significant that, in the case of an agree-
ment to sell land, an exception was recognized in England. 
In this case, formal validity is said to be sufficiently supported 
by the proper law of the contract, which in general, though 
not necessarily, is the lex situs.22 
These few examples demonstrate the great interest parties 
unaware of foreign law have in the rule and particularly 
in its optional form. 
3· Lex Causae 
United States. Exactly what is the present rule in this 
country? Story seemed favorable to the imperative lex loci 
contractus with special reference to formalities. 23 Wharton 
stated a practical concurrence of English and American jurists 
in acknowledging the rule, locus regit actum, and only 
doubted whether the rule was imperative or optional. 24 He 
was followed by Mr. Justice Hunt, speaking for the 
Supreme Court, who stated that "obligations in respect to 
the mode of their solemnization are subject to the rule locus 
regit actum.m5 To some writers, reviewing the situation 
21 KG. (March 19, 1925) 44 ROLG. 152 expressly denying the objection of 
public policy; RG. (May 16, 1928) 121 RGZ. 154, 157 (Czechoslovakian 
immovable). 
22 DICEY 644 exception I to Rule 159; CHESHIRE 543-545· 
28 STORY§ 260 cj. § 242a. 
24 
2. WHARTON 1436, 1438 §§ 676, 679. 
25 Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank (18 75) 91 U.S. 406, 41 I. 
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from the angle of European doctrine, the cases appear 
practically, though not by definition, to agree with the op-
tional rule. 216 This, however, as a description of the existing 
law, is certainly inaccurate. 
With good reason, Lorenzen has always maintained that, 
as in former times, form, unseparated from substance, is 
governed by the general law of the contract, which need not 
by any means be that of the place of contracting.27 No modern 
case has been found distinctly applying the law of the place 
of making solely because formal validity was in question. 
The decisions mostly involve the statute of frauds, im-
movables, insurance policies, conditional sales, and negotiable 
instruments. We shall have to deal with each of these sub-
jects later on.28 
Other countries. The Treaty of Montevideo applies its 
principle of lex loci solutionis also to the problems of formal 
validity, with the exception only that "the forms of public 
instruments are governed by the law of the place in which 
they are executed."29 This exception has been criticized as 
inconsistent with the principle and in the revision has been 
reduced to the execution of the public forms prescribed by 
the applicable law.30 That obligations referring to immov-
ables, though independent contracts, as remarked before, 
are compulsorily subject to the lex situs, is provided in the 
Polish law.31 
26 BATIFFOL 372 § 435; NUSSBAUM, 51 Yale L. }. (19tz) 893, 9o6if. and 
Principles 148 § 15; HINRICHSEN, Die lex loci contractus im amerikanischen 
Internationalprivatrecht (Heidelberg 19 3 3) 6. 
27 LoRENZEN, 2o Yale L. J. (19II) at 427; 6 Repert. 317 No. 174; 15 Tul. 
L. Rev. (1941) 165 at 173; Book Review, 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) IZ3; 
see also GOODRICH 270 § 106. 
28 On the Statute of Frauds, see infra II 2. 
29 Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civil Law (r889) art. 39 cf. p, following 
the doctrine of Gonzalo Ramirez. See ALFREDO AROCENA, Los Actos Jurfdicos en 
el Derecho lnternacional Privado ( 1896, reprint Montevideo 1941). 
30 2 V1co 288 § 351; VIco, Report on the Revision of the Treaty, Republica 
Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano (1940) 165; SALAZAR id. 207. 
31 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6. 
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(a) National law. Some codifications, with the earlier 
prevalence of the local law in mind, have offered as an 
alternative only that the form agree with the common na-
tional law of all parties.32 Diverse codes derive therefrom 
a triple option: the form may comply with any of three 
laws, that governing the whole transaction, or that of the 
place of making, or the national law of all parties. 33 
(b) Cumulated tests. The C6digo Bustamante declares 
that "the law of the place of contracting and that of perform-
ance shall be applied simultaneously to the necessity of exe-
cuting a public indenture or document for the purpose of giv-
ing effect to certain agreements and to that of reducing them 
to writing." This seems to mean that, instead of favoring the 
contract by an alternative, the requirements are cumulated. 84 
This definitely is a cumbersome solution. 
(c) Law of the forum. Using a method of reserving appli-
cation of the lex fori, described earlier, several Latin-Ameri-
can enactments, headed by the Chilean Code, which followed 
an Austrian suggestion, impose their internal formalities on 
contracts "destined to have effect" in the state, a formula 
which would seem to presuppose a place of performance 
at the forum, but sometimes appears to require no more 
32 Belgian Congo: C. C. art. 11 par. r. 
Greece: Formerly C. C. (I856) art. 7 for Greeks abroad. 
Italy: Formerly Disp. Prel. (I86s) art. 9 par. I, c. Com. art. s8. 
Spanish Morocco: Int. Priv. Law. art. I9, and Tanger: Int. Priv. Law, art. 
1 o for transactions of foreigners in the zones. 
33 Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. 1 1. 
Italy: Disp. Prel. (I 942) art. 25. 
French Morocco: Int. Priv. Law, art. 1 o knows even four possibilities for 
validity, viz., the laws of nationality of the parties, those of France, those of the 
Protectorate, and the laws and customs of Morocco. 
34 Codigo Bustamante, art. 1 8o. DE BusTAMANTE, Manual 281 § I 14 gives 
no reason. Probably to the same effect, the new Brazilian In trod. Law (I 942) 
prescribing Brazilian forms, infra n. 35, nevertheless requires observation of 
the law of the place of contracting. 
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than a law suit for enforcement at the forum.s.s This is also 
provided in Georgia.36 An illustration has been given by a 
Chilean writer: a contract of partnership, executed in France 
by private instrument, is without value in Chile where solemn 
execution is required.37 
On the other hand, we may recall those codes that uphold 
the validity of contracts agreeing with the law of the forum. 58 
Sometimes these code provisions have been understood to 
cover only formal requirements.39 
The Civil Code of Mexico gives an option between the 
law of the place of contracting and the national law of the 
forum to be exercised only when persons domiciled in the 
35 Brazil: Introd. Law (I942) art. 9 § r, a most confusing provision, seems 
to envisage contracts performable in Brazil and to provide that they must 
follow the formalities compulsorily prescribed in Brazil (forma essencidl). See 
TENORIO, Lei Introd. 2r8; SERPA LOPEs, 2 Lei Introd. 347; probably also 
ESPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 603. But Dr. Frazao orally advises caution, because 
forma essencidl might be reasonably understood as referring to the necessity of 
a public instrument only and, hence, might be applicable exclusively to con-
tracts for the transfer or constitution of rights in immovables, under C. C. art. 
I 34 II. 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 8 par. I. 
Guatamala: Law on Foreigners of 1936, art. 24 sent. 2. 
Nicaragua: C. C. VI (I4) par. x. 
Panama: C. C. art. 7. 
Venezuela: C. C. ( 1942) art. 11 par. 1. 
With special regard to public documents: 
Chile: C. C. art. I 8. 
Ecuador: C. C. art. 1 7. 
El Salvador: C. C. art. r6. 
Honduras: C. C. art. I 6. 
Uruguay: See GUILLOT, 1 C. C. 123. 
Perhaps also VALERY 1223 § 873 and his Note, Clunet I922, 990 has been 
influential on some of these laws. 
Colombia: C. C. art. 22 replaces the reference to be found in the Chilean 
Code to "proofs which shall have effect in Chile," by reserving "matters of na-
tional competence"; 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 45-47 § 1031 asserts that this 
reduced role of the lex fori is justified, but is it clear? 
36 Georgia: Code Ann. (1933) § 102-108. 
37 G. PALMA RoGERS, I Derecho Comercial (I 940) 312. 
38 Austria: All g. BGB. §§ 35-3 7· 
Argentina: C. C. art. 14 (4). 
39 See, e.g., 1 EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ I I o § 30 in reference to § 35 of the 
Austrian AUg. BGB. 
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forum contract abroad for performance within the forum.~0 
This awkward legislation causes many doubts. 
(d) Preponderance of lex causae. A few European writers 
have postulated a general subordination of the local law to 
the lex causae. 41 French authors, in particular, have been 
preoccupied by the formalities of marriage, conceiving lex 
causae and national law as identical, and have requested that 
solemnities should always be prescribed by the lex causae; 
the lex loci contractus should intervene only for determining 
the acts by which or the manner in which a solemnity can be 
executed. 42 Following this current, the Institute of Inter-
national Law in r927 adopted a set of rules by which the 
law governing the substance of a transaction not only may 
dispense it from solemnities required by the local law-
which does not go beyond the optional meaning of locus regit 
actum---but also may "expressly," though not by mere 
construction, impose an "authentic," i.e., public, act not re-
quired locally. 43 Of course, the C 6digo Bustamante, art. I 8o, 
goes beyond this restriction upon the local law, providing 
quite generally that both the law of the place of contracting 
and that of its "ejecuci6n"-which probably 111eans per-
formance-shall be applied simultaneously to the necessity 
of properly executing a public indenture or document. 
In the field of obligatory contracts, such theses seldom 
have been put into actual practice. At most, there are instances 
like the following. The German Reichsgericht has reasonably 
argued that parties selecting the applicable law are supposed 
to leave to this law, which is the lex causae, the decision 
40 Mexico: C. C. (I928) art. IS. 
41 In particular for the protection of the national law, I FRANKENSTEIN 522; 
DEVos, I6 Revue Inst. Beige (1930) 133 at ISS and writers cited therein. 
42 z ARMINJON 135 § 59 with references. Contra: especially LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE 367 § 3I5 who observes that the parties cannot know which law 
will govern. 
43 Annuaire I927 III 185, 317, 335 {art. VI). To a similar effect, Belgian 
revised draft, art. IO, NEUMANN, IPR. 20I. 
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whether it recognizes the maxim, locus regit actum.44 Another 
case has aroused much attention. Membership in a German 
private limited company ( Gesellschaft mit beschrankter H af-
tung) cannot be transferred except by a public instrument. 
At a time when this type of corporation had not yet been 
adopted in Switzerland, a transfer of such a membership 
was made there by simple written contract, under the general 
Swiss rule that contracts need no form. A German court 
invalidated the contract on the ground of German public 
policy discarding the rule, locus regit actum.45 Others attained 
the same result by the argument that the Swiss law of the 
time had no provision at all for this specific type of contract. 46 
The local law, thus, would only be applicable, if it recognizes 
the same kind of contract. This proposition, however, is 
strikingly inconsistent with the assumption that parties may 
evade the most solemn formalities of the lex causae by 
using less or no formality under the law of the place where 
they are. In fact, the decision should have been justified 
on a third basis. The formal and substantive requirements 
of transfer of membership do not pertain to the scope of 
obligatory contracts but are a part of the personal law of 
the corporation. German law, hence, determined imperatively 
the formal conditions of a change in the membership; and 
contrary to the Reichsgericht, it should not make any dif-
ference what formality is prescribed by the present Swiss 
law in the case of Swiss private limited companies. 
II. ScoPE oF THE RuLEs 
I. Concept of Formal Requirements 
There is practically no doubt that the concept of form 
includes the problems whether oral conclusion suffices or 
44 RG. (Feb. 27, I9I3) Warn.Rspr. I913, No. 302.. 
45 0LG. Karlsruhe (July n, I90I) 3 ROLG. z63, II Z.int.R. 458; NIE-
MEYER, Das. IPR. des BGB. I I 6. Contra: RAAPE I 89. 
46 RG. (March :u, 1939) 160 RGZ. 225, zz8, evidently following the views 
of I FRANKENSTEIN 201 n. 156; LEWALD 69 No. 91. 
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there is required written documentation, use of certain words, 
signature with one's own hand, seal; co-operation of a public 
official, such as authentication of signatures and minutes of 
declarations of consent, taking oaths, or entry in a public 
register; presence of witnesses; service of declaration by 
registered mail, or by a sheriff or marshal, et cetera. On 
the other hand, it is also certain that formality has nothing 
to do with capacity to contract / 7 with agency; with the ques-
tions whether an obligation is created by a unilateral declara-
tion, and whether declarations must reach the addressee in 
order to be effective; with the rules of evidence; and with 
the consent of third parties, called in certain countries "forme 
habilitante." It is obvious that formal in contrast with sub-
stantive requirements are concerned with the exterior of 
contractual declarations, the means of expressing consent. 
However, the border lines between form and substance are 
not free from uncertainty in all laws, and this gives the 
dominant theory one more opportunity to entrust to the 
domestic law of the forum the power to decide what should 
be form in the meaning of the conflicts rule/8 The opposite 
theory of characterization, according to the law referred to, 
results in applying the municipal provisions of the law at the 
place of making to those problems which are considered prob-
lems of form at this place. 49 In the writer's opinion, the pre-
cise domain of form must be defined, for the purpose of 
conflicts law, according to the common denominator of what 
is regarded as form in the various municipal systems: Form is 
47 It is true, there is a theory of a few French writers that such a provision as 
that requiring promises of gift to be in writing (French C. C. art. 9 3 I ; German 
BGB. § 5 I 8 and many other codes) involves the capacity of the donor rather 
than form and hence are subject to his national law. See 2 LAURENT 433ff. 
§§ 24off., 6 id. 693 § 4I 7; LEON DuGUIT, Des conflicts de legislations relatifs 
a la forme des actes civils (Paris I 882) II 3 (unavailable); PoULLET § 289; 
ROLIN, Annuaire I925, 228; NIBOYET 66o-66I § 537· This has been generally 
recognized as an error. See e.g., PILLET, 2 Traite 459 § 623; WEISS, 3 Traite 
I I I; KosTERS I 90; ARMIN JON, 2 Precis§ 59· 
48 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. I I I; LEWALD 65; MELCHIOR I43 § 98; NussBAUM, 
D. IPR. 89; RAAPE I74 and D. IPR. I3I (with uncertain restrictions). 
4 ~ M. WOLFF, IPR. 78. 
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the external side of the making of the contract, the expression 
as opposed to the content of legal declarations. A separate rule 
for "form" as contrasted with "substance" of the contract 
is only justified, if at all, by the relatively minor importance 
of the manners of expression. If the Dutch Code provides-to 
use the most celebrated example, although it deals with 
wills and not with contracts-that a Dutchman should not 
make a testament in a foreign country by private document, 
this regards form. To characterize this provision as one re-
stricting capacity to make a will, as many French writers 
have done, is a plain artifice, which no Dutch lawyer em-
ploys.50 In reality, the Dutch conflicts rule permitting local 
foreign forms is discarded in this case. Other countries may 
or may not give effect to this prohibition by adjusting their 
conflicts rules, as a matter of international policy. But it is 
difficult to see why they should yield to this exorbitant Dutch 
pretension. All countries have a stake in the security of 
transactions, not to be disturbed by willful national claims. 
Still less, are singular national "characterizations" entitled 
to extraterritorial recognition. It is a perfect parallel to the 
controversial character of compulsory religious marriage.51 
Hence, if the law of the place of contracting, that governing 
the contract, or that of the forum should have developed some 
extraordinary method of tracing the border line between 
form and capacity or other substantive incidents, this is im-
material for the scope of the conflicts rule relating to form. 
2. Form and Procedure52 
(a) Statute of Frauds. The variants in which the old 
Statute of Frauds (I 677) 53 reappears in British and American 
50 See MELCHIOR 143 § 98. 
51 See citations Vol. 1 pp. 2 I 4-2 I 6. 
52 It is not intended to deal here with those contracts made for procedural 
purposes previous to or during a lawsuit, such as submission to arbitration or 
to a state court, confession, release, waiver of remedies. They involve particular 
conflicts problems not thoroughly investigated thus far. 
53 29 Car. z, c. 3, s. 4· 
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statutes/4 all contain formal requirements, if judged accord-
ing to the normal conceptions of a modern lawyer, and 
therefore have to be taken as subject to the conflicts rules 
concerning form. It does not matter how a statute of frauds 
is treated for particular purposes of municipal law in the 
positive practice of courts. This, indeed, agrees with the con-
clusion of recent English and American writers, 55 strength-
ened by the French parallels to be discussed hereafter, as 
well as with the prevailing attitude of American cases. 56 In this 
country, Leroux v. Brown57 and the American cases following 
this ill-famed precedent or other mistaken theories58 should 
no longer continue to be held as authority.59 The arguments 
underlying the better modern approach have been vigorously 
expounded in Lorenzen's excellent papers60 and more recently 
summarized by the Delaware Superior Court:61 ( r) It assures 
more security for the inhabitants of a state to know that all 
contracts made in such state either must be written or may 
54 On the maximum amounts for oral agreements in the various jurisdictions 
of the British Commonwealth and the United States, see RABEL, I Recht des 
Warenkaufs I I o-I I z. For a summary of American cases, see PARMELE, "Statute 
of Frauds and conflict of laws," I05 A. L. R. (I936) 6sz-68I; DOBBINS, 
"Conflict of Laws-Statute of Frauds as Defense to Enforcement of Contract 
Executed in One State and Sued on in Another State. [Illinois]," 3 Wash. and 
Lee L. Rev. (I 94 I) I 03; BRIDGFORTH, "The Mississippi Statute of Frauds 
in the Conflict of Laws," I4 Miss. L. J. (I942) zs6; Note, 6 Md. L. Rev. 
(r94z) z62. 
55 BECKETT, CHESHIRE, LORENZEN, CHEATHAM, BEALE, GOODRICH cited 
Vol. I p. so. This was also STORY's well-known position (ed. x, 1834) 
§ z6z, and that of z WHARTON § 690 and THAYER, Preliminary Treatise on 
Evidence 39off. 
56 Cochran v. Ward (189z) 5 Ind. App. 89, z9 N. E. 795; Franklin Sugar 
Refining Co. v. Lipowicz (I9z8) Z47 N.Y. 465, I6o N. E. 9I6 with ample 
references; Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co. (I941) 311 Ill. App. III, 35 N. E. 
( zd) 5 22 following "the weight of authority." 
57 (r8sz) 12 C. B. Sox. 
58 LORENZEN, "The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 32 Yale 
L. J. (r9z3) JII, 315-318; STUMBERG 137-141. 
59 Because of uncertain arguments in a few cases, noted in 3 Wash. and Lee 
L. Rev. (194I) IOJ; 14 Miss. L. J. (194Z) Z56; 6 Md. L. Rev. (I94Z) z6z, 
some annotators have assumed a continued grave division of opinion. 
60 LORENZEN, supra n. 58. 
<ll Lams et ux. v. Smith Co. (r935) 36 Del. 477, 178 Atl. 651; the impor-
tance of this decision has been noted 105 A. L. R. (I936) 646; Clunet 1937, 
873 with Note by Barbey; BARBEY, Le Conflit 94> 97· 
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be oral, respectively; (z) while England has one statute 
of frauds, there are as many as there are jurisdictions in 
this country; and (3) the fate of a contract ought not to 
depend on selecting a court before which to bring the suit. 
As the significance of this classification has been treated on 
an earlier occasion,S2 it remains only to illustrate the practical 
e:ff ects by a few cases. 
(i) Goods of more than fro value were sold in England 
without a memorandum in writing. Although English courts 
may regard the unenforceability of an action on the contract 
as lack of a remedy, foreign courts have to apply section 4 
of the English Sale of Goods Act as a part of English law, 
deemed to govern the form. 63 
(ii) An oral agreement was entered into in Tennessee, 
to sell a quantity of cheese free on board cars in Wisconsin. 
The amount involved exceeded the permitted scope of an 
executory oral contract under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin 
court held the contract governed by the law of Tennessee 
because it was so intended by the parties, and therefore valid. 64 
(iii) Even though the forum were to characterize its own 
statute of frauds as "procedural," it will confine this char-
acterization to the purposes of domestic private and pro-
cedural law. It will not apply this statute to contracts the 
form of which is regarded as governed by foreign law. 
That courts in this field would tend to uphold the contract 
by the means of choice of law cannot fairly be stated. Most 
cases have been of such nature as to justify in the opinion 
of the courts the application of the law of the place of con-
tracting, often identical with the law of the forum. 65 Other 
62 Vol. I, so-s2. 
63 LoRENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (1923) 311 at 315. 
64 D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (1914) 155 Wis. 541, I45 
N. W. 372. 
65 Resulting in validity: Hunt v. Jones (I879) I2 R.I. 265, 34 Am. Rep. 
635; Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co. (I886) IS R. I. 38o, 2 Am. St. Rep. 
902; J. H. Ellis and Cap Baker v. The Eagle-Picher Lead Co. (I924) II6 
Kan. I44> 225 Pac. 1072; Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining 
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decisions favor the law of the place of performance over the 
lex loci contractus for various reasons.66 
(b) Exclusion of nonwritten evidence. The French Civil 
Code (art. 1341) provides that any transaction exceeding 
the value of (originally) one hundred fifty francs must be 
executed before a notary or by private writing, and that no 
proof by witnesses is accepted. This provision has been widely 
imitated, with many variants in civil and commercial laws. 
Testimony may be entirely excluded, as under the former 
Russian law; or some mention of the agreement in a letter 
suffices as a "commencement" of proof which may be com-
pleted by testimony; or the agreement is enforceable, if the 
other party admits its making. Also in France witnesses may 
be admitted to testify to a commercial agreement in the dis-
cretion of the court. 67 
In the French tradition, stemming from the fourteenth 
century, all these provisions belong to the group of decisoria 
litis, contrasted with ordinatoria: they are not merely destined 
to regulate the course of proceeding but also to decide the 
substance of the suit. In this conception repeatedly pro-
nounced by the French Supreme Court and shared by the 
overwhelming majority of the Latin countries, legal pre-
sumptions, judicial confession, and certain kinds of party 
oaths terminating litigation, also are substantive matters and 
governed by the lex causae, at least to the extent that none 
Co. (1925) 8 F. (zd) 6o1; and particularly Lams et ux. v. Smith Co. (1935) 
supra n. 61. 
Resulting in unenforceability: Dacosta and Davis v. Davis and Hatch (1854) 
24 N.J. Law (4 Zab.) 319; Cochran v. Ward (1892) 29 N. E. 795; Osborne 
v. Dannatt (1914) 167 Iowa 615, 149 N. W. 913 (Nebraska law). 
66 See for a list PARMELE, supra n. 54, 105 A. L. R. (1936) 675-677. 
Garnes v. Frazier & Foster (Ky. 1909) 118 S. W. 998 rejects the action on 
the basis of the law of the forum which was also that of the place of per-
formance as against the lex loci contractus of West Virginia. The court seems 
to construe the defense as a remedy depriving the plaintiff of a cause of action. 
61 See the survey in RABEL, 1 Recht des Warenkaufs 108-110. 
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of these procedural means is admissible unless it is permitted 
by the law governing the substance.68 
This theory of "preconstituted proofs" certainly extends 
the domain of substantive law further and restricts that of 
procedure more than the common law or the laws of Northern 
and Central Europe can concede. A French writer, on the 
background of comparative research, suggests in fact the 
elimination of such institutions as confession and oath from 
the doctrine.69 
But, notwithstanding some doubts in past times70 and 
isolated opposition by modern writers/1 the rules restricting 
testimony by witnesses in favor of written documentation 
generally enjoy classification as pertaining to formalities in 
the meaning of conflicts law.72 This is a very interesting fact. 
It is quite true that the idea of legislators drafting such 
provisions centers in the procedural situation of a suit on 
the contract; originally they attempted to obviate perjury 
68 Cass. (civ.) (February 23, 1864) D. 1864.1.166, s. 1864.1.385; and 
many other decisions, particularly Cass. (civ.) (June 14, 1899) Abdy v. Abdy, 
S. 1900.1.22.5, Clunet 1899, 8o4 followed in the same cause by Cass. (civ.) 
(Feb. 6, 1905) D. 1905.1.481, S. 1907.1.393, Clunet 1906, 4IZ. Cf. PILLET, 
Note, S. 1900.1.225; SURVILLE 667 n. 3; NIBOYET 678 § 557; LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNJERE 3 70 § 318; BATIFFOL 3 76 § 442. And see for the application of 
the Ordonnance de Mou:\ns, xs66, art. 54> precursor of c. c. art. 1341, DANTY, 
Traite de la preuve par te;noins (ed. 6, 1769) 49 No. 11. 
69 BATIFFOL 377 § 444· 
70 Obertribunal Stuttgart (Sept. 25, 1858) 13 Seuff. Arch. No. 182, cited 
by LORENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (1923) at 319 n. 31 and 334 n. 8r is not repre-
sentative of the German doctrine. 
71 FRANKENSTEIN 364-370 and in JW. 1929, 3506; RAAPE 175, later aban-
doned, D. IPR. 132. 
72
'See the long list of writers, collected by LORENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (1923) 
at 329 n. 66. 
Germany: 2 BAR 377 § 39H KG. (Oct. 25, 1927) JW. 1929, 448, IPRspr. 
1929 No. 7 (oral agreement in Russia exceeding value of soo gold rubles; 
Soviet Code of Civil Procedure applied); RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 280 
and authors cited; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 90; RAAPE, D. IPR. r p, 2. 
Greece: App. Athens (3r8/r934) cited by FRAGISTAS, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 
644. 
Poland: S. Ct. (Nov. 18, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 380. 
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by bribed witnesses. But, as the French Advocate General 
in a learned report of I 8 So remarked, in the eyes of the 
parties making a contract, the problem is whether they must 
reduce it to writing.73 This, however, is enough of a form 
problem for the purposes of conflicts law, despite the fact 
that admission of a witness is certainly a judicial act. 
Lorenzen has correctly co-ordinated this indirect com-
pulsion to writing with the statutes of frauds, both to 
be treated under the conflicts rule concerning formalities. 
Johnson, too, writing in Quebec, has seen the analogy of 
the two institutions (which in reality rests upon a close 
historical connection), and, after hesitating between Leroux 
v. Brown and the French doctrine, wisely preferred the 
latter. 74 
(c) Parol evidence. In England and the United States, 
the rules excluding parol evidence controverting the text 
of written contracts have sometimes been construed as re-
medial, 75 but the great weight of authority classifies them as 
substantive for the purpose of conflicts law.76 This sound view 
agrees with the Continental theory.77 
3· Form and Revenue Law 
A vivid discussion went on for a time between followers 
of the idea that the revenue laws of a foreign state are not 
73 Proc. Gen. Desjardin in the case Benton v. Horeau, Cass. (civ.) (August 
24, 188o) D. 188o.1.447, Clunet 188o, 48o. 
74 3 JOHNSON 704-724. Historical analysis, as I may add, joins the English 
and French legislation in an unsuspected relationship. The Statute, in fact, was 
inspired by the French Ordonnance de Moulins of A. D. 1566, art. 54, predeces-
sor of arts. IJ+Iff., C. C., and both to a large extent had the very purpose of 
prescribing formalities. See RABEL, "The Statute of Frauds and Comparative 
Legal History," 63 Law Q. Rev. (1947) 174· 
75 Downer v. Chesebrough (1869) 36 Conn. 39,4 Am. Rep. 29. 
76 Dunn v. Welsh (1879) 62 Ga. 241; Baxter Nat'l Bank v. Peter S. J. 
Talbot (1891) 154 Mass. 213, 28 N. E. 163; Restatement§ 599; THAYER, 
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) 390; WIGMORE, 5 Evidence (ed. 
z, 1923) § 24oo; GooDRICH 209 § 86; STUMBERG q6. 
77 See French C. C. art. I 341 and its literature cited above. 
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to be enforced/8 and the advocates of locus regit actum. The 
former denied/9 the latter recommended80 the rejection of 
contracts that are declared void for want of a stamp at the 
place of making. Older English decisions have recognized 
the invalidity imposed by the law of the place of contract-
ing. 81 But in the field of bills of exchange where the question 
is more important, the British Bills of Exchange Act of I 8 82 
departed from this view,S2 and the Geneva Convention of 
1930 concerning stamp laws, adopted by many countries,S3 
pronounced that the validity or the exercise of the rights 
flowing from such instrument shall not be subordinated to 
the observance of the provisions concerning the stamp. 
It seems high time to generalize this sound principle, in 
agreement with the American cases. Since one of the two 
conflicting views must yield, it stands to reason that laws 
clinging to fiscal sanctions against the security of contracts 
should be internationally ignored. 
78 In re Visser, H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker [1928] Ch. 877; 
Moore v. Mitchell ( 1929) 30 F. (2d) 6oo, note opinion of Learned Hand, J., 
reproduced by 3 BEALE 1637. 
79 United States: Ann. Cas. I 9 I 5 B 844, Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer ( r8o6) 
I Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 94; Skinner v. Tinker (N.Y. r86r) 34 Barb. S.C. 333· 
Italy: App. Napoli (Dec. 29, I926) I9 Rivista (1927) 268. 
80 NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 89 n. 2, 319 n. 5 cites and approves a few Continental 
cases; FEDOZZI 255 and GooDRICH 271 approve the older English view. 
81 Alves v. Hodgson (I 797) 7 T. R. 241 at 243 by Kenyon, C. J. "Then 
it is said that we cannot take notice of the revenue laws of a foreign country; 
but I think we must resort to the laws of the country in which the note was 
made, and unless it be good there it is not obligatory in a court of law here." 
Clegg v. Levy (r8r2) 3 Camp. r66; Bristow v. Sequeville (r85o) 5 Ex. D. 
275; Republica de Guatemala v. Nuiiez [1927] r K. B. 669. In case the 
foreign law declares only that an unstamped contract is inadmissible as proof, 
the English courts applied their procedural theory of disregarding the foreign 
rule of evidence, James v. Catherwood (r823) 3 D. & R. I9o; In re Visser, 
H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker [1928] Ch. 877. See DICEY 704 
note (9); CHESHIRE 245· 
82 45 & 46 Viet., British Bills of Exchange Act, 18 82, c. 6I, s. 72 ( 1) (a)· 
Canada: An Act relating to Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory 
Notes, Rev. Stat. I927, c. I6 s. I6o (a). 
83 Convention concerning Stamp Laws in connection with Bills of Exchange 
and Promissory Notes, Geneva, June 7> 1930; HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 560 
No. 26o; see literature cited Vol. 1 p. 34· 
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4· Determination of the Place of Contracting 
The question where to locate the place of contracting 
again arises, with all its grave difficulties. 
(a) Contract by correspondence. On the ground of the 
usual characterization "according to the lex fori," a contract 
is considered made at the place where the final act necessary 
under the law of the forum for completing the consent is 
done. 84 We have discussed this approach before. 85 It may 
suffice to remember that under this method a German court 
should ascertain a place of contracting in the United States 
by consulting the German Civil Code. By another approach, 
out of sheer dogmatism, cumulative application of the consent 
requirements in both domiciliary laws has been advocated.86 
Continued discussion of the problem has fostered more 
proposals and a more complex situation.87 A unilateral act, 
however, such as giving notice to a debtor or making a binding 
offer, though usually becoming legally significant only upon 
its reception, is generally held in conflicts law to have oc-
curred at the place where it is sent.88 
This confusion is incurable. The maxim, locus regit actum, 
was not invented for contracts or acts by correspondence, any 
more than was the lex loci contractu.>. If it is to be practicable 
in our time, it ought to be appropriately modified. 
84 United States: Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works (Tenn. 1943) 172 
S. W. (zd) 812; 2 BEALE 1o69ff. §§ 325.1, 326.r. 
Germany: RG. (Feb. u, 19o6) 62 RGZ. 379, 381 (where the acceptance 
is declared in the case of§ I5I BGB., cf. LEWALD 7off.); RG. (Jan. 29, I9oi) 
1 2 Z.int.R. 113 (where the formal act is completed) ; GEILER in I Diiringer-
Hachenburg 55 n. 20. 
R
5 Contra: RAAPE 178; supra Chapter 30 pp. 452ff.; in this special field the 
theory of Bartin was theoretically attacked by MARCEL VAUTHIER, Sens et 
applications de Ja regie locus regit actum (Bruxelles 1926) Iorff. 
86 1 BAR 361; NIEDNER, EG. BGB. art. rr; 2 ZITELMANN I64; RAAPE, D. 
IPR. IJo; also OLG. Celle (Nov. 7, I879) 35 Seuff. Arch. No. 89. Contra: 
NEUMEYER, 22 Z.int.R. (r9rz) 519. 
87 See the hard task faced by RAAPE I 78-181. 
88 HABICHT 89; WALKER 229; NEUMEYER, lPR. 14; FRANKENSTEIN 545; 
RAAPE 177 and D. IPR. qo. 
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(b) Determination by the parties. If the parties agree 
that their contract should be deemed to be made at a certain 
place, while they make the contract at another place, the 
local law of the place indicated is not able to prevail over 
both the law of the real place of contracting and that govern-
ing the contract. But it may, and generally will, be itself 
the lex causae, by virtue of the party agreement. This is a 
controversial consideration, however, with respect to signa-
tures on negotiable instruments, if they need the indica-
tion of a place of issuance and name an agreed location.89 
III. OPERATION oF THE RuLEs 
r. Solemnities Prescribed by Lex Causae 
Even though a court may follow exclusively the formal 
requirements of the law governing the entire contract-as 
American courts do-it has to account for local differences 
in particulars. Therefore the following rule of the Restate-
ment is true beyond its intended scope: 
"§ 335· The law of the place of contracting determines 
whether an instrument alleged to be a contract under 
seal is effectively sealed; whether it is duly executed and 
delivered .... " 
This rule is meant pleonastically to explain the principle 
that formal validity is altogether determined by the law of 
the place of contracting. However, it must apply also to 
some effect when, contrary to the Restatement, another law 
governs validity and requires an instrument under seal. 
On the other hand, contracts governed by the law of the 
forum and thereby needing some publicity, may be executed 
outside the state in an analogous but not identical manner. 
89 Germany: RG. {Jan. 15, 1894) 32 RGZ. IIS, 117. On the controversy 
and the position of the Geneva Convention of 1930, see BRACCO, La Legge 
Uniforme sulla cambiale (1935) 27; SCHNITZER, Handelsr. 383. 
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This, in fact, seems to be the meaning of the elaborate pro-
visions commonly found in American statutes, declaring what 
officers may take acknowledgments outside the state in the 
United States and without the United States.90 New York 
has a long list of such foreign officers, qualified according 
to different countries.91 Only in Ohio is it expressed that 
"any instrument in conformity with the law of the foreign 
country is valid,"92 but if Oregon declares it unnecessary 
for the instrument to state that "it is executed according to 
the laws of the country where made,m3 the idea evidently 
is prevalent that a deed acknowledged before a consul of the 
United States, a French notary, or a German court is sufficient 
at the forum, if the officer conforms to his own law. The main 
importance of these provisions concerns their applica-
tion to deeds disposing of real estate in the state, but is not 
confined to them. 
The same is true in civil law countries, at least to the 
extent that, if in one country notarial form is prescribed, a 
notarial document of another is satisfactory despite differences 
of officers, recitals, witnesses, signatures, and recording.94 
Even under a conflicts rule such as that of Venezuela requir-
ing public instruments or private documentation according 
to its own Civil Code/5 it may be presumed that these writ-
ings can be drawn up according to the local style. The new 
text of the Montevideo Treaty expressly provides that the 
90 See CARL LOUIS MEIER, Anderson's Manual for Notaries Public (Cincin-
nati 1 940) §§ 1 6zff. 
91 New York: Book 49, Real Property Law (McKinney 1936) § 301, Book 
49, Real Property Law (McKinney 1944) §§ 301, 301a. 
92 Ohio: Gen. Code Ann. (Page 1938) § 8516, Rev. Stat.§ 4111. 
93 Oregon: 5 Compiled Laws Ann. (1940) § 70-116, Code (1930) § 63-114, 
L. 1907, c. 169 § I p. 325· 
94 Universal doctrine, evidently meant to be expressed in the Brazilian Intro-
ductory Law (1942) art. 9 § 1. See, e.g., 2 BAR 379 § 397; NIBOYET 66o 
§§ 535> 536; HABICHT 87. 
95 Venezuela: C. C. ( 1942) art. 1 r par. z. 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 8. par. 2. 
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formalities pertaining to the class or "quality" of instruments 
required by the governing law (which is always the lex loci 
solutionis) is determined by the law of the place of contract-
ing (art. 36). 
Very cautious provisions looking in the same direction 
are contained in the Protocol on Uniformity of Powers of 
Attorney, sponsored by the Pan-American Union, of which 
the United States is a member.96 
It is regrettable that numerous European writers have con-
fused these obvious rules by talking of the "imperative 
character" of locus regit actum, because a notary has neces-
sarily to follow the procedure prescribed by his own law.97 
In reality, the principal function of locus regit actum is not 
even in question, but, on the one hand, internal rules are 
construed so as to permit authentication by foreign officials/8 
and, on the other hand, the foreign official obeys the regula-
tions of his own state by virtue of administrative rather than 
conflicts law. 99 
An important doubt has been raised, however, concerning 
the equivalence of the institutions for securing evidence. In 
France, from Roman times, and in many other countries 
by old, if less venerable, tradition, notaries form a veritable 
profession of accepted standing with proper education, or-
ganization, and discipline. Their intervention in the drawing 
of minutes and records implies a certain investigation into 
the physical and mental state of the parties appearing and 
affords certain guarantees beyond the identification of per-
sons. The question is whether notaries public or other officers 
96 56 Stat. I376, arts. V, IX, X, 36 Am. J. Int. Law (I94z) Supp. at I95> 
I 96. See supra p. I 96 n. I IS· 
97 2 LAINE 409 § 226; DESPAGNET 663ff. § 2 I 7; Institute of International 
Law, Draft I9Z7, Annuaire I927 III 335 art. 4· 
98 NEUMEYER, Annuaire I 927 Ill 169, 171; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 94; BAR-
MAT, supra n. I, 358. 
99 NEUMEYER, Annuaire I927 III I70i BARMAT, supra n. I, 133, 359· 
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in the Anglo-American countries, in Denmark, Sweden, and 
others, can replace a French notary or a German notary or 
court not only in authenticating signatures, which is unchal-
lenged, but also in establishing a French ccacte authentique'' 
or a German "offentliche Beurkundung eines Rechtsge-
schafts.moo 
In the United States, acknowledgments may be taken in 
all jurisdictions, before notaries or similar officers, in pro-
cedures analogous to the two elements of a European notarial 
document, viz., the certification by the public officer entitled 
to full faith, and the party's declaration, the object of the 
certification, which may be refuted by ordinary evidence.101 
The party may produce an instrument and acknowledge 
having signed it; by the reference in the certification and 
inclusion in the official record, the requirements for Ger-
man notarial minutes, for instance, are literally fulfilled.102 
Of course, proceedings and background for such authentica-
tions vary. Also, a contract under seal is generally perfected 
by delivery of the instrument, whereas a civil law contract 
requires acceptance of the promise. Nevertheless, the Euro-
pean courts have generally not hesitated to accept American 
certifications, even in matters not permitting the use of a 
foreign local form, such as articles of association for a Ger-
man limited partnership or a conveyance of real estate. 
A special situation exists in New York. An opinion of a 
New York Attorney General has encouraged the notaries to 
adjust their declarations and attestations completely to the 
requirements for proper recordation in any foreign state.103 
The notary does not assume responsibility for the validity 
100 The problem has been noted with the request of inquiry by 1 FRANKEN-
STEIN 536; RAAPE 165; M. WoLFF, IPR. 78. Cf. Clunet 1910, 478. 
101 GLASSON et TISSIER, 2 Traite de procedure civile (ed. 3, 1926) 679 § 
6o3; DALLOZ, 9 Repert. Pratique 392ff. §§ 14off. 
102 Germany: Law on Voluntary Jurisdiction§ 176. 
103 State of New York, Annual Report of the Attorney General (1941) 458. 
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of his act, nor would the county clerk attest to more than 
the genuineness of the notary's signature and his qualification 
to act as notary in the state. Nevertheless, the act may come 
fairly close to foreign models. It is surprising, though, and 
may stir doubts abroad, that the legal basis of this practice, 
notable in itself, should be found in a clause of the New 
York notary law dealing only with bills of exchange and 
promissory notes.104 It may be timely to suggest that these 
provisions be expressed in a separate clause when a future 
law is drafted. 
2. Form Agreeable to Lex Loci Contractus 
The proper meaning of the rule, locus regit actum, goes 
farther than the mere substitution of a foreign solemnity for 
the domestic formality. Limitations upon such replacement 
often have been attempted, but provoked such unanswerable 
questions as whether an English will of a Frenchman attested 
by two witnesses, or a holographic will of a Frenchman made 
in Louisiana in the presence of his wife, may be recognized 
in France as an "acte authentique,mos or, after all, what 
"acte'' is "authentique'' and what is not/o'a As the rule has 
come to be interpreted, in the common opinion, no other 
solemnity is needed than that required at the locus, and 
none, if the transaction takes place in a jurisdiction where 
104 Executive Law, Consolidated Laws of New York 1909, Vol. z, c. IS § 
I05 (I) (Book IS, Executive Law, McKinney I916): "A notary public has 
authority: 1. Anywhere within the state to demand acceptance and payment of 
foreign and inland bills of exchange and of promissory notes, and may protest 
for the non-acceptance or non-payment thereof, to exercise such powers and 
duties as by the law of nations and according to commercial usage, or by the 
laws of any other government, state or country, may be performed by notaries." 
Only the following subsection (z), Consolidated Laws of New York I9091 Vol. 
z, c. I8 § I05 (z) (Book I8, Executive Law, McKinney I9I6) and Laws 
I943> c. 333, concerns the power to take affidavits and to certify the acknowl-
edgment and proof of deeds and other written instruments. 
105 Long ago the courts answered wisely in the affirmative; Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 
6, I843) S. I843.1.2o9; Cass. (req.) (July 3, I854) S. I854·I-4I7· 
106 On this dispute, especially among Dutch authors, see BARMAT, supra n. I, 
35zff. 
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no formality is necessary. 
Thus, under the Civil Code of Quebec, a promise to make 
a gift needs notarial form, and the original is to be kept 
of record; but the same section of the Code expressly recog-
nizes execution validly made outside the province without 
notarial form. 107 
Public policy. But does public policy of the law governing 
the contract not react unfavorably, especially if it happens 
also to be the law of the forum? Can a law requiring certain 
acts to be clothed in writing and especially ordaining record-
ing by public instrument, in order to secure serious delibera-
tion before the deal and reliable evidence after it, simply 
be avoided by the parties going abroad? The objection has 
been voiced in various ways by Paul Voet and later authors, 
refuted by Waechter and Savigny, and repeated again by 
modern writers up to Niboyet and Frankenstein.108 Several 
Latin-American codes, mentioned earlier, have been inspired 
by similar ideas.109 To this, the reply has always been110 
that opportunities to obtain consular authentication, though 
useful, are insufficient, that the old customary rule precisely 
intends to give the parties the right to conclude their transac-
tion under any sovereign, and that the privilege given to the 
parties serves international business and security. It may 
be admitted that the doubt has some foundation in such 
107 Quebec: C. C. art. 776. Even a petitory action was maintained on a deed 
of sale of Quebec land made under private signature in Chicago, Brosseau v. 
Bergevin (I905) 27 Que. s. c. sro; 3 JOHNSON 332· 
108 See P. VoET, op. cit. supra n. 12; FoELIX ( ed. I, I 843) 96 § 58, ( ed. 3) 
§ 82, I and IV with citations; 2 LAURENT§§ 240 ff., 6 id. §§ 4I7ff.; NEu-
BECKER 79; NIBOYET 66I § 537; I FRANKENSTEIN 520ff.; ECONOMOPOULOS in 
2 Acta, International Academy of Comparative Law (I935) Part 21 522. 
Ioo Supra n. 35; see for instance, BEVILAQUA 259ff. commenting on Brazilian 
law. The dominant liberal rule, however, is adopted, for instance, in Argentina, 
seeS. Ct., 2I Fallos 251, 23 id. sz6; 32 id. 118. 
110 WAECHTER1 25 Arch. Civ. Prax. (I842) 4IH SAVIGNY § 38I, GUTHRIE 
in his translation 324 note (n) discussing English law; 2 WHARTON 1463 § 
695; I BAR 350; SURVILLE 30I Nos. I9off.; WALKER 224; 2 ARMINJON I34 § 
59; FEDOZZI 250. For wills in particular, see WEISS, 4 Traite 647ff.; FEDOZZI 
2J3· 
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vital matters as recognition of children and perhaps also 
marriage contracts. But the tutorial concern of legislation 
for persons engaging in a surety agreement, a promise to 
make a gift or an obligation to convey land must not extend 
over the entire world. Even though parties could temporarily 
go abroad for the sole purpose of obtaining an easier mode 
of contracting, the establishment of an exception for the 
repression of such evasionm would open the door to in-
quisitions harmful to the great task of "locus regit actum." 
The French Court of Cassation, indeed, although always 
particularly wary of the observance of French law by French 
nationals, has not hesitated to recognize in two leading cases a 
marriage contract made in Constantinople and a donation 
made in Canada, both formally valid according to the respec-
tive local laws but not in compliance with the French Code; 
ordinary obligatory contracts are included by an obvious 
argumentum a fortiori. 112 
Also in the United States, although a few courts have not 
been certain how to treat their domestic statutes of frauds, 
if such a court should decide to construe its statute as non-
procedural, it would hesitate to enforce it as an expressiOn 
of public policy.113 
111 Recently, 2 ARMINJON I 6I ff. § 68; RAAPE I 89 and D. IPR. I 29. The 
contrary dominant opinion is approved in Norwegian law by GJELSVIK, Das 
internationale Privatrecht in Norwegen (Leipzig I 935) I 25. 
112 Cass. (req.) (April I8, I865) S. I865.1.3I7; Cass. (civ.) (June 29, 
I922) D. I922.1.127, S. 1923.1.249; NIBOYET 678ff. § 557; LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE 368 § 315; 2 ARMINJON 134ff. §59· 
113 One of the few cases regarded as adopting this view, following WHARTON 
1442 § 69o is Barbour v. Campbell (1917) 101 Kan. 616, 168 Pac. 879. See 
also the obiter dictum in Farley v. Fair et ux. (1927) I44 Wash. 10I, 256 
Pac. 1031. An analogous suggestion in Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. William 
D. Mullen Co. (D. C. D. Del. I925) 7 F. (2d) 470, 473 was reversed (C. C. A. 
3d 1926) 12 F. (2d) 885. Contra: See Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing 
Co. (1917) 137 Minn. 141, 148, I62 N. W. Io82, 1085; Canale & Co. v. 
Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (19I4) 155 Wis. 541, I45 N. W. 372 (supra p. 
soo); Henning v. Hill (I923) 8o Ind. App. 363, I4I N. E. 66; and see 
LORENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (I923) at 334ff., 105 A. L. R. (I936) 652, 669ff. 
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3· Renvoi 
As usual, renvoi may serve to relax a too rigid conflicts 
rule. Argentina decrees an imperative lex loci contractus for 
formal validity. Whether renvoi is admitted in Argentina, 
is an unsettled question, but it has been hypothetically re-
sorted to in several cases.114 In fact, if we suppose a contract 
made in Quebec, void there under the domestic law but 
valid under the law of New York where it is to be performed, 
and the parties have stipulated for New York law, a Quebec 
court would have to apply the lex causae under the optional 
rule locus regit actum. An Argentine court ought to decide 
in the same way by use of transmittance. But any American 
court should judge likewise, independently of its theories 
of either formal validity or renvoi. In the case where the 
two foreign laws involved agree in the result, foes of renvoi 
have perforce conceded its necessity. 
4· Defective Form 
Where parties have failed to comply exactly with both 
the forms of the lex casuae and the lex loci actus, the effects 
of nonobservance may be very different in the two laws. 
Accordingly, in the traditional meaning of locus regit actum, 
a party may avail himself of that law which more nearly ap-
proaches giving effect to the act.115 An adverse opinion, how-
ever, mentioned earlier in connection with formally defective 
marriages, urges the supremacy of the lex causae.u6 
An agreement to sell land, for instance, violating the 
statute of frauds of both states, may be considered void in 
114 z Vrco 285. The problem discussed in the text has been recognized by 
GJELSVI K, supra n. Ill, at I 2 7 and has been treated more often with respect to 
the form of wills. 
115 Cases, Vol. 1, 229 n. 121. 
n
6 NIEMEYER, Das. IPR. des BGB. 114; RAAPE 186, 255 and D. IPR. 128 
No.4; MANNL, 1 I Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 786-8o6; cf. Vol. 1, 230. 
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one and merely unenforceable in the other; or void under 
the lex loci contractus because of violation of the statute of 
frauds and under the lex situs merely lacking proper evidence 
and curable by various events; or void at both places but 
creating an obligation to pay damages for reliance in one 
jurisdiction. Only the dominant theory is logical and practi-
cal. Why should, for instance, curing of a formal defect under 
the law of the place of contracting not have its full effect? 
If the theory of locus regit actum is sound in itself, its 
stature should not be reduced by half. 
On the other hand, the dominant opinion may run into 
some practical difficulties in particular cases, which, how-
ever, thus far have not been experienced or discussed. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
Of all the ordinary and exceptional rules stated above, 
only two are susceptible of serious competition: The American 
application of the lex causae and the optional rule, locus 
regit actum, prevailing in the rest of the world. The com-
pulsory rule in England is antiquated, 117 and the nationalistic 
Latin-American experiments deserve sharp rejection. The 
proposals of the Institute of International Law have at-
tempted a compromise between governing law and local law, 
envisaging national prerogatives over family and inheritance 
law rather than the needs occurring in contracts. 
The rule, locus regit actum, shares the fate of many older 
principles; it has been widely accepted but justified by con-
flicting theories. Sovereignty, international law, regionality 
of public policy, customary law, voluntary submission of the 
parties, vested rights, convenience of the parties, expediency 
for international business-each one singly and all these 
motives in co-operation-have been advanced as the true 
basis of the rules. The draftsmen of the German codification 
117 Cf. recently, M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 454· 
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considered only reasons of practical convenience, us and at 
present this is the dominant conception. The attribution of 
exclusive force to the lex causae is opposed as a source of 
iniquity. 
In fact, the American courts have in many cases escaped 
unt.enable results by shutting their eyes to the consequences 
their rulings would have on questions other than those of 
form. A court may be satisfied with the justice of treating 
an oral contract under the law of the place where it is 
made. But, if it operates in conjunction with a general rule 
that validity, or validity and effect, is governed by lex loci 
contractus, this law would have to apply also to the necessity 
of consideration, the capacity of a married woman to contract, 
the influence of misrepresentations made by an agent, the 
validity of a clause exempting a party from liability, and 
so forth. Such incidents, in their turn, have been judged in 
individual cases by other criteria. The Supreme Court in 
Pritchard v. Nor ton (supra p. 3 62) took the question of 
consideration away from the law of New York, the place of 
contracting, to Louisiana, the place of performance. Certainly, 
it is by no means desirable to divide the contract into frag-
ments, instead of subjecting it to the one law of characteristic 
significance. But formal validity, if guaranteed by the law 
of the place of making as an added opportunity to grant 
validity under the over-all law, leaves the latter intact 
and satisfies practical needs. With respect to wills, the Uni-
form Wills Act, Foreign Executed, adopted by twelve states, 
has created a special rule for formalities and permits a will to 
be executed in the mode prescribed by the law either of the 
place where executed or of the testator's domicil.119 Cases 
118 2 ZITELMANN 143ff.; 6 Protokolle Zweiter Lesung des Entwurfs des 
BGB. 32-37; MELCHIOR§ 155; GEILER in I Diiringer-Hachenburg 56 n. 21. 
119 See for comment, WALTER W. LAND, Trusts in the Conflict of Laws 
(New York 1940) 24, 54 §§ 8, 16 and see his observation, p. 45, regarding-
tang-ible property on the alternative reference rule of most ~tatutes, 
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concerning bills and notes before the Negotiable Instruments 
Act could best be harmonized by a permissive locus regit 
actum, as suggested by Lorenzen,120 who has proposed this 
rule also for a Pan-American unification of conflicts law.121 
If the rule were adopted by the American courts, an irritating 
source of disturbance would disappear. The courts would gain 
more freedom to choose the proper law for the substance of 
the contract. 
We have, however, realized the necessity of developing 
the rule so as to take care of the really typical modern cases. 
Whenever the laws of two or more territories are involved 
in the formation of a contract, to give exclusive preference to 
one of them is quite as wrong as to cumulate their require-
ments. Rather, compliance with one of the two local laws 
should suffice. The problem is different from the inquiries 
for determining the place of contracting for the purpose of 
finding the governing law or the law deciding whether or 
not the contract has been formed. The customary privilege 
for upholding formal validity is sound; hence it ought to be 
extended rather than curtailed. Consequently, in the case of 
contracting by correspondence, the law of the place where the 
offer is dispatched should suffice for determining validity of 
the contract, as well as the law of the place whence the ac-
ceptance is sent. 
An even broader possibility has been suggested by Laine 
to the effect that the law of the forum, and any other law 
indicated by an interest of the parties, also should be able to 
validate the form of a contract.122 In this country, the idea 
of giving the law of the forum a favorable influence on valid-
ity was revived by Lorenzen with respect to the statute of 
120 LORENZEN, The Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills and Notes (New 
Haven, London 1919) 89; cf. KuHN, Comp. Com. 267. 
121 LORENZEN, 15 Tul. L. Rev. ( 1941) at 167. 
122 LAINE, Clunet 19o8, 674, 681-685, 692-693· 
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frauds at a time when the statute of frauds was widely re-
garded as procedural. 123 The very success of Lorenzen's 
construction of the statute of frauds as substantive in conflicts 
law seems to obviate this emergency solution. 
The law of the forum as such, indeed, should not compete 
with the others in the field of obligatory contracts, either for 
the sake of a permissive policy or for that of rejecting foreign 
transactions. 
Domestic policy should not be opposed, in particular, to 
the free use of foreign instruments, as it is done in numerous 
Latin-American codes, when the solemnities required at the 
forum for similar transactions are lacking. Respect for foreign 
law should also be maintained in carrying into practice the 
universally recognized rule that solemnities prescribed by 
the governing law are replaceable by compliance with anal-
ogous local formalities. An apparent exception to this minor 
function of the rule locus regit actum exists in the United 
States to the extent tha.t the statutes indicate what persons are 
empowered to take acknowledgments outside the state. This 
is probably intended to be a facilitation rather than an imposi-
tion. Usually the enumeration of the designated legal officers 
is extensive. Nevertheless, it would be preferable to leave 
their selection to the respective foreign systems and to make it 
clear that, as a rule, obligatory agreements do not need to 
comply with the domestic formalities when they are executed 
abroad. 
12
"LoRENZEN, JZ YaleL.J. (19z3) at 333-334· 
CHAPTER 32 
Scope of the Law of the Contract 
W HEN the law governing a contract, or a group of contracts, has been ascertained, what problems does it cover? In principle, notwithstanding the 
theories that would split the contract into segments, it should 
embrace all incidents of the contractual relationship. 1 Special 
rules regarding form2 and those concerning the application 
of a personal law to capacity to contract/ have been treated 
earlier in this work. 
This chapter, however, will discuss doubts and objections 
that have been raised to the rule of a unitary law for the 
problems arising on a contract. This ~iscussion cannot be ex-
haustive, since questions of classification originate with the 
consideration of each special type of contract. Moreover, 
such topics as acts of parties modifying the obligation or 
transferring rights or duties, and the whole doctrine respect-
ing limitation of actions and termination of contractual rights, 
cannot be expounded at this juncture. 
While American conflicts literature is accustomed to ask 
whether lex loci contractus, or lex loci solutionis, or lex fori 
applies to a problem, we have here to speak in terms of the 
law of the contract, of a second law applicable to special prob-
lems, and of public policy opposing foreign law. This diverg-
ency of method causes some difficulties in the effort of com-
paring the solutions. 
1 See particularly the comparative survey as of I 9I 7 by KosTERS 773-779· 
2 Supra Chapter 3 r. 
3 Vol. I Chapter 4· 
sr8 
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I. FoRMATION oF THE CoNTRACT 
I. Consent in Form 
The problem. The municipal laws provide diverse solu-
tions for questions such as whether an offer binds the offeror 
and, if so, for what length of time; whether acceptance must 
be declared, dispatched, arrive, or be perceived, to conclude. 
the consent, and whether perfection of the contract has 
retroactive effect. Many particulars, too, vary.4 
What law to apply to these questions, is a matter of both 
practical and theoretical interest. 5 
Illustrations: (i) Binding force of offer. Lorenzen6 has 
presented the following example: A resident of New York 
having made an ordinary offer, without time limit or other 
qualification, by letter to a German in Germany, revokes it 
by cable a few hours after the letter is received. The ad-
dressee, knowing that under German law the telegraphic 
withdrawal is inoperative, at once accepts the offer. Under 
New York law, the offer is revocable until dispatch of ac-
ceptance and the contract fails to come into existence. If, 
according to Lorenzen's suggestion, the lex fori were to 
apply, the parties would be held to the contract in any 
German court but not in any American court. 
(ii) Acceptance by silence. A seller in New York offers 
merchandise to a firm in Liverpool with which he frequently 
has business relations and which had declared a desire for 
these particular goods. The addressee does not answer. Courts 
in the United States, and decidedly many Continental courts, 
are more inclined than English courts to imply acceptance 
by silence. In an analogous case, a Swiss seller and a French 
4 For comparative law see RABEL, r Recht des Warenkaufs 69-ro8; Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law, De la formation des 
rontrats entre absents, Etude Preliminaire (mimeographed) S. d. N.-U. D. P. 
r 935, Etude XVI. 
5 EDUARD WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (r929) 775; ACHENBACH, Der briefliche und 
telegraphische Vertrag im vergleichenden und intermitionalen Privatrecht 
(Hamburg r 9 34). 
6 LORENZEN, 31 Yale L. J. (1921) at 53· 
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buyer had negotiated through the seller's agent in Paris; 
the agent had no authority to conclude the bargain, and 
the seller failed to give an express confirmation. The Swiss 
Federal Tribunal nevertheless held the contract to have been 
completed under Swiss law as the lex loci contractus.1 
(iii) Loss of letter of acceptance. A merchant in Paris 
by letter to a firm in New York offers to buy certain goods; 
the letter of acceptance is lost in the mail. The New York 
seller sues on the basis of a contract perfect under New York 
law. The French party denies the contract according to 
French law. 
(iv) Delayed answer. In a Norwegian case,8 A in New 
York, owning land in Norway, by a letter to B in Norway, 
offered to sell the land but limited the time for acceptance. 
B answered affirmatively in time, but his letter was delayed 
in the mail and reached the offeror when the time limit, 
and let us suppose, a reasonable time for receiving an answer, 
had expired. A failed to make any reply. The majority of 
the Supreme Court in Oslo granted B's action against A, 
by application of Norwegian law, because A should have 
notified B of the delay or otherwise should have complied 
with the contract. The minority dissented on the ground 
that New York law as the law of A's domicil applied. 
Conflicts rules. Many approaches have been tried. Beale, 
as well as the Swiss Federal Tribunal, according to his 
usual method, applies the lex loci contractus/ which, how-
ever, in relation to foreign countries leads nowhere.1° Conti-
nental writers have proposed to resort to the national law of 
the offeror,11 or the law of his domicil in several variants.' 2 
7 BG. (Sept. 28, 1912) 38 BGE. II 516,519. 
8 Norwegian'S, Ct. (1924) 2. Z.ausl.PR. (192.8) 873 No. 51; HAUDEK 67 
approves the majority vote and RAAPE, D. IPR. z68 No . .3 the dissident vote. 
9 2 BEALE rr74-1I76; Restatement§ 332 (c). 
Swiss BG. (June 9, r9o6) 32 BGE. II 415; (Sept. 28, r9u) 38 BGE. II 
516, 519· 
10 Supra Chapter 30, p. 456. 
11 BARTIN, 2. Principes 89. 
12 German RG. (Nov. 20, 1902) 53 RGZ. 59 (isolated); NussBAUM, 
D. IPR. 239; BATIFFOL 345 § 393 and n. 2 suggesting that a prolonged 
sojourn may replace domicil. 
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Another doctrine, following the usual way out of embarrass-
ment, cumulates the requirements of both laws involved.13 
But more often the true emergency solution, lex fori, has 
been suggested.14 
Only the German courts have been 'in position to face the 
problem squarely.15 They apply the same law that would 
govern the contract if it were valid.16 Where the automatic 
force of the law of the place of contracting is eliminated, this 
is the natural solution, approved by those modern writers 
who are not afraid of an alleged vicious circle, nor of the 
existence of a contract which may be denied by the domicili-
ary law of one party.17 
Illustration: ( v) It is litigious whether a contract has 
been effectively agreed upon between S, operating a saw-
mill in A, State X, and P, a manufacturer of furniture in B, 
State Y, to sell four carloads of lumber, deliverable at a 
certain date on the side tracks of the railway depot in A. 
Because of this determination of the place of delivery, as will 
be submitted in the third volume of this work, the law of 
State X governs the contract. This includes all questions 
of consent in form as well as in fact. There is no inquiry 
into such questions as which party has first made an offer 
or where acceptance has been signed or mailed or received. 
A similar result is perhaps viewed in Brazil by C. C. art. I o8 7: the contract 
is made where the offer has been made, and Introd. Law (I 942) art. 9 § 2: 
where the offeror resides. 
13 LEWALD No. 295; PACCHIONI 329 § 10; for cumulation modified by favor 
to validity ACHENBACH, supra n. 5, criticized by WAHL, Book Review, IO 
Z.ausl.PR. (I936) I07o. 
14 LORENZEN, 31 Yale L. J. (1921) at 53; PILLET, 2 Traite I8o-181; 
DIENA, 2 Prine. 256; HAUDEK 91. Contra: PACCHIONI 328 § IO, 
15 Statement by BATIFFOL 346 § 394 bis and n. x. 
16 This is the law intended by the parties or the law of the place of per-
formance. See RG. (Jan. 3, 191 1) 55 Gruchot's Beitrage 888; (May IS, 
I917) Warn. Rspr. 19I7, 267; (Jan. I6, I925) 34 Z.int.R. 427; (March 13, 
1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. I j (May u, 1928) Leipz. z. I928, 1550j (Feb. 3> 
1933) IPRspr. 1933, 19 No. 10. 
The lex loci solutionis has been also advocated in Argentina by ZEBALLOS 
in z Weiss-Zeballos 295 n. (a). 
17 WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I 92 9) 7 8 8-8oo; RABEL, id. 7 53. 
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Writers following this theory have been preoccupied, it 
is true, with hardships resulting, for instance, if an American 
party, contrary to his own law, should be declared bound by 
an offer, as in the above example (i) under German law, or 
an English party bound by his silence as in the above example 
(ii). One proposal is that the court of such a party's domicil 
might free him on the ground of public policy.18 This, how-
ever, would not help, if the case were to be tried in the other 
court, and would defy the purpose of the rule. A more attrac-
tive suggestion has been to consult the domiciliary law of 
each party, not for all, but for the single question, whether 
his conduct presents any declaration that might be a subject 
matter for legal construction.19 The underlying argument of 
equity, however, is doubtful in view of the interest of the 
other party, which, supposedly, would be protected by his 
own law. In addition, English and American courts cannot 
be expected to follow a personal law. 
Indeed, the apparent hardship disappears, if the modern 
principles of interpretation are duly transferred into the field 
of international business transactions. A German court under 
German law cannot treat a proposal to contract as a binding 
offer, if the offeror must be presumed to have intended the 
contrary.20 An offer by a New York firm, in the absence of 
particular circumstances, can not be understood as would an 
offer of a German to another German. Nor should an offer 
by a New Yorker to a Norwegian, under express limitation 
of time, be construed as embodying the conception that he 
must repudiate a belated acceptance. Under any law what-
ever, informal declarations ought to be construed according 
18 BATIFFOL 346 § 394; RAAPE, D. IPR. 266 v. 
19 M. WOLFF, IPR. 75; WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 8oo; RABEL, id. 754; 
K. Th. KIPP, in Fischer-Henle-Titze Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (1932) 11o9 II 
I; RAAPE, D. IPR. 267. 
20 See also WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 8o1. For an analogous appraisal of 
the question whether a proposal is meant as an offer, RAAPE, D. IPR. 2.69 
No.5· 
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to the principles of good faith, considering the laws and 
usages of the place where the declarant lives. Certainly, if a 
declaration is sent out into the world, the sender is not en-
titled to expect that the effect will always be the same as 
under the law of his domicil. But this does not affect our 
cases. Wise judges are careful not to subject foreign promises 
to domestic standards, unless submission to them appears to 
be required by usage. 
2. Consent in Fact 
The problem. Error, fraud, duress, and simulation are 
everywhere grounds for nullity or voidability, yet circum-
stances vary. 21 Error, in particular, may be either more or 
less liberally allowed to vitiate the consent. The most im-
portant difference of laws resides in the question whether 
error must be caused by misrepresentations of the other party 
or at least the latter must have been unaware of the error. 
In addition, the various shades of invalidity are divergently 
regulated, and so is the liability of the party avoiding a con-
tract on the ground of his own mistake. The following ex-
amples may illustrate the ensuing conflicts problem: 
(i) A, a resident of British Columbia, acquired what in 
his opinion were treasury bonds of a corporation in the state 
of Washington, but were actually common stock shares, the 
holder of which was liable under the corporate charter for 
certain payments. 
The Canadian court refused to apply the law of the 
charter, using the argument that, because of the seller's 
misrepresentation, A had never become a shareholder under 
the law of British Columbia.22 The report of the case does 
21 For comparative municipal law see YEHJA TAG-ELDINE, Le dol francais 
et Ia misrepresentation anglaise, contribution a !'etude de la theorie du con-
sentement et de ses vices. (Vol. XVI Bibliothique de l'Institut de Droit Compare 
de Lyon, 1926). 
22 American Seamless Tube Corp. et al. v. Goward [1930] 3 D. L. R. 870 
(B.C. S.C.); fortunately, the court adds that the contract would have been 
voidable under California law, too. 
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not state why this law applied, but probably it was taken for 
granted that the contract was made there and that the lex 
loci contractus governed the entire contract. A comparable 
case came recently before the Supreme Court of the United 
States.23 A mutual insurance company, chartered in New 
York, became insolvent. Assessments were adjudged in pro-
ceedings in New York against the policy holders regarded 
as members under New York law, and suit for enforcement 
was brought against residents of Georgia at their domicil. 
The Georgia Supreme Court refused enforcement on the 
ground that the policy was a contract made in Georgia and 
therefore governed by Georgia law.24 Under the New York 
statutory law, the policy holders were liable to the assessment, 
but according to the law of Georgia they were deemed not 
to have become members of the company, a clause on the 
back of the policy being insufficient to produce this effect. 
Although in this case protection of residents was conspicuous, 
the reasoning was simply based on the law governing the 
contract. 
(ii) In I897, a German reinsurance company in the Rhine-
land, the Aachener Riickversicherungs A.G., consented to a 
reinsurance contract for three-fifths of a fire risk in Japan 
with an insurance company of Hamburg, through an agree-
ment made in Japan by the agents of both parties. The com-
pany in Aachen contested the validity of the agreement 
because its agent had not been made aware of the unusual 
fact that the other two-fifths of the risk had been covered 
previously by another reinsurance. The Reichsgericht ap-
plied articles I I ro and I I I 7 of the French Civil Code, in 
force in the Rhineland at the time of contracting, as the law of 
the domicil of the debtor.25 
Conflicts rules. Aprioristic theory, again, has postulated 
that the personal law of the party whose assent is concerned, 
should govern, 26 or that the lex loci contractus must neces-
23 Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc. (1941) 314 U.S. 2or. 
24 Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc. (1941) 191 Ga. 502, 13 S. W. 
(2d) 337· 
25 RG. (Dec. s, 1902) 53 RGZ. 138. 
26 For the national law among others: 8 LAURENT 228-229 § 158; PILLET, 
SCOPE OF THE LAW OF THE CONTRACT 525 
sarily determine this problem of validity,.27 but courts in 
England/8 the United States, and Germany have instinc-
tively applied the same law that would govern the contract 
if it were valid. In the United States, this has been, as usual, 
either the law of the place of contracting,29 that of the place 
of performance/0 or the law intended by the parties.31 In 
Germany, the Supreme Court and other courts in the last 
decade have firmly upheld the law of the contract,S2 and 
finally this attitude has found the deserved theoretical recog-
nition. 33 Frail French authorities at present are understood 
as aiming at the same effect. 34 
The last international draft on conflicts rules concerning 
sales of goods has adopted this view in applying even the law 
stipulated by the parties to the consent problems.35 Occasion-
Principes 448 § 238; BARTIN, I Principes I75> I77, 2 id. 6o; AUDINET, I 
Melanges Pillet 78; I FRANKENSTEIN 572. For the domiciliary law, PILLET, 
2 Traite 289 § 537; LEWALD 239 No. 296. Contra: WEISS, 4 Traite 392 n. 4; 
KOSTERS 774; and decisively EATIFFOL 336if. §§ 38I-384. 
27 FOOTE 402; 2 BEALE I225; ROLIN, I Principes 48I § 29Ij 2 ARMINJON 
234 II§ 97· 
Switzerland: BG. (April Io, I8g6) 22 BGE. 47I, 483; 32 id. II 4I6; 38 id. 
II 5'9; Trib. com. Zurich (Feb. I4, I937) Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. I937> I64 No. 
85, cited I2 Z.ausl.PR. (I939) 594· 
The German Reichsgericht argued similarly in two or three isolated cases. 
28 SeeM. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 445 § 42I; BATIFFOL 34I § 387. 
29 Cases: z BEALE I225 § 347.I but in Elbro Knitting Mills v. Schwartz 
( 1929) 30 F. (2d) Io, the "Michigan contract" was not questioned. 
'
3° Cases: 2 BEALE 1226 § 347.I ns. I-6. 
31 Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard ( I896) 94 Va. I46, 26 S. E. 42 r. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Haag (June 6, I935) W. I9J6, 402. 
'
2 RG. (Dec. 5, I9II) 7 8 RGZ. 55 : sale of membership in a limited private 
company, error on the money paid in; OLG. Hamburg (Sept. 27, I9I8( Hans. 
GZ. I9I8 HBl. No. 92, aff'd, RG. (March II, I9I9) 95 RGZ. I64: sale of 
nuts, the price payable in Vienna, Austrian law applied to the excusable 
ignorance by the German buyer of a German war decree; RG. (Oct. 30, I926) 
39 Z.int.R. 276, 28I, Revue I928, 523 (duress); (June I3, I933) IPRspr. 
I933, 3I (fraud); and many older cases, see the list established by LEWALD 
240 No. 297. 
33 WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 782; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 237; BATIFFOL 340 
§ 386; see also NussBAUM, Principles I78, and ARMINJON, 3 Travaux du 
comite fran~ais de droit international prive ( I93 7) at 94· 
'
4 BATIFFOL 343 § 389. 
'"See 7 Z.ausl.PR. (I933) 957 art. 2 (3). 
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ally courts have resorted to the law of the forum. This hap-
pened in England, when the foreign law did not seem to 
guarantee annulment of a contract made under duress, 36 in 
a case of the German Reichsgericht disregarding the Turkish 
law on employment/7 and in one or two American insurance 
cases involving misrepresentation of the insured.38 The most 
characteristic of these decisions is that by the English Court 
of Appeals in Kaufman v. Gerson. The defendant, a woman, 
had promised the plaintiff, her husband's creditor, to pay 
the debt in consideration of his promise not to prosecute her 
husband criminally. Under English law, the contract would 
have been bad because its object was to stifle a prosecution 
and it was obtained by coercion. However, the places of con-
tracting and of performance made it a French contract, and 
under French laws, supposedly, the promise was valid. The 
court argued, however, that enforcement in England would 
violate the rule that the plaintiff must come into court with 
clean hands. The decision deserves the severe criticism it has 
suffered, 39 since opinions are and may well be divided on the 
existence of unlawful coercion when a creditor attempts to 
obtain satisfaction of his valid claim by threatening legal 
sanctions. 
36 Kaufman v. Gerson [I904] I K. B. 59'• Clunet I9o5, Io63; Societe des 
Hotels Reunis, Societe Anonyme v. Hawker [I9I3] 29 T. L. R. 578. See also 
Hope v. Hope (I857) 8 De G. M. & G. 73I (agreement illegal according to 
English law). 
37 RG. (Oct. 30, I926) 39 Z.int.R. 276, Revue I928, 523· 
38 Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Miazza (I9o8) 93 Miss. I8 at 36 and 
422 at 435, 46 So. 8I7 at 8I8 and 48 So. IOI7 at Ioi8. In John Hancock 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates (I935) so Ga. App. 7I3, I79 S. E. 239, the 
court operates on the assumption that the materiality of representations made by 
the insured in his application affects the remedy only and therefore is to be 
decided under the law of the forum. 
39 DICEY, Appendix, Note 3, 882; FALCONBRIDGE, The Law of Banks and 
Banking (ed. 5, I935) 902; 3 BEALE I647 § 6!2.I; GooDRICH 26o n. 9; 
Notes, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I93I) 635; 33 Col. L. Rev. (I933) so8. On 
the problems in substantive American law, see the remarks of DAWSON, "Eco-
nomic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law," II Tul. 
L. Rev. (I937) 345, 359· 
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3· Want of Consideration 
The common law requirement of consideration has a 
parallel in the much-debated requirement of the French 
Civil Code (arts. II08, I I 3 I) by which an obligation must 
have une cause licite: "An obligation without cause or on a 
false cause or on an illicit cause can not have any e:ffect."40 
To believe a considerable part of the French doctrine/1 this 
provision includes the rules that in onerous contracts a 
promise must have an actual counterpart in a promise or in a 
giving or doing by the other party, and that on principle, 
with exceptions, obligations ought not to be separated from 
their economic background. Central European systems, how-
ever, use other forms of thinking that do not need this gen-
eral requirement. 
Any law governing the contract will naturally determine 
the requirement of consideration. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Pritchard v. 
Nor ton applied the law of the place of performance, accord-
ing to the presumed intention of the parties, thus preventing 
the contract from being held invalid for want of consideration 
under the lex loci contractus.42 There are parallels to this 
decision in England43 and France.44 The American cases re-
4° For comparative municipal law, see LORENZEN, "Causa and Considera-
tion in the Law of Contracts," 28 Yale L. J. (1919) 62r at 623. On the 
peculiar combination of both in Louisiana, see SNELLINGS, "Cause and Con-
sideration in Louisiana," 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934) 178. 
41 See on the vast controversies, ESMEIN in Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite 
Pratique, in particular his own thesis at 350 § 252. 
42 (r882) ro6 U. 'S. 124. 
43 British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (1921) 66 Sol. J. 18 (applying Eng-
lish law expressly stipulated for in the contract) ; In re Bonacina Le Brasseur 
v. Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch. 68, 73 (validity under Italian law conceded although 
the action is dismissed on other grounds). 
44 App. Paris (Feb. 28, 1935) Revue Crit. 1935, 748 applying French law 
as lex loci solutionis to a German-created bill of exchange, see comment by 
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 434· The Court of Cassation (req.) has affirmed 
the decision, (Dec. 14, 1937) Nouv. Revue 1938, 131, on the basis of German 
lex loci contractus, in a laconic reasoning, well explained in the note ibid.: 
under German law the bill was valid but the action could be refuted by plead-
ing that the plaintiff would be enriched without cause. 
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ferring the question to the lex loci contractus seem to con-
sider this law as governing the entire contract. 45 For German 
courts, the application of the law of the contract follows as 
a matter of course. 46 
Recently, the Tribunal de la Seine dealt with several 
strange agreements made in New York by German refugees, 
whereby a man promised huge sums to his wife and daughter, 
without any visible motive and as was supposed, with no 
intention of making a gift. The court thought it probable 
that the promise was void under the German law, applicable 
as presumably intended by the parties, but added that, if 
approved by German law, the agreement would be void 
under French imperative public policy.47 This is one of the 
easy ways of dealing with obscure facts; the case could have 
been conveniently solved under the German Civil Code. 
II. NATURE AND EFFECTS 
r. The Nature of the Contract 
The law applicable to an obligatory contract should deter-
mine what kind of a contract is made. 
Illustration. Before the German Civil Code came into 
force, a promise to deliver goods to be manufactured with 
materials owned by the promisor was considered in the courts 
following common (Roman) law as a sales contract, whereas 
the Prussian Landrecht assumed that a contract for work 
and labor entitled the customer to cancel his order. In several 
cases one party was domiciled in the territory of the common 
law and the other in that of the Landrecht. 
Instead of treating each party as debtor according to his 
own law, as was done in other cases, the German Supreme 
45 BATIFFOL 353 § 408 n. 5· 
46 Bay. ObLG. (July 6, 1904) 5 Bay. ObLGZ. 357 (force of an I. 0. U. not 
indicating the ground of obligation); OLG. Miinchen (April 13, 1929) 
Zeitschrift fiir Rechtspflege in Bayern (1929) 365 cited by LEWALD 244 No. 
302 (consideration required by English law). See also supra p. 362 n. 15. 
47 Trib. civ. Seine (July 5, 1939) Revue Crit. 1939,450. 
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Court subjected the entire contract to the law of the promi-
sor.48 No one thought of resorting to the law of the forum. 
A deterrent example of a contrary reasoning may be found 
in a case of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, influenced by the two 
unnatural theories which recommend splitting the contract 
and characterizing its nature according to the lex fori. 49 
A resident Swiss, having executed by letter an acknowledg-
ment of a loan of £3250, to an English woman domiciled 
in Paris, demurs to an action for recovery, brought by an 
assignee, because he has not received the money. What law 
determines his plea? In this case, suitable for an elementary 
law class, the Federal Tribunal argued as follows: First, 
it is considered that the making of a loan contract, under 
French law, requires as in Roman law the transfer of the 
money to the borrower as an essential prerequisite; that 
under Swiss law the mutual consent of the parties suffices to 
create contractual rights of the borrower to receive and of the 
lender to recover the money; and that English law is still 
different, the court using an unusual term probably meaning 
that English law does not make a promise to lend or borrow 
specifically enforceable. The court considers, further, that 
under the French approach no contract has been made, unless 
the money was given, hence, the question would be one of 
formation, governed in Swiss conflicts law by the lex loci 
contractus. If, however, under the Swiss construction, the 
contract originated independently of delivery, the issue would 
be merely one of the requisites for recovery, pertaining to the 
"effects" and determined by the law chosen by the parties 
or, subsidiarily, by that of the place where repayment is due. 
In this dilemma, remembering .that a court characterizes 
problems according to its own domestic law and citing 
Nussbaum, the Federal Tribunal resorts to the Swiss con-
struction of a loan as a consensual contract and reaches the 
law of the place of performance which is-the French law. 
Thus, because under the Swiss Code of Obligations a loan 
48 RG. (May 13, r89r) z Z.int.R. 587. For other German cases, see LEW.ALD 
248 No. 306. 
19 BG. (Nov. 7, 1933) 59 BGE. 397· 
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may originate by mere consent, the French Civil Code is 
applied, under which it may not! Even the harmful division 
between validity and the effects of contract can be worked 
out in a more suitable way than by the domestic construction. 
It was the task of the court candidly to interpret its own 
dubious conflicts rule and to state, once and for all, whether 
the problem is attributable to "validity" or to "effects." The 
Restatement, at least, does not fail to explain that any re-
quirement for making a promise binding is determined by the 
law of the place of contracting (§ 332,d). 
The law of the contract, no doubt, should include all re-
quisites for validity as well as the legal category of the trans-
action and, therefore, its legal effects. 
2. Intended and Legal Effects 
Most courts do not hesitate to include interpretation of a 
contract in the law which governs the whole of the contract. 
They also apply this law to the questions, who obtains rights 
through the contract, and what is the object of these rights. 
For it is plainly not feasible to consult two different laws for 
determining the extent of the contractual duties, the one 
when they are to be inferred from construction of the parties' 
intention, implied in fact, and the other when they flow from 
legal rules completing an agreement, implied in law. 
In the narrower domain of interpretation, the natural con-
ception was adopted in this country over a century ago by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. When two sureties 
in New Orleans signed a bond payable in Washington, D.C., 
the court held that, in the absence of a stipulation to the 
contrary, their liability was joint, according to the common 
law of the District rather than divided in half under Lousi-
ana law. 50 Nobody then doubted that the bond was subject as 
5° Cox and Dick v. U.S. (1832) 31 U.S. (6 Pet. S.C.) 172. 
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a whole to the law of the place of performance, a rule also 
applied by the Supreme Court in Pritchard v. Norton.51 
Analogous results may be found in many decisions relating 
to legal effects of contracts. 
Nevertheless, the Restatement, influenced by a few cases, 
has confused the matter. It determines "the nature and ex-
tent of the duty for the performance" by the lex loci con-
tractus (§ 332, f), but declares "the duty for the perform-
ance" to be "discharged by compliance with the law of the 
place of performance." (§ 358). It is instructive to see how 
hard Stumberg tries to apply these contradictory tests. 52 He 
deals with an Oklahoma case53 where a contract granting an 
automobile agency was made in Michigan with the Ford 
Company and the agency was to be maintained in Columbus, 
Ohio. The plaintiff in obtaining the contract acted for the 
benefit of a company in which he took an altruistic interest 
and invested money to help manage the agency. The court 
applied Michigan law as the lex loci contractus to the "execu-
tion, interpretation, and validity." Hence, the breach of the 
contract by the Ford Company was found not to entitle the 
third beneficiary to sue for damages, nor the promisee who 
sued as assignee. The decision, as Stumberg recognizes, might 
have been otherwise, if the center of the contract had been 
sought in Ohio without clinging to the mechanical use of the 
lex loci contractus, although perhaps the facts relevant for 
equity were not fully published. However, Stumberg wonders 
whether this problem would fall under the "extent of the 
duty" or the "compliance with the duty," especially the de-
termination of "the person to whom performance shall be 
rendered" (§ 366), and asks: "Is it practically possible to 
draw a line sharply dividing the extent of the obligation of 
51 Supra n. 42. 
52 STUMBERG 2 z o n. 7 4 continued on p. 2. 2. r. 
53 Brown v. Ford Motor Co. (C. C. A. xoth 1931) 48 F. (zd) 732. 
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the contract from its performance?" Our answer has been 
given before and is strictly: No. 54 
3· Interpretation of Terms 
Rules of interpretation. It is a settled principle that rules 
of interpretation contained in the law governing the contract 
must be applied to the exclusion of those of the lex fori. 5~ 
But doubts have long been raised against this principle.w In 
fact, if the contract is mechanically governed by the law of the 
place of contracting, there is no consideration provided for 
the circumstances under which parties envisage performance 
in another country. Moreover, we might hold this principle 
to be objectless to the extent that the various rules of inter-
pretation are superseded by the proposition recognized in na-
tional laws as well as in the international practice as a "gen-
eral principle," that we must always look for the real and 
harmonious intention of the parties when they bound them-
selves.57 On this basis, the court of any country must pay 
54 Supra p. 450; and see the vain efforts in the Restatement itself, § 332 com-
ment c, to solve the "difficult problem" of separation of duty and performance. 
For another consequence see hereafter p. 537· 
55 STORY§§ 272, 280. 
California: C. C. § I 646, cf. Monarch Brewing Co. v. George J. Meyer 
Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 9th I942) I3o F. (2d) 582. The courts adhering to the 
lex loci contractus commonly enumerate construction and interpretation as well 
as validity as subject to this law. 
England: In re Societe Intercommunale Beige d'Electricite, Feist v. The 
Company [I933] Ch. 684, 690; St. Pierre v. South American Stores Ltd. 
[I937] 3 All E. R. 349> 351, 355· 
France: Lex loci contractus, Cour Paris (April 5, I905) Clunet I9o6, 
17o; Trib. civ. Seine (March 12, I9o8) Clunet I9o8, II32; WEISS, 4 Traite 
348, 364; ROLIN, I Principes 429 § 23I, 547 § 344,550 § 346. 
Germany: RG. (March IS, I892) JW. I892, 220 No. 27; (April 6, I9Il) 
24 Z.int.R. 305. 
C6digo Bustamante, art. I 84 with exceptions. 
In principle, though with exceptions, the law governing the contract also 
includes the force allowed to commercial usage, see I Recht des Warenkaufs 
62; this problem will be studied with particular reference to sales contracts. 
56 See 2 BAR 34; 7 LAURENT 582 §§ 479-482; DESPAGNET 896 § 302; SuR-
VILLE 332 § 2I9i VALERY 978 §§ 678ff.; all inspired by BouLLENOIS. 57 Permanent Court of Arbitration, decision between the Netherlands and 
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natural and necessary regard to the foreign origin of an 
instrument. 
Ascertainment of true meaning. Thus, in a leading English 
case, a Brazilian in Brazil executed in the Portuguese lan-
guage a power of attorney, granting authority to a London 
broker to buy and sell shares. The Court of Appeals, before 
deciding what law determined the extent of the authority, 
held that the exact meaning of the declaration ought to be 
ascertained through interpreters and experts according to the 
language and the habits at the place of transaction.58 A char-
ter party between two German corporations contained clauses 
usual in English maritime trade, including an exception 
clause, a cessor of liability clause, and an indemnity clause.59 
In another case, a vessel was insured, both parties being Ger-
man corporations doing business in New Guinea, with the 
general conditions attached in English. (Institute Time 
Clauses) .'6o In both cases, the German Supreme Court stated 
the meaning of the English original, although the contract 
was governed by German law. Indeed, in all cases of party 
statements and agreements, the true meaning must be dis-
covered under full observation of all circumstances. This may 
be supposed to be provided for in practically all municipal 
laws61 and does not touch conflicts problems. 
Reference to local conceptions. Neither is conflicts law af-
fected, when it appears that parties expressly or probably re-
Portugal in the Island of Timor case, The Hague (June z5, 1914), in The 
Hague Court Reports (ed. J. B. Scott 1916) 354, 365, 38::. 
58 Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., Ltd. [1891] r Q. B. 
79, 82 per Lord Esher, M. R., 85 per Lindley, L. J. 
59 RG. (May 221 1897) 39 RGZ. 65. 
60 RG. (November 7, 1928) rz2 RGZ. 233. 
"
1 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 458 § 432 calls attention to the English rule 
of construction that words of an instrument must be interpreted from the con-
text, or understood in their plain and literal meaning, and requires that this 
rule be not applied in interpreting a contract governed by French, German, or 
Swiss law. This is correct; but the same is true and recognized by the English 
courts when the instrument is executed abroad, irrespective of the applicable 
law. 
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ferred to the conceptions of a place other than that of con-
tracting. It has been held that in a fire insurance policy an 
indication of time was to be computed according to the law of 
the place where the property covered was burned,112 and with 
respect to a contract of accident insurance prescribing that 
packing should be done in the presence of an adult, that who 
was an adult ought to be determined by the law of the place 
where the packing was supposed to be done.'63 To explain 
such decisions as though they referred to the law of the place 
of performance,S4 is inaccurate. The packing firm had nothing 
to "perform," nor had the insurance company to "perform" 
at either of the two places mentioned. Also, it could well 
have been that a commercial usage might have interpreted 
time or adult quality differently from the general law of the 
contract, and the former would have prevailed. 
It follows, at the same time, that German courts are wrong 
when they purport to apply English law as an exception 
to German law governing the entire contract, whilst they 
simply ascertain the significance of certain clauses inserted 
in a bill of lading or an insurance policy according to Eng-
lish usage. 65 
It is a definitely distinguishable phenomenon that the 
parties or conflicts rules may subject a part of the contractual 
relationship to special applicable laws. What is to be done in 
interpreting foreign expressions has been well said to be 
really a question of fact. 66 
The rule of the law of the contract in itself, however, is 
perfectly sound. 
62 Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. David Moffat Co. (1913) 
154 Fed. 13. 
63 Banco de Sonora v. Bankers' Mutuality Casualty Co. ( 1904) 12.4 Iowa 
576, 1oo N. W. 532. 
64 2 BEALE 1261 ns. 2 and 3; STUMBERG 237 n. 18,219 n. 73· 
65 See the cases supra n. 55 and Bay.ObLG. (Oct. 14/28, 1912) Recht 1913 
No. 7o, cited by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 242 who seems to approve of it in prin-
ciple. 
66 Note, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1910) 563. 
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III. LEGALITY 
In the Anglo-American conflicts literature, the doctrine of 
"illegality" has been singularly inflated and confused by 
sweeping English dicta relied upon by Beale. We have to 
state the correct opinion to this effect: 
(a) The pertinent question is not whether the "making" 
or the "performance" of a contract is prohibited, but whether 
or not the contract is valid and enforceable by the applicable 
law, which is the law governing the contract as a whole. This 
observation needs no proof, although it seems to be widely 
neglected. 
(b) The law of the place of contracting (if it does not 
govern the contract) is immaterial, and its prohibitions with-
out any importance, as expounded earlier.67 
(c) The law of the place of performance as such is of no 
greater significance. 
(d) The rules of private law of the forum likewise should 
not obstruct the application of foreign law, except in ex-
traordinary cases. 
The two last contentions will be developed here and in 
the next chapter, respectively. 
One of Dicey's rules reproduces the assertion of English 
judges that a contract valid under its proper law is neverthe-
less void if prohibited by the law of the place of performance.68 
Repeatedly, renowned judges have connected this alleged 
rule with the broader proposition that English courts should 
not sanction the breach of the laws of other independent 
states. 69 The principal thesis, alone contemplated here, re-
67 Supra Chapter 29, pp. 397-400. 
68 DICEY 657 exception 3 (n) to Rule 159. 
69 Scrutton, L. J., in Ralli Brothers v. Compaiifa Naviera Sota y Aznar 
[192o] 2 K. B. 287, 30.4. The principle was called"· .• too well established 
now to require further discussion" by Lord Wright, M. R., in International 
Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders Aktiengesellschaft v. Rex. [1936] 
3 All E. R. 407, 429. 
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curs in the municipal English law of obligations and, accord-
ing to critics, belongs only to that branch of law; 70 in fact, 
it has been used in no case where a law other than English 
law or the law of the place of performance itself governed 
the contract.71 The Restatement of the Law of Conflicts, how-
ever, has elaborated on this rule: 
"If performance of a contract is illegal by the law of the 
place of performance, there is no obligation to perform so 
long as the illegality continues.m2 
The comment assumes that a local prohibition at the place 
of the intended fulfillment makes the contract unenforceable 
at any place, although this law does not govern the contract 
(or in Beale's theory, its validity). 73 Again, the rule reap-
pears in the American Restatement of contracts law. But Wil-
liston at least indicates how uneasy he feels about this un-
reasonable dogma; and in a somewhat forced argument, he 
leads the discussion to the result that illegality under any 
nongoverning law does not itself kill or paralyze an obliga-
tion.74 
The mistake, indeed, is of a double nature. Neither ( r) 
has the place of performance in conflicts law the absolutely 
dominant role which Dicey and Beale believed; nor ( 2) does 
70 MANN, "Proper Law and Illegality in Private International Law," 18 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1937) 97 at 107-u3; MEZGER, Nouv. Revue 1937, 
51·7 at 5311!.; CHESHIRE 1.77 n. 5 seems to agree, except for the recognition of 
the broader rule by the courts. See also NussBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (1941.) 893 
at 917. 
71 MANN, id. at III. 
72 Restatement § 3 6o. 
73 Restatement§ 360 comments band f. 
Also the Polish Int. Priv. Law, art. 1 o has a similar provision: "The parties 
are bound by the specific legal prohibitions annulling transactions contrary to 
law, provided that they are in force in the states (sic) in which the debtor is 
domiciled and the obligation is performable by him." This obscure provision 
does not appear in the Czechoslovakian drafts. 74 Restatement of the Law of Contracts§ 458 comment b; WILLISTON, 6 Con-
tracts 5093 § 1791.; note the embarrassment of }ENKS, 1 Digest of English 
Civil Law (ed. 3> 1938) 131. § 307. 
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a prohibition of the contractual performance absolutely elimi-
nate the contractual duty in the law of obligations. 
In the first place, we are carried back to the unfortunate 
attempts to bisect the contract so that it may be governed by 
different laws. The defects of this method appear patent 
here. If payment in gold coins, traffic in narcotics, prices ex-
ceeding a ceiling, are forbidden in any country, this does 
not mean that the contract is blameless while performance 
is reproved. The "great difficulty" admitted by Beale is in 
distinguishing what is illegality of contracting and what is 
illegality of performance, subject to different law; this 
difficulty must be immense, since the only material case is 
that where the contract itself is vitiated because of a prohibi-
tion of performance. 
In the second place, we may contend, as a result of in-
vestigations that cannot be repeated here, that under all 
modern laws controlling obligations, although with some 
variety and occasional uncertainties, a debtor will be excused 
from his duty of specific performance (where this duty is 
recognized) by impossibility or frustration; and that his duty 
to pay damages for nonperformance is released, if impos-
sibility or frustration is not included in the risk to be borne 
by the debtor according to the individual contract or supple-
tive legal rules. 75 
As a simple result, we have to look to the governing law, 
none other, to ascertain whether any obstacle laid in the path 
of performance, frees the debtor from his duty of specific 
performance, if any exists, and from damages. English courts 
are certainly not more ready than others to excuse the debtor 
in any venture. Let us contemplate the leading case principal-
75 See Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. T. W. Allen & Sons, Ltd. [I9I8] I K. B. 
540; [I918] 2. K. B. 467; Romer, L. J., in Walton Harvey, Ltd. v. Walker and 
Homfrays, Ltd. [I 93 I] I Ch. 2.74, 2.85; RABEL, I Recht des Warenkaufs 2.77, 
343> 357· 
CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
ly claimed to support the thesis of Dicey and Beale and many 
more prudent assertions in the English and American litera-
ture. 
The Ralli case7'6 was decided under English law to the 
effect that an English firm was held not bound to pay a certain 
freight difference. The firm had sold jute to a Spaniard in 
Barcelona and, in a charter party made in London with a 
Spanish shipping company, agreed to a freight rate for carry-
ing the jute from Calcutta to Barcelona. Half of the freight 
was to be paid by the buyer upon arrival as part of the 
purchase price. The Spanish law having established a maxi-
mum freight for jute, the buyer refused to pay more. Did 
the court really hold English law to be that, because of a 
Spanish prohibition, the Englishman did not owe the freight 
promised by him? This would cover the usual proposition, but 
the court would certainly not have agreed to such an unten-
able ruling. If a German firm had bought cotton in New 
York at the market price, to be paid on sound arrival in 
Hamburg and the German state had decreed a ceiling price 
for cotton, it is not very probable that any American court 
would hold the contractual right to the price unenforceable. 
What characterized the case was the fact that the freight in 
question, half of the contractual amount, should have been 
paid by the Spanish buyer to the Spanish company in Spain. 
Although one of the judges remarked that he did not look 
beyond the immediate issue, it seems evident that the English 
seller, if bound to pay the difference, would have lost his re-
course against the buyer in a Spanish court, and that this was 
the reason why it seemed equitable to send the Spanish com-
pany back to the law of its own country. 
Whether such equitable considerations, not quite un-
familiar to English and other courts, are sound in municipal 
law is of little interest here. The really decisive considera-
tion, pointing to the distribution of risks, a consideration 
76 Supra n. 69. 
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grounded in a model English tradition, 77 was admirably fol-
lowed by the Privy Council a few weeks after the Ralli case, 78 
and very neatly formulated in the following American deci-
sion.79 
The Tweedie Corporation of New Jersey, owner of the 
vessel "Catania," let the ship on hire to the McDonald Cor-
poration of West Virginia by a written contract in New York, 
where both companies entertained offices. The vessel was to 
transport laborers on four trips from Barbados, an English 
colony, to Colon. New York law evidently governed. After 
two trips had been made, the British government prohibited 
any export of workers from Barbados. The performance, thus, 
was not impossible but illicit in Barbados. Did this prohibi-
tion of performance by the law of the place of performance 
excuse the hiring company from payment or even invalidate 
the contract? The court, somewhat perturbed by the con-
fused authorities, nevertheless penetrated to the decisive con-
sideration. In the spirit of the contract, as the court assumed, 
the McDonald Corporation had to carry the risk of the 
change of laws of a foreign government at the place of per-
formance. This rigor may be approved or disapproved, but 
the solution is sought in the correct field of excuses for non-
performance according to the governing law of New York, 
and the risks contemplated by the parties directed this de-
CISIOn. 
IV. NoNPERFORMANCE OF THE CoNTRACT 
I. In General 
Apart from the questionable theories establishing a sepa-
rate law applicable to performance,S0 in principle the law 
77 See Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais (r884) 12. Q. B. D. 
589. 
78 Trinidad Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd. v. G. R. Alston and Co. [1920] 
A. C. 888. 
79 Tweedie Trading Co. v. James P. McDonald Co. (1902) 114 Fed. 985; 
other cases are discussed by 2 BEALE 1263 § 360.2. 
80 Especially BEALE us&, 1267, 1274; in France, VALERY 987 § 685; 
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governing the contract determines all its effects, including 
the requisites of default, excuses for nonperformance, and the 
effects of unexcused failure to perform. 81 
The English Law Reform Act of 1943, in modernizing the 
rules of restitution in various cases of failure of considera-
tion, expressly.presupposes that the contract is governed by 
English law.82 The Act is understood thereby to subject the 
right of restitution to the law of the contract and has been 
criticized on this ground83 because this right should be gov-
erned by the law of the place where enrichment was ob-
tained.84 But while undue enrichment in general may have to 
follow extracontractual lines in both substantive and con-
flicts law, consideration or an advance payment given on the 
ground of a contract is to be recovered under contractual 
rules. Even though, in the part concerning contracts, a code 
may refer to its rules relating to undue enrichment, as the 
German Code does, it is well settled that the relation created 
by the contract extends to the duty of restitution. 85 Hence, 
German courts apply the law governing the contract, and a 
Judge Learned Hand in Louis-Dreyfus et al. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. 
(I93o) 43 F. (2d) 824 recognizes that liability and excuses for nonper-
formance must follow the same law, but nevertheless, following the Restatement, 
excuses the debtor under Canadian law from the fulfillment of a Minnesota 
contract. Cj. NussBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (I942) at 9I7 n. 149; BATIFFOL, 26I 
n. I, 407 n. 2. 81 United States: BATIFFOL 407-408 n. 2 recalls the constant practice in the 
cases concerning insurance and transportation. 
England: Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnaise (I884) I2 Q. B. D. 
589; Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. T. W. Allen & Sons, Ltd., supra n. 75· 
Austria: OGH. (Oct. 24, I928) 10 SZ. 6o9. 
France: NIBOYET, 16 Recueil (I927) I 83; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 437 
§ J58. . 
Germany: RG. (June 26, I912) Leipz. Z. I912, 762; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. IS, 
I93o) 30 Bay. ObLGZ. 354, 368; LEWALD No. 303. 
Switzerland: BG. (June 28, I9I8) 44 BGE. II 280 (intention of the 
parties). 82 The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, I 943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 
40. 83 G. L. WILLIAMS, 7 Modern L. Rev. (I944) 66, 69. 84 Williams follows GUTTER!DGE and LIPSTEIN, "Conflicts of Law in 
Matters of Unjustifiable Enrichment," 7 Cambr. L. J. (I939) 8o. 
85 See BGB. §§ 323 par. 3, 325 par. 1 sent. 3; §§ 346, 347, 348 make clear 
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similar rule has probably been adopted in the draft of the 
Montevideo Treaty in 1940.86 
Illustration. The English Act repeals the rule in the 
Fibrosa case87 that a party who prepaid money under certain 
accidental circumstances may recover all the money paid, 
and the payee is not allowed to deduct his own damage and 
expense. Suppose that an English firm has paid a sum under 
an English contract to a party in a British jurisdiction in 
which the Reform Act has not yet been adopted, why should 
the payee not profit from the new and unquestionably just 
law governing the contract rather than depend on the place 
where by a casual circumstance the money was paid? 88 
The Restatement, it is true, applies its section concerned 
with the quasi..:contractual obligation of restitution in an il-
lustration, to an agreement whereby A promises to build a 
house for B on B's land. The promisor starts on the building 
but does not complete it. When he sues B to recover the 
amount by which A's labor and materials have benefited B, 
the law of the place where the land is, allegedly applies. But 
in the illustration, fortunately, it is this law that allows the 
that restitution on the ground of rescission is not identical with recovery of 
undue enrichment. 
86 Germany: Under the common law: RG. (June 18, 1887) 4 Bolze No. z6; 
Bay. ObLG. (Nov. 16, 188z) 38 Seuff. Arch. z6o, still regarded as leading 
cases by NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 295 n. z. Under the actual practice, the courts 
apply the law of the place of performance of each party with respect to his 
obligation. If a buyer has paid the price in advance, he may recover after rescis-
sion, under the law of the place where he had to pay under the contract. For the 
cases see LEWALD zp. No. 311 sub (z). RAAPE, D. IPR. 296ff. adds support 
by examining the practical results. 
Montevideo Treaty, draft of 1940, art. 43 says that the obligations arising 
without contract are governed by the law of the place where the act is done 
from which they derive "and, in the proper case (en su caso) by the law 
governing the legal relations to which they correspond." This obscure text 
seems best construed as above. 
87 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd. [1943] 
A. C. 32. 
88 Exactly to the same effect, FALCONBRIDGE, "Frustrated Contracts: The 
Need for Law Reform," 23 Can. Bar Rev. (1945) 43 at 6o with reference 
to Ontario. And see, more recently, MoRRIS, "The Choice of Law in Statutes," 
62 Law Q. Rev. (1946) 170, 181; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws (1947) 
365. 
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recovery.89 Otherwise, it would have been difficult to defend 
the nonapplication of the law decisive for all of the contract. 
2. Sanctions of Nonperformance 
The unity of the contract must naturally be preserved also 
with respect to the several sanctions of nonperformance. 90 
Rescission. Whether a party is entitled to cancel a contract 
and what restitution is due in this case by either party, is de-
termined by the law of the contract.91 Beale, who would have 
preferred the law of the place of performance, explains the 
cases by the theory of the courts that the right of rescission 
flows from a sort of implied contract.92 But this, indeed, is 
the correct theory, inasmuch as it acknowledges a right in-
herent in the contract. 
Damages. The old conception that damages exclusively 
pertain to the procedural law of the forum, has maintained 
as little force with respect to breach of contract as with re-
spect to tort.93 The right to recover and the measure of 
89 Restatement§ 452 illustration 3· 
90 E.g., German Reichsgericht (Jan. I o, I 9 I I) Warn. Rspr. I 9 I I, No. I I I : 
the right to exercise a lien is governed by the law of the contract rather than 
that of the place where the right is exercised. 
91 United States: Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank of New York (I924) 239 N.Y. 
I58, I45 N. E. 9I7, aff'd (1928) 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745; American 
Union Bank v. Swiss Bank Corp. (I93o) 40 F. (2d) 446; (both cases recog-
nized by 2 BEALE 1275, as authorities contrary to his own theory). For in-
surance, see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens (I9oo) 178 U.S. 389; Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Johnson, Administrator (1934) 293 U.S. 335; 
and for other types of contracts, Pratt v. Dittmer (I 92 I) 5 I Cal. App. 512, 
I97 Pac. 365; James N. True v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (I9I4) I26 Minn. 
72, 147 N. W. 948. 
As an example of application of the foreign law stipulated by the parties, see 
Rubin v. Gallagher (I 940) 294 Mich. I 24, 292 N. W. 5 84 (partial recovery 
of paid installments in a title-retaining sale). 
England: Benaim and Co. v. Debono [I924] A. C. 5I4. 
France: Cass. (civ.) (May u, I93o) S.I93I.1.129, Clunet 193I, I64ff.; 
BATIFFOL 405 § 490. 
Germany: RG. (Oct. 30, I926) 39 Z.int.R. 276; Reichsarbeitsgericht (Dec. 
2I, I932) IPRspr. I933, 23. 
92 2 BEALE I275 § 373.I. 
93 The procedural theory was maintained in Massachusetts as a hangover from 
SCOPE OF THE LAW OF THE CONTRACT 543 
damages in a violated contract are determined by the law 
governing the contract.94 This law also extends to the question 
whether damages may be obtained in addition to rescission.95 
Occasionally, as in tort, it happens in this country that a court 
wrongly denies the right to damages because of a different 
construction in the domestic law. The Michigan Supreme 
Court in Mount Ida School v. Rood/'6 refused to enforce the 
right of a school to a contractual fee under an agreement 
recognized to be governed by Massachusetts law, because the 
plaintiff asked for the full amount allowable in Massachu-
setts, instead of deducting at once in his own complaint the 
costs he would have incurred in case of performance, as pre-
scribed in Michigan. The court, to avoid the "illogical and 
unjust result" of Massachusetts law, resorted to the public 
policy of the forum and has been justly criticized therefor.97 
the past: Grimshaw v. Bender and Dana (r8o9) 6 Mass. 157; Ayer v. Tilden 
(r86o) 15 Gray (8r Mass.) 178; Ives v. The Farmers' Bank (r86r) 2 Allen 
(84 Mass.) 236. 
94 United States: Restatement § 413 (law of the place of performance); 
Walker v. Lovitt (r9rl) 250 Ill. 543, 95 N. E. 631; Amos v. Kelley Co. 
(1927) 240 Mich. 257, 215 N. W. 397; Riddle v. Hudson (1917) 68 Okla. 
173, 172 Pac. 921, 926; Wynne v. McCarthy (C. C. A. 10th 1938) 97 F. 
(zd) 964; Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Klaxon Co. (1940) II5 F. (:z.d) 
z68, 275; Smyth Sales Inc. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co. (1942.) 12.8 F. 
(zd) 697, 702 {the last two dicta by Goodrich, J.). 
Canada: Supreme Court of Canada, Livesley v. Horst & Co. [ 1 924] S. C. R. 
6os, [1925] 1 D. L. R. 159. 
Ontario: Schrader, Mitchell & Weir v. Robson Leather Co. [1912] 3D. L. R. 
8 3 8 (lex loci contractus) . 
Quebec: See 3 Johnson 394 n. 2. 
Germany: RG. (March 27, 1903) JW. 1903, 184; (Jan. 21, 1908) Leipz. 
Z. 19o8, 3o8, and many subsequent cases; RG. (March 2.4, 1933) IPRspr. 1933 
No. 14. 
Italy: Cass. (June 2o, 1938) Sett. Cass. 1938, 131, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 324 
No. 173. 
95 Cass. (civ.) (May u, 1930) supra n. 91. 
96 Walton School of Commerce v. 5troud (1929) 248 Mich. 85, 226 N. W. 
883, Wiest, J., dissenting; Mount Ida School v. Rood (1931) 253 Mich. 482, 
235 N. W. 227, 74 A. L. R. 1JZ5· 
97 Notes, 14 Minn. L. Rev. (1930) 665, 67o; 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1930) 
64o; So U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 126; AILES, "Substance and Procedure in 
the Conflict of Laws," 39 Mich. L. Rev. (1941) 392, 411, 417. But the federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals has regretfully accepted the rule that the law of the 
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Penalties. The same law may be expected to apply to the 
various types of penalties stipulated in contracts. This has 
been constantly recognized by the German courts resorting to 
the law governing an obligation in order to determine the 
validity of a penalty promised in case of nonperformance or 
delay,98 the concurrence of the right of penalty with the right 
of damages,99 and the question of waiver.100 
The same is probably true in this country, 101 with one re-
striction. The purpose in agreeing on a penalty may be either 
to fix a lump amount of damages or to punish the defaulting 
debtor irrespective of damage, both valuable stipulations when 
the evidence of actual damage is difficult to obtain, the latter 
method also being useful to secure promises lacking any 
pecuniary estimation. Nevertheless, some American courts 
persist in believing that all liquidated damages are punish-
ments and that they are 1:1nenforceable despite the fact that 
their purpose is not "to punish an offense against the public 
justice of the state" but to grant a civil right to a private 
person.102 These courts are said to be supposed to refuse en-
forcement to a promise that they regard as a penalty, al-
though it is valid under the law considered by these courts 
themselves as governing/03 
An analogous public policy was once announced in a Ger-
man decision which reduced an agreed sum by application of 
forum applies as settled by these cases, Transit Bus Sales v. Kalamazoo Coaches 
lnc.(1944) 145F.(2d) 8o4,807. 
ns RG. (March 15, 1892) 2 Z.int.R. 477; RG. (Dec. 1, 1911) 22 Z.int.R. 
3 1 1 ; and other cases. 
99 RG. (Jan. 5, 1887) 19 RGZ. 33 (penalty clause under English law). 
100 ROHG. (Feb. 1, 1875) 16 ROHGE. 14; OLG. Dresden (July 10, 1891) 
2 Sachsisches Archiv fur burgerliches Recht 6so, cited by LEWALD No. 375a. 
101 Restatement § 422 ( 1). 
102 Words of Mr. Justice Gray in defining statutory penalties with respect 
to judgments not falling under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Huntington 
v. Attrill (1892) 146 U.S. 657,673-4. 
103 Restatement§ 422 (2); BEALE 1340 § 422.1 cites only two cases of 1889 
and r893, respectively. 
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the domestic provision contained in the Civil Code that the 
judge should mitigate an exaggerated penalty according to 
his discretion. It has been correctly objected that such reduc-
tion cannot be essential, since the German Commercial Code 
allows no such judicial mitigation.104 
Moratory interest allowed as damages. Finally there is 
no reason why, on principle, damages for delay in a money 
payment fixed by law at some percentage of the principal 
sum, should not be governed by the law of the contract/05 
The contrary decisions of the French Court of Cassation are 
obsolete.106 But in the United States, it is said that the law 
of the place of performance applies.107 Since the cases alleged 
for support mostly refer to negotiable instruments, which, in 
fact, are in a special category, we shall reserve the question 
for a later opportunity. 
3· Burden of Proof 
We may repeat the statement made in the discussion of 
torts that, in the prevailing theory, except in English courts, 
burden of proof is controlled by the law governing the sub-
stantive rights. :~cos 
104 Germany: BGB. § 343; OLG. Hamburg (Dec. 23, 1902) 59 Seuff. Arch. 
63, I.j. Z.int.R. 79• Contra: see 2 FRANKENSTEIN 232; LEWALD 257· 
Similarly, Switzerland: BG. (Feb. 2S, 1915) 41 BGE. II 138. 
On the other hand, in Brazil, 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 21 o states that a 
Brazilian court may exercise a German-created right of mitigating a penalty, 
art. 927 of the Brazilian C. C. not being based on public policy. 
105 Germany: RG. (Feb. 20, I88o) I RGZ. 59, 61; (Jan. 8, 1930) Hans. 
RGZ. 1930 B 2u, 214. 
106 BATIFFOL 413 § so3 has only alleged correct decisions of lower courts, 
but the decision Cass. (civ.) (May IS, I935) S.I93S·I.244 clearly recognizes 
the law of the place of contracting as that intended by the parties, cf. ESMEIN, 
10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 884. 
107 2 BEALE 1335 § 418.2; STUMBERG 240 fl. 28. 
108 LoRENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (I923) at 332 n. 74; supra pp. 283-286. 
Germany: RG. (April 17, 1882) 6 RGZ. 412; (Oct. 29, 1925) 79 Seuff. 
Arch. 353 No. :us; (May 19, 1928) 82 id. 289 No. 164. 
The application of the lex fori in England has been reaffirmed by an 
Admiralty Court judge and the Court of Appeals in The Roberta [1937] 58 
Ll. L. Rep. 159, 177; [1938] 6o id. 84, 85. 
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v. CHANGE OF LAW 
The prevailing view seems to be that in any law suit the 
law governing a contract applies in the form in which it is 
in force at the time of the final decision.109 Rules of law 
repealed after the making of the contract are inapplicable 
and replaced by the current rules. This opinion is in con-
formity with the view set forth in this work that all references 
to a foreign law·as applicable to a certain question are directed 
to the whole law of the foreign state, to the body of its system 
susceptible of alterations, and not to a few selected rules. 
Occasionally, in this country, a contrary idea has been 
advanced, as if the applicable law were that existing at the 
time when the contract was made. The New York Court of 
Appeals thought it necessary to excuse a deviation from this 
alleged principle, when it applied the Joint Resolution of 
Congress abrogating the effect of gold clauses to bonds issued 
previously in New York, the new law being constitutional and 
representing the public policy of the forum.110 Evidently, 
such opinions are stimulated by the doctrine prohibiting re-
troactive laws from impairing vested rights. But our subject 
should not be confused with constitutional problems. 
At any rate, the New York Court argued on the presump-
tion of an intention of the parties to submit to the laws of 
109 England: In re Chesterman's Trusts [1923] 2 Ch. 466, 478. 
France: BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 615 at 618; HAMEL, Nouv. Revue 
1937, 4Q9 at 509; BATIFFOL 68 § 74· 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 27, 1927) and (March 22, 1927) IPRspr. 1926/27 
No. 42 with more documentation; RG. (May 26, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058. 
11° Compafiia de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of 
Finland (1935) 269 N.Y. 22, 26, 198 N. E. 617. 
It is entirely distinguishable that under the Georgia Code (1895) § z88o, 
(1933) § 57-106 "every contract bears interest according to the law of the 
place of the contract at the time of the contract," and therefore a defendant's 
plea that the contract was usurious according to a certain Alabama law, was 
dismissed, because the defendant had not proved the existence of that Ia w at the 
time of the contract; see Thomas v. Clarkson (1906) 125 Ga. 72, 54 S. E. 
77; and for subsequent cases, Jones v. Lawman (1937) 56 Ga. App. 764, 770, 
194 S. E. 416, 420. This regards a cause of initial defect in the contract. 
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New York. There are cases, in fact, in which the parties may 
well be supposed to have tacitly agreed on a reference to a 
law merely as it was at the time. However, as seen earlier, it 
is controversial whether the parties are allowed to do so.111 
As a rule, no such temporary limit should be understood to 
inhere in either an agreement or an intention of the parties; 
too many difficulties would be raised in ascertaining a sub-
stituted law. In fact, the Joint Resolution of 1933 has been 
applied in a great number of decisions in various countries as 
a subsequently enacted part of New York law governing bond 
debentures.112 
Similarly, the main part of the German Law of Revaloriza-
tion of r 92 5, prescribing that certain debts expressed in 
"Mark" currency should be due in the amount of a percentage 
in new "Reichsmark," was regarded without hesitation as an 
alteration of the German law. 
Only the peculiar provision of this law was much contested 
whereby a debtor having redeemed a mortgage with heavily 
depreciated money was bound to add some supplementary 
payment. While some courts of other countries repudiated 
this retroactive law under the point of view of public policy,118 
a Dutch court argued that a Dutchman, having bought a 
house in Germany, paid the mortgage. effectively under the 
law then existing, and resold the house before the new law 
went into force, had no connection with Germany and could 
not be affected by German legislation.114 The court, thus, de-
nied the continued effect of the governing law rather than its 
retroactivity, a view of great force. 
Finally, obligations entered into under the Czarist Russian 
legislation before the 7th of November, 1917, were pro-
hibited by Soviet legislation from being brought before the 
111 Sup1·a Chapter 281 p. 393· 
112 See the surveys in Z.ausl.PR. Vols. 9-1 I. 
118 See the cases infra Chapter 33, p. 567 n. 46. 
114 Rb. Rotterdam (June q, 1930) W. 12266. 
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courts.115 In agreement with the prevailing opinion, a Swiss 
court held that as a consequence Soviet law replacing the 
former law made the obligations in question unenforceable 
also in Switzerland.116 While the objection of public policy to 
the legislative impairment in this case was expressly denied, 
it might be granted under circumstances where the contract 
has sufficiently close connection with the forum, as when the 
debtor resides in the forum at the time of the decree.117 But 
even so, obligations expressed in Czarist roubles are without 
object.ll8 Cases seem to be rare in which it may be reasonably 
argued that an old Russian contract survives under some 
substituted law.119 
In conclusion, we may state the principle that changes in 
the applicable law must be observed, except where a contrary 
agreement of the parties is ascertainable and permitted by the 
law of the forum. 
115 Art. 2 of the Introductory Decree of Oct. 3 I, I 922, to the Civil Code. 
116 App. Ziirich (Dec. I9, I928) 3 Z. f. Ostrecht (I929) I403 with approv-
ing note by FREUND. 
117 In the case of Nazi-German expropriations, Weber v. Johnson (I939) 
15 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 77o; Anninger v. Hohenberg (I939) I72 Misc. 1046, I8 
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 499· 
118 Lehman, J., in Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (I 9 34) 
z66 N.Y. 71, Io5, 193 N. E. 897, 9Io. 
119 M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 43 I § 406 makes the interesting suggestion 
that a revolutionary overthrow of the existing law and its replacement by 
something new is not included in a choice of law by the parties. In my opinion, 
this is a question of interpretation, as also with respect to less exorbitant changes 
of law, such as the Joint Resolution on gold clauses. The difficulties, however, 
of a new choice of law made necessary by the suggestion, may be great. 
CHAPTER 33 
Public Policy1 
I. THE LAw oF THE FoRUM 
A. THE PRESENT SITUATION 
THE manifold objections raised against a free choice of law by the parties have proved without foundation except as justified by resort to the public policy of the 
forum. 2 Equally, it has been indicated, despite various as-
sertions, that neither the law of the place of contracting nor 
that of the place of performance has a paramount role in 
regulating the legality of transactions, but the forum may 
have a word to say. 3 At the same time, it has appeared that 
1 For the United States, see BEACH, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of 
Vested Rights," 27 Yale L. J. (1918) 656; GooDRICH, "Public Policy in the 
Law of Conflicts," 36 W.Va. L. Q. (1930) 156; id., "Foreign Facts and Local 
Fancies," 25 Va. L. Rev. (1938) 26; 3 BEALE§ 6r2.r; STUMBERG, "Conflict 
of Laws-Validity of Contracts-Texas Cases," ro Tex. L. Rev. (1932) r63, 
1 8 z; also STUMBERG r 7 8-r 79; HussERL, "Public Policy and Ordre Public," 
25 Va. L. Rev. (1938) 37· Note, "The Public Policy Concept in the Conflict 
of Laws," 33 Col. L. Rev. (1933) 508. 
In the continental literature, every writer on conflicts law has discussed the 
problem. Basic: KAHN, "Die Lehre vom Ordre Public (Prohibitivgesetze) ," 
first in 39 Jherings Jahrb. (r898) 1-I12, 1 Abh. 161-254. Bibliographies by 
NIBOYET, 10 Repert. 92, 1 STREIT-VALLINDAS 315-317. MARTI, "Der Vor-
behalt des eigenen Rechtes im internationalen Privatrecht der Schweiz," 
(Abhandlungen zum Schweizer. Recht, ed. Gmiir-Guhl, No. 176, 1940). 
More recent articles by LoUis-LucAs, "Remarques sur l'ordre public," Revue 
1933, 393, and VALERY, "Examen critique des remarques sur l'ordre public 
de M. Pierre Louis-Luca~," 6r Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles 1934) 194, con-
tinue the French dispute on the elements of which ordre public consists. Are 
there one (NIBOYET, Manuel 547 § 443); or two, namely, (a) in the pre-
vailing distinction ordre public interne and international (WEISS, 3 Traite 
94) or (b) rather relative and absolute (LAINE, Annuaire 1908, 4 7) ; or three 
(LoUIS-LUCAS); or four (VALERY) elements? 
For a complete survey on the German practice until 1932, see MELCHIOR 
324ff. 
2 Supra pp. 427-429. 
3 Supra p. 5 35· 
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resort to the public policy of the forum is a delicate and very 
rarely justifiable measure. 
Under these circumstances, some observations on the in-
fluence of public policy are indispensable in the present con-
nection, although we have not attempted any such generaliza-
tions in the field of family law. In fact, while the common 
habit of treating public policy in conflicts Jaw in comprehen-
sive terms is quite unsound, the controversy on this much de-
bated subject has a special meaning for obligations. The need 
for security of transactions involving family or inheritance 
may well mean that the state of domicil or nationality should 
be privileged to regulate the individual's marriage, adoption 
or will. The social policy of such state and its conception of 
family interests have some claim to be preferred over the 
legal systems of places where parties merely happen to meet. 
Where personal law and contracts law clash, however, as in 
the question of the capacity of married women to undertake 
obligations by contract, the solution is controversial; Amer-
ican courts are divided in recognizing the policy of the domicil 
or that of the state of contracting as predominant. We have 
supported the English intermediary proposition that for busi-
ness contracts the law governing the contract should apply 
to the exclusion of domiciliary policy.4 Special considerations 
apply also with respect to transfer of possession or title; any 
influence of contracts on personalty or realty may be excepted 
from this chapter. 
Uncertainty. Interstate and international contracts not con-
cerned with family or inheritance rights and not directly 
affecting possession or title, are secure only if they are re-
moved as completely as possible from the play of local policies 
and predilections alien to the purpose of the contract. Never-
theless, time and again, though but sporadically, courts have 
4 See Vol. 1 p. 195. 
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measured contracts with the yardstick of their local concep-
tions, whether because one party was a resident of the forum 
-a regrettable approach sometimes shared by New York 
judges; or because the agreement was completed by a "final" 
act within the forum-a view sanctioned by the Restatement's 
exaggerated formalism; or on the ground of the parties' na-
tional connection-as frequently but unjustly claimed by 
French and Latin-American jurisdictions. In a number of 
cases, contracts have been subjected to the "public interest" 
of the forum without any connection with its territory. 
The various general formulas used in enactments referring 
to the exception of public policy, 5 though sometimes worthy 
of attention, have been of no practical help. The C6digo 
Bustamante establishes special rules for obligations but recog-
nizes "international public order" on an extremely vast 
scale.6 A recent law of Guatemala characteristically deprives 
foreign law of all effect if it is "contrary to the national 
sovereignty, the laws and the public order."7 
By common agreement, not all municipal legal rules are 
a potential obstacle to the application of foreign law, not even 
by any means all those considered "imperative" in the 
domestic sphere. Only a "strong" public policy in the words 
of the Restatement ( § 6 r 2), or an "international public 
order," as the internationally relevant part of the national 
public policy is commonly called in France, prevent enforce-
ment of the law referred to by a conflicts rule. Just what 
rules pertain to this class remains in intentional obscurity. The 
fantastic use of the doctrine made in certain judicial decisions 
has been shown in lists of horrible cases collected long ago. 8 
5 See MAKAROV 4I9 (Systemat. Register); NIBOYET, IO Repert. 92ff. 
6 Arts. I75-I82, 246. 
7 Law on Foreigners of 1936, art. 23. 
8 See, for instance, KAHN, I Abhandl. I 69, 214-2 I 7, 247 n. I 32, 248-25 t; 
I FRANKENSTEIN I 86. 
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Over and over again, writers have emphasized that the cases 
cannot be forced into any system, which is quite true in the 
present state of things. Any scholar in any country, devoting 
himself to a study of habits of court in this field, must feel 
exactly as did the observer in this country who declared that 
he retired baffied from an examination of the American cases: 
"The conclusion must be, then, that a clearly developed 
and defined concept of public policy cannot be found in 
the cases .... We do know enough to say with considerable 
confidence that an investigation to determine when the courts 
will apply the doctrine of public policy to deny the recog-
nition of a foreign right would result in the conclusion, 'you 
never can tell.' m 
You never can tell! The worst feature of the traditional 
latent conflict between private international law and munici-
pal law is precisely this resultant uncertainty. For the sake 
of relatively few doubtful cases, the sword of Damocles hangs 
over each and every contract. The courts usurp a discretionary 
power when to apply conflicts rules and when to sacrifice 
them, a freedom exercised at the cost of the parties' freedom 
to contract outside the forum. The antiquated loose talk of 
comity between states, not having any contractual rights to be 
enforced, perpetuates a feeling that conflicts rules are inferior 
to internal rules. 10 But, for a long time, the best informed 
scholars and judges have agreed that an unqualified reserva-
tion in favor of the law of the forum is a menace to extrastate 
business activity. The great majority of writers, it is true, 
have been satisfied with the disconsolate and resigned state-
ment that there is no rule or method of forecasting. Perhaps, 
most of them share in the conviction of the courts that public 
9 NuTIING, "Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine," I 9 Minn. 
L. Rev. (1935) 196, zoo. 
10 See for illustration the summary in 15 C. J. S. 836, 837 and the cases in 
ns. 2 7-29 ibid. 
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policy ought to remain as an unlimited safety valve, although 
they want it used only as an exception. 
Full Faith and Credit Clause. In the United States, the 
application of public policy in conflicts law must be dis-
tinguished from "matters of local concern" exempted from 
the constitutional duty of states to enforce the laws and acts 
of sister states. Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
contains potential force to develop federal conflicts rules, 
only few rudimentary elements for such development have 
appeared. All theories for delimiting the domain of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause on the basis of the cases have failed. 
As was stated in 1935, "it seems reasonably clear ... that the 
Supreme Court has not constituted itself an arbiter in all con-
flicts cases and that there is a field, albeit of indeterminate 
boundaries, where the public policy of the state may hold 
sway."11 
At the beginning of 1945, a long series of elaborate deci-
sions had led the Supreme Court to a point where one of the 
Justices declared: 
"I cannot say with any assurance where the line is drawn 
today between what the Supreme Court will decide as con-
stitutional law and what it will leave to the states as common 
law."12 
It is certainly true that a slight connection of a case with 
the forum not only makes application of the domestic law 
ludicrous but ordinarily also calls for the sanction of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.13 But the inverse would not be true. 
Although remaining in the sphere of constitutional independ-
ence, a court is by no means entitled to impress local views 
on foreign transactions. The conflicts rule binds the court. 
11 NUTTING, supra n. 9, at zos. 
12 Mr. Justice }ACKSON, "Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the 
Constitution," 45 Col. L. Rev. (1945) x, 13· 
13 STUMBERG 253, Note in fine. 
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Confusion is sometimes encountered even in recent cases. A 
federal court sitting in Missouri considered a clause of re-
straint of trade stipulated in the employment contract of a 
branch manager.14 The clause was valid according to Missouri 
law and void according to Michigan law. The employee had 
never been in Michigan; the contract was negotiated in St. 
Louis and performed first in Illinois and thereafter in St. 
Louis. The one thing done in Michigan was that the com-
pany, resident there, assented to the contract. The court ex-
plains that authorities are divided between lex loci contractus 
and lex loci solutionis, but that the true answer, independent 
of both, is given by the principle laid down by the Supreme 
Court of the United States that a state has to enforce a sister 
state's law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, except 
where its own public policy prevails. In the case at bar, 
Missouri had a major interest, while Michigan had practically 
none. This is true, but if the contract had had sufficient con-
nection with Michigan to render the application of the Mich-
igan law natural, it would be very improper for a Missouri 
court to declare the clause valid despite the Michigan pro-
hibition, whatever its so-called "interest." Public policy 
validating foreign void agreements is possible but rarely as-
serted, and for good reasons. Thus, the conflicts question 
should have been plain. The decision was correct for the 
simple reason that the entire contract was centered in Mis-
soun. 
Due Process Clause. From the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, it has 
been occasionally deduced that a state may not resort to its 
own public policy to invalidate a contract made and con-
summated in another state. It was thus decided in 1934 that 
clauses of an insurance contract entered into in Tennessee in 
14 Holland Furnace Co. v. Connelley ( 1 942) 48 F. Supp. 543· 
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the presence of the parties and their employees, valid accord-
ing to a decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court, could not 
be challenged in Mississippi at the domicil of the insured.15 
The Supreme Court expressly recognizes that a state cannot 
enlarge the obligations of the parties to accord with every 
statutory policy.16 While similar reasonings may normally be 
based also on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due 
Process Clause can be used to cover the observance of the law 
of foreign countries. 
American repugnance to the use of the exception. Fortu-
nately, American writers17 and courts are more reluctant than 
all others to avail themselves of this exception. The issue has 
been clarified by frank emphasis on the independent reasons 
of policy supporting conflicts law. 
"There surely is a policy both of good morals and com-
mercial stability in giving legal effect to agreement lawfully 
made. To deny enforcement to the foreign made contract 
makes the state of the forum a shelter for those who refuse 
to perform their legal obligations. Unlike the cases where a 
court refuses relief to persons in pari delicto, such a rule 
penalizes the obligor who, by hypothesis, was doing nothing 
forbidden by law when and where his contract was made. 
Both morality and expediency are opposed to such a con-
clusion. Fortunately we may say with high confidence that 
this attitude is passing ... we become not only less suspicious 
towards other people's food and customs, but of their legal 
institutions as well.ms 
English courts are more impressed by regard for interna-
tional comity, requiring the recognition of the legislation of 
15 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (I 9 34) 
292 u. s. 143· 
16 /d. at 149; Home Insurance Co. v. Dick (1930) 281 U.S. 397,407-8. 
17 3 BEALE I 6 5 I agrees with the protest: the resort to the exception "should 
be extremely limited. This is especially true between the states of the United 
States." 
18 GOODRICH, 36 W.Va. L. Q., supra n. r, at 171. 
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other independent states/9 but the result is similar, inasmuch 
as public policy serves only exceptionally to bar the applica-
tion of foreign law. The courts are anxious to limit the public 
policy doctrine to "clear cases in which the harm to the public 
is substantially incontestable and does not depend upon the 
idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds."20 It is true, 
however, that the English extension of procedural, penal 
and jurisdictional prerogatives reduces such liberality in 
many instances, 21 although this is more notable in the field of 
torts. 
Recent European reaction. This highly desirable progress 
in the general American attitude must be anxiously preserved, 
in face of a strange literary reaction coming from Europe's 
darkest currents of nationalism. Writers have consciously 
yielded to a resurgent spirit that militates against the "lib-
eral" and "cosmopolitan" tendencies of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The usual approach has been reversed. Public policy, 
far from furnishing a rare exception to conflicts law, is now 
elevated to the foremost principle, and application of foreign 
law subordinated, as a mercy granted when convenient to the 
domestic system. No longer a kind of nuisance, resort to the 
law of the forum is deemed an organic element of conflicts 
law. The Italian sources of this new theory seem to flow from 
fascism, on the one hand, and from the theories of "recep-
tion," on the other. That foreign law must not only be re-
ferred to by the conflicts rule but also "received" into the 
domestic law, has become a dangerous proposition. It will 
suffice to quote in translation a few passages found in texts 
of writers who would not have been expected to foster such 
VIews: 
19 Scrutton, L. J., in Aksionairnoye Obschestvo. A. M. Luther v. Sagor & Co. 
[I9ZI] 3 K. B. 532> ss8. 
20 Lord Atkin in Fender v. St. John-Mildmay [I938] A. C. 1, IZ 
21 M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law I 78 § I 70. 
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The principle followed thus far as basis of the inter-
nationalistic conception, ought to be reversed by applying 
the logically opposed nationalistic conception. This applica-
tion purports to consider the problem of the clause of reser-
vation or of public order, as a problem of interpretation. 
The foreign law may be enforced as special internal law in 
the cases of international nature, provided that it can be 
assumed that the legislator has intended its enforcement as 
such. . . . Where such application cannot be founded upon 
the most probable intention of the legislator, automatically 
the internal common law re-enters into force, that is, the 
territorial law. 22 
In the first place, the assertion seems legitimate that ... 
the limitation by public order constitutes in a certain sense 
a part of every rule of private international law. In every 
conflicts rule a clause must be considered implied to the 
effect that ... foreign rules are referred to only to the extent 
that the insertion of such rules into the internal legal order 
does not disturb the harmony of its system. 23 
Recently, such a voice has been heard in this country. Nuss-
baum encourages the courts to a more uninhibited use of the 
public policy doctrine on the ground of local conceptions of 
the conflict of laws. In his opinion, the tendencies against 
public policy were caused by "liberal" and international-
minded illusions and still more by "dogmatic" preferences.24 
To quote: 
" ... in the question of 'public policy,' obnoxious though 
this concept may appear from the cosmopolitan point of 
view, the latter would practically lead to the weakening of a 
country's position vis-a-vis of foreign powers.ms 
"English and American courts ... are most hesitant to 
22 PACCHIONI, Elementi 207-208. 
23 AGo, Teoria 3 r 9-po. 
24 NusSBAUM, "Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Con-
flict of Laws," 42 Col. L. Rev. (I 942) I 89 at r 98 and in his other articles 
cited id. 196. 
2
" NussBAUM, op. cit. preceding note at 2oo. 
sss CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
resort, in terms, to public policy .... In a few cases courts 
have tried to rationalize their reserved attitude, but the 
reasons advanced are unconvincing. The explanation must 
probably be sought in the liberal tradition of the common-law 
courts. . . . Liberalism postulates international-mindedness 
favorable to the recognition of foreign law .... 
"Antipathy to public policy is not confined to common 
law courts. It is even more intense in the majority of con-
tinental writers. To them, it is the 'Cerberus' lying at the 
threshold of International Private Law. . . . In fact it is 
not so much liberalism of the English brand as internationalist 
dogmatism that is behind the prevailing attitude of Con-
tinental learning .... The most important part of the Amer-
ican problem of public policy bears upon interstate relations. 
With respect to this area, American writers have taken a 
particularly strong stand against the use of public policy .... 
Nevertheless, the several states, having been left in the 
possession of an almost unlimited legislative power in the 
private law field-a power actually exercised on the largest 
scale-they can hardly dispense with the protection provided 
by the public-policy rule against the infusion of disturbing 
elements which may result from contrary legislative policies 
of sister states.ll26 
Is it necessary to say that even the most rigid positivism 
can afford to give conflicts rules established by the state itself 
the same value as other state law? Or to point out that per-
haps liberalism but certainly not preconception enters into the 
cause when arbitrariness is utterly disliked? 
B. THE PROBLEM 
The familiar formulas, declaring the priority of "public 
policy, laws of the state, and morality" or reservations of 
"imperative laws and good morals" are too vague and com-
prehensive. Others, more modestly referring to public order 
and good morals, are exploited far beyond their literal mean-
26 NussBAUM, Principles I I 3, I Is, 123. 
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ing. If you establish a conflicts rule on the premise that a 
certain situation of living should be governed by a certain for-
eign law and at the same time declare that this same situation 
under unspecified conditions may require resort to the law 
of the forum, you have indeed deprived the conflicts rule of 
its legal character and reverted to the fabulous "comitas 
gentium," which negatived legal rules of international be-
havior and left every decision to uncontrollable courtesy. 
Perfectly well aware of this line of thought, courts like to 
repeat the old slogan of comity every time they consider a 
possible breach of their otherwise recognized conflicts rules. 
In the field of contracts, it would seem that the difficulties 
caused by the multiformity of our legal systems may be 
considerably alleviated, if territorial claims of state legisla-
tion are definitely confined to those branches of law that have 
to serve public interests. 27 
I. Policy of Public, Especially Administrative, Law 
The prudent Roman jurists had a trichotomy of leges per-
fectae, leges minus quam perfectae, and leges imperfectae, 
according to whether contracts violating a legal prohibition 
were void, punishable only, or not affected by any sanction. 
Modern legislators, with their multitude of commands and 
prohibitions, rather take for granted the rule that offending 
agreements are void, and leave to the courts the laborious 
task of construing this or that prohibition so as not to affect 
validity. Despite such attempts at restrictive interpretation, in-
numerable criminal, fiscal, and especially administrative pro-
visions do entail, often by natural consequence, sometimes 
27 The Continental literature discussing "territorial" law or lois de sureti et 
police sometimes approaches the distinction used here. Particularly NIBOYET 
550 § 443; to Repert. 95 No. 7, distinguishes public order from imperative 
laws, and NEUMEYER, 4 Int. Verwaltungs R. zp, 431 separates public law 
from public policy. However, nowhere to my knowledge has the view advocated 
in this chapter been supported. 
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wantonly, the nullity or at least unenforceability of con-
travening agreements. A purpose of general state administra-
tion or of the welfare of the population in general, is pro-
tected by interfering with private law. Sales of poison, arms, 
or liquor, employment of children, creating of monopolies, 
stipulations of gold clauses, trading with the enemy, are 
ordinarily void to the extent that the transactions are for-
bidden, not to mention contracts to overthrow the govern-
men, or to forge money. 
On the other hand, it is still true, after every imaginable 
controversy in the last decades, that in establishing the rules 
of behavior characteristic of private law, the state fulfills its 
own interest only in so far as it is interested in fair justice 
as the basis of mental and physical happiness. The particular 
rules serve in the first place the interests of individuals and 
organizations rather than those of state or society. 
If a state, not contented with the broad inroads of modern 
public law into the former spheres of private law, considers 
every substantive rule as mingled with consideration of com-
munity interests, it is logical to deny the existence of private 
law as the National-Socialist writers have done; they de-
tested even the name of "Civil Code." 
If a continuing fundamental difference between private 
and public law is conceded, the position of conflicts law in 
the meaning of private international law appears distinctly 
attached to private law alone, while administrative and fiscal 
rules have their own scope to be delimited for each according 
to its specific purpose. 
It will perhaps be objected that the distinction between 
private and public law, not familiar to the older common 
law, has been blurred in the civil law countries by wide 
spheres of mixed policies. However, the interference of 
public interest, great as it is, proceeds in discernible directions. 
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To take the most important example, modern labor law is 
composed of two parts.28 The one, pertaining to public law, 
which regulates the relations of employers and employees to 
the state and other public corporations, has been extended 
to include legislation on working hours, women and child 
labor, social insurance, organization of unions, or compulsory 
representative bodies, labor boards, and the procedure for 
settlement of labor disputes. The other part consists of the 
rules relating to individual contracts of employment as well 
as to collective bargaining. That a tariff convention is a 
contract of private law has been deduced in German law from 
the three points of view that the parties are private persons, 
the form is that of a private contract and the purpose is the 
regulation of private relations. 29 
In certain situations where the border line between private 
and public relations may seem doubtful, the difficulty of 
deciding on the exception of public policy exists under any 
theory. It is nevertheless certain from the objective point of 
view of critical jurisprudence that, for instance, a statutory 
provision prohibiting premature termination of an employ-
ment contract pertains to private law, when it is a perpetual 
regulation of the time requisite to give notice, since, then, it 
primarily protects the private interests of the workers and 
the enterprises, while it belongs to public law when it is an 
emergency measure in a temporary national crisis of unem-
ployment. 
To analyze the significance of this distinction, however, 
we have to contrast the application of domestic law with that 
of foreign law. 
28 See HuECK in Hueck and Nipperdey, 1 Lehrbuch des Arbeitsrechts ( 1931) 
8, who points out that this essentially theoretical question has a great practical 
significance for jurisdiction of courts and application of the general rules con-
cerning contracts. Our query furnishes a third practical angle. 
29 NIPPERDEY in 2 Lehrbuch, just cited n. 28, (1932) 131 § 12. 
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Public law of the forum. The distinction is of great im-
portance with respect to the various kinds of substantive rules 
of the forum. Prohibitions, established in public law, apply 
irrespective of the conflicts rules accompanying private law 
institutions. As an example, we may recall the principles 
elaborated in the American courts before Prohibition, in the 
application of the laws of "dry" states against the sale of 
intoxicating liquor. 
A court of a dry state, as a matter of course, had to enforce 
its own statute for the purpose of general welfare. Except 
in so far as the legislature was restrained by constitutional 
provisions, an annotator said, the state could forbid any action 
for the recovery of the purchase price of intoxicating liquor, 
even 
"with respect to a sale every element of which, from the 
solicitation of the order to the consummation of the executed 
contract by delivery of the goods, had its situs in another 
state the law of which permitted such sales; and this, too, 
without reference to any intention upon the part of either 
party to violate or evade the laws of the forum."30 
When a. court, however, was not bound by a statute, it 
would not refuse to entertain such an action merely because 
the sale, if made at the forum, would have been invalid, when 
there was no intention to violate or evade the law of the 
forum. 
Thus, a sale made outside the state was commonly en-
forced even though the order was solicited by an agent in the 
state.31 But some local statutes were construed as prohibiting 
also such preliminary steps, or as outlawing any transactions 
that contemplated introduction of the liquor into the forum.32 
All this resembles private international law but is es-
30 Note, Conflicts of laws as to sales of intoxicating liquor, 61 A. L. R. 
(1903) 417,418. 
31 E.g., Wind v. Iller & Co. (1895) 93 Iowa 316, 321, 61 N. W. 1oo1, 1ooz. 
32 STUMBERG 3 7 I. 
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sentially independent. Whether the object of a sale be liquor 
or anything else, no such grounds for invalidity as error, lack 
of authority of a representative, or incapacity to contract, nor 
the problems of nonperformance have ever been subjected 
to the law of a jurisdiction where negotiations have merely 
started. No statute would undertake to impress its normal 
domestic rules on contracts, "every element of which has its 
situs in another state." A state may also think it suitable to 
insist on annulling a sale of intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or 
weapons, despite an agreement of the parties submitting 
them to another law, although there is no other reason for 
challenging this choice of law by the parties. 
If thus, for fundamental clarification, we have to recognize 
the need of a separate delimitation of each administrative 
prohibition of the forum, it must be emphatically postulated 
that legislators and courts confine them within narrow 
boundaries. Extensions such as those described a~e relating 
to the domain of liquor laws, or of many tax statutes, do not 
favor a sound development of international law, either ad-
ministrative or private. In many cases, reasonable interpreta-
tion may well be satisfied with applying a domestic adminis-
trative prohibition exactly to the same contracts that ought 
to be governed by the private law of the forum, namely, the 
contracts centered there. Interfering with private contracts 
for purposes of general welfare is a matter delicate enough 
and should not be aggravated without cogent reasons by 
attacks on foreign contracts too. 
When a contract, however, is not within the local domain 
of the forum's prohibition, the ordinary conflicts rules apply. 
The courts know perfectly well that beyond those limits, an 
administrative policy of the forum is not usually susceptible 
of being taken as an absolute standard, overriding conflicts 
law and foreign law. A contract made and to be performed 
in Mexico could produce an action for payment of delivered 
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intoxicating liquor, enforceable in Arizona despite the Eigh-
teenth Amendment then in force. 3~ While, the court said, 
there were previous cases reluctant to enforce a foreign 
transaction which the law of the forum would disapprove, 
later decisions have realized the necessity that the course of 
trade 
" ... should be encouraged and fostered for mutual welfare. 
Of those Mexicans with whom we make valid contracts in 
this country, we expect faithful performance or the right 
to secure redress through Mexican courts. Adverse decisions 
on grounds of policy will breed suspicion or discrimination 
against us. We should be careful not to give less than we 
expect to receive." 
Sunday contracts. Another informing example is the treat-
ment of Sunday contracts in American courts. Among eight 
cases cited by Beale,34 in four the validity of the transaction 
was recognized under the lex loci contractus. 35 In one case, 
under the lex loci solutionis/6 and in two cases where the 
contract was made between persons present and naturally 
subject to the law of the place of contracting/7 invalidity 
was pronounced, evidently for individual equitable considera-
33Veytia v. Alvarez (1926) 30 Ariz. 3I6, 329, 247 Pac. II?, 121, I22. 
Contra: Ayub v. Automobile Mortgage Co. (Tex. Civ. App. I923) 252 S. W. 
287, representing a minority view, as stated by STUMBERG 252 n. 7I· 
34 2 BEALE I233 ns. I and 6 and I235 n. 6. 
35 Swann v. Swann (E. D. Ark. I 884) 2 I Fed. 299, Caldwell, J., declaring 
that the prohibition of Sunday contracts in Arkansas is not meant to constitute 
a strong public policy; Brown v. Browning (I886) IS R.I. 422, 7 At!. 403 
(contract made in Connecticut after sunset on Sunday valid by Conn. statute) ; 
McKee v. Jones (I89o) 67 Miss. 405, 7 So. 348 (sale of a horse, clearly 
governed by the law of Louisiana where it was permitted); Watkins Co. v. Hill 
(I926) 2I4 Ala. 507, Io8 So. 244. Adde Stamps v. Frost (I935) I74 Miss. 
32 5, I 64 So. 5 84 (terms agreed upon on Sunday in Tennessee, executed on 
Monday; contract would have been void if agreed to on Sunday in Mississippi). 
36 Brown v. Gates (I904) I2o Wis. 349, 97 N. W. 22I, rehearing denied 
(I904) 98 N. W. 205. See the comment by BATIFFOL son. 1. 
37 Strouse v. Lanctot (Miss. I9oo) 27 So. 6o6 (judgment for a resident who 
had been persuaded by a traveling salesman on a Sunday to order a number 
of suits); Lovell v. Boston & MaineR. Co. (I9Io) 75 N.H. 568, 78 At!. 
62 I (the waiver of liability of the railway invalidated, but nevertheless the 
liability affirmed on torts principles, the action being an "action on the case")· 
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tions. Only one case remains where the court had some chance 
to validate the contract under the law of the place of pay-
ment, but invalidated it under the law of the forum, in which 
all other elements were located, as the court took care to 
state.38 Far from reading into the domestic statute an ab-
solute standard of religious behavior, the courts are acutely 
aware of the territorial limits. Prevailingly, the practice in 
this field implements the policy described by Williston 
whereby in the main, "the courts have been astute so to in-
terpret contracts as to find them not to conflict with Sunday 
statutes or to hold them to have become executed and, there-
fore, unassailable."39 
In a similar way, it has been held in British Columbia that 
a contract of indemnity for bail, there illicit, is enforceable 
when made in proceedings in the State of Washington 
where the agreement is lawful, such contract not being "in-
herently repugnant to moral and public interests."40 
In a Texas decision, the antitrust laws of Oklahoma were 
held to prevent enforcement of a contract made in Minnesota, 
but performable in Oklahoma. Only because the Oklahoma 
statutes were not proved and were presumed to be identical 
with the Texas antitrust law the latter was applied; an added 
reservation of the court's right to limit "comity" may be 
taken as harmless. 41 
Foreign governing law. We are on traditional ground, 
when a transaction is governed by a foreign private law and 
declared void by this law as a consequence of a provision of 
its public law. Although rarely expressed in the literature, 
the opinion seems common everywhere that on principle a 
foreign-governed contract is subject to all prohibitions of the 
38 Arbuckle v. Reaume (1893) 96 Mich. 243,55 N. W. 8oS. 
39 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 48 I 6 § 1700. 
40 National Surety Co. v. Larsen [I 929] 3 D. L. R. 79 (Brit. Col. C. A.), 
[1929] 4 D. L. R. 918, 943· 
41 Watkins Co. v. McMullan (Tex. Civ. App. I928) 6 S. W. (2d) 823. 
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governing law, irrespective of their purpose. The foreign 
private law applies, whether or not it is influenced by ad-
ministrative law.42 
For what reason the private law of Michigan avoids a con-
tract governed thereby-be it because of measures exercised 
under the police power or because of measures for the protec-
tion of children, employees, or insured persons-is of no 
concern to the private international law of other jurisdictions. 
When a corporation is doing business in a foreign state with-
out authorization and that state avoids contracts thus made, 
the nullity is recognized wherever the law of that state is 
held to govern the contract. 43 Continental courts decide in the 
same way.44 
This principle, of course, is exposed to the exception of 
the public policy of the forum, when the latter clashes with 
the foreign public interest underlying the decision of the pri-
vate law problem. War measures of the enemy are absolutely 
incapable of enforcement. Exchange restrictions serving 
economic warfare in times of political peace, confiscation, or 
impairment of private property, when reaching beyond the 
borders of the foreign state, are repudiated. 45 
2. Policy of Private Law 
If, thus far, judicial practice as a whole agrees with the 
facts of international legal life, the problem is different in 
the narrower sphere of the typical interests safeguarded by 
private law. The problem is this: Should such social policy 
as pursued in insurance or usury statutes, or the economic 
42 MELCHIOR 267 §§ I79-I8I with instructive exposition of the German prac-
tice, a Dutch and a French case. Adde Swiss BG. (Dec. I4, I92o) 46 BGE. 
II 490, 495· Contra: NEUMEYER, 4 Int. Verwaltungs R. 249 n. 67 without any 
persuasive reason. 
43 See supra pp. 2o6 n. I47, 2I4 n. I88. 
44 E.g., OLG. Hamburg (May 2 3, I 907) Leipz. Z. I 908, 249· 
45 For some comparative notes, see RABEL, "Situs Problems in Enemy Prop-
erty Measures," I I Law and Cont. Probl. (I945) 122-I23. 
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policy inspiring national legislation on the liability of public 
carriers override the court's own conflicts rules? For in all 
these cases the interests of the individual customers are pri-
marily protected, although the frequency of these contracts 
is deemed to warrant special legislation. 
To face the problem more closely, the premise of this in-
quiry may be remembered, namely, that the contract at bar 
is not sufficiently connected with the forum to call for the 
application of the lex fori as the governing law; on the con-
trary, the contract is considered to be centered in a foreign 
jurisdiction. The question, then, is: Should this contract, 
nevertheless, be affected by the policy of the domestic law 
concerning private interests? 
It is submitted that this question should be strictly answered 
in the negative, and that the courts, particularly the Ameri-
can courts, prevailingly do reach the same result, although 
a few cases here and there uphold the pretension of an un-
restricted sovereign discretion. 
While we shall continue to discuss the present role of 
public policy with each particular subject, we may contem-
plate here some popular prototypes of a paramount policy 
of the forum. 46 
'
6 For an outstanding example of a borderline case, we may refer to the pro-
vision of the German law on revalorization of I925, mentioned above p. 547, 
which revived debts paid with heavily depreciated money. Public policy was 
advanced as an objection by Trib. civ. Seine (April 9, I93o) Clunet I930, 
1012 and Trib. Geneve (May 31, I930) Revue 1930, 395, and implicitly by 
the French Cass. (civ.) (April 14, 1934) S.1935.I.2o1, justly criticized by 
NIBOYET ibid. The exception of public policy was, however, disregarded by 
Trib. Mixte Cairo (Feb. 17, 1930) Clunet 1931,467, and thoroughly refuted 
by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Feb. 26, I932) 58 BGE. II 124,126. BARTIN, 
Note, Clunet 1931, 470 asserted territorial limits for retroactive laws. ARMIN-
JON, Revue I 9 3 o, 3 8 5 claimed that the German law was inapplicable as 
"political." The French Court of Cassation in another case, Cass. (req.) (Oct. 
19, 1938) Gaz. Pal. 1938 II 886 reached the same result by interpreting the 
intention of the parties as directed to extinguishing definitely the debt; see 
contra the note ibid. For a more powerful argument see supra Chapter 32, 
p. 547 and n. I 14·· 
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C. EXAMPLES 
1. Wagering Contracts 
Foremost under the typical examples of contracts unen-
forceable under cogent laws of the forum are gambling and 
wagering contracts. Differences of legal treatment are fre-
quent enough, particularly with respect to the more serious 
problems of speculative bargains, to provoke conflicts of laws. 
A well-known decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court of 
1884 demonstrates the intransigent point of view.47 A specula-
tion in stocks upon margins was validly undertaken under 
the rules of New York, but the court declared it an offense 
against "the plain public policy" of New Jersey, because a 
transaction of exactly the same kind would have been unlaw-
ful there. Enforcement, thus, was refused against a resident 
of the forum. As Goodrich observed, "it would be hard to 
find a more striking instance of an 'intolerable affectation of 
superior virtue'-the famous words of Judge Beach-by one 
state toward another."48 That the Restatement has adopted 
this decision49 is inconsistent with its own praise of uniform 
enforcement of rights acquired in other states. 
But what in this country may count as an irregular solu-
tion, commonly occurs in many, if not most European juris-
dictions. The domestic restrictions on dealing in futures are 
either regarded as an absolute moral standard, or as an in-
eluctable screen of protection for the domiciliaries of the 
forum. 50 Thus, the prevailing French doctrine always refuses 
47 Flagg v. Baldwin (r884) 38 N.J. Eq. 219, 48 Am. Rep. 308; accord, 
Coffe & Carkener v. Wilhite (r9r6) 56 Okla. 394, r56 Pac. r69. 
48 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra n. I, at I 7 I. 
49 Illustrations respecting gambling debts and dealing in cotton futures, to 
§ 6I2. 
50 See BRANDL, Internationales Borsenprivatrecht (Marburg 1925) I56ff.; 
AMIEux, 2 Repert. 442 No. 2 Iff.; NIBOYET, r o Repert. 92; GuTZWILLER 
I 5 72; BRANDL, 2 Rechtsvergleichendes Handworterbuch 599· 
For'Switzerland, see 58 BGE. II 52; 6r id. II 1I7. 
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enforcement, if it would be denied by the French law of 
r885, which, it is true, allows a relatively large place for 
dealing in futures at exchanges. Where the contract is unen-
forceable under the foreign governing law itself, even though 
this law may follow from party agreement, this prohibition, 
too, is mostly observed.~1 The elaborate German law distin-
guishes between valid dealings at German stock and commod-
ity exchanges (requiring specific personal qualifications) and 
unenforceable speculative contracts. All foreign transactions 
that would be subject to the exception of wager, if made in 
Germany, are unenforceable against persons domiciled in 
Germany.52 Moreover, agreements involving business at le-
gitimate foreign exchanges, such as an order of a domiciliary 
to a broker in Liverpool53 or New Y ork54 to sell or buy <:!otton 
or coffee at the local exchange, 55 or to sell stock for delivery 
"ultimo" at the Stock Exchange in Paris, is open to the 
exception that effective delivery or reception was not in-
tended; foreign transactions, it is explained, are not certain 
to afford the public the same guarantees as institutions under 
the control of the German government.56 In well-deserved 
51 See for citations AMIEUX, z Repert. 443 Nos. 24, 27; PILLET, 2 Traite 
239, 240 § 5I4; SURVILLE 359ff. § 248; NIBOYET, IO Repert. IJ2 No. 240 
his, 246. To the same effect, Institute of International Law (Paris I 9 I o) Revue 
1910, 956. 
Greece: App. Athens (r9o4, No. usa) Clunet I9o8, 245. 
Switzerland: C. Obi., art. 5 r 3 ; the identical section of the former text has 
been treated as of public order, BG. (Feb. 10, 1905) JI BGE. II 55, 6o; 
(Feb. 2, 1932) 58 id. II 48, 52; (June 4, 1935) 6r id.II l14· 
App. Douai (Nov. z, I933) Clunet 1934, II95· 
52 German Exchange Law (Borsengesetz) of I go8 § 6r; BGB. §§ 762, 764; 
RG. (Feb. 7, r899) 43 RGZ. 9I; (July 8, I899) 44 RGZ. 52, 54 and many 
subsequent decisions. See STAUB-HEINICHEN in 4 Staub § 376, Anhang 66 
n. So, roo n. 197. 
53 RG. (Jan. 30, I9r7) 89 RGZ. 358. 
54 RG. (Oct. r4, 1931) 134 RGZ. 67, 70. 
55 RG. (July r 3, I 90I) 49 RGZ. 59: the New York broker was represented 
by an agent in Hamburg, but this does not change this aspect of the case. RG. 
(June 15, I9o3) 55 RGZ. I83 involved stock transactions at exchanges in New 
York and Chicago. 
56 89 RGZ. 359, supra n. 53· The Austrian Supreme Court extended the 
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criticism, this attitude has been termed an offense against the 
natural international boundaries. 57 The Anglo-German 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal refused to consider the German 
notions.58 The Reichsgericht, however, drew a further un-
desirable consequence from them, by applying the principle 
that prohibited contracts may not be enforced by agreement 
for foreign arbitration, jurisdiction, or foreign law.59 
As another example of intolerance, a recent Belgian de-
cision refuses enforcement to a stock exchange operation 
validly made in Paris, if it can be proved that the parties did 
not intend factual delivery of the securities. 60 The Seine 
Tribunal even held that because the French law prohibited 
"le pari aux courses de chevaux" other than "pari mutuel,"61 
a partnership to exercise a license of the Hungarian Jockey 
Club for race betting was unlawful and that a partner could 
not ask for an accounting on the business done. 62 
Contrary views definitely prevail in the Anglo-American 
orbit. As is well known, Lord Mansfield's approach in case 
of a foreign loan given for gambling purposes was different, 
stressing the fact that the loan was valid where given and 
domestic absolute prohibition on grain dealings in futures to foreign trans-
actions and seems to have been followed in this claim by the Czechoslovakian 
Supreme Court (March 2, I934) Io Z.ausl.PR. (I936) I68. 
57 BRANDL, supra n. so, I76, I83. 
58 Gruning and Co. v. Gebriider Fraenkel (Feb. 6/r 7, I922) I Recueil trib. 
arb. mixtes 726 (contract made subject to the Rules of the Liverpool Cotton 
Association). 
59 Germany: RG. (May I 8, I904) s8 RGZ. I 52 (leading case). For thorough 
criticism see LUDWIG RAISER, Das Recht der allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen 
(I93S) I39, I43 and n. 2. For other countries, see BRANDL, supra n. so, 209 
n. s2. 
60 Trib. civ. Liege (Jan. 13, I936) summarized in 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (I938) 
2s8 No. IOI9I. 
61 Cf. the analogous American statutes in the cases discussed by WILLISTON, 
6 Contracts 4703 § I 66s n. 6. 
62 Trib. civ. Seine (June 2, I922) Clunet I924, 429. The court simply ap-
plied the French law, and as the note judiciously observes, the decision should 
have referred to the French ordre public-as though then it would be correct. 
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resulting in judgment for the plaintiff to the extent of the 
money lent.63 Several cases followed his application of Eng-
lish law qua lex loci solutionis, presumably intended by the 
parties, 64 while, in a contrary opinion, the English gaming 
statutes were held to have no bearing at all on foreign games.65 
In other cases, where the contract made no reference to 
English localities, actions for recovery of gain in gambling or 
of a loan for gambling, were enforced on the ground of the 
validity of the transaction in Baden-Baden66 or Monte Carlo.67 
Whatever law may have been declared applicable, the courts, 
during the growing complication of British legislation on 
gaming,68 gave no quarter to the exception based on public 
policy of the forum. 
In a case of I 933, a Missouri court thought that "the 
overwhelming weight of authority in this country is that 
gambling transactions will not be recognized as valid in states 
having statutes declaring such gambling contracts and tran-
sactions illegal and void, even where they are perfectly valid 
in the state where entered into."69 But the court in this case 
was clearly impressed by suspicion of many dishonest ma-
noeuvers, including false personation, narcotizing tablets, and 
card sharpers, all this scenario being employed against rustic 
innocence. Whether really much authority is available, seems 
63 Robinson v. Bland (r76o) 2 Burr. ron, I w. Bl. 234; cf. Cozens-
Hardy, L. J., in Moulis v. Owen [I9o7] I K. B. 746, 755ff. 
64 Story v. McKay (I 8 8 8) I 5 0. R. 69 (note executed in New York payable 
in Ontario); Moulis v. Owen [1907] I K. B. 746 (baccarat game in Algiers, 
check payable in London). 
65 Fletcher Moulton, L. J., dissenting in Moulis v. Owen, supra n. 64, at 
757; DICEY, Note, 23 Law Q. Rev. (1907) 249, approved in a Note by SIR 
FREDERICK POLLOCK, id. at 251. 
66 Quarrier v. Colston (1842) 1 Phillips 147. 
;;7 Saxby v. Fulton [1909] 2 K. B. zo8; DICEY 6so illustration z n. (1) 
approves. 
68 See FALCONBRIDGE, "More Anomalies in the Law of Wagering Contracts," 
9 Can. Bar Rev. (1931) 331. 
69 Maxey v. Railey & Bros. Banking Co. (Mo. 1933) 57 S. W. (zd) ro9r, 
1093· 
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doubtful; however, games of chance, indeed, are not worthy 
of serious judicial consideration, nor of scholarly discussion. 
With respect to dealings in futures, however, or, in another 
version, with respect to contracts for commercial objects/0 al-
though the Supreme Court of the United States has rather 
purposefully avoided deciding the issue under the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause/1 in conflicts law the weight of authority 
is represented again by holdings of the Missouri courts. Mis-
souri has severe prohibitions against dealings in futures, but 
these statutes are declared to have no extraterritorial effect 
on contracts made in other states dealing with the rise and fall 
of stocks, bonds, and commodities; the recognition includes 
brokerage contracts made in the state when the transactions 
are to be performed outside the state.72 The governing law, 
hence, also determines whether there is a gaming contract. 73 
Peculiar difficulties seem to arise only from the doctrine 
7° CoRBIN, Cases on Contracts (ed. 2, 1933) 1128 n. 1o. 
71 Bond v. Hume ( 191 7) 243 U. S. 15. The Supreme Court has not contested 
however, the view of the Missouri Court in the cases of the following note. 
72 Edwards Brokerage Co. v. Stevenson ( 1901) I 6o Mo. 5 I 6, 6 I S. W. 6 I 7; 
dicta and citations in Elmore-Schultz Grain Co. v. Stonebraker (19I9) 202 
Mo. App. 8I, 2I4 S. W. 2I6; Claiborne Commission Co. v. Stirlen (Mo. App. 
I924) 262 S. W. 387. Strangely deviating, McVean v. Wehmeier (I923) 2I5 
Mo. App. 587, 256 S. W. Io85 applying Missouri law because the contract was 
made in the state and ignoring the string of cases in point. Cf. in general, 
MINOR 384 § 16I, 422 § q6. 
The cases cited seem simply to apply the law of the place of performance. 
But the federal courts have employed various methods in order to validate 
orders performable on a "contract-market" authorized by federal statute ( 7 
U.S. C. A.§§ Iff., Supp. I945). See Notes, 40 Harv. L. Rev. (I927) 638; 
8I U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I933) 88r. 
The statutes in question, Mo. Rev. Stat. I939, §§ 47I4-47I6, 47I9, are 
sharply distinguished from the provisions against bucket shops, Rev. Stat. I 9 3 9, 
§§ 4706-4 713, which are considered to make contracts illegal irrespective of 
transactions on a foreign market, and are not superseded by the federal statutes 
on grain futures, see Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co. (I932) 288 U.S. 188, 
196 n. 2. In a subsequent decision, Wolcott & Lincoln v. Humphrey (1938) 
1I9 S. W. (zd) 1022, the Missouri Supreme Court seems to overrule the entire 
distinction, but in fact emphasizes merely the section, then 43 I 8 (Rev. Stat. 
I 939, § 4708), which belongs to the bucket shop law. 
73 Hood & Co. v. McCune (Mo. App. I92I) 235 S. W. I 58. 
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that recovery cannot be had on a note or bill or mortgage, 
illegal or void for want of consideration in the place of per-
formance. On the latter ground, English courts have re-
fused enforcement of a check given as security for a foreign 
gambling debt but allowed the creditor to sue on the debt 
itsel£74 and American courts have been influenced by this 
strange view. 75 
To justify the German refusal to enforce foreign wagers, 
the argument has been advanced76 that enforcement is a mat-
ter of procedure, since in German law an obligation to pay 
is recognized to the extent that money paid to discharge a 
gaming debt cannot be recovered. 77 But in correct analysis, 
the absence of the right to sue is a defect of the obligation, 
to be classified along with voidness and other forms of in-
efficacy. 
Lotteries. Also in the related field of lotteries, several 
American courts have clearly applied the foreign law. As 
early as a century ago, when an obligation was entered into 
to sell lottery tickets in Kentucky, on the basis of an enact-
ment by that state for the benefit of a college, a New York 
court held that the contract, valid where performable, was 
enforceable, irrespective of the prohibition of lotteries by 
New York statutes.78 In other cases, the law of the place 
where the ticket was sold, or a partnership in lottery tickets 
was formed, has been applied. 79 But that the policy of the 
74 Moulis v. Owen, supra n. 64; Societe Anonyme des Grands Etablissements 
du Touquet Paris-Plage v. Baumgart [I 92 7] W.N. 7 8. 
75 Thuna v. Wolf (I928) 132 Misc. 56, 228 N.Y. Supp. 658, declares the 
action on the gambling debt itself to be possibly enforceable. 
76 KAHN, I Abhandl. I88 who characteristically referred at the same time 
to the then treatment of the Statute of Frauds; recently RAAPE, D. IPR. 62 
again argues to this effect. 
77 See BGB. § 762 par. I sent. 2. 
78 Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Bassford and Nones (I 844) 6 Hill p6. 
79 M'Intyre v. Parks (Mass. I 84I) 44 Mass. 207; Thatcher v. Morris 
(r854) II N.Y. 437; Roselle v. McAuliffe (1897) I4I Mo. 36, 39 S. W. 
274; 2 BEALE 1240. 
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forum does not decide by itself, is the generally accepted 
doctrine, well grounded in the territorial character of such 
statutory prohibitions. In a recent revival of Dicey's80 con-
trary proposition, it has been asked: Why should the forum 
be compelled, in a lottery action by or against a resident, to 
subordinate its policy to the policy of another state? 81 But 
the answer is simple. The policy of such a law does not ex-
tend to every suit coming before its courts nor to all contracts 
"made" in its territory, but only to the contracts centered 
within the forum. The old case in the matter of the Kentucky 
lottery, mentioned before, is correct also on this point. 
Indorsed gaming notes. Of particular informative value 
is a series of cases dealing with innocent indorsees of notes 
issued to pay gaming debts or to furnish the means for wager-
ing. By a universally favored rule, any illicit cause of an obli-
gation embodied in a negotiable instrument is no defense 
against an indorsee ignorant of the facts. This, in the vast 
majority of countries and courts, extends to notes and bills, 
originating in gambling.82 The North Carolina court has 
remarked that it would encourage vice, if a successful gambler 
could obtain the value of such a note by indorsement and then 
render his obligation ineffective by pleading his own wrong-
doing. 83 Statutes annulling private contracts for reasons of 
general social welfare, if not handled with great caution, have 
an unfortunate tendency to defeat their own purpose. How-
ever, the Illinois Supreme Court has maintained a practice, 
allowing the plea of prohibited gambling against an innocent 
indorsee despite a contrary law governing the indorsement. 
80 DICEY 655 illustration 7> without any case citation to support it. 
81 NussBAUM, Principles I23, as example for the thesis quoted supra n. 26. 
82 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 4729 § I 676; Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts § 590; FALCONBRIDGE, I Banking and Bills of Exchange (ed. 5, I935) 
7I 2. The same is recognized even in Switzerland which has the most in-
transigent attitude in Europe against wagering, see C. 0BL., art. 5I4 par. I 
in fine. 
83 Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Crafton (I 92 I) I 8 I N. C. 404, I 07 
S. E. 3I6. 
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The practice goes back to a decision where the notes were all 
dated at St. Louis and payable at the same place. The bargain 
consisted of mere speculations upon the future prices of grain 
and under Missouri law was void, but this defense could not 
be objected against an ignorant indorsee who had acquired 
the notes before maturity. The Illinois court referred to the 
Criminal Code of Illinois and to its own previous views, to 
the effect that the transaction was 
"Not only contrary to public policy but it is a crime-a· 
crime against the state, a crime against religion and morality, 
and a crime against all legitimate trade and business."84 
That this is still the law in Illinois, 85 shows how muddled 
the considerations of "public policy" are. Such violent moral 
indignation, of course, may impel a court to protect the bench 
from contamination with the outrageous foreign law. Not a 
difference in laws or legal systems but deep-seated moral 
inconsistency of a foreign-created right with the domestic 
principles compels resort to public policy. However, the out-
burst is somewhat misplaced. A wise court should not take 
the attitude of a conscientious objector, when it is asked to 
give an innocent indorsee what he would receive in nearly 
every other jurisdiction. 
In the soundest decisions, the exception of public policy, 
in fact, is reduced to the function of an objectively ascertained 
moral sense: 
"A contract that is valid where made and that does not 
involve any morale turpitude, and is not pernicious and 
detestable will be enforced in a state although the laws of 
such state forbid the making of such contract."86 
84 Pope v. Hanke (I894) I55 Ill. 6I7, 630,40 N. E. 839,843. 
85 Thomas v. The First Nat'l Bank of Belleville (I904) 2I3 Ill. 26I, 72 
N. E. 8oi: although the contract is licit in Missouri and the District of Co-
lumbia, it is not enforceable, since it violates the penal laws of Illinois! See for 
other cases, 3 8 Ill. Ann. Stat. (I 9 34) 4o6ff., annotations to § 329; the Sup-
plement of I 944 has no additions. 
86 American Furniture Mart Bldg. Corp. v. W. C. Redmon Sons & Co. (Ind. 
I936) I N. E. (2d) 6o6 at 6o9, HARPER & TAINTOR, Cases 8oi (cognovit 
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2. Various Contracts 
Champerty. The old absolute prohibition of "champerty" 
was conceived as a prohibitory law making void any agree-
ment to share in the future proceeds of a law suit. The tra-
ditional English approach that the disapproval affected con-
tracts wherever made87 is hardly to be encountered any more.88 
On the one hand, the scope of the offense of champerty has 
shrunk, in the opinion of American jurisdictions, so as to 
embrace no more than an officious interference, without 
proper interest, in other people's obligations,89 and its col-
lateral effects have been more or less weakened. 90 On the 
other hand, the American courts usually admit any solution 
offered by the law of the place where suit for enforcement of 
the debt is brought. 91 
Beale and other writers92 have reproached this practice 
for failing to distinguish between prohibited agreements to 
be governed by the lex loci contractus and prohibited suits, 
note validly executed in Illinois; if enforcement were refused, people in In-
diana would be invited to fraud by signing notes in Illinois unavailable in 
their own courts). The decision refers to International Harvester Co. of 
America v. McAdam (19ro) 14z Wis. 114, rz4 N. W. ro4z; Garrigue v. 
Keller (1905) 164 Ind. 676, 74 N. E. sz3, sz7. These cases follow one of 
the rules in ELISHA GREENHOOD, The Doctrine of Public Policy in the Law 
of Contracts (Chicago 1886) 46. 
87 Grell v. Levy (1864) 16 C. B. N. S. 73; DICEY 654 illustration 3; 
LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws z r 7 n. 64 points to two Arkansas cases, viz., 
Arden Lumber Co. v. Henderson Iron Works (1907) 83 Ark. z4o, 103 S. W. 
185; White-Wilson-Drew Co. v. Egelhoff (r9ro) 96 Ark. 105, 131 S. W. zo8. 
But these cases deal with notes incorporating ten per cent for attorney's fees, 
valid under Louisiana law, but declared unenforceable in Arkansas, being 
private penalties. This is a different type of case. 
88 Alberta: Waters v. Campbell (C. A. Alberta 1913) zs W. L. R. 838, 6 
W. W. R. 957, LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws z17§ 97· 
89 Gilman v. Jones (r889) 87 Ala. 691, 5 So. 784, 787,7 So. 48. For details 
see WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 48 34ff. § I 7 rz; Restatement, Contracts § 542. 
90 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 484rff. § 1713. 
91 Richardson v. Rowland (1873) 40 Conn. 565; Gilman v. Jones (r888) 
supra n. 89; Roller v. Murray (r9o7) 107 Va. sz7, 59 S. E. 4zr. In Black-
well v. Webster (r886) z9 Fed. 614 the law of the place of contracting was 
applied. 
92 z BEALE IZ3I; STUMBERG Z4I. 
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enforceable or not according to the Jaw of the place of per-
formance, which place seems to be identified with the place 
where the court is sitting. At the same time, this border line 
is described as practically difficult to trace. But the place of 
the law suit is not necessarily the place of "performance" of 
an accounting between the parties to the agreement; nor 
should it be material for the question which statute applies, 
whether some statutes continue to make the agreement void 
and the others merely prohibit the law suit. The view of the 
courts should be supported, not by mechanical rules but 
rather by the fact that the agreement is centered at the place 
where the suit is intended to be brought. However, in each 
of these opinions, the idea of an absolute prohibition affecting 
all foreign agreements is left far behind. 
Other examples. Similarly, it has been held in Alabama 
that assignment of a life insurance policy to a person with 
no insurable interest in the life of the insured was validly 
executed in New York and to be enforced as against the law of 
the forum, since it comprised nothing inherently bad.93 The 
contrary, it is true, has recently been held to be the view 
of Texas, by a federal court in that state.94 
Again, general opinion repudiates the use of public policy 
to enforce the forum's conception of annulment for duress. 95 
Examples can be multiplied.916 
Protection of personality. Statutory provisions for the pro-
tection of workers or employees in employment contracts (not 
in the class of "territorial" provisions respecting health or 
93 Haase v. First Nat'l Bank of Anniston (I9I9) 203 Ala. 624, 84 So. 76r. 
94 Griffin v. McCoach (C. C. A. sth I94I) I23 F. (2d) 55o, 551. The 
Supreme Court of the United States had previously recognized the constitutional 
freedom in "public policy which protects citizens against the assumed dangers 
of insurance on their lives held by strangers," Griffin v. McCoach (I 941) 3 I 3 
U. S. 498. Cf. MoRGAN, "Choice of Law Governing Proof," 58 Harv. L. Rev. 
(I944) I53 at I57 n. 8. 
95 Supra p. 525. 
96 For other examples see WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 5094 § 1 792. 
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morality pertaining to public labor law) regularly apply 
only as a part of the governing law. Some doubt has affected 
the restrictions imposed on stipulations in employment con-
tracts forbidding the employee to engage in activities com-
petitive with the business for which he is engaged, during a 
certain time after termination of his services. The statutes 
vary greatly. Some nullify any such restraint of trade. Others 
allow three months, a year, three years, or a reasonable time. 
What law governs, is controversial, but prevailing opinion 
seems to favor the law of the place or places where services 
have been rendered.97 
The exception of public policy, however, has rarely been 
used. Fry,]., did it with sweeping language in a well-known 
case of a French employment, but in this instance English 
law was the governing law.98 In one case, an express stipula-
tion for the law of the state controlling the employing com-
pany was disregarded, on the ground of public policy, as "in-
effectual to avoid the statute of California, the place of per-
formance."99 A German decision extended the local restric-
tion to a foreign contract of a German national in a foreign 
business place.Hlo These two solutions are plainly wrong. The 
97 United States: 2 BEALE 1230; Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co. (C. C. A. 
9th, N. D. Cal. I 924) 300 Fed. I, 3· On the other hand, Holland Furnace Co. 
v. Connelley (D. C. E. D. Mo. I942) 48 F. Supp. 543 applies the local 
Missouri law permitting the clause even in case Michigan law forbidding it 
were the governing law. Cf. supra pp. 383, 554· 
Germany: A natural effect of the rule of lex loci solutionis. 
Italy: App. Genova (April I8, I904) Riv. Dir. Com. I904 II 36I (employ-
ment of a teacher in Switzerland by the Berlitz School of Milan; Italian law 
applied, against the prohibition of the Swiss lex loci contractus). 
98 Rousillon v. Rousillon (I88o) I4 Ch. D. 351, 369; see CHESHIRE q8. 
99 Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co. (C. C. A. 9th I 924) 300 Fed. I, 3· 
100 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (April 6, I907) 72 Seuffert's Blatter fiir 
Rechtsanwendung 672, for employees of German nationality, strange, but ap-
proved by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 274 n. I and apparently by LEWALD 244· An-
other decision, OLG. Dresden (Jan. 25, I9o7) I4 ROLG. 345, forcibly intro-
duces minimum terms for giving notice (HGB. § 67) ·into an English employ-
ment contract of a German employee; this has been criticized as going much 
too far even by NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 274 n. I. 
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first mtmmtzes without justification the agreement of the 
parties on the applicable law, which would have satisfied 
even the theory requiring substantial connection therewith. 
A protective norm of California private law was treated as 
if it were a police regulation for the general welfare. The 
German case is typical for the unilateral "protection" of 
nationals, which easily may turn out to cause unfavorable 
discrimination against these nationals abroad. 
On a broader plan, individuals are protected by modern 
private law against binding themselves by excessive obliga-
tions. The prototype of these provisions was the rule of the 
Code Napoleon that no one can engage his services but for 
a time or for a certain enterprise.101 This fundamental law of 
emancipation from serfdom has justly been treated always as 
imperative also in conflicts law.102 It is clear, however, that 
not the same exalted position belongs to the varying municipal 
rules determining in detail the time or place for which an 
individual may validly commit his services.103 
The same is true, for instance, in the case where an irre-
vocable and all-inclusive power of attorney, without valuable 
consideration and any proper interest of the agent, was ex-
ecuted in New York for exercise in Germany. The two laws 
differed in allowing remedies against exploitation of the prin-
cipal, but either law, if governing the contract, was good 
enough.104 It would have been different, if one of the laws 
involved had not provided any aid against thoughtless dis-
position by a person of all his assets; but there is scarcely such 
a law. 
101 C. C. art. I 780. 
102 8 LAURENT 243 § I 69; WErss, 4 Traite 3 76 and n. 4; 3 FIORE § I I I 9· 
103 RouAsT, Melanges Pillet 210; CALEB, 5 Repert. 2I2 No. 53; more 
recently also BARTIN, "Une conception nouvelle de Ia loi locale," 52 Recueil 
(I9J5) II 583, 627, denies the application of ordre public to employments in 
foreign countries. To an opposite effect, 2 FRANKENSTEIN 336. 
104 The problem is studied by RABEL, "Unwiderruflichkeit der Vollmachtt 7 
Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 797, 8os, 8o7. 
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J. Immoral Transactions105 
Bribery. In I 8 So, the Supreme Court of the United 
States106 refused enforcement to the petition of the Turkish 
Consul General against the Winchester Arms Company for 
payment of a ten per cent commission unquestionably prom-
ised him by the firm. He had, by his influence, induced the 
purchasing agent of his government to accept the defendant's 
offer for very considerable deliveries. The Court took into 
account that the Turkish government at that time may have 
considered the behavior of the plaintiff, not paid for his work, 
as quite blameless; but the Court stated that the contract was 
corrupt. 
"The services stipulated and rendered were prohibited 
by considerations of morality and policy which should prevail 
at all times and in all countries .... Contracts permissible by 
other countries are not enforceable in our courts, if they 
contravene our laws, our morality, or our policy. The con-
tract in suit was made in this country, and its validity must 
be determined by our laws. But had it been made in Turkey, 
and were it valid there, it would meet with the same reproba-
tion when brought before our courts for enforcement.m07 
The Court, in my respectful opinion, was right in deciding 
the case because the contract was made and to be performed 
in this country and gravely violated the American sense of 
propriety. The same reason explains why the Court, as it 
said, would always refuse enforcement to foreign contracts of 
such kind. But that "our laws" and "our policy" are as com-
pulsory as "our morality," cannot be conceded. 
Lease of a gambling house. In a well-justified contrast to 
the Italian decisions granting liberal enforcement to foreign 
105 English cases are collected by DICEY 653-655; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 
181 § 172. 
106 Oscanyan v. Arms Co. (r88o) 103 U.S. 26r. 
107 /d., supra n. ro6, at 271, 272 and 277. 
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valid gaming contracts, the Court of Cassation in Rome<'s 
refused enforcement to an Egyptian judgment by which the 
leaseholder of a gambling house was held obligated to pay 
the rent. The offense was not seen so much in the aleatory 
character of the games as in the exploitation of dangerous 
human passions for egoistic purposes, as it was stressed that 
morality was violated. This reasoning is sound, if the refusal 
of the courts to deal with res turpes is ever considered sound. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Too great a margin has been left to the discretion of courts 
in disregarding the normal effects of conflicts rules. In this 
opinion, I feel encouraged by the results of Nutting. He sug-
gests, however, a transfer from the courts to the legislatures 
of the selection of the domestic interests that are to be safe-
guarded from foreign encroachment. 109 A similar proposal 
was made in I 9 I o by the Institute of International Law: 
Every lawmaker should determine with utmost care which of 
his provisions may never be replaced by foreign law.110 But 
do legislatures, in this respect, deserve more confidence than 
the majority of the judges who have learned to understand 
the necessary restrictions of local views? The evil could easily 
be aggravated by asking too many questions of the legisla-
tures in each type of enactment. 
The principle itself, rather, must be freed from its vague 
and all-inclusive character. Although no mechanical rule can 
shape the elusive exception of public policy, it may well be 
defined in a more reliable manner. Our results are as follows. 
108 Cass. Roma (March 26, 1926) Monitore 1926, 1, 406, Clunet 1926, 
1092· 
1.09 NUTTING, I 9 Minn. L. Rev., supra n. 9, at zo3, 209. 
110 See Clunet 1910, 976. The same idea was expressed by Mr. Baron 
Parke in Egerton v. Earl Brownlow (I853) 4 H. L. Cas. I, 122, to the effect 
that English judges should refrain from defining the public good. 
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I. Conflicts rules delimiting the application of private law 
rules exist because the substantive rules of the various civilized 
jurisdictions are supposed to be exchangeable. This relation-
ship should not be jeopardized at the forum by a pretended 
superiority of its own policies or legal techniques. The task of 
conflicts rules in the field of contracts is to determine to 
what state a contract belongs. This done, no uncertainty aris-
ing from uncontrollable evaluations should be tolerated. 
2. However, the rules of private international law are 
limited to a part of the entire legal system. They have no 
power over the rules of domestic public law, including all 
rules serving the interests of the state itself and the general 
welfare. These rules are, or should be, accompanied by their 
own territorial delimitations. In their domain, they enjoy at 
the forum unconditional precedence over private international 
law. There is no uncertainty about that. But the boundaries 
should and may very well be chosen, quite as for our ordinary 
conflicts rules, so as to include in principle only the contracts 
centered within the forum. 
3· Foreign private law is applicable as it is, however it may 
be influenced by foreign public interests. There is no way of 
distinguishing the purposes of foreign enactments and no 
reason why we should recognize the validity of transactions 
repudiated by the law to which we ourselves subject them, or 
to invalidate transactions only because we do not agree with 
the purposes of the legislation competent under our con-
flicts rule. 
4· The only general barriers to foreign law in the sphere 
of private international law, that may prove indispensable, 
arise from the depth of basic moral conceptions, which in our 
times naturally include those of fundamental social justice. 
Therefore, we may refuse unqualified enforcement to a 
foreign law allowing serfdom, legalizing contracts involving 
prostitution, or denying effectual relief to children or incom-
petent persons. Among civilized nations, we should not ex-
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pect to find any considerable number of such abnormities. 
A step further, a court holding that in no case should a 
debtor be forced to utter ruin by the enforcement of a con-
tract, may admit such defense, thus far unknown to American 
law, against an American contract.111 But the differences of 
views respecting overwhelming difficulty of performance 
caused by unfavorable circumstances no longer appear so 
widely separated as to warrant invocation of public policy.112 
Zitelmann contrasted good morals with offense to the in-
ternal law; likewise various modern laws literally restrict 
the application of public policy to cases where recognition of 
the foreign law would be inconsistent with public order and 
morality.113 The idea is sound, if only it were not dissolved 
into blue fog. 
5· We may thus summarize: 
Under Dicey's exception of public policy, a contract 
(whether illegal by its proper law or not) is invalid if it or its 
enforcement is opposed to English interests of state, to the 
policy of English law, or to the moral rules upheld by Eng-
lish law.114 
In the formulation advocated here, a contract valid by the 
law governing it, is nevertheless subject to the public law of 
the forum to the extent of proper territorial delimitation, 
and to deeply rooted and reasonable objections of good 
morals, including fundamental social justice. 
6. What effect is due to a judgment refusing enforcement 
of a foreign-governed right on the ground of local public pol-
111 
'See BATIFFOL 404 § 487. 
112 I am referring to a famous problem on which it suffices, for the present, to 
consult for American law, WILLISTON, 6 Contracts SSII § I963, and for com-
parative law, RABEL, I Das Recht des Warenkaufs § 45· 
113 I ZITELMANN 334, 368. 
Brazil: Introd. Law (1916) art. I7; Introd. Law (I942) art. I7· 
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. x. 
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 30. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 38. 
114 DICEY 652 Rule I6o exception r. 
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icy? The most common view in the conflicts laws of all coun-
tries takes it for granted that such a judgment has the full 
effect of res judicata. Occasionally other ideas have been ex-
pressed. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Supreme Court 
of the United States, has asserted that, if a state declines to 
enforce a foreign cause of action, "it merely denies a remedy, 
leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that 
he is free to enforce it elsewhere."115 The Court, of course, 
operated on the sole basis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
and dealt with a special case of workmen's compensation. 
Even so, the dictum raises serious problems. But to transfer 
this solution into the sphere of conflicts hw, as has been re-
cently suggested by an eminent authority/1<1 would promote 
strange results. Evidently, if a court will deny enforcement 
without altering the possible cause of action, it can sometimes 
do so by refusing to take jurisdiction on the merits,117 in 
which case we should wish the court to pronounce expressly 
that it does not decide the merits. Our discussions on the ap-
plicable law, however, always presume that jurisdiction has 
been assumed. If so, a court should ordinarily enforce foreign 
rights, but if it does not, the common effects of taking cog-
nizance must apply to the plaintiff. It would be rather dan-
gerous to open an easy middle road for provincial minds. 
II. VIOLATION oF FoREIGN LAw 
The exception of public policy is generally understood to 
point exclusively to the public policy of the forum.118 A 
115 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper (1932) 286 U. S. 145 at 160. 
The question has also been touched upon in International Harvester Co. of 
America v. McAdam (1910) 142 Wis. 114, 120, 124 N. W. 1042, 1044. 
116 In addition to occasional dicta, recently this view has been taken by 
MORGAN, "Choice of Law Governing Proof," 58 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) 153 
at 156, 157· 
117 This desperate method of avoiding injustice has been mentioned but not 
applied in Precourt v. Driscoll (1931) 85 N.H. 28o at 283, 157 Atl. 525 at 
527, cited by MoRGAN, mpra n. n6, at 190. 
us See the interesting opinion of STORY §§ 245, 255-257. 
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sharp contrast thereto is marked by the thesis of English 
judges that they would not assist or sanction agreements 
breaching the law of a friendly foreign country.1111 It is a 
remarkable proposition, despite its vague form and rare ap-
plication. Apart from the mistaken rule giving the law at the 
place of performance the power to invalidate the contract/20 
the most important case is one by which the English courts 
joined an international series of decisions against smuggling. 
We shall contemplate this interesting though isolated re-
gard for foreign law. 
Smuggling. 121 Under an old inherited view, foreign reve-
nue laws are refused enforcement.122 On this ground, English 
courts in the eighteenth century disregarded a Portuguese 
prohibition on export of gold123 and a French prohibition of 
assignats.'24 In France, the Parlement d' Aix (I 7 59) and the 
Court of Cassation (r835) held by the same approach that a 
contract contemplating the import of contraband into another 
country is not void, unless it includes 'corruption of the cus-
toms officers, clandestine measures (ruse) being immaterial.125 
However, Pothier was the first, in the name of hon~sty, to 
protest against this indi:fference/26 and later many French and 
119 Supra p. 535 n. 69. 
120 Supra pp. 536 f. 
121 A good comparative monograph: MESSINESI, La contrebande en droit 
international prive (Paris I9 32). 
122 State of Colorado v. Harbeck (I92I) 232 N. Y. 7I, IJ3 N. E. 357; 
Lorenzen, Cases 269; for English cases, see WESTLAKE Z9I § ZIJ. 
In re VISSER, H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker [I928] Ch. 877, 
884. 
SACK, "(Non-) Enforcement of Foreign Revenue Laws, in International Law 
and Practice," 8I U. of Pa. L. Rev. ( 1933) 559· 
123 Boucher v. Lawson (I735) Hardw. 85, 89, 194, I95; dictum to the same 
effect by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson (I 77 5) I Cowp. J4I in a tea-
smuggling case. 
124 Smith v. Marconnay (I 796) Peake Add. Cas. 8I N. P.; cf. I 1 Eng. and 
Emp. Dig. 403. 
125 See MESSINESI, supra n. I zr, at I7ff.; BATIFFOL 359 § 4I8; Cass. (req.) 
(August zs, r835) S. r83s.r.673 (secret importation of food into Spain). 
126 Oeuvres de POTHIER, 5 Traite du contrat d'assurances (r847) § s8. 
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other writers followed him.127 The German Supreme Court 
developed a consistently strict practice, 128 repudiating sales 
and agreements for carriage intended to infringe foreign 
customs laws or prohibitions on importing or exporting, for 
the protection of public welfare, such as, for instance, on im-
portation of cocain into British India.129 The refusal included 
also loans to finance smuggling180 and sales of alcohol de-
liverable on the high seas near the territorial waters of Sweden 
and Finland.131 Three French appeal courts and that of 
Brussels shared in this doctrine, 132 under which it is im-
material what law governs the contract. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals of London joined this view 
in a decision of 1928, with a dissenting vote maintaining the 
old theory.133 By a contract governed by English law, 
whiskey was bought to be introduced into the United States 
during prohibition. The sales contract was declared unen-
127 United States: 3 KENT 266; 2 WHARTON 1139 § 484. 
England: PoLLOCK, Contracts 3 6 t. 
France and Belgium: 8 LAURENT 174ff. §§ II4-II7; WEISS, 4 Traite 383 n. 
3; DESPAGNET 909 § 307; VALERY 965ff. § 669 ; PILLET, 2 Traite 238 § 513 
and in Clunet 1896, 1 at 8; 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT, Part I, 85ff. §§ 68-70. 
Germany: VoN MoHL, 1 Staatsrecht, Volkerrecht und Politik (186o) 724; 
HEFFTER, Europ. Volkerrecht (ed. 8, I888) § 32 n. 9; NEUMEYER, 4 Int. 
Verwaltungs R. 423. 
Switzerland: 2 BROCHER 92 § I 6o. 
Against an isolated contrary view of PHILONENKO, Clunet I930, 441ff., see 
BATIFFOL 356 § 414. 
128 Germany: RG. (Nov. 5, I898) 42 RGZ. 295, 297; (Dec. 2, 1903) 56 
RGZ. 179, 181; (Sept. 30, I9I9) 96 RGZ. 282; and others. 
Austria: OGH. (May 5> 1928) Rspr. 1928, 122 No. 253; (March 3, 1931) 
Rspr. I931, 7o, Clunet I93I, 118o. 
129 RG. (June 24, 1927) JW. 1927, 2288, IPRspr. 1926/z7 No. 15; cf. 
OLG. Stuttgart (Sept. 25, 1891) Clunet 1894, 896 (gold exportation from 
Russia). 
130 RG. (March 10, 1927) JW. 1927, 2287, IPRspr. 1926/27 No. 17. 
131 RG. (Oct. 26, 1928) IPRspr. I928 No. 2o. 
132 France: App. Pau (July 2, 1886) Clunet 1887,57 (affreightment); Trib. 
com. Douai (Nov. I I, 1907) S. I 907.2.308 (partnership for smuggling contra-
band into Belgium); App. Alger (Feb. 20, 1925) Clunet 1926, 701 (partner-
ship for smuggling tobacco into Spain). 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 17, 1886) Clunet 1887, 214. 
133 Foster v. Driscoll [1929] 1 K. B. 470,518, 510. 
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forceable, by Lord Sankey with a reference to Dicey's rule 
respecting all prohibitions of the law of the place of per-
formance, but by Lord Lawrence on the ground that the con-
tract's recognition "would furnish a just cause for complaint 
by the U. S. Government against our Government ... and 
would be contrary to our obligation of international comity, 
. . . and therefore would offend our notions of public 
morality." 
The common basis of all these cases is the conviction that 
organized smuggling violates good morals and undermines 
the mores of the population along the frontiers~ Many 
writers, therefore, have stressed the fact that the offense is to 
the forum's own public policy rather than to the foreign law. 
Nevertheless, Lord Lawrence's formulation, quite ade-
quately, establishes as a basis respect for the foreign law 
under the forum's conception of public or, as it has often been 
put, of international morality. 
This doctrine has encountered difficulties. Its most certain 
application is that where it is proved that both parties know-
ingly intended to circumvent a foreign prohibition on im-
portation. On the other hand, an affreightment merely pre-
paratory to smuggling has been held valid even in German 
courts/34 Moreover, the mere knowledge of the vendor that 
the buyer intends to use the goods for smuggling is not suf-
ficient; the contract must involve a promotion of smuggling. 
Also contracts having the effect rather than the purpose of 
violating foreign law have been approved.135 
Between these two extremes, courts have enforced con-
tracts, because of the lack of some aggravating element which 
they required for repudiating the bargain. Where a hotel 
manager of Maine acquired liquor in Massachusetts for re-
134RG. (Feb. 9, 1926) 69 Gruchot's Beitrage 78, IPRspr. 1926/27 No. 
I 6. 
135 KG. (Oct. 10, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 21. 
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sale prohibited in Maine, Mr. Justice Holmes, then a judge 
on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, recognized that it 
would be "barbarous isolation" for a state "to enforce all 
contracts made and to be performed within its territory, with-
out regard to how much they might contravene the policy 
of its neighbor's life." But, for the application of the foreign 
prohibition, he required a not too remote connection of the 
act of selling the liquor with the apprehended result, and in 
refusing the action for the price in the instant case, he did 
it on the assumption that the seller expected and desired the 
unlawful sale and intended to facilitate it. As a principle, 
Holmes found the sale void only when the illegal intent of 
the buyer is not only known to the seller but encouraged by 
the sale.136 This requirement has been taken as an expression 
of the widespread tendency of American courts to restrict 
the extraterritorial effect of statutes concerning intoxicating 
liquor, which were considered a disturbing element in com-
merce. But similar arguments were used abroad to validate 
contracts during the American era of prohibition. When a 
dock was leased in the Detroit River on the Windsor side 
for storing liquor, the Ontario court upheld the contract. One 
judge noted the absence of proof that by the lease the parties 
intended to commit a breach of the laws of the United States, 
a surmise not being sufficient, because the judge could not 
take judicial notice of the "alleged rum-running conditions 
in Windsor." Another left the question open whether a con-
spiracy to infringe the American laws by importing liquor 
was existent, since whatever the plaintiff did in Canada, was 
legal and valid.137 Also the French Court of Cassation de-
clared valid a contract of maritime insurance covering spirits, 
although the insurer admittedly knew very well that the 
136 Graves v. Johnson (1892) 156 Mass. 2II, 30 N. E. 818. Most cases con-
cerning liquor sales are merely applying the law of the forum. 
137 Westgate v. Harris (Ont. S. Ct., App. Div.) [1929] 4 D. L. R. 643. 
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purpose of the voyage was to bring the vessel near American 
territorial waters for transshipment. On this occasion, the 
Court did not formally reiterate the century-old thesis of the 
permissibility of clandestine smuggling, but thought that it 
was licit to vend alcohol on the high seas and that the sellers 
could not be sure of the intentions of the buyers.138 Maritime 
insurance in such cases is the more reprehensible, as it elimi-
nates risk incurred by dishonest adventures.1311 But strangely, 
opinions are divided on this point.140 
Generalizations. Present American writers have adopted 
the view now prevailing and seem willing to generalize it 
to the effect that a contract should not be enforced, if it is 
made with a view of violating the laws of another country or 
at least of a sister state. 141 The English dicta mentioned be-
fore have the same tendency. They are in harmony with an 
old case which rejected a contract that aimed at supporting 
subversive activities.142 
A similar decision of the Tribunal de la Seine invalidating 
a loan governed by French law by which a revolution in 
Venezuela would have been supported,143 inspired Niboyet 
to enlarge the doctrine disapproving of smuggling con-
138 Cass. (req.) (March 28, I928) S. I928.r.3o5. NIBOYET's note ibid. and 
in Gaz. Pal. I928.r.8u points to the court's denial of an international public 
policy, whereas BATIFFOL 361 § 420 is somewhat encouraged by the hesitance 
of the Court. 
'
39 See NIBOYET, supra n. I 38. 
140 United States: Cases for validity are cited by WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 
495 3, 4954 n. 7· 
In Germany, the OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 2I, 1927) Hans. RGZ. I928 B No. 
2, IPRspr. I 92 8 No. r 9, validated maritime insurance for smuggling. Contra: 
LG. Berlin III (Nov. 2, I928) IPRspr. I929 No. 13 (American Prohibition); 
NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 246. 
The Netherlands: Condemning the insurance company, H. R. (Jan. 1o, 
1924) 8 Revue Dor 299. 
141 See WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 4950 § 1749· 
142 Jones v. Garcia del Rio (I 823) T. & R. 297· 
143 Trib. civ. Seine (July z, 1932) Florsheim v. Delgado-Chalbaud, S. 
'934·2·73 at 75, Clunet 1933, 73; Revue Crit. 1934, 77o; recommended for 
imitation, Note, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1930) 283. 
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tracts. 144 He calls for a true "ordre public international," 
determinative of conflicts law in all countries, instead of for 
individual states. There has never been doubt about the de-
sirability of mutual respect for legislation. But the slowness 
of development in this field has evident reasons. Probably, 
we have to be satisfied in the near future with a prudent ex-
pansion of the idea that violation of foreign law may be 
immoral. 
International treaties. The normal way of securing inter-
national assistance for the purposes of a state is, of course, 
the conclusion of treaties. For example, the United States 
made eleven treaties to improve its opportunities for inspect-
ing and arresting vessels suspected of carrying alcohol.145 Also 
a few multipartite conventions for the suppression of smug-
gling have been signed.14~; 
This suggests a final consideration. We have discussed 
the Brussels Convention sanctioning the Hague Rules and 
the satisfactory middle course achieved in dealing with lia-
bility of shipowners. Certain concessions have been suggested, 
recognizing prohibitions imposed by nonparticipant states on 
the inclusion of exemption clauses in bills of lading.147 It 
should be expected that also, vice versa, states remaining 
aloof from the multipartite treaty, nevertheless respect the 
Hague Rules as adopted in the port of dispatch. If they do 
not apply the law of this port as the law of the contract in 
144 Note by NIBOYET, S. 1934.2.73-75; Revue Crit. 1934, 772. 
145 MESSINESI, supra n. 121, 60-64; DICKINSON, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles 
1926) 371. 
146 Conventions for the suppression of contraband traffic in alcoholic liquor: 
of Brussels (July 2, r89o, art. 92, implemented June 8, 1899) 82 British 
and Foreign State Papers 55 at 76 and 91 id. 6; of St. Germain on the liquor 
traffic in Africa (Sept. ro, 1919) also ratified by the United States, 8 L. of N. 
Treaty Series 12, HUDSON, r Int. Legislation 352 No. 8; of Helsingfors (Au-
gust 19, 1925) 42 L. of N. Treaty Series 73, and 45 id. 183, HuDSON, 3 Int. 
Legislation 1673 No. 144 and 7 id. 752 No. 484. 
Pan-American Convention on the Repression of Smuggling, Buenos Aires 
(June 19, 1935) HUDSON, 7 Int. Legislation 100 No. 415. 
147 Supra Chapter 29, p. 426 and n. 139· 
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general, still they ought to recognize the true international 
public policy embodied in a treaty of such merits.148 
148 Correct international contract practice is illustrated by a bill of lading 
written in English for shipments from Antwerp whereby the jurisdiction of 
the courts of Hamburg is exclusively competent but the lawsuits are "to be 
delivered according to article 91" of the Belgian Maritime Code (Hague 
Rules). The Commercial Tribunal of Antwerp (Nov. 16, 1939) Jur. Port 
d' Anvers I 940, 2 2 5 has accepted this clause as valid, since the foreign court 
must be presumed to respect the Belgian public policy embodied in art. 91 cit. 
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I, p. 36 I (as amended by Act of February 24, I 933, Stat-
utes of Nevada I933• c. 28, § I, p. 24) (Compiled Laws 
I929, § I848) ................................ 203 
Act of March 24, I909, Statutes of Nevada I908-I909, c." 
I9I, p. 25I .................................. I6o 
New Hampshire 
Revised Laws (I 942) c. 280 
§ I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 92 
I 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 
New Mexico 
Statutes ( I 94 I) 
§ 54-80I ..................................... I53 
54-804 ..................................... I53 
54-805 ..................................... 204 
54-807 ..................................... 204 
New York 
Decedent Estate Law, Laws I909, c. I8 (Consolidated 
Laws, c. I3) § I7, as amended .................... I66 
Domestic Relations Law, Laws 1909, c. I9 (Consolidated 
Laws, c. I4) § 57, as amended by Act of May 27, I937• 
c. 669, p. I 520, § I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 
Executive Law, Laws I909, c. 23 (Consolidated Laws, c. 
I8) § I05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5IO 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Personal Property Law, Laws I 909, c. 4 5 (Consolidated 
Laws,c.4I)§I2a ............................. I4 
Real Property Law, Laws I 909, c. 52 (Consolidated Laws, 
C. 50) §§ 30I, 30Ia ............................ 507 
Stock Corporation Law, Laws I923, c. 787 (Consolidated 
Laws, c. 59) 
§ 7I-73 ..................... . 
IOS .................................... . 
225 
8s 
II4 ..................................... 224 
General Corporation Law, Laws I 929, c. 6 50 (Consolidated 
Laws, c. 23) 
§ 2IO (as amended by Laws I935, c. 47I) ........ I93 
2I8 .................................. 204, 206 
222 (as amended by Laws I944, c. 727) ........ 225 
Vehicle and Traffic Law, Laws I929, c. 54 (Consolidated 
Laws, c. 7 I) § 59, as amended . . . . 269 
Insurance Law, Laws I939, c. 882 (Consolidated Laws, c. 
28) as amended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9I 
Act of April 6, I943, Laws I943• c. 333 .......... SIO 
New Zealand 
Shipping and Seaman Act, I908, Statutes of New Zealand, 
I908, No. I78 ................................ 416 
Nicaragua 
Civil Code (I 904) 
Titulo Preliminar 
Art. VI (I 4) ........ · · . · · · 
VIII (4) ............... . 
Art. 34 ....................... . 
Commercial Code ( I 9 I 6) 
.... ·463, 494 
. ......... 474 
........... I88 
Art. 8 ..................................... I8o 
10 ................................. 243, 270 
339 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
North Carolina 
Consolidated Statutes ( 19 I 9) § I I 8 I (General Statutes 
I943, § ss-u8) .............................. 203 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
North Dakota 
Revised Code of I943 
§ IO-I 709 ................................ 204, 207 
IO-I 7 IO 
IO-I 733 
IO-I734 
IO-I7J5 
IO-I737 
.................................... I92 
................................ 204, 207 
................................ 204, 207 
Norway 
Law on Registration, of May I 7, I 890, § I 6 . . . . . . . . . . . I 89 
Treaty with the U.S.S.R., of December I5, I925, art. 5 36 
Nova Scotia 
The Domestic, Dominion and Foreign Corporations Act, 
I9I2, Revised Statutes of Nova Scotia, I923, c. I73> s. 30 I48 
Ohio 
General Code (I 9 I o) 
§ 85I6 ...................................... 507 
§ 8623-8 (as added by Act of March 8, I927, Laws I927, 
v. I I2, p. I2) ....................... I6I 
8625-5 (as added by Act of June 30, I933, Laws I933> 
V. I I5, p. 409) .................... · · I93 
8625-I6 (as added by Act of June 30, I933> Laws 
I933,v. II5,~4I2) .................. I52 
8625-25 (as added by Act of June 30, I933, Laws 
I933,v. 115,p.4I3) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 204 
Oklahoma 
Constitution (I 907) art. IX, § 44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 52 
Statutes Annotated (I94I) tit. I8, § 454 .............. 205 
Ontario 
Highway Traffic Amendment Act, Statutes I 930, c. 48, s. 
IO ...................................... 243> 270 
Highway Traffic Act, Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1937, c. 
288, s. 47 .................................... 243 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Extra Provincial Corporations Act, Revised Statutes of On-
tario, 1937, c. 252, s. 2 ......................... 182 
Oregon 
Code (1930) § 63-114 ........................... 507 
Compiled Laws Annotated ( 1940) 
§ 70-116 (cf. § 70-126d, Supp. 1945) .............. 507 
77-207 ..................................... 205 
77-306 ..................................... 205 
77-307 ..................................... 205 
77-318 ..................................... 152 
Palestine 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Ordinance, No. 43, of 1926 ..... 427 
Panama 
Civil Code (1916) 
Art. 6 ...................................... 371 
7 ..................................... 494 
82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
Commercial Code ( 1 91 6) 
Art. 6 .................................... 447 
II ......................... · · · · · · · · · · · 47 
296 ................................ 186, 217 
378 .................................... 186 
Law No. 32, of February 26, 1927, art. 91 ......... 145, 217 
Pan-American Conventions 
Convention of Habana on Commercial Aviation, of February 
20, 1928 
Art. I ...................................... 346 
28 ..................................... 346 
Convention on the Regulation of Automotive Traffic, Wash-
ington, October 6, 1930, art. 10 ................... 245 
Convention of Buenos Aires on the Repression of Smuggling, 
of June 19, 1935 .............................. 590 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Declaration on the Juridical Personality of Foreign Com-
panies, of June 25, I936 ......................... I45 
Protocol on Uniformity of Powers of Attorney which are to 
be Utilized Abroad, Washington, February I7, I940 
......................................... 196, 508 
Paraguay 
Commercial Code ( I903) 
Art. 286 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
287 .................................... I79 
Paris Conventions 
Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables, of March 
I4, I884 .............................. · ·. · · 339 
Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, 
of October IJ, I9I9 
Art. I .................................... 346 
7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2I 
Convention on Motor Traffic, of April 24, I926, art. 8 245 
Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, Con-
vention of March 20, I883, Convention of December I4, 
I900, Convention of June 2, I9I I, Convention of Novem-
ber 6, I925, Convention of June 2, I 934 .......... 296, 299 
Pennsylvania 
Business Corporation Law, of May 5, I933, Laws I933> No. 
I06 
§ 302 
IOI4 
Peru 
(as amended by Act of May I6, I945, Laws 
I945, No. 256, §I) (Purdon's Statutes An-
notated I930, § 2852-302) ............ I6I 
(as amended by Act of May 23, I945, Laws 
I945, No. 373, § 7) (Purdon's Statutes An-
notated I930, § 2852-I0I4) ........... 204 
Constitution (1933) art. 17 .................... 180, 200 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Civil Code (I852) art. 40 ......................... 372 
Civil Code (I 936) 
Titulo Preliminario 
Art. VII ............................... 372, 447 
IX ................................ 32, 156 
Art. 1058 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I86 
Commercial Code (I 902) 
Art. I5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 
52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487 
Poland 
Commercial Code (I934), Decree No. 502, of June 27, 
I934, § 8I · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 94 
Law of August 2, I 926, on International Private L~w 
Art. I ................................... 34, 102 
2 .................................... . 
3 .................................... . 
5 
6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492 
7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. 404 
9 . . . . . . . . . ..... 440, 447· 456, 474 
IO ..................................... 536 
II ............................. 232, 236, 255 
38 ..................................... 583 
Law of August 2, I 926, on Interlocal Private Law 
Art. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 
Law on Stock Companies, Decree No. 383, of March 22, 
I928 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
Art. 4 ....................................... 183 
Order of December 20, I928, No. 9I9, concerning Authori-
zation of Foreign Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 8 3 
§ 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 88 
Decree No. I4, of February 7, I9I9, art. 7 ............. I87 
Treaty with the United States, of June IS, I93I, art. II 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36, I02, 2I8, 219 
Portugal 
Civil Code ( 1867) 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Art. 24 ................................... 487 
I78I ................................... I65 
236I ................................... 240 
2362 ................................... 240 
Commercial Code (I 888) 
Art. 4 ............... · · .. · · ... 369, 399, 447, 487 
I09 ................................. 143, I8o 
I IO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
I II ............................ I8o, 190, I97 
II2 ···································· 2I3 
6]4 ................... 236, 340, 344, 348, 349 
Prussia 
Allgemeines Landrecht (I 794) I, 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528 
§ I I3 ....................................... 474 
256 . . . . . . . . . . . ........................ 448 
Law of January I7, I845, Preuss. Ges. Samml. I845, No.5, 
§§ I76, I77, I89 .............................. 2I2 
Law of June 22, I86I, Preuss. Ges. Samml. I86I, No. 26, 
art. I, § I 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 I 2 
Mining Law (Allgemeines Berggesetz), of June 24, I865 332 
Ausfiihrungsgesetz of September 20, I 899, art. 6 . . . . . . . . I 6 5 
Law of June 29, I9I4 ........................... I83 
Puerto Rico 
Civil Code (I 930) art. I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487 
Commercial Code (I932) art. 83 ................... 487 
Quebec 
Civil Code (I 866) 
Art. 7 ..................................... 488 
8 ................................. 369, 447 
, I7 .................................... 158 
352 .................................... 158 
358 .................................... 158 
776 ................................. 488, 'jl I 
Rhode Island 
General Laws of 1938 (Annotated) c. I 16 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Rome Convention for the Unification of certain Rules relating 
to Damages caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Sur-
face, of May 29, 1933 ........................ 32S, 342 
Art. 2 ..................................... 329 
s ..................................... 329 
14 ..................................... 329 
Rumania 
Commercial Code (I SS7) 
Art. 237 ..................................... 135 
23S .................................... IS3 
239 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
244 .................................... IS3 
245 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 197 
246 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I9S 
247 ................................ I98, 2I6 
Commercial Code (193S) 
Art. 353 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·. · · .. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 34 
354 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4S 
355 · · · · ... ·. · ....................... IS3, I87 
356 ................................. ISO, 1S4 
357 .................................... ISO 
35S · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 195 
Russia 
Civil Code (I922) ............................... 373 
Introductory Decree of October 31, 1922 
Art. 2 ................................... 54S 
406 .................................. 231 
Code of Civil Procedure ( 1923) .................. 448, 502 
Art. 7 ...................................... 447 
Maritime Law of June 14, I929, art. 4 ............... 340 
Treaty with Italy, of February 7, 1924, art. 9 . . . . . . . . . . 36 
Treaty with Germany, of October 12, 1925, art. 16 .... 36, 21S 
TABLE OF STATUTES 645 
PAGE 
Treaty with Norway, of December 15, 1925, art. 5 36 
Treaty with Turkey, of March 16, 1931, art. 7 . . . . . . . . . 36 
Exchange of Communications between President Roosevelt 
and Mr. Litvinoff, of November 16, 1933 . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
Treaty with Iran, of August 27, 1935, art. 8 . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
St. Germain Conventions 
Convention relating to the Liquor Traffic in Africa, of Sep-
tember 10, 1919 ............................... 590 
Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Aus-
tria, of September 10, 1 91 9, art. 249 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
Saskatchewan 
Companies Act, Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1940, c. 
113, s. 189 ............................... 182, 195 
Saxony 
Civil Code (1863) 
§ 9 ........................................ 487 
II ..................................... 462, 463 
Decree of November 1 o, 1899, § 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 8 3 
South Africa 
Treaty with Germany, of September 1, 1928, art. 15 ... 36, 103 
South Carolina 
Code of Laws ( 1942) 
§ 7764 ...................................... 152 
7765 ...................................... 192 
7769 ...................................... 203 
7789 ...................................... 203 
South Dakota 
Code (1939) 
§ I 1.2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 
I 1.2103 ................................... 205 
Laws 1921, c. 355, § 4 ............................ 489 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Spain 
Civil Code (I SS9) 
Art. I I .................................... 4S7 
27 .................................... I33 
2S .............................. I3, 34· I33 
37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I3 
746 .................................... I65 
74S .................................... 165 
Commercial Code ( ISS 5) 
Art. I5 ......................... 133, 15I, ISO, I99 
21 .................................. I33· ISO 
Law of June 30, ISS7, on Associations ............ I33• I66 
Spanish Morocco 
Dahir of I 9 I 4 (de la condici6n de los espaiioles y extranjeros) 
Art. I9 ...................................... 493 
20 .................................. 36S, 447 
Sweden 
Law on Registration, of July I3, 1SS7, § I6 ............ 1S9 
Treaty with Germany, of May I4, I926, art. 5 . . . . . . . . . 36 
Switzerland 
Civil Code (ZGB.) (I 907) .................... · · · · 
Art. 55 ..................................... . 
56 ..................................... . 
Code of Obligations (OR.) (I9II) ............. 47I, 
Art. 4I ................................. 234, 
43 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 
44 
45 
47 
55 
74 
106 
51 3 
5I4 
559 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26o, 
................................. I6S, 
I 51 
12S 
34 
529 
260 
279 
279 
26I 
27S 
269 
47I 
47I 
569 
574 
94 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Revised Code of Obligations (I936) art. 952 .......... I88 
Final and Transitory Provisions ( Schluss-und U ebergangs-
bestimmun gen) art. I 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Penal Code (I937) art. 3 :ff •................... 0 •••• 296 
Law of March 28, I905, on the Liability of Railroads for 
Risk ........................................ 260 
Law of March I5, I932, on Motor Vehicle Traffic, art. 49 264 
Law of December I 8, I 936 (enacting the Revised Code of 
Obligations of I 936) ............ 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 88 
Law of I943, on Unfair Competition . 0 •••••••• 0 0 ••••• 296 
Treaty of Commerce with the United States, of November 
25, I85o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Convention with France, of June IS, 1869 .. 0 ••••••••• 263 
Treaty with Great Britain, of October I7, I93I, art. 3 37 
Tangier 
Dahir of January I5, I925 (sur la condition civile des itran-
gers) art. IO ............................... · · · 493 
Tennessee 
Act of December I 3, I 929, Acts of I 929, Extra Session, c. I 3, 
§ 2 (Code Annotated I943, §§ 4II9, 4120) 
................................ I92, 205, 206, 207 
Texas 
Act of April 3, 1889, Laws I889, p. 87 (as amended by Act 
of May 20, I93I, Laws 193I, p. 264) (Revised Civil 
Statutes of I925, art. I536) ... 0 •••••••••••••••••• 205 
Act of May 4, I897, Laws I822-I897, v. IO, p. I22I (Re-
vised Civil Statutes of I925, art. I532) .............. I52 
Act of March 30, I9I7, Laws I9I7, p. 365 (Revised Civil 
Statutes of 1925, art. 4678) ...................... 238 
Thailand 
Civil Code (I925) art. 438 279 
Trianon Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and 
Hungary, of June 4, I920, art. 232 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Turkey 
Law of 30 November, I330/r9I4 
Art. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
I2 .................................. 143, 180 
13 ..................................... 200 
Treaty with Great Britain, of March I, 1930, art. 2 ...... 103 
Treaty with Russia, of March 16, 1931, art. 7 . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
Treaty with the United States, of October 28, 193I, art. I .. 2I9 
Treaty with Egypt, of April7, I937, art. IO ............ I03 
United States 
Federal Acts : 
Constitution 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 (Commerce Clause) . I 8 I, 4 I 5 
Article IV, Section I (Full Faith and Credit Clause) .. 
· · · · · · · · 3, I IO, I8I, 544, 553, 554, 555, 572, 584 
Bill of Rights, Amendments I-X ................. I25 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause ................. 143, I8I, 554 
Equal Protection Clause . . . ........... I8I, 555 
Eighteenth Amendment ....................... 564 
Act of March 3, I 8 5 I, as amended by Rev. Stat. § § 498 3-
4989 ...................................... 352 
Act of July 2, I890 (Sherman Act) 26 Stat. 209, c. 647, 
IS u.s. c. §§ I-7 ........................... 299 
Act of February I 3, I 893 (Harter Act; Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act) 27 Stat. 445 c. IOS ........... . 
389, 390, 39I, 4I6, 4I8, 4I9, 420, 42I, 422, 424, 425 
Act of August 2 7, I 894 (Wilson Act) 28 Stat. 509, c. 349 299 
Act of March 4, I 9 I 5 (Seamen's Act) 38 Stat. II 64, c. 
IS3, as amended ....................... 346 
Act of September 7, I9I6 (Shipping Act) 39 Stat. 728, 
c. 45 I ..................................... 4I6 
Act of October 6, I9I7 (The Trading with the Enemy 
Act) 40 Stat. 4I I, c. 106, § 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
Act of March 30, I 920 (Federal Death on High Seas 
Act) 4I Stat. 537, c. I I I,§ 4 . . . . ..... 346, 347 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Joint Resolution of Congress, June 5, I933, 48 Stat. I I2 
c. 47 .............................. 393, 547> 548 
Act of August 29, I 935, 48 Stat. 960, c. 804 . . . . . . . . . . 35 2 
Act of April I 6, I 9 36 (Carriage of Goods by Sea Act) 49 
Stat. I207, c. 229 ............................ 4I7 
§ I3 ................................. 4I9, 420 
Act of June 5, I936, 49 Stat. I479, c. 52 I,§ 2 ..... 352, 422 
Act of September 2I, I942 (Commodity Exchange Act) 
42 Stat. 998, c. 369, as amended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 2 
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the 
United States, of I938 ...................... I2, 285 
Presidential Proclamation of August 2 I, I 94 I, on Juridical 
Personality of Foreign Companies, 55 Stat. I 20 I, .. 4, I 4 5 
Treaty with Switzerland, of November 25, I85o ....... 20 
Treaty with Germany, of December 8, I923, art. I2 ... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36, I02, 2I9 
Treaty with Hungary, of June 24, I 925, art. 9 . . . . . . . . . 36 
Treaty with El Salvador, of February 22, I926, art. I3 .. 2I9 
Treaty with Honduras, of December 7, I927, art. I3 36 
Treaty with Austria, of June I9, I928, art. IO ....... 36, 2I9 
Treaty with Poland, of June IS, I93I, art. I I ....... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ·36, I02, 2I8, 2I9 
Treaty with the Turkish Republic, of October 28, I93I, 
art. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2I 9 
Exchange of Communications between President Roosevelt 
and Mr. Litvinoff, of November I6, I935, art. 8 . . . . . . . 89 
Treaty with Greece, of November 2 I, I 936, art. I ... 36, 2 I 9 
Uniform Acts, Approved by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws 
Negotiable Instruments Act, of I896 . . . . . . . . . . . . SI6 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, of I909, § I ......... 75, 77 
Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, of I9IO (now 
Model Execution of Wills Act, of I 940, § 7) . . . . . . 5 I 5 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, of I9I6 ....... 94, I I4 
Business Corporation Act (Model), of I928 ......... I6I 
§I, XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Foreign Corporation Act, of I934 ......... I48, I93, 2I4 
§ I · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 99 
6so 
Uruguay 
2 
286 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
I75 
66 
Civil Code (I9I4) Titulo Final, as amended by Law of No-
vember 25, I94I, art. 2394 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
Utah 
Constitution (I 895) art. XII, § 6 
Code Annotated (I943) §I8-8-s .. 205, 2II 
Venezuela 
Constitution ( I 93 6) art. 3 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 5 I 
Civil Code (I 942) 
Art. I I ................................. 494, 507 
I 9 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · I 35 
30 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · I 35 
1186 ................................... 255 
I65I ................................... 135 
Commercial Code (I 9 I 9) 
Art. 359 (new 334) · · · · · · · 35, 47, I35, I79, 188 
360 (new 335) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 
36I (new 336) .......................... I79 
362 (new 337) ....................... 2I3, 2I6 
Law of July I7, I925 (Ley de minas) art. 30 ........... I66 
Vermont 
Public Laws I933, § 5988 ......... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Versailles Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and 
Germany, of September I o, I 9 I 9 
205 
Art. 54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
2 96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
297 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
Virginia 
Constitution (I 902) § I 63, as amended .............. . 
Code of I9I9, § 3848, as amended by Acts of I926, pp. 48I, 
482, and Acts of I 932, p. 407 ................. 204, 
Warsaw Convention on the Unification of certain Rules regard-
ing International Air Transport, of October I2, I929 .... 
. . . . . . . . . ......................... ·342, 247, 
Art. 2I 
22 .................................... 28o, 
25 
28 ...................................... . 
29 ..................................... . 
Washington 
Constitution (I 889) art. I 2, § 7 ........ . 
Laws I925, Extra Session, c. I86, § 6 (Remington Revised 
Statutes, I932, § 3862-11) ...................... . 
Laws I937, c. 70 
§ I2 (Remington Revised Statutes, I932, § 3836-12) ... 
I8 (Remington Revised Statutes, I932, § 3836-I8) 
West Virginia 
Act of February 22, I90I, Laws I90I, c. 35, § 31 (Michie's 
Code Annotated, I 94 3, § 309 I) ....... · · · · .. · · · · · 
Wisconsin 
PAGE 
2II 
4I7 
342 
342 
342 
342 
342 
I66 
204 
Statutes ( I943) § 226.02 ........... 192, 205, '207 
Wiirtemberg 
Executory Law to the BGB., art. 282 ................. I83 
Wyoming 
Revised Statutes Annotated (I 93 I) 
§ 28-I 4 I (as amended by Act of February I 7, I 939, c. 62, 
§ 20, Supp. I940, § 28-I4IA) . . . . . . . . . . 207 
28-204 2II 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
PAGE 
Yugoslavia 
Commercial Code (I 9 3 7) 
§ 104 ....................................... 189 
165 ....................................... 189 
231 215 
500 .................................... 138, 151 
501 ...................................... 34> 44 
502 .............................. :135, 151, 163 
503 ............................... 145, 179, 201 
504 ....................................... I89 
507 .................................... !89, 190 
508 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 
512 215 
Table of Anglo-American Cases 
PAGE 
Adelaide Electric Supply Co., Ltd. v. Prudential Assurance 
Co., Ltd. [I934] A.C. I22, I45, 151 ........... 388, 464 
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt 
& Mfg. Co. (C.C.A. 7th 1941) I24 F. (2d) 706, 709 .. 323 
Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A. M. Luther v. Sagor & Co. 
[I92I] 3 K. B. 532, 558 .......................... 556 
Alabama, Great Southern R. Co. v. Carroll (I 892) 97 Ala. 
126, I I So. 803 .......................... 246, 303, 3I6 
Alabama Western R. Co. v. Talley-Bates Construction Co. 
(I909) I62 Ala. 396, 402, 50 So. 34I .............. 2IO 
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Ind. Accident Comm. of California 
(I935) 294 u.s. 532 ............................ 396 
The Albert Dumois (I 900) I 77 U.S. 240 ........... 342, 343 
Albro v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (I902) II9 Fed. 629, 
a:ff'd (1904) I27 Fed. 28I ........................ 412 
Alexandria A. & Ft. S.R. Co. v. Johnson ( I900) 6I Kan. 4I7, 
59 Pac. 1 o6 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I I 
Allegheny Co. v. Allen (I903) 69 N.J. Law 270, 55 Atl. 724 
.......................................... 206, 2I4 
Allen v. Standard Trust Co. (1920) 57 D.L.R. I05 . . . . . . . . So 
Alpena Portland Cement Co. v. Jenkins and Reynolds Co. 
(I9Io) 244 Ill. 354, 9I N.E. 48o .................. I44 
Alsing Co. v. New England Quartz & Spar Co. (I 90 I) 66 
App. Div. 473, a:ff'd, I 74 N.Y. 536 ................. 204 
Alston v. New York C. P. Corp. (1927) 36 Ga. App. 777, I38 
S.E. 270 ....................................... 203 
Alvesv. Hodgson (I797) 7 T.R. 24I at 243 .......... 486, 504 
The Amalia (1864) Br. & Lush. 151, I Moo. P.C. Cas. 
(N.S.) 47I ..................................... 338 
American Amusement Co. v. East Lake Chutes Co. (I 9 I I) 
I74 Ala. 526, 56 So. 961 .......................... 2IO 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (I909) 213 U.S. 
347,357,29S.Ct.511 ........................ 246, 299 
American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber Co. (I9I7) 74 Fla. 
130, 77 So. 168 ................................. I90 
653 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
American Freehold Land & Mortgage Co. v. Jefferson (I892) 
69 Miss. no ................................ 407, 4IO 
American Furniture Mart Bldg. Corp. v. W. C. Redmon Sons 
& Co. (Ind. I936) I N.E. (2d) 6o6 at 609 .......... 575 
American Ry. Express Co. v. Rouw Co. (I 92 7) I 7 3 Ark. 
8IO, 294 S.W. 40I . . . . . . ....................... 192 
American Seamless Tube Corp. et al. v. Goward [I 930] 3 
D.L.R. 87o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 523 
Amer. Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Secretary of State 
(I909) I59 Mich. I05, I23 N.W. 568 ............... 154 
American Union Bank v. Swiss Bank Corp. (I930) 40 F. (2d) 
446 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 542 
Amos v. Kelley Co. (I927) 240 Mich. 257, 2I5 N. W. 397 543 
Amos D. Bridge's Sons, Inc. v. State of New York (I 92 I) 
I88 App. Div. 500, a:ff'd 23I N.Y. 532 ....... I49, 2IO 
Anninger v. Hohenberg (1939) I72 Misc. I046, I8 N.Y. 
Supp. (2d) 499 ................................. 548 
Anonymous (I784) I Brown Ch. C. 376 .............. 465 
The Aquitania (I 924) Am. Marit. Cas. I 924, I 440 . . . . . . 349 
Aramayo,/nre,FranckeMines,Ltd. [I9I7] I Ch.45I ..... 55 
Arbuckle v. Reaume ( I893) 96 Mich. 243, 55 N. W. 8o8 .. 565 
Arden Lumber Co. v. Henderson Iron Works (I907) 83 Ark. 
240, I03 s. w. I85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 576 
Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap. Copper Co. 
(I92o) 236 Mass. I85, 128 N. E. 4 ................. 247 
Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co. (C. C. A. 5th I937) 88 F. 
(2d) 449 ...................................... 4I I 
Armstrong v. Dyer and Hobby (I935) 268 N.Y. 67I, I98 
N.E. 551 ...................................... 225 
Arnold v. Potter (I867) 22 Iowa I94 ................ 409 
Arp v. Allis Chalmers Co. (I907) I30 Wis. 454, IIO N.W. 
386 .......................................... 287 
The Arum [I92I] P. I2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 
Ashurst v. Ashurst (I898) II9 Ala. 2I9 ................ 4II 
Associated Trust, In re (D.C.D. Mass. I9I4) 222 Fed. IOI2, 
IOI3 ................................. 98, I I3 
Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Nichols ( I924) 264 U.S. 348 ..... 278 
TABLE OF CASES 6ss 
PAGE 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa FeR. Co. v. Smith (I9I3) 38 Okla. 
I57, I32 Pac. 494 ................... · · .4I9, 475, 476 
Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey (I876) 116 Mass. 47I . . . . 7I 
Attorney General v. The Jewish Colonization Ass'n [I 900] 
2 Q.B. ss6, [I9oi] I K.B. I23 ................... 32, 54 
Auckland City Council v. Alliance Assurance Co., Ltd. [I 9 3 7] 
A.C. 587, 6o6 .................................. 464 
Automotive M. C. v. American S.M. P. Corp. (I924) 232 
Ill. App. 532 .................................... 203 
Ayer v. Tilden (I 86o) I 5 Gray (8 I Mass.) I 78 . . . . . . . . . 543 
Ayub v. Automobile Mortgage Co. (Tex. Civ. App. I923) 
252 s. w. 287 ................................. 564 
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co. (I9I7) 242 U.S. 394 . . . . . . . . 74 
Baldwin v. Gray (La. I826) 4 Mart. N.S. I92, I6 Am. Dec. 
I69 ........................................... III 
Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts (I9I3) 23I U.S. 68 .... I73 
Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh (I893) I49 U.S. 368 250 
Banco de Sonora v. Bankers' Mutuality Casualty Co. (I 904) 
I24 Iowa 576, IOO N. W. 532 ..................... 534 
Bank of Augusta v. Earle (I839) I3 Pet. S.C. SI8, 588-589 
....................................... 28, I24, I67 
Bank of Australasia v. Harding (I85o) 9 C.B. 66I ........ 102 
Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori [I 937] 
Ch. D. 5I3, 3 All E.R. 8, Clunet I938, 105 . . . . . . . . . . 87 
Bank of Nova Scotia v. McKinnon (I892) I2 C.L.T. I78 
N.B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
Bank of Topeka v. Eaton (I 899) 95 Fed. 355 . . . . . . . . . . I I I 
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux (I809) 5 Cranch 6I, 78 ........ I43 
Banks v. King Features Syndicate (D.C. S.D.N.Y. I939) 30 F. 
Supp. 352 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 
Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow 
[I923] 2 K.B. 682 at 69I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Nat'l City 
Bank of New York (1929) 133 N.Y. Misc. 527, 233 N.Y. 
Supp. 255 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
Barbour v. Campbell (1917) 101 Kan. 616, I68 Pac. 879 . 512 
Barclayv. Talman (1842) 4Edw.Ch. 128 .............. 87 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Barker v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (I9I7) 228 Mass. 
42I, 426, II7 N.E. 894 at 896 ...................... 112 
Barndt v. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab (I938) 28 F. Supp. 
8I5, Am. Marit. Cas. I939, I564 .................. 423 
Barrows v. Downs (I87o) 9 R.I. 446, II Am. Rep. 283 ... I08 
Bartley v. Andrews (1923) 202 N.Y. Supp. 227, 208 App. 
Div. 702 ....................................... I 13 
Baschet v. London Illustrated Standard Co. ( 1900) I Ch. D. 
73 ............................................ 276 
Bateman v. Service (P.C. I88I) 6 App. Cas. 386 .......... So 
Baxter N at'l Bank v. Peter S. J. Talbot ( 1 891) 154 Mass. 2 I 3, 
28 N.E. 163 .................................... 503 
Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller (I 92 5) 266 U.S. 4 57 . . . 58 
Belestin v. First Nat'l Bank (I914) 177 Mo. App. 300, 164 
S. W. I6o ...................................... 465 
The Belgenland (1885) 114 U.S. 355, 366, 369 .. 337, 347, 348 
Benaim and Co. v. Debono [1924] A.C. 5I4, 519 ... -455, 542 
Benners v. Clemens (I 868) 58 Pa. 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465 
Bensley v. Bignold (1822) 5 Bar. & AI. 335, 341 ........ 398 
Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus (1898) 172 Mass. 
154, I 58, 51 N.E. 531, 532 .................... 28, 55 
Bishop v. Hannan Real Estate Exchange (1934) 267 Mich. 
575, 255 N.W. 599 .............................. 206 
Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. T. W. Allen & Sons, Ltd. [1918] 
I K. B. 540, [1918] 2 K.B. 467 ............... ·537, 540 
Blackwell v. Webster (1886) 29 Fed. 614 .............. 576 
Blad's Case (I673) 3 Swan. 603, Blad v. Barnfield (1674) 
3 Swan. 604 .................................... 239 
Blandi v. Pellegrini (1915) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 552 ........ 461 
Boddy v. Continental Inv. Co. ( 192 I) 18 Ala. App. 6 5, 88 
So. 294 ........................................ 205 
Bogardus v. Fitzpatrick (193I) 139 Misc. 533, 247 N.Y. 
Supp. 692 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 
Bonacina, In re, Le Brasseur v. Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch. 68, 73 527 
Bond v. Burne (I917) 243 U.S. 15 .................... 572 
Bondholders Security Corp. v. Manville [1933] 3 W.W.R. 1, 
[1933] 4D.L.R.699 ····. · ................... 144, 446 
Boucher v. Lawson (1735) Hardw. 85, 89, 194, 195 ...... 585 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Bowen v. Newell (I855) I3 N.Y. 290, 64 Am. Dec. 550 465 
Boyle v. Southern R. Co. (I90I) 36 N.Y. Misc. 289,73 N.Y. 
Supp. 465 .................................... 278 
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper (I932) 286 U.S. 145 
at I6o ........................................ 584 
Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co. (C.C.A. 3d 1930) 43 F. 
(2d) 724, aff'd, id. 730, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 897 .... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46, 402, 4IO, 476 
Bristow v. Sequeville (I85o) 5 Ex. D. 275 ............ 504 
British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg ( 192 I) 66 Sol. J. I 8 
................................. 38I, 405, 408, 527 
British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mo<;ambique [I 893] 
A. C. 6o2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 
Brosseau v. Bergevin (I905) 27 Que. S.C. 510 .......... 5II 
Brown v. Browning (I 886) I 5 R. I. 422, 7 Atl. 403 . . . . . . 564 
Brown v. Ford Motor Co. (C.C.A. 10th I93I) 48 F. (2d) 
732 ........................................... 53I 
Brown v. Gates (I904) I20 Wis. 349, 97 N. W. 221, re-
hearing denied (I904) 98 N. W. 205 ............ 455, 564 
Buckeye v. Buckeye ( I93I) 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 . 265 
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Dakota v. Bilan (1899) 59 Neb. 458 4IO 
Bullock v. Caird (I875) IO Q.B. 276 .................. II7 
Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co. (I93I) 200 N.C. 5II .... 4IO 
Burel v. Hutson (I924) I65 Ark. III, 263 S.W. 57 ...... 330 
Burgoyne v. James (S. Ct. N.Y. I935) I56 Misc. 859, 282 
N.Y. Supp. I8 ............................. 97, 98, I07 
Burke v. The McClintic-Marshall Construction Co. (I 9 I o) 9 
O.N.P. (N.S.) 577 ............................... I93 
Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co. (I938) I82 Miss. 423, I8I 
So. 3I6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 
Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union (I944) 65 S. Ct. 
I43 ........................................... I2I 
Caldwell v. Gore (I932) I75 La. 501, I43 So. 387, I44 So. 
I5I .......................................... 330 
Caldwell v. North Carolina (I903) I87 U.S. 622 . . . . . . . I49 
Cameron v. Orleans & Jefferson R. Co., Ltd. (I 902) I o8 La. 
83, IOI, 32 So. 208, 2I5 .......................... I I2 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard (I883) I09 U.S. 527 
........................................ 74, So, 159 
Canadian NationalS. S. Co. v. Watson [I939] S.C.R. II, I3, 
[I939] I D. L. R. 273,274 ........................ 243 
C.P.R. v. Parent ( 1914) 24 Que. K. B. 193 ............ 293 
Canadian P. R. Co. v. Sullivan (C.C.A. Ist 1942) 126 Fed. 
(2d) 433, cert. denied ( 1942) 316 U.S. 696 ........ 193 
C.P.R. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1890) I7 S.C.R. 
151 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ 129 
Canadian Sugar Refining Co. v. Furness, Withy & Co. ( I905) 
27 Que. S. C. '502 .................... · · · · · · · · · · · 379 
Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (I 9 I 4) I 55 Wis. 
54I, I45 N.W. 372 . . . . . . ..................... SI2 
Carr v. Fracis Times & Co. [1902] A. C. I76, I82 ...... 239 
Carroll v. City of East St. Louis (I873) 67 Ill. 568, I6 Am. 
Re~ 632 ....... : . .............................. I66 
Cary-Lombard L. Co. v. Thomas (I893) 92 Tenn. 587, 22 
S."\V. 743 . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... 207 
Castleman v. Canal Bank & Trust Co. (I934) I7I Miss. 29I 41I 
Centofanti v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (I914) 244 Pa. 255, 90 
Atl. 55s ....................................... 324 
Central India Mining Co. v. Societe Coloniale Anversoise 
[I92o] I K.B. 753,762 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s6 
Central Vermont R. Co. v. White (I9IS) 238 U.S. 507 .... 286 
Cesena Sulphur Co. v. Nicholson (I 876) I Ex. D. 428 . . . . . . 42 
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain (I 87 I) 43 N.Y. 424, 433 . . . . I6S 
Chapman v. Hallwood Cash Register Co. (App. Texas I903) 
73 s.w. 969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I45 
Charles Ehrlich & Co. v. J. Ellis Slater Co. (I 920) I 83 Cal. 
709, 192 Pac. 526 .............................. I 10 
Charles H. Lilly Co. v. Johnston Fisheries Co. (I 909) I o 
W.L.R. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 
Charlebois v. Baril [I927] 3 D.L.R. 762 ............. ·. 455 
Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam 
Navigation Co. ( I883) IO Q.B. 52 I, 537 .... 336, 342, 348 
Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., Ltd. (I 890) 
[189I] I Q. B. 79, 82 ........................... 533 
The Chattahoochee (I899) I73 U.S. 540, 550 ........... 420 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Chemacid S.A. v. Ferrotar Corporation (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1943) 
5 I F. Supp. 7 s6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
Chesterman's Trusts, In re [I 923] 2 Ch. 466, 4 78 . . . . . . 546 
Chestnut Securities Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission (C.C.A. 
lOth 1942) 125 F. (2d) 571, (1942) 316 u.s. 668 . . . . 29 
Chicago, St. L. & N.O. R. Co. v. Doyle (1883) 6o Miss. 977 316 
Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co. (I 94 I) Am. Marit. Cas. 
I94I, 483 ..................................... 347 
Christian Union v. Yount (I879) 101 U.S. 352 ......... 165 
Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. McMullen (I889) II7 Ind. 439, 
20 N.E. 287 ................................ 316 
Cisler v. Ray (1931) 82 Cal. Dec. 396,2 Pac. (2d) 987 ... 378 
Claiborne Commission Co. v. Stirlen (Mo. App. 1924) 262 
s. w. 387 ..................................... 572 
Clark v. Southern R. Co. (19I8) 69 Ind. App. 697, 119 N.E. 
539 ........................................... 416 
Clegg v. Levy (x8I2) 3 Camp. I66 .................... 504 
Cloyes v. Chapman (I876) 27 U. C. C. P. 22, 3I ........ 453 
Cochran v. Ward (I892) 5 Ind. App. 89,29 N. E. 795 .499, 501 
Cochrane v. Morris (I93I) 10 N.J. Misc. 82, 157 Atl. 652 82 
Coffe & Carkener v. Wilhite (1916) s6 Okla. 394, 156 Pac. 
x69 ........................................... 568 
Coffin v. London & Edinburg Ins. Co. (1928) 27 F.(2d) 6I6 
.......................................... 475, 476 
Coggs v. Bernard (I 704) 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Re. I 07 290 
Collinsv.MorganGrainCo. (1926) x6F. (2d) 253,255 ... 71 
Comm. Bank of India, In re (1868) 6 Eq. 517 .......... 87 
Comm. Bank of South Australia, In re (1886) 33 Ch. D. 173, 
174 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
Comm. Corp. Securities, Ltd. v. Nichols [ I933] 3 D.L.R. 56 446 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hyde (C.C.A. 2d I936) 
82 F. (2d) I74 .............................. 374> 396 
Commonwealth Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan (I 926) I 98 Cal. 
6I8, 246 Pac. 796 ............................... ISS 
Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil ( I925) I03 Conn. 390, 
405, 130 Atl. 794, 8oo ............................ 277 
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Bassford and Nones (1844) 
6 Hill 526 ..................................... 573 
66o TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Compafifa de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage 
Bank of Finland (I 935) 269 N.Y. 22, 26, I 98 N.E. 
6I7 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·375, 546 
Concord Apartment House Co. v. Alaska Refrigerator Co. 
(I 898) 78 Ill. App. 682 .......................... II I 
Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc. (I935) 266 N.Y. 
244, I94 N.E. 692 ............................ 293, 423 
Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Central R. Co. 
(I9I8) 78 N.H. 553, I03 Atl. 263 ........... ·303, 330 
Continental Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Daimler [I 9 I 6] 2 A. C. 
307 ........................................... 57 
Converse v. Hamilton (I9I2) 224 U.S. 243 ............ 3, 8I 
Convery v. Lanarkshire Tramways (I905) 8 F. II7 ...... 24I 
Cope v. Doherty (I858) 2 De G. & ]. 6q, 44 Eng. Re. I I27 277 
Cormier v. Hudson (I933) 284 Mass. 23I, I87 N.E. 625 . 264 
Coster v. Coster (I943) 289 N.Y. 438,46 N.E. (2d) 509 ... 266 
Cotton v. U.S. (I85o) II How. 229.................. II 
Cox and Dick v. U.S. (I832) 3I U.S. (6 Pet. S.C.) I72 .... 530 
Craig & Co., Ltd. v. U ncas Paper Board Co. (I 926) I 04 
Conn. 559, I33 Atl. 673 .......................... 380 
Crane v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. (I908) 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 
222 ........................................... 324 
Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co. (I899) 148 Mo. 583, 50 
S.W. 5I9, a:ff'd (I9oo) I78 U.S. 389 .............. 4I2 
Crawford v. Seattle etc. R. Co. (I9I5) 86 Wash. 628, ISO 
Pac. I I 55 ..................................... 402 
Creamette Co. v. Famous Foods, Ltd. (I933) Ex. C. R. 200 143 
Crockin v. Boston Store of Ft. Myers (Fla. I 940) I 88 So. 
8s3 ........................................... I48 
Crofoot v. Thatcher (I899) I9 Utah 2I2, 57 Pac. I7I . . . . 70 
Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby (I9I2) 222 U.S. 473, 477, 32 S. Ct. 
I32 ....................................... 235, 246 
Curley v. Clifford [I94I] 2 D.L.R. 729, [I94I] 0. W. N. 
I54 ........................................... 243 
Cutler v. Thomas' Estate (I852) 25 Vt. 73 ............ II4 
Dacosta and Davis v. Davis and Hatch (I854) 24 N.J. Law 
(4 Zab.) 3I9 ................................... 501 
Dalziel v. Coulthourst's Executors (I934) S.C. 566 ........ 236 
TABLE OF CASES 661 
PAGE 
Darian v. McGrath ( 1943) 215 Minn. 22, 10 N.W. (2d) 403 
Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co. (19I0) 146 Mo. App. 
246, 130 s.w. 430 ........................... 324, 327 
David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America 
(19I2) 225 u.s. 489 ............................ . 
Davidson v. Hill [I 90 I] 2 K.B. 6o6 .................. . 
Davis v. Farmers Co-op Equity Co. (I923) 262 U.S. 3I2 ... . 
Davis v. Gant (Civ. App. Texas I922) 247 S.W. 576 ..... . 
Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co. (C.C.A. 9th I924) 300 Fed. 
204 
349 
I93 
278 
I, 3 ........................................... 578 
Davis v. Ruzicka (I 936) I 70 Md. I I 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 
Dawson v. Dawson ( I93I) 224 Ala. I3, I38 So. 4I4 ...... 265 
Dawson v. Murex, Ltd. [I942] I All E. R. 483 ........ 285 
D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (I9I4) ISS Wis. 
54I, 544, I45 N.W. 372, 373· ....... 44I, 476, 477, soo 
De Bueger v. Ballantyne & Co. [I938] A.C. 452 ....... 465 
De Wet v. Browning (I930) S.A.L.R. Transvaal Prov. Div. 
409 ........................................... 446 
Dickey v. Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. (I 9 I 5) I 19 Ark. I 2, 
I73 S.W. 398 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 69 
Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co. (I932) 288 U.S. I88, 196 .. 572 
Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp. 
(I925) 267 u.s. 22 .......................... ·76, 77 
Dobell & Co. v. Rossmore S.S. Co. [1895] 2 Q.B. 408 . ·39I, 424 
Dobree v. Napier (I836) 2 Bing. N.C. 78I .............. 239 
Doetsch, In re, Matheson v. Ludwig (I 896) 2 Ch.D. 836 . . . I I 8 
Dolan v. Mutual Res. Fund Life Ass'n (1899) 173 Mass. 
I97, 53 N.E. 398 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ........ 4I2, 4I3 
Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat'l Bank (I904) I27 Iowa 
IS3, 98 N. W. 918, I02 N.W. 836 ................ 276 
Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (I934) 266 
N.Y. 7I, IOS, Io6, 109, I93 N.E. 897, 9IO .. 88, 89, 38I, 548 
Downer v. Chesebrough (I 869) 36 Conn. 39, 4 Am. Rep. 
29 ............................................ 503 
Drews v. Williams (I898) 50 La. Ann. 579, 23 So. 897 . . 93 
Driefontein Cons. Gold Mines v. Janson, Ltd. (1900) 2 Q.B. 
339, [r 9oi] 2 K.B. 4I 9, [I 9o2] A.C. 484 . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
Dudley v. Collier (1888) 87 Ala. 431, 6 So. 304 ........ 2IO 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Dugan v. Lewis ( I89I) 79 Tex. 246 . . . ....... 4I I 
Duke of Marlborough v. Att. Gen. [I94S] I All E.R. I6S, 
I7 I ........................................... 364 
The Dumfries (I8S7) Swab. 63, I2S ................. 336 
Duncan v. Ash wander (D.C.D. La. I 936) I 6 F. Supp. 829, 
832 ........................................... 383 
Duncan, Fox & Co. v. Schrempft & Bonke [I9IS] I K.B. 36s 378 
Dunlop v. Mercer (I907) IS6 Fed. S4S ................ 209 
Dunn v. Welsh ( I879) 62 Ga. 24I ............... S03 
Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques Van Moses (I724) I 
Strange 6I2, a:ff'd (I728) 2 Ld. Raym. IS32, (I730) id. 
IS3S· ....................................... 3I, 73 
Dyke v. Erie R. Co. (I87I) 4S N.Y. II3 .............. 29I 
The Eagle Point (I9o6) 73 U.S. C.C.A. s69, I42 Fed. 4S3 347 
The Eastern Carrying Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Benefits Life & Prop. 
Ins. Co., Ltd. (I9I9) 3S T.L.R. 292 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
Eastlick v. Hayward Lumber & Investment Co. (I 928) 33 
Ariz. 242, 263 Pac. 936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 
Easton v. George Wostenholm & Son (C.C.A. 9th I90S) I37 
Fed. S24 ....................................... II2 
Eaton v. Woman's Home Missionary Society (I9I4) 264 Ill. 
88, IOS N.E. 746 ................................ I82 
Edinburgh and Glasgow Bank v. Ewan (I8S2) I4 Ct. Sess. 
(2nd Ser.) S47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 
Edinburgh & Leith R. Co. v. Dawson (I839) 7 Dowl. P.C. 
S73 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
Edwards Brokerage Co. v. Stevenson (I 90 I) I 6o Mo. S I 6, 
6I s. w. 6I7 ................................... S72 
Egerton v. Earl Brownlow (I8S3) 4 H. L. Cas. I, I22 ... sSI 
Elbro Knitting Mills v. Schwartz (I929) 30 F. (2d) IO .... S2S 
Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co. (I89S) ISS U.S. IOS, ISS. 
Ct. 77 I ........................................ 247 
J. H. Ellis and Cap. Baker v. The Eagle-Picher Lead Co. 
(I924) II6 Kan. I44, 22S Pac. I072 ............... soo 
Elmore-Schultz Grain Co. v. Stonebraker (I 9 I 9) 202 Mo. 
App. 8I, 2I4 S. W. 2I6 ........................... S72 
El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth (Tex. Com. App. 
I923) 2SS s.w. IS9 ............................. 238 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
El Paso, etc. R. Co. v. McComas (Tex. Civ. App. I903) 72 
s. w. 629 ...................................... 3I6 
Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Sedgwick, Collins & 
Co. [I927] A.C. 95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SS 
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Clements (I S9 I ) q.o U.S. 
226 ........................................... 4I3 
Ernst v. Elmira Municipal Improvement Co. (I S9S) 24 N.Y. 
Misc. 5S3, 54 N.Y. Supp. I I6 ....................... 78 
Erving v. Chicago and Northwestern R. Co. (I927) I7I 
Minn. 87, 2I4 N.W. I2 ...................... I92, I93 
Eskovitz v. Berger (I936) 276 Mich. 536, 268 N. W. 883 25S 
Evans v. McKinney (I923) 308 Ill. IOO, I39 N.E. 99 .... I54 
Evans & Sons v. Stein & Co. (I904) 42 Scot. L. R. I03, Jurid. 
Rev. I905, 402 .................................. 3I9 
Falls v. U.S. Savings, Loan and Bldg. Co. (I893) 97 Ala. 4I7 4IO 
Farley v. Fair et ux. (I927) I44 Wash. IOI, 256 Pac. I03I 5I2 
Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Anderson (I933) 216 
Iowa 988, 250 N.W. 2I4 ......................... I09 
Farnsworth v. Terre Haute etc. R. Co. (I859) 29 Mo. 75 23 
Farrell v. Employers' Liability Assurance Co. (I 933) 54 R. I. 
IS, I68 Atl. 9I I ................................ 264 
F. A. Straus & Co., Inc. 'v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (I930) 
254 N.Y. 407, I73 N.E. 564 ...................... 423 
Federal Schools v. Kuntz (I 93 I) I 6 La. App. 289, I 34 So. 
I IS ........................................... 203 
Fender v. St. John-Mildmay [I938] A.C. I, I2 ........... 556 
Ferguson v. Flower (La. I 826) 4 Mart. N.S. 3 I 2 . . . . . . . . I II 
Fibreboard Products, State ex rel. v. Hinkle (I928) I47 Wash. 
IO ........................................... I55 
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, 
Ltd. [I943] A. C. 32 ............................ 54I 
Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Miazza (I908) 93 Miss. I8 
at 36,422 at 435, 46 So. 8I7 at 8I8, 48 So. I017 at IOI8. 526 
Fidelity Savings Ass'n v. Shea (IS99) 6 Ida. 405 .......... 4IO 
First National Bank of Waverley v. Hall (I 892) I 50 Pa. 466, 
24 Atl. 665 ................................. I I2, I I4 
First Title and Securities Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (I93I) 211 
Iowa IOI9, 233 N.W. I37 ...................... 6S, I I I 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Fischl v. Chubb (I937) 30 Pa. D. & C. 40 .............. 273 
Fitch v. United Royalty Co. (I936) I43 Kan. 486, 55 Pac. 
(2d) 409 ................................... 108, I I3 
Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co. (I929) 252 N.Y. I27, I69 
N.E. II2 .............................. 246, 285, 260 
Fitzsimmons v. City Fire Ins. Co. of New Haven (I S64) IS 
Wis. 246, S6 Am. Dec. 76I ....................... 205 
Flagg v. Baldwin (ISS4) 3S N.]. Eq. 2I9, 4S Am. Rep. 308 56S 
Flinn v. Gillen (I92S) 320 Mo. I047, IO S.W. (2d) 923 ... 205 
Floyd v. National Loan & Investment Co. (I90I) 49 W.Va. 
327 ........................................... 4IO 
Foster v. Driscoll [I929] I K.B. 470, 5IS, 510 .......... 5S6 
Foubert v. Turst (I703) I Brown Pari. Cas. 3S, 42 ...... 36I 
Francis v. Humphrey (1939) 25 F. Supp. I .............. 2S5 
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Lipowicz ( I92S) 247 N.Y. 
465, I6o N. E. 9I6 .............................. 499 
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. William D. Mullen Co. 
(D.C.D. Del. I925) 7 F. (2d) 470, 473, reversed (C.C.A. 
3d I926) I2 F. (2d) ss5 ........................ 5I2 
Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (App. Div. 
N.Y. I924) 203 N.Y. Supp. 232, I46 N.E. 369 . . . . . . . . SS 
The Fri (C.C.A. 2d I907) I54 Fed. 333 ............... 42I 
Fritts v. Palmer (1SS9) I32 U.S. 2S2 ................. 204 
Fritz Schulz Jr. Co. v. Raimes & Co. (I9I7) IOO N.Y. Misc. 
697, I66 N.Y. Supp. 567 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5S 
Fruin-Colnon Contracting Co. v. Chatterson (I9I2) I46 Ky. 
504, I43 s.w. 6 ................................ 203 
Fryklund v. Great Northern R. Co. (I907) IOI Minn. 37, 
III N. W. 727 ................................. 263 
Furniss v. Larocque (I SS6) 2 Montreal L.R.S.C. 405 . . . . 4S6 
Garnes v. Frazier & Foster (Ky. I909) I IS S.W. 998 ..... 50 I 
Garrigue v. Keller (I905) I64 Ind. 676, 74 N. E. 523, 527 576 
Gasque v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [I 940] 2 K.B. 
So . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
General Conference v. Berkey (I 909) I 56 Cal. 466, I o 5 Pac. 
4I I ....................................... I 55, IS2 
General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou (IS43) II M. & W. 
S77, I52 Eng. Re. I06I .............. So, IOI, II7, 263 
TABLE OF CASES 665 
PAGE 
George M. Muller Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank of Dothan 
(I9I2) I76 Ala. 229, 57 So. 762 ................ I49, 2IO 
George Monro, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and Chemical 
Corp. [I9H] K. B. 432 .......................... 320 
George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co. (C.C.A. 2d I9H) 
I42 F. (2d) 536, 540 ......................... 297, 322 
Gerli & Co., Inc. v. Cunard S. S. Co., Ltd. (C.C.A. 2d I93I) 
48 F. (2d) II5, II7 .......................... 374, 405 
German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl (I9I5) 2I6 N.Y. 57, 
I09 N.E. 875 ................................... 224 
Getridge v. State Capital Co. (I 933) I 29 Cal. App. 86, I 8 
Pac. (2d) 375 .................................. I90 
Gibbs and Sons v. La Societe lndustrielle et Commerciale des 
Metaux (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 399 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
Gilman v. Jones (I889) 87 Ala. 69I, 5 So. 784, 787, 7 So. 48 576 
Gilman v. Stevens (I 896) 63 N.H. 342, I Atl. 202 ........ 465 
Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co. (I 902) I 90 U. S. 
540, 543 ....................................... 438 
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. David Moffat 
Co. (I9I3) I54 Fed. I3 ........................... 534 
Golden v. Cervenka (I 9 I 7) 2 7 8 Ill. 409 at 440, II 6 N.E. 
273 at 286 ..................................... I54 
Gonzales v. Tuttman et al. (I945) 59 F. Supp. 858, 862 .. 225 
Goode v. Colorado Investment Loan Co. (I 9 II) I 6 N.M. 
46I, II7Pac.856 ............................... 4II 
Goodman v. London R. Co. (I877) I4 Scot. L. Rep. 449,450 294 
Graham v. First Nat'l Bank of Norfolk (I88I) 84 N.Y. 393, 
38 Am. Rep. 528 ................................ 465 
Grainger & Son v. Gough [I 896] A.C. 32 5 at 335 . . . . . . . . I 7 5 
Grand v. Livingston (I896) 38 N.Y. Supp. 490, aff'd (I899) 
I 58 N.Y. 688, 53 N.E. I I25 ...................... 433 
Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wright (C.C.A. 2d I928) 2I F. (2d) 
8I4, 8I5 ...................................... 344 
Graves v. Johnson (I892) I56 Mass. 2II, 30 N. E. 8I8 .... 588 
Gray v. Gray (I934) 87 N.H. 82, IJ4 Atl. 508 .......... 265 
Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones (I 900) I 77 
U.S. 449 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 97, I I3 
Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Burwell (I926) I2 F. (2d) 
224, cert. denied, 271 U.S. 683 ...................... 415 
666 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King (I 92 I) 37 T.L.R. 
436, 445 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · I67 
Green v. Northwestern Trust Co. (I9I4) 128 Minn. 30, I50 
N.W. 229, 23I .............................. 402, 436 
Greenlee v. Hardin (I930) I57 Miss. 229, I27 So. 777, 7I 
A.L.R. 74I ................................... 475 
Philip L. Gregory v. Maine Central R. Co. (I945) 3I7 Mass. 
636,59 N.E. (2d) 47I, I59 A.L.R. 7I4 .......... 283, 285 
Grell v. Levy (I864) I6 C.B.N.S. 73 .................. 576 
Griffin v. McCoach (C.C.A. 5th I94I) I23 F. (2d) 550, 
55I, 3I3 u.s. 498 ............................... 577 
Grimshaw v. Bender and Dana (I8o9) 6 Mass. I57 ...... 543 
Groesbeck v. Beaupre (I940) 307 Ill. App. 2I5, 30 N.E. 
(2d) 53I :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8I 
Haase v. First Nat'l Bank of Anniston (I9I9) 203 Ala. 624, 
So So. 76I ..................................... 577 
Hall, Ltd. v. Pim Jr. and Co., Ltd. (I927) 33 Com. Cas. 324 438 
The Halley (I868) 2 L.R.P.C. I93• 204 ....... 242, 276, 343 
Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. (I9I7) I37 Minn. 
I4I, I48, I62 N.W. Io82, 1085 .................... 5I2 
The Hamborn [I9I9] 2 A.C. 993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
Hamburg-American Line Terminal and Navigation Co. v. 
United States (I928) 277 U.S. I38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
Hamilton v. Accessory Transit Co. (N.Y. I857) 26 Barb. 46 9I 
Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery [I 894] A.C. 202, 2 I 2, 
6 R. I88 ........................... 364, 385, 388, 475 
Hampshire Land Co., In re (I 896) 2 Ch. D. 7 43 . . . . . . . . I 69 
Harris v. Columbia Water Co. (I90I) 108 Tenn. (24 Pick) 
245, 67 S.W. 8I I ................................ 205 
Harris v. U.S. Mexico Oil Co. (I922) IIO ~an. 532,204 
Pac. 754 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
Hart & Son v. Furness, Withy and Co. (I904) 37 N.S. R. 74 379 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. 
(I934) 292 u.s. I43· I49 ........................ 555 
Haskell v. Bailey (I894) 25 U.S. App. 99, 63 Fed. 873 .... 3I8 
Hauck Clothing Co. v. Sophie Sharpe (I899) 83 Mo. App. 
385 ........................................... 475 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Haven v. Home Insurance Co. (I9IO) I49 Mo. App. 29I, I30 
S.W. 73 ....................................... 4I2 
Hayman v. Morris (I942) 36 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 756 ...... 225 
Hazel v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. (I 89 I) 82 
Iowa 477, 48 N.W. 926 ........................... 475 
Heart of America Ins. Agency v. Wichita Cab and Transport 
Co. (I940) ISI Kan. 420,423, 99 Pac. (2d) 765, 767 .. 203 
Hecker H-0 Co. v. Holland Food Corp. (C.C.A. 2d I929) 
36 F. (2d) 767 ................................. 296 
Hemphill v. Orloff (I928) 277 U.S. 537, 550 · · · ·. ·. · · · 99 
Henni v. Fidelity B. & L. Ass'n (I 90 I) 6 I Neb. 7 44, 86 N. W. 
475 ........................................... 203 
Henning v. Hill (I923) 8o Ind. App. 363, I4I N.E. 66 .. 5I2 
Henriques v. General Privileged Dutch Co. (I 728) 2 Ld. 
Raym. I532, (H. of L. I730) id. I535, 92 Eng. Re. 494 
......................................... 68, 73. I29 
Hibbs v. Brown (I907) I90 N.Y. I67, 82 N.E. II08 .... I08 
Hill-Davis Co., Ltd. v. Atwell (I932) 2I5 Cal. 444, IO Pac. 
(2d) 463 ...................................... I08 
Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consolidated (I 937) I04 
Mont. 328, 67 Pac. (2d) 8I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
Hoffman v. North American Union (Mo. App. I933) 56 S.W. 
(2d) 599 ...................................... 4I2 
Hogan v. Hamburg American Line (I934) I52 N.Y. Misc. 
405, 272 N.Y. Supp. 69o ......................... 346 
Holland Furnace Co. v. Connelley (D.C.E.D. Mo. I942) 
48 F. Supp. 543 . · · · · · · ..... · .......... · ... · .. 554, 578 
Holman v. Johnson (I775) I Cowp. 341 ............... s8s 
The Holstein (I936) ISS L.T.R. 466 ................ 148 
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick (I930) 28I U.S. 397,407-8 ... 555 
Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins (I920) 107 Kan. 153, I90 
Pac. 601 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
Hood & Co. v. McCune (Mo. App. I921) 235 S. W. 158 .. 572 
Hope v. Hope (I857) 8 De G.M. & G. 731 ............ 526 
Hopkins v. Great Western Fuse Co. (194I) 343 Pa. 438, 22 
Atl. (zd) 717 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8o 
Horton v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1899) 151 Mo. 604, 52 
s.w. 356 ...................................... 412 
668 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Hoskins v. Rochester S. & L. Ass'n (I903) I33 Mich. 505, 95 
N.W. 566 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 
House v. Lefebvre (I942) 303 Mich. 207, 6 N.W. (2d) 487 456 
Howard v. Howard (I93I) 200 N.C. 574, I58 S.E. IOI .. 265 
Howe Machine Co. v. Walker (I877) 35 U.C.Q.B. 37 .. I44 
Howells v. Wilson (C.A. I936) 69 Que. K. B. 32 .... 24I, 243 
Hoyne, In re (I922) 277 Fed. 668 .................... I 14 
Hubbard v. Exchange Bank (C.C.A. 2d I896) 72 Fed. 234, 
cert. denied, I63 U.S. 690 .......................... 476 
Hudson v. Green Hill Seminary (I885) II3 Ill. 6I8 ...... III 
Hudson v. Von Hamm (I927) 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 250 
Hudson River Pulp Co. v. Warner & Co. (1900) 99 Fed. 187, 
39 U.S. C.C.A. 452 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
Hullett v. King of Spain (1828) 2 Bli. N.S. 31, 28 R.R. 56 ... 150 
Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson (1922) 258 U.S. 290 . . . . 46 
Hunt v. Jones (I879) 12 R.I. 265, 34 Am. Rep. 635 .... 500 
Hunter v. Derby Foods (C.C.A. 2d 1940) IIO F. (2d) 970 319 
Hunter W. Finch & Co. v. Zenith Furnace Co. (1910) 245 
Ill. 586 at 594, 92 N.E. 52 I at 524, aff'd, 146 Ill. App. 257 212 
Huntington v. Attrill (1892) 146 U.S. 657,666,673-4 .278, 544 
Husted v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (19I0) 143 Mo. App. 623, 
128 s. w. 282 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 
Hutchison v. Ross (1933) 262 N.Y. 38I, 187 N.E. 65 . . . . 14 
Hyde v. Goodnow (I849) 3 N.Y. 266 ................ 206 
Illinois Fuel Co. v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co. (1928) 319 Mo. 
899, 8 S. W. (2d) 834, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 640 ...... 162 
The Imperial Anglo-German Bank, In re (I872) 26 
L.T.N.S. 229 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
Insurance Co. v. Kennedy (1896) 96 Tenn. (12 Pick.) 7II, 
36 s.w. 709 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 
Intermountain Lloyds v. Diefendorf (I 93 I) 5 I Ida. 304, 5 
Pac. (2d) 730 .................................. I54 
International Harvester Co. of America v. McAdam (I 9 I o) 
I42 Wis. 1 I4, I20, 124 N.W. I042, I044 ........ 576, 584 
International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders Aktien-
gesellschaft v. R. [I 936] 3 All E. R. 407, 429 . . . . . . . . . . 535 
Ives v. The Farmers' Bank (I86I) 2 Allen (84 Mass.) 236 543 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais (I884) I2 
Q.B.D. 589, 6o4 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 464, 539, 540 
James v. Catherwood (I823) 3 D. & R. I90 ° 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 504 
James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (I 925) 239 N.Y. 
248, I46 N.E. 369 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 
James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry (I927) 273 
U.S. I I 9 o o o o 0 o o o 0 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 2 7 8 
The James McGee (I924) 300 Fed. 93 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 349 
J as. Richardson & Sons. v. The Burlington [I 93 I] S.C.R. 76 424 
Jefferson Island Salt Co. v. Longyear Co. (I923) 210 Ala. 
352, 98 So. 119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 192 
John E. Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen et al. (I937) 276 N.Y. 
274, I I N.E. (2d) 908 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 209 
Johnson County Savings Bank v. Walker (I9o8) So Conn. 
509, 69 Atl. I5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46I 
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates (I935) 50 Ga. 
App. 7I3, I79 S.E. 239 0 ° 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 526 
Joint Stock Co. of Volgakama etc. v. National City Bank (App. 
Div. N.Y. I924) 206 N.Y. Supp. 476 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88 
Jones v. Garcia del Rio (I 823) T. & R. 297 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 589 
Jones v. Lawman (I937) 56 Ga. App. 764, no, I94 S. E. 
416, 420 0 0 0 0 0 0-0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 546 
Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (I936) I58 Misc. 466, 286 
N.Y. Supp. 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 358 
Jones v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. [1924] 2 K.B. 730 293 
The Jupiter [1927] P. 122, 250, 253 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88, 91 
Justis v. Atchison etc. R. Co. (1910) I2 Cal. App. 639, I08 
Pac. 328 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 265 
Karius v. All States Freight, Inc. (I94I) 176 Misc. I55, 26 
N.Y. Supp. (2d) 738 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 193 
Karvalsky v. Becker (1940) 2I7 Ind. 524, 29 N.E. (2d) 560 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 211, 214 
Kaufman v. Gerson [1904] I K.B. 59I, Clunet I905, 1063 ° 0 526 
Keeler v. Fred T. Ley & Co. (I93I) 49 F. (2d) 872; (I933) 
65 F. (2d) 499 ° 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 326 
Kendrick v. Burnett (I897) 25 R. 82, 35 Scot. L.R. 62 ° 24I, 353 
M.A. Kennedy v. Fiat of Turin ( I923) 24 O.W.N. 537 0 0 0 0 384 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
The Kensington (I90I) I83 U.S. 263 ................. 422 
Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp. 
(I922) 262 u.s. S44 ............................ I43 
Kernan v. Webb (I929) so R.I. 394, I48 Atl. I86, I88 ... 269 
Kerr v. Dougherty (I 88o) 79 N.Y. 32 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 67 
Kertson v. Johnson (I932) ISS Minn. S9I, 242 N.W. 329 . 264 
Kessler v. Armstrong Cork Co. (C.C.A. 2d I907) ISS Fed. 
744 ........................................... 46S 
Keynsham Blue Lias Lime Co. v. Baker (I863) 33 L.J. Exch. 
4I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
Kiene v. Ruff (I8SS) I Iowa 482, 486 ................. 325 
Kilkenny & GreatS. and W. R. Co. v. Feilden (I 8 S I) 6 Exch. 
79· 83 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
King v. Sarria (I877) 69 N.Y. App. 24, 2S Am. Rep. I28 
.......................................... I08, II4 
Kingery v. Donnell (I936) 222 Iowa 24I, 246,268 N. W. 
6I7, 620 ....................................... 260 
Kircher v. Kircher (I 939) 288 Mich. 669, 286 N. W. I 20 266 
Klatt v. Wayne Circuit Judge (I920) 2I2 Mich. S90 ...... 208 
Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Commonwealth (I924) I38 Va. 
soo, I22 S.E. I22 .............................. I82 
Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills (I900) I79 U.S. 69, 7I .4I6, 420 
Knutson v. Rawn [I943] 2 D. L. R. s82 .............. 2s8 
Kroch v. Le Petit Parisien [I937] I All E.R. 72S ......... 32I 
Kyle v. Kyle (I94I) 2IO Minn. 204, 297 N. W. 744 .... 266 
Kyriakos v. Goulandris (C.C.A. 2d I94S) Am. Marit. Cas. 
I94S, I04I ..................................... 344 
La Bourgogne [I899] P. I, [I899] A.C. 43I ........ I48, I75 
La Bourgogne (I9o8) 2IO U.S. 9S, II6, I38, I40 ....... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32S, 338, 3SO 
Lampson, Fraser & Huth, Inc. v. Simpson [I942] 3 W.W.R. 
238 ........................................... I44 
Lams et ux. v. Smith Co. (I93S) 36 Del. 477, I78 Atl. 6SI 
........................................... 499· SOI 
Land Grant R. & T. Co. v. Coffey County (I 870) 6 Kan. 
24S. 254 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
Lanier v. Union Mortgage, Banking & Trust Co. (I897) 64 
Ark. 39 ........................................ 4I I 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Lasswell Land & Lumber Co. v. Lee Wilson & Co. (C.C.A. 
8th I9I6) 236 Fed. 322, cert. denied, 24-2 U.S. 6s2 0 0 0 0 0 209 
Laughlin v. Michigan Motor Freight Co. (I936) 276 Mich. 
54-5, 268 N.W. 887 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 268 
Lawrence v. Batcheller (I 88 I) I 3 I Mass. so4-, 509 0 0 0 0 ° 0 I o8 
Lazard Bros. & Co. v. Midland Bank, Ltd. [I932] I K.B. 6I7, 
a:ff'd, H. of L. [I 933] A. C. 289 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 90 
Le Forest v. Tolman (I875) II7 Mass. I09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 229 
The Leon (I88I) 6 P.D. 14-8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0337, 350 
Leroux v. Brown (I852) I2 C.B. 8oi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 °4-99, 503 
Le Sueur v. Manufacturers' Finance Co. (C.C.A. 6th I922) 
28 5 Fed. 4-90 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o 4- II 
Leverett v. Garland (192I) 2o6 Ala. s56, 90 So. 34-3 ° 0 0 0 0 0 207 
Levy v. Daniels' U -Drive Auto Renting Co. (I 928) I o8 
Conn. 333, I4-3 Atl. 163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 27S 
Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner (C.C.S.D. Tex. 
I9o8) I63 Fed. 6os 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 So 
Lie:ff v. Palmer (I937) 63 Que. K.B. 278 ° 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 24-3 
Limerick and Waterford R. Co. v. Fraser (I827) 4- Bing. 
394- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 
Lindstrom v. International Navigation Co. (C.C.E.D. N.Y. 
I902) I I7 Fed. I73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 32S 
Lister v. McAnulty [I943] Que. K.B. I84- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26I 
Little v. Chicago etc. R. Co. (1896) 6s Minn. 4-8, 67 N.W. 
846 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24-7 
Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 
(I889) I29 U.S. 397,4-44-, 4-47, 4-S8 :ff.o 0337, 37S, 4-I9, 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4-2I, 4-33 
Liverpool, Brazil & River Platte Navigation Co. v. Agar & 
Lelong (C.C.E.D. La. I882) I4 Fed. 6IS 0 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 
Livesley v. Horst & Co. [I924-] S.C.R. 6os, [I92S] I D.L.R. 
1S9 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 277, S4-3 
Livingston v. Jefferson (I8II) IS Fed. Cas. 66o 0 0 0 0 0 024-6, 302 
Locknane v. U.S. Savings & Loan Co. (I898) I03 Ky. 26s 0 0 4-IO 
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Balgowan S.S. Co. 
(I93I) 16I Md. I4-S, ISS Atl. 334-, 77 A.L.R. I302 0 0 ° 0 238 
Loomis v. People's Construction Co. (I9I4-) 2II Fed. 4-S3 0 0 14-9 
Loranger v. Nadeau (I932) 2IS Cal. 362, IO Pac. (2d) 63 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. 0 0. 0 ..... 0 .... 0 0 .... 0 0. 0 0 .. 2SO, 2S8 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Lord Advocate v. Huron and Erie Loan & Savings Co. (I911) 
S.C. 6I2, 6I6 ................................... I76 
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (I9I8) 224 N.Y. 
99, I2o N.E. I98 ........................ 238, 250, 25I 
Loui~-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (I 930) 43 F. 
(2d) 824, 826, 827 ................ 36I, 423, 465, 540 
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Smith (I 909) I 35 Ky. 462, I 22 S.W. 
8o6 ........................................... 278 
Lovell v. Boston & Maine R. Co. (I9Io) 75 N.H. 568, 78 
Atl. 62 I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564 
Lowe v. Pressed Metal Co. (I9I6) 9I Conn. 9I, 99 Atl. I . . 87 
Lowery v. Zorn (La. App. I934) I57 So. 826, 83I ....... 264 
Lucas v. Coupal (I930) 66 O.L.R. I4I ............... 263 
Ludlowv. Van Ren$elaer (18o6) I Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 94 .. 504 
Lu-Mi-Nus Signs Co. v. Regent Theatre Co. (I930) 250 
Mich. 535 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 
Lutherv.Sagor&Co. [I92I] 3K.B.532,558 ............ 556 
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Esteves (I937) 89 F. (2d) 528,530 .. 286 
McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co. (I939) I84 Miss. 663, 
I86 So. 305 .................................... 264 
McClelland v. Trustees Executors and Agency Co., Ltd. (High 
Court of Australia 1936) 55 Commw. L.R. 483 at 493 
.......................................... 369, 43I 
McDiarmid v. Hughes (I888) I6 O.R. 570 ............ I67 
McDonald v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (I896) 3I O.R. 663 .. 424 
Mcintyrev.Parks (Ma~. I84I) 44 Mass. 207 ............ 573 
McKee v. Jones (I89o) 67 Miss. 405, 7 So. 348 ........ 564 
McKee v. Stewart Land & Live Stock Co. (I925) 28 Ariz. 
5II, 238 Pac. 326 ............................... IH 
McLean v. Pettigrew (I944) (I945] S.C.R. 62, [I945] 2 
D.L.R. 6 5, affirming Pettigrew v. McLean (I 942) 48 R.L. 
(N.S.) 400 ..................................... 243 
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (I9I6) 2I7 N.Y. 382, III 
N.E. 1050 ..................................... 3I9 
McVean v. Wehmeier (I923) 2I5 Mo. App. 587, 256 S.W. 
1085 ........................................ 572 
Machado v. Fontes [I897] 2 Q.B. 23I ........ 240, 242, 243 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Mackay v. New York etc. R. Co. (I909) 82 Conn. 73, 72 
Atl. 5s3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I6I 
The Madrid [I937] P. 40, [I937] I All E.R. 2I6 .... I92, 354 
Magann v. Auger (I90I) 3I S.C.R. I86 ............... 455 
Mahar v. Harrington Park Villa Sites (I9I2) 204 N.Y. 23I, 
234, 97 N.E. 587, 58 9 ....................... 204, 209 
Mandel v. Swan Land & Cattle Co. (I895) 154 Ill. I77, 40 
N.E. 462 ...................................... I44 
Manufacturers Finance Co. v. B. L. Johnson & Co. (I 93 I) 
15 Tenn. App. 236 ........................... 4II, 478 
Manufacturers' Finance Trust v. Collins (I 933) 227 Mo. 
App. u2o, 58 s.w. (2d) Ioo4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
Maritime Assurance Co. v. Assecuranz-U nion von I 86 5 
(I935) 52 Ll. L. Rep. I6 ........................ 476 
Martin v. Zurich General Accident Co. (C.C.A. Ist I936) 84 
F. (2d) 6 ..................................... 264 
Martin Bros. v. Nettleton (I926) I38 Wash. I02, 244 Pac. 
386 ........................................... 206 
Masci v. Young ( I932) I09 N.J. Law 453, I62 Atl. 623 .. 269 
Matheson Bros., Ltd., lnre (I884) 27 Ch. D. 225 . . . . . . . . . 87 
Mathys v. Manchester Liners (I904) 25 Que. S.C. 426 .... 379 
Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc. (I942) I2 So. (2d) 253 .... 267 
Matter of People, Russian Reinsurance Co. (I93I) 255 N.Y. 
4I5, I75 N.E. II4............................... 9I 
Maxey v. Railey & Bros. Banking Co. (Mo. App. I933) 57 
s.w. (2d) I09I, I093 ............................ 57I 
May v. Roberts (I 930) I 33 Ore. 643, 286 Pac. 546, 549 . . . 7 I 
Mercantile Bank of Australia, In re (1892) 2 Ch. D. 204 . . 87 
Merchants' & Manufacturers' Securities Co. v. Johnson (C.C.A. 
8th I934) 69 F. (2d) 940, cert. denied, 293 u.s. 569 ... 4I I 
Meroney v. Atlanta National Building and Loan Ass'n (I893) 
I I2 N.C. 842, I7 S.E. 637· ( I895) II6 N.C. 882 ...... 4IO 
Mertz v. Mertz (I936) 27I N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. (2d) 597 ... 265 
Metropolitan Bank v. Godfrey (I86o) 23 III. 53I ......... I67 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kane (I 94 I) I I 7 F. ( 2d) 398, 
I33 A.L.R. I I63 ............................... 204 
Meylink v. Rhea (I904) I23 Iowa 3IO, 3II, 98 N.W. 779, 
780 ........................................... 490 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Mich. Central R. Co. v. Mix (I929) 278 U.S. 492 ....... I93 
Mich. Trust Co. v. Herpolsheimer (I932) 256 Mich. 589 . . . 98 
Midland Savings & Loan Co. v. Solomon (I905) 7I Kan. I85, 
I9I, 79 Pac. I077 ............................... 4I I 
The Miguel di Larrinaga (D.C.S.D.N.Y. I9I4) 2I7 Fed. 
678 ........................................... 4I9 
The Milford (I858) Swab. 362, I66 Eng. Re. n67 ...... 338 
Millard v. Brayton (I90I) I77 Mass. 533, 537, 59 N.E. 
436 ........................................... 4I3 
Miller v. Kaliwerke Aschersleben Aktien-Gesellschaft (C.C.A. 
zd I922) 283 Fed. 746 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 
Mirando v. LoCurto (I928) 249 N.Y. I9I, I63 N.E. 557 .. 275 
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co. Inc. ( I922) 
257 u.s. 533 :, ................................. 193 
Missouri S.S. Co., In re (I889) 42 Ch. D. 32I, 330, 336 
.................................. 369, 397, 4I9, 475 
Mittenthal v. Mascagni (I903) I83 Mass. I9, 66 N.E. 425 .. 384 
TheM. Moxham (I876) I P.D. I07, III, II3 ....... 268, 342 
Mojonnier Bros. v. Detroit Milling Co. (I925) 233 Mich. 
3I2 ........................................... 208 
Monarch Brewing Co. v. George J. Meyer Mfg. Co. (C.C.A. 
9th I942) I30 F. (2d) s8z ....................... 532 
Montreal Cotton & Wool Waste Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. 
of Maryland (I927) 26I Mass. 385, 158 N.E. 795 .. 368, 38o 
Moore v. Mitchell (1929) 30 F. (zd) 6oo ............. 504 
Moore v. Pywell (I907) 29 App. D.C. 312, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
I078 ...................................... 324, 327 
Morgan v. New Orleans M. & T.R. Co. (I876) 2 Woods 
244, I7 Fed. Cas. 754 ........................... 470 
Morrisette v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (I904) 76 Vt. 267, 56 
Atl. I I02 ...................................... 259 
Morrow v. Merrick (I 92 3) I 57 Ark. 6 I 8, 249 S. W. 369 . . . 330 
Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co. (C.C.A. 8th I93I) 52 F. 
(zd) 364 ...................................... 263 
Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co. 
(I939) 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E. (2d) 758, a:ff'd (I940) 
309 u.s. 624 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
Moulis v. Owen [I907] I K.B. 746, 755 ff ... · ..... 57 I, 573 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance 
and General Mutual Life Assurance Society, Ltd. [I938] 
A.C. 2 24-, 24-0 .............................. 4-4- I' 4-6 s 
Mount Ida School v. Rood (I93I) 2S3 Mich. 4-82, 23S N.W. 
227, 74- A.L.R. I32S ............................ S4-3 
M.S. Cohn G. Co. v. Southern S. Co. (I927) I29 Okla. I7I, 
264- Pac. 206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20S 
Muller v. Dows (I876) 94 U.S. 4-4-4- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
Muller & Co. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [I927] I 
K.B. 78o, aff'd [I928] A.C. 40 .................... 4-SS 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill (I904-) I93 U.S. SSI, SS7 
.................................. 388, 389, 392, 398 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Johnson, Administrator 
(I934-) 293 u.s. 33S ............................ S42 
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Minehart (Ark. I904) 
83 s.w. 323 ................................ 388, 39I 
Naftalin v. London, Midland & Scottish R. Co. (I 933) S.C. 
2S9 ....................................... 24-I, 
Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American etc. Co. (I903) I89 
u.s. 22I . . .............................. . 78 
Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Foster (I882) 78 Tenn. 3SI ...... 3I6 
The National Bank of St. Charles v. De Bernales (I 8 2 5) I 
C. & P. s69, Ry. & M. I9o .................... 68, 73 
National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co. (I942) 
4-7 F. Supp. 4-99, so4- ............................. 32I 
National Surety Co. v. Larsen [I929] 3 D.L.R. 79, [I929] 
4- D.L.R. 9 I8, 943 ............................... s6s 
Neuchatel Asphalte Co. v. Mayor of New York (1898) ISS 
N.Y. 373, 4-6 N.E. 1043 ......................... 204-
Newby v. Van Oppen and The Colt's Patent Firearms Mfg. Co. 
(x872) 7 Q.B. 293 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 
New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass. v. Olin 
(C.C.A. 7th 194-o) 114 F. (2d) 131, 137 ............ 4-13 
Newman v. Eldridge (1902) 107 La. 3IS, 31 So. 688 . . . . 93 
New Orleans etc. R. Co. v. Harris (1918) 24-7 U.S. 367 .... 286 
New York Central R. Co. v. Lockwood (1873) 17 Wall. 3S7, 
379 ........................................... 416 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens (I900) I78 U.S. 389 
.......................................... 4I5, 542 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (I9I8) 246 U.S. 357, 375, 
376, 377. 382 ....................... 8I, I99· 38I, 4I4 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head (I9I3) 234 U.S. I49 at 
I63 ........................................... I98 
Niblack v. Seaberg Hotel (I938) 42 N.M. 28I, 76 Pac. (2d) 
IIS6 .......................................... 204 
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Babcock (I894) I54 U.S. I90 .... 277 
Northwest Trading Co. v. Northwest Trading Co. [C.A. 
I920] I W.W.R. 353, aff'd [I920] 3 W.W.R. 729 ..... I44 
N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. James Finlay 
& Co., Ltd. [I927] A.C. 6o4, 6o8, 6o9 .......... 385, 388 
Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co. (I 94 I ) 3 I I Ill. App. I I I, 
35 N.E. (2d) 522, 388 Ill. 474, 58 N.E. (2d) 460 .. 470, 499 
Ober v. Stephens (I903) 54 W.Va. 354, 46 S.E. I95 ...... 204 
O'Brien v. Chicago R. Co. (I868) 53 Barb. (N.Y.) 568, 36 
How. Pr. 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
Ocean Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Queensland State Wheat Board 
[I94I] I K.B. 402, 4I2, 4I5 ................. ·389, 39I 
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (I925) 9 F. (2d) 
724 .............................. 293· 379· 4I6, 422 
Oceanic S. N. Co. v. Mellor (The Titanic) (I9I4) 233 U.S. 
7I8 ........................................... 352 
O'Connor v. Wray [I930] S.C.R. 23I, [I93o] 2 D.L.R. 
899 ....................................... 241, 243 
Oklahoma Fullers Earth Co. v. Evans (I937) I79 Okla. I24, 
125, 64 Pac. (2d) 899, 90I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Ontario Marble Works, Ltd. v. Lepage Marble Works, Ltd. 
(I924) 31 Que. Pr. 217 ......................... I44 
Ontario Wind Engine & Pump Co. v. Eldred (Sask. I9I2) 2 
W.W.R. 6o, 2 D.L.R. 270 .................... I29 
The Oranmore (D.C.D.Md. I88s) 24 Fed. 922, aff'd, 92 
Fed. 396 ...................................... 4I9 
O'Reilly, Skelly & Fogarty Co. v. Greene (I896) 40 N.Y. 
Supp. 36o, aff'd, 41 N.Y. Supp. 1056 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
Ormsby v. Vermont Copper Min. Co. (1874) 56 N.Y. 623 63 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Osborne v. Dannatt (I9I4) I67 Iowa 6I5, I49 N.W. 9I3 .. 50I 
Oscanyan v. Arms Co. (I88o) I03 U.S. 26I, 27I, 272, 
277 ........................................... 580 
O'Toole v. Meysenburg (C.C.A. 8th I9I8) 25I Fed. I9I, 
I94 ........................................... 375 
Ottawa El. R. Co. v. Letang [I924] S.C.R. 470 ......... 259 
Owen v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co. (I909) 84 S.C. 253, 255, 66 
S.E. 290 ....................................... 4I5 
Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co. (I937) I92 Atl. 
I 58, aff'd, 464, I I2 A.L.R. I I3 .................... 405 
Owners of the Steamship Pass of Ballater v. Cardiff Channel 
Dry Docks & Pontoon Co., Ltd. [I942] 2 All E.R. 79 .. 329 
Parsons v. American Trust & Banking Co. (I934) I68 Tenn. 
49, 73 S.W. (2d) 698 ........................... 286 
Pattison v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n (I935) 360 Ill. 6I6, 
I96 N.E. 882 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I6o 
Paul v. Virginia ( I868) 8 Wall. I68 ................. I25 
Pearson (or Pearlman?) v. Great West Life Assurance Co. 
(C.A. I9I2) 2 W.W.R. 563, 4 D.L.R. I54 .......... I9I 
Peck v. Noee (I9o8) I54 Cal. 35I, 97 Pac. 865 . . . . . . . . . . 83 
Peck-Williamson Heating etc. Co. v. McKnight (I 9 I 8) I 40 
Tenn. (I3 Thomp.) 563,205 S.W. 4I9 ........... 205, 206 
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand 
(I865) 3 Moo. P.C.Cas. (N.S.) 272, 290 ... -445, 446, 475 
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co. 
(I9I7) 243 u.s. 93 ............................. I93 
People v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. (1894) I53 Ill. 25, 38 
N.E. 752 ...................................... I54 
People v. Mercantile Credit Guarantee Co. (I90I) 65 App. 
Div. (N.Y.) 306, 309, 72 N.Y. Supp. 858 . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank (I935) 36I Ill. 
75, I97 N.E. 537 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · I63 
Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Construction Co. (I 930) 2 I I Cal. 
228, 295 Pac. I .................................. 202 
Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co. (I886) I5 R.I. 380, 2 Am. 
St. Rep. 902 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500 
The Petter Lassen (D.C.N.D. Cal. I939) 29 F. Supp. 938 .. 346 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Peyton v. Desmond (1904) 129 Fed. I ................. 247 
Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co. (1943) 133 F. (2d) 663 .. 297 
Phillips v. The Energia (1893) 56 Fed. 124 ............. 416 
Phillipsv. Eyre (1870) Q.B. 1 at 27 ............... 239, 241 
Phillips v. Malone (1901) 3 O.L.R. 47, aff'd (1902) 3 
O.L.R. 492 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454 
Phillips Co. v. Everett ( 1919) 262 Fed. 341 at 343 173 
Pickering v. Stephenson (1872) 14 L.R. Eq. 322 158 
Pickles v. China Mutual Ins. Co.; China Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Smith (1913) 47 S.C.R. 429, 10 D.L.R. (1913) 323, 
conf'ng, 46 N.S.R. 7, 3 D.L.R. 766 (S. Ct. of Nova Scotia 
1912) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
Pietri v. Seguenot (1902) 69 S.W. 1055, 1057 413 
Succession of Pilcher (I 887) 39 La. Ann. 362, I So. 929 93 
Pilgrim v. MacGibbon (1943) 313 Mass. 290, 47 N.E. (2d) 
299 ........................................... 283 
Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express (1941) 314 U.S. 201, 207, 
191 Ga. 502, 13 S.W, (2d) 337 . . . . . . .... 79, 524 
Pinney v. Nelson (1901) 183 U.S. 144............. 81 
Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. v. Grom (1911) 142 Ky. 51, 133 S.W. 
977 ........................................... 291 
Poling v. Poling (1935) 116 W.Va. 187, 179 S.E. 6o4 .... 266 
Polson v. Stewart (1897) 167 Mass. 211, 213, 45 N.E. 
737, 738 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490 
Pope v. Hanke (1894) 155 Ill. 617,630,40 N.E. 839, 843 .. 575 
Powell v. Great Northern R. Co. (1907) 102 Minn. 448, 113 
N.W. 1017 .................................... 238 
Powers v. Cunard S.S. Co. (1925) 32 F. (2d) 720 ........ 349 
Pratt v. Dittmer (1921) 51 Cal. App. 512, 197 Pac. 365 ... 542 
Precourt v. Driscoll (1931) 85 N.H. 280 at 283, 157 Atl. 
525 at 527 ............................. 260, 285, 584 
The Presidente Wilson (D.C.D. Mass. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 
466 ........................................... 348 
Price v. Independent Oil Co. (1933) 168 Miss. 292, 150 So. 
521 ........................................... 108 
Priest, In re, Belfield v. Duncan [1944] I All E.R. 51 ..... 489 
Pritchard v. Norton (1882) 106 U.S. 124, 137 ......... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362, 375, 433, 461, 475, 515, 531 
TABLE OF CASES 
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. (I933) 288 U.S. 476 
PAGE 
s6 
Quarrier v. Colston (1842) I Phillips 147 ............... 571 
Radovcic v. The Prine Pavle (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1942) 45 F. 
Supp. I 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346 
Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (Mo. App. 
I934) So S.W. (2d) 272 ......................... 412 
Ralli Brothers v. Compafiia Naviera Sota y Aznar [I 920] 2 
K.B. 287, 304 .......................... 535, 538, 539 
Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co. v. Custodian of Enemy 
Property (I923) S.A.L.R. App. D. 576 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 
Rauton v. Pullman Co. (I937) I83 S.C. 495, 502, I91 S.E. 
4I6, 4I9 ...... : . .............................. 277 
RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman (I940) II4 F. (2d) 
86 ............................................ 321 
Reed and Barton v. Maas (C.C.A. 1st I934) 73 F. (2d) 
359 ........................................... 319 
Reeves v. Southern R. Co. (1905) 49 S.E. 674 ............ I92 
Regina v. Lesley (I 86o) Bell C.C. 220, 233 .... 239, 306, 308 
Reichwaldv.Com.HotelCo. (I883) 106Ill.439 ......... I27 
Reilly v. Clyne (I925) 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 . . . . . . . . 98 
Relfe v. Rundle (I88o) 103 U.S. 222, 225 .......... 85, 127 
Rembours en Industriebank N.V. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston 
(D.C.D. Mass.) CCH War Law Service, Statutes, par. 
9I55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
Renfrew Flour Mills v. Sanschagrin, limitee ( 1 928) 45 Que. 
K.B. 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... 457 
Republic Creosoting Co. v. Boldt C. Co. ( C.C.A. 6th I 930) 
38 F. (2d) 739 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 
Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez [I927] I K.B. 669, 691 
.......................................... 486, 504 
Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondhold-
ers Aktiengesellschaft [I937] A.C. 500, 529 ....... 364, 39I 
Rex Beach Pictures Co. v. Harry I. Garson Productions (I 920) 
209 Mich. 692, 706 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 
Richardson v. Rowland (I873) 40 Conn. 565 .......... 576 
Riddle v. Hudson (I9I7) 68 Okla. 173, I72 Pac. 921, 926 .. 543 
68o TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (I 92 7) 48 R.I. 433, I 38 Atl. 
I86 ........................................... 264 
Ripple v. Mortgage and Acceptance Corp. (I927) 193 N.C. 
422, I37 S.E. I56 ................................ 410 
Risdon I. & L. Works v. Furness [1906] I K.B. 49 . . . . . . . 8I 
The Roberta [I937] s8 Ll.L.Rep. I59> I77; [1938] 6o id. 
84, 8s ..................................... 425, 545 
Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co. 
( 1921) 257 u.s. 213 ............................. I93 
Robinson v. Bland (1760) 2 Burr. 1077, I W. Bl. 234 ... . 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 363, 364, 369, 57 I 
Rodgers v. The Adriatic Fire Ins. Co. (1895) 148 N.Y. 34, 
42 N.E. 515, 516 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
Roller v. Murray (1907) 107 Va. 527, 59 S.E. 421 ..... 576 
Roselle v. McAuliffe (I897) 141 Mo. 36, 39 S.W. 274 .... 573 
Rosenbloom, In re (1922) 280 Fed. I39 ............... 208 
Ross v. Ross (1893) 25 Can. Sup. Ct. 307 ............... 488 
Ross v. Sinhjee (1891) 29 Scot. L.R. 63 ............... 261 
Rouquette v. Overmann (I875) IO L.R. Q.B. 525 ........ 465 
Rousillon v. Rousillon (I88o) I4 Ch. D. 351, 369 ....... 578 
Rowson v. Atlantic Transport Co. [1903] 2 K.B. 666 .... 424 
Royal British Bank v. Turquand (1856) 6 E. & B. 327 .... 169 
Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegaco 
Lloyd Brasileiro (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1928) 31 F. (2d) 757 .. 343 
Rubin v. Gallagher (1940) 294 Mich. I24, 292 N.W. 584 
.......................................... 380, 542 
Rundell v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (I 900) 
Ioo Fed. 655 ................................... 325 
Russian & English Bank v. Baring Bros. & Co., Ltd. [I 936] 
A.C. 405 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, In re [1933] I Ch. 745, 
Clunet I934, 445 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
Russian Bank of Foreign Trade v. Excess Ins. Co. [I9I9] I 
K.B. 39, 35 T.L.R. 42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Comptoir d'Es-
compte de Mulhouse [I925] A.C. 112, 40 T.L.R. 837 . . 88 
Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (I925) 2II App. Div. 
132, 207 N.Y. Supp. 574 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
Ryerson & Son v. Shaw (I9I7) 277 Ill. 524, II5 N.E. 650 .. 2II 
TABLE OF CASES 68I 
PAGE 
Saccharin Corp. v. Chemische Fabrik etc. Akt. [I 9 I I] 2 K.B. 
5I6 ........................................... I75 
The Saginaw (1905) 139 Fed. 906 .................... 350 
The St. Joseph [1933] P. I I9, I34 ................... 420 
St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. James (I895) I6I U.S. 
545 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
St. Pierre v. South American Stores, Ltd. [I937] 3 All E.R. 
349> 351, 355 ................................... 532 
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (I933) 262 
N.Y. 220, I 86 N.E. 679 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
Samuels & Lesser, In re (D.C. S.D.N.Y. I9I3) 207 Fed. I95, 
I98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
Sanderson & Son v. Armour & Co. (1922) 9I L.J. (P.C.) 
I67 ........................................... 385 
San Remo Copper Min. Co. v. Moneuse (I912) 149 App. Div. 
(N.Y.) 26, I33 N.Y. Supp. 509, reversed (I9II) I32 N.Y. 
Supp. 570 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
Sapone v. New York Central R. Co. (1927) 225 N.Y. Supp. 
2 I I ...................... ,· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 I 
Saunders v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App I923) 253 
S.W. 177 ...................................... 4I2 
Sawyer v. El Paso & N.E. R. Co. (r9o8) 49 Tex. Civ. App. 
106, 108 s.w. 7I8 ........................... 287, 291 
Saxby v. Fulton [I909] 2 K.B. 208 ................... 57I 
Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp. ( 1934) 68 F. (2d) 942 at 
944 ....................................... 232, 270 
Schering, Ltd. v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank Aktiebolag (1943) 
[I944] Ch. D. I3 ............................... 38o 
Schollenberger, Ex parte (r877) 96 U.S. 369, at 377 ....... I67 
Schrader, Mitchell & Weir v. Robson Leather Co. [I 9 I 2] 3 
D.L.R. 838 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543 
The Scotland (r88r) ro5 U.S. 24, 29, 3I, 33 ......... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338, 347, 348, 352, 354 
Scott v. Seymour (r862) I H. & C. 2I9, Ex. Ch ......... 246 
Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank (I 87 5) 91 U.S. 406, 4I I .. 450, 49 I 
Sebeck v. Plattdeutsche Volkfest Verein (I900) 64 N.J. Law 
624, 46 Atl. 63I ................................ 267 
Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse (I928) 274 U.S. 403, 
408 ................ 0 ••••••••• 0 •••••••••• 0 • 402, 409 
682 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Selig v. Hamilton (I9I4) 234 U.S. 652 . . . . . . . . 3 
Shaw v. Quincy Mining Company (I892) I45 U.S. 444, 
450 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
Siegmann v. Meyer (C.C.A. 2d I938) IOO F. (2d) 367 ... 266 
The Silvia (I 898) I 7 I U.S. 462 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Draper (I899) I03 Tenn. 262 ........ 208 
Sinnott v. Hanan (I9I3) 156 App. Div. (N.Y.) 323, I4I 
N.Y. Supp. 505 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
Sinnott v. Hanan ( I9I5) 2I4 N.Y. 454, 108 N.E. 858 .. 69, 85 
Skinner v. Tinker (N.Y. I 861) 34 Barb. S.C. 333 . . . . . . . . 504 
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R. Co. (I 904) I 94 U.S. I 20 ..... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251, 277, 279 
Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co. (I927) 244 N.Y. 482, 
155 N.E. 749 ................................... 381 
Smith v. Brown (I939) 302 Mass. 432, 433, 19 N.E. (2d) 
732, 733 ...................................... 282 
Smith v. Condry (1843) I How. 28, II L. Ed. 35 ... 342, 353 
Smith v. McMicken (I848) 3 La. Ann. 3I9, 322 . . . . . . . . . . 93 
Smith v. Marconnay (1796) Pqke Add. Cas. 8I N.P ....... 585 
Smith v. Parsons (1893) 55 Minn. 520 ................ 4II 
Smyth Sales v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co. (I 942) 128 F. 
( 2d) 697' 699> 702 ...................... 2 77' 326, 543 
Snashall v. Metropolitan etc. R. Co. (1890) 8 Mackey (D.C.) 
399 ........................................... 265 
Snyder v. Fidelity Savings Ass'n (1901) 23 Utah 29I ...... 410 
Societe Anonyme des Grands Etablissements du Touquet Paris-
Plage v. Baumgart [1927] W.N. 78 . . . . . . . . . . . 573 
Societe des Hotels Reunis (Societe Anonyme) v. Hawker 
[1913] 29 T.L.R. 578 ........................... 526 
The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler 
( I 8 I 4) 2 Gall. I 0 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 4 3 
Societe lntercommunale Beige d'Electricite, In re, Feist v. The 
Company [I933] Ch. 684, 690 .................... 532 
South African Breweries, Ltd. v. King [I899] 2 Ch. 173, 177, 
aff'd [1900] I Ch. 273 .................. 402, 433, 475 
Solomon v. Ross (1764) I H.Bl. I3I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank of New York (1924) 239 N.Y. 
158, 145 N.E. 9I7, aff'd (I928) 250 N.Y. 69, I64 N.E. 
745 ........................................ 88, 542 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Spain (King) v. Hullett & Widder (I828) 7 Bli. N.S. 3S9, 
I Cl. & F. 333 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I so 
Spiller v. Turner (I897) I Ch. D. 9II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
Spitz v. Secretary of State of Canada [I939] 2 D.L.R. S46 . . 77 
Spurrier v. La Cloche [I 902] A. C. 446 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 S 
Stabler v. El Dora Oil Co. (I9IS) 27 Cal. App. SI6, ISO 
Pac. 643 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
Stamps v. Frost (I93S) I74 Miss. 32s, I64 So. s84 ..... s64 
Standard Bank of South Africa, Ltd. v. Efroiken and Newman 
(I924) S.A.L.R. App. D. I7I, I76, I78, I96 .......... 466 
Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Tampico Nav. Co. (D.C.S. 
D.N.Y. I92I) 2I F. (2d) 79S ..................... 343 
State ex rel. Colvin v. Paine (I926) I37 Wash. s66, 243 Pac. 
2, aff'd, I37 Wash. S72, 247 Pac. 476 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
State ex rel. Griffith v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (I92S) 
II7 Kan. s64, 232 Pac. 2S4 ...................... I82 
State ex rel. Northwestern Mutual Fire Association v. Cook 
(I942) 349 Mo. 22S, I6o S.W. (2d) 687 ............ I94 
State ex rel. Standard Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan (I920) 282 
Mo. 26I, 22I S.W. 728, 732 ...................... ISS 
State Life Ins. Co. v. Dupre (I 93S) I 9 Tenn. App. 30 I, 86 
s.w. (2d) 894> 897 ........................ 20S, 206 
State of Colorado v. Harbeck (I92I) 232 N.Y. 7I, I33 N.E. 
3S7 ........................................... sss 
State of Russia v. Nat'l City Bank of New York (I934) 69 F. 
(2d) 44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
Steinman v. Midland Savings & Loan Co. (I908) 78 Kan. 
479 ........................................... 4II 
Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Klaxon Co. (I940) IIS F. 
(2d) 268, 27S .................................. S43 
Stern v. Drew (App. D.C. I922) 28s F. 92s ........... 380 
Sternfeld v. Toxaway Tanning Co. (I942) 290 N.Y. 294, 
49 N.E. (2d) I4S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . So 
Stevens v. Pratt (I882) Ioi Ill. 206 .................... IS6 
Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works (I943) I8o Tenn. I37> 
I72 s. w. (2d) 812 ....................... ·382, sos 
Stoddard v. Thomas (I 9 IS) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. I 77, I 8 I .... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46, 4IO, 4I4 
Story v. McKay (I888) IS 0. R. 69 ................... S7I 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Stothart v. William T. Hardie & Co. (I903) IIO La. 696,34 
So. 740 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. (I925) 
8 F. (2d) 6oi .................................. soo 
Strampe v. Minnesota Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. (I909) I09 
Minn. 364, I 23 N.W. 1083 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 
Stump v. Sturm (I9I8) 254 Fed. 535 ................. IS6 
Strouse v. Lanctot (Miss. I9oo) 27 So. 6o6 ............. 564 
Sturges v. Vanderbilt (I878) 73 N.Y. 384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson (I864) IS C.B.N.S. 759, 
779 ............................ 27, 79, 337, 339, 35I 
Sudlow v. Dutch Rhenish R. Co. (I855) 2I Beav. 43 . . . . . . 79 
Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green (I9IS) 237 
u.s. 53I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8I 
Swann v. Swann (D. C. E. D. Ark. I884) 2I Fed. 299 ..... 564 
Tarbox v. Childs (I 896) I 6 5 Mass. 408, 43 N.E. I 24 . . . . 46 5 
Terral v. Burke Construction Co. (I922) 257 U.S. 529 .... 204 
Texas.etc. R. Co. v. Gross (I910) 6o Tex. Civ. App. 62I, I28 
s. w. II73 .................................... 278 
Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Humble (I90I) I8I U.S. 57 ....... 265 
Texas & P.R. Co. v. Richards (I887) 68 Texas 375, 4 S.W. 
627 ........................................... 238 
Textile Properties v. Whittall Associates (I934) 157 Misc. 
108, 282 N.Y. Supp. I7 ........................... I07 
Thatcher v. Morris (1854) II N.Y. 437 .............. 573 
Thomas v. Birmingham Railway Light and Power Co. (I912) 
I95 Fed. 340 ................................... 2IO 
Thomasv. Clarkson (I9o6) I25 Ga. 72,54 S. E. 77 ...... 546 
Thomas v. The First Nat'l Bank of Belleville (I 904) 2 I 3 Ill. 
26I, 72 N. E. 8oi ............................... 575 
Thomas v. Matthiessen (C.C.D. N.Y. I909) I70 Fed. 362; 
(I9II)I92Fed.495····························· 82 
Thompson v. Bourchier [I933] O.R. 525, [I933] 3 D.L.R. 
I I9 ........................................... 270 
Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer (I893) 52 Minn. 
I74• I79• 53 N.W. 1137, II38 ·. ·. · · · · · · · · · · .436, 462 
TABLE OF CASES 685 
PAGE 
Thuna v. Wolf (I928) I32 Misc. 56, 228 N.Y. Supp. 658 .. 573 
Tide Water Pipe Co. v. State Board of Assessors (I895) 57 
N.J. Law 5I6, 3I Atl. 220 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
The Titanic (I9I4) 233 U.S. 7I8 at 733 ... 338, 346, 35I, 352 
Tolman v. New Mexico & Dakota Mica Co. (1885) 4 Dak. 4, 
22 N.W. 505 ................................ · · · 79 
The Torni [I932] P. 78, 88, 27, 37, 83 ff ..... 397, 398, 427 
Tovarishestvo Manufactur Liudvig-Rabenek [I944] I Ch. 
404, 408 .................................... 87, I76 
Townsend v. Riley (I865) 46 N.H. 300 ................ 4II 
Traglio v. Harris (I940) I04 F. (2d) 439 ............. 260 
Transit Bus Sales v. Kalamazoo Coaches, Inc. ( I 944) I 4 5 
F. (2d) 8o4, 8o7 ............................... 544 
Trent Import Co. v. Wheelwright (I9I2) II8 Md. 249, 84 
Atl. 543 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 70 
Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publishing 
Co. (D.C.D. Mass. I942) 46 F. Supp. 198, 203 ....... 322 
Trinidad Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd. v. G. R. Alston and Co. 
[I92o] A. C. 888 ............................... 539 
Tri-State Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Holm (I 924) I 6o 
Minn. 378, 200 N.W. 296 ........................ I8I 
James N. True v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (I9I4) 126 Minn. 
72, I47 N. W. 948 .............................. 542 
Tweedie Trading Co. v. James P. McDonald Co. (I902) I I4 
Fed. 985 ...................................... 539 
Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard (I896) 94 Va. I46, 26 
S. E. 42I ..................................... 525 
Union Trust Co. of Md. v. Rodeman (I936) 220 Wis. 453, 
264 N.W. 508 at 5I2 ............................. I49 
United Cigarette Machine Co. v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. 
(C.C.A. 2d. I926) I2 F. (2d) 634 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 
United Divers Supply Co. v. Commercial Credit Co. (C.C.A. 
5th I923) 289 Fed. 3I6 ........................... 4Io 
U.S. v. Pink (I942) 3I5 U.S. 203 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
U.S. v. Sisal Sales Corp. (I 92 7) 2 7 4 U.S. 268, 2 76 . . . . . . . 299 
U.S. v. Tingey (I 8 3 I) 5 Pet.S.C. I I 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II 
686 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
United States v. Wagner (I867) 2 L.R.Ch. 582 . . . . . . . I 50 
U.S. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Lanzarotti (I929) 47 Ida. 287, 
274 Pac. 630, 632 ............................ 46, 4I2 
U.S. Savings & Loan Co. v. Scott (I896) 98 Ky. 695,34 
s.w. 235 . . ................................... 4IO 
Uravic v. Jarka Co. (I93I) 282 U.S. 234 ............... 343 
Usher v. West Jersey R. Co. (1889) I26 Pa. St. 206, I 7 Atl. 
597 ....... : ................................... 265 
Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. (C.C.D.N.J. I9o3) I22 
Fed. I05 and (C.C.D.N.J. I907) I54 Fed. 867, 869, aff'd 
(C.C.A. 3d 1908) I62 Fed. 67I, cert. denied, 2I4 U.S. 
5I5 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 295, 296, 322 
Vanderpoel v. Gorman (I894) 140 N.Y. 563,35 N.E. 932 .. I 55 
Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (I 899) 93 Fed. 260 . . . . 324 
Venuto v. Robinson (C.C.A. 3d I94I) II8 F. (2d) 679 .... 273 
Veytia v. Alvarez (I926) 30 Ariz. 3I6, 329, 247 Pac. II7, 
I2I, I22 ....................................... 564 
Victoria Machinery Depot Co. v. The Canada (I9I3) I7 
D.L.R. 27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
Vidrine v·. Guillory (I925) 3 La. App. 462 .............. 33I 
Vipond v. Furness, Withy & Co. (S. Ct. of Canada I9I6) 35 
D.L.R. 278 .................................... 379 
Vi$er, In re, H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker [I 928] 
I Ch. 877, 884 ............................. so4, s8s 
Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [I939] A. C. 
277, 289, 290, 297 ..... 364, 385, 398, 399> 402, 404, 406 
Vladikavkazsky R. Co. v. New York Trust Co. (I934) 263 
N.Y. 369, I89 N.E. 456 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Crafton (I92I) I8I N.C. 
404, I07 s. E. 3I6 .............................. 574 
Wait v. Kern River Mining, Milling & Dev. Co. (I909) 157 
Cal. I6, 106 Pac. 98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
Walker v. Lovitt (I9II) 250 Ill. 543, 95 N.E. 63I ...... 543 
Walpole v. Canadian National R. Co. [I92I] 66 D.L.R. I27, 
[I923] A. c. II3, 70 D.L.R. 20I ............ 229, 24I 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Walsh v. New York & New England R. Co. (I894) I6o Mass. 
57I, 36 N.E. 584 ................................ 236 
Walton Harvey, Ltd. v. Walker and Homfrays, Ltd. [I93I] I 
Ch. 274, 285 .......................... · · · · · · · · · 537 
Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud (I 929) 248 Mich. 8 5, 
226 N. W. 883 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543 
Warner v. Delbridge & Cameron (I896) IIO Mich. 590, 68 
N.W. 283 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
Warren v. Interstate Realty Co. (I9I4) I92 Ill. App. 438 .. I54 
Warrender v. Warrender (I835) 2 Cl. & Fin. 488, 535 ... 364 
W. A. Ryan & Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (I885) 65 
Tex. I3 ................................... 475 
Washington-Alaska Bank v. Dexter Horton National Bank 
(I920) 263 Fed. 304 ............................. I6o 
Waters v. Campbell (C.A. Alberta I9I3) 25 W. L. R. 838, 
6 W.W.R. 957 ............................ 576 
Watkins Co. v. Hill (I926) 2I4 Ala. 507, 108 So. 244 .... 564 
Watkins Co. v. McMullan (Tex. Civ. App. I928) 6 S.W. 
(2d) 823 ...................................... 565 
Wayman v. Southard (U.S. I825) IO Wheat. I .......... 375 
Weber v. Johnson (I939) I5 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 770 ...... 548 
Weisberg v. Hunt (I92I) 239 Mass. I90, I98, I3I N. E. 47I, 
474 ........................................... 378 
Wells v. Irwin (I942) 43 F. Supp. 2I2, 214 ............ 238 
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown (I9I4) 234 U.S. 
542,547,34S.Ct.955 ....................... 235, 25I 
Westgate v. Harris [I929] 4 D. L. R. 643 ............. 588 
West Pub. Co. v. Superior Court of San Francisco (I 942) I 28 
Pac. (2d) 777 .................................. I48 
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox (I936) 298 U.S. I93 . . . . . . . . 29 
White v. Howard (I87I) 38 Conn. 342 ............... I67 
White-Wilson-Drew Co. v. Egelhoff (19Io) 96 Ark. 105, 
I3I S. W. 208 ............... · .... · ............. 576 
Wieden v. Minneapolis, St. Paul etc. R. Co. (I 930) I 8 I Minn. 
235, 238, 232 N.W. I09, I IO ...................... 282 
Wilchick v. Marks and Silverstone [I 934] 2 K. B. 56 . . . . . . 3 I 2 
Williams v. Colonial Bank (I888) 38 Ch. D. 388 . . . . . . . . . 75 
688 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Williams v. Dearborn T. Co. (I927) 2I8 Ky. 27I, 29I S.W. 
388 ........................................... 203 
Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. (I900) 52 La. Ann. 
I4I7, 27 So. 85I ................................. 266 
Wilson v. Todhunter (I9I8) I37 Ark. So, 207 S.W. 22I 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I 2, I I 4 
Wind v. Iler & Co. (I895) 93 Iowa 3I6, 32I, 6I N. W. 
IOOI, I002 ..................................... 562 
Windisch v. Mortgage Security Corp. of America (I 93 I) 2 54 
Mich. 492, 236 N. W. 88o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 
The Windrush (D.C.S.D.N.Y. I922) 286 Fed. 25I, aff'd 
(C.C.A. 2d I924) 5 F. (2d) I425 .................. 350 
Winter v. Baldwin (I889) 89 Ala. 483, 7 So. 734 ........ I90 
Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Munday (I9I8) I68 Wis. 3I, I68 
N.W. 393, I69 N.W. 6I2, aff'd, Munday v. Wisconsin 
Trust Co. (I920) 252 U.S.499 .................... 207 
Wolcott & Lincoln v. Humphrey (I938) II9 S. W. (2d) 
I022 .......................................... 572 
Wolf v. Lancaster (1903) 70 N.J. Law 201, 56 Atl. I72 ... I87 
Wolski v. Booth & Flinn, Ltd. (1916) 93 Misc. 651, 157 
N.Y. Supp. 294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 10 
Wood v. Cascade Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (I 894) 8 Wash. 42 7, 
36 Pac. 267 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 
Wooden v. Western New York and Pennsylvania R. Co. 
(I89I) I26 N.Y. IO, 26 N.E. !050 . . . . . 238 
Woronin, Luetscheg & Cheshire v. Frederick Huth & Co. 
(K. B. 1928) Clunet I928, 756, 758 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
Wyman v. Pan-American Airways, Inc. (1943) I8I N.Y. 
Misc. 963, 43 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 420 ................ 347 
Wynne v. McCarthy (C.C.A. roth 1938) 97 F. (2d) 964, 
970 ....................................... 277, 543 
Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 
(I923) I23 Wash. 387, 212 Pac. 564, rehearing, 216 Pac. 
85I ........................................... 465 
Young v. Masci (I933) 289 U.S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599 ..... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229, 252, 269 
Index 
[References are to pages. For citations of enacted conflicts rules, 
see the Table of Statutes supra.] 
Abandon, 35I-352. 
Acceptance 
delayed, 520. 
letter lost, 520. 
by silence, 5I9. 
Accomplices, 3IJ. 
Acquisitions by Corporation, I64-
I67. 
Act Done by Corporation (Re-
statement), I70. 
Acting, in Tort, JII-323 
by distance, JI7 ff. 
in several states, Jl4-JI7 
Action !}bantum Meruit, 2Io. 
Advice, JIJ. 
Affreightment, 383, 389, 405, 4I5-
427. 
"Agency" 
of corporation, 74, n. 28, 83, 126, 
I37, I67-I7'2, I89, I93, JI8. 
law governing contracts, I 8~ 
I90· 
of foreign corporation, I74, I77, 
I82. 
of unincorporated association, 9, 
106, n. 53· 
Agreement on the Applicable Law, 
Chapters 28 and 29, 356-429 
conditional, 393, 547· 
respecting consent to the con-
tract, 525. 
by counsel in court, 386-387. 
effecting nullity, 387, 475, 477· 
for exemptions from liability, 
4I5-427, 428. 
express, 367, 376-384. 
in fraudulent evasion, 400. 
in insurance contracts, 4I2-4I5. 
on jurisdiction, 380, n. 89. 
in loan contracts, 4o8-4I2. 
nature, 366, 367, n. JO. 
permissibility, 360 ff. 
on place of contracting, 380, 506. 
requirement of substantial con-
nection, 402-408. 
renvoi, 387. 
scope, 387. 
for several laws, 388-393. 
for special reference, 388-393. 
tacit, 367, 384-387. 
Aircraft 
collision, 345 f., 347· 
damage on surface, 328, 346, 
n. 52. 
Aircraft-Transport 
agreements, 379, n. 85. 
Aktiengesellschajt, 8, 169. 
Aliens, Law of, 10, I 8, 106, I 30, and 
Chapter 2J. 
Anstalt, I2. 
Anti-trust Laws 
federal, 29~300. 
state, 565. 
Antwerp York Rules, 388. 
Arbitration Clause, 376-377, 385-
386. 
Argentina. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
foreign corporations, IJ3, n. 42, 
qo, n. 85, I79, n. 26. 
law of the forum, 474· 
law of the place of contracting, 
446, n. 54· 
party autonomy, 371. 
Arrest, '23o-2JI, 239,n. 38,307-308. 
Assault, 3I4. 
Association, 5, I4-I5. 
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23, n. 6o. 
Central Office 
concept, 39-40. 
ascertainment, 4o-42. 
real existence, 42-45. 
transfer, 5o-56. 
Cesena Sulphur Co. Case, 41. 
Change of Law, 546-548. 
Characterization. See also Classifi-
cation. 
causation and fault, 260. 
corporate and unincorporate or-
ganization, IOQ-IOI, I02-I07, 
I2I. 
formal requirements, 496-498. 
legal person, Ioo. 
legal structure of contract, 528-
530. 
merchant character, 73-74, I38, 
I9I. 
place of contracting, 452-456, 
459, 505. 
place of performance, 47I-472. 
Charter of Corporation, 69, 85, I 25, 
128, IJ9· 
Charter Party, 389. 
Chile. See also Table of Statutes. 
foreign corporations, I84-I85. 
party autonomy, .37o-37I. 
China. See also Table of Statutes. 
recognition of foreign corpora-
tions not doing business, I4I. 
Choice of Law in Contracts 
by the parties, Chapters 28 and 
29, 357-429. 
judicial, 43o-440. 
of several laws, 388-393, 484. 
CITEJA, 341. 
Classification. See also Character-
ization. 
burden of proof, 283, 545· 
capacity to contract, 497, n. 47, 
498. 
capacity to sue (personal law and 
procedure), 72-73, 104, n. 63, 
II9, I2I, I47, I50. 
contract and tort, 29o-294. 
damages, 276-279, 542-545. 
form and procedure, 498-503. 
partnership and con tract, I I 6-
I I9. 
presumptions, 283-286, 545· 
revenue law, 498-504. 
tort and family law, 257, 26o, 
263, 265-267. 
tort sanctions, 276-281. 
"Clause Paramount," 383-384, 
426-427. 
Co/legit,, I27. 
Collision of Aircraft, 345-346, 347· 
Collision of Vessels, 336 ff. 
on high seas, 347-350. 
in territorial waters, 342-345. 
Colombia. See also Table of Sta-
tutes. 
contracts, 494, n. 35· 
reciprocity, 25, I4o, n. 86. 
Comity, I26, I73, 552. 
Commercial Property, 61. 
Company, Term, IO, I45· 
Concurrence, of Contract and Tort 
Claims 
in conflicts, 29o-293. 
in municipal law, 287-289. 
of tort claims, 304-306. 
Congregations 
dissolution, 87, I36. 
Congress of Antwerp, 332, 339, 
349, 354· 
Connection, Most Characteristic 
in contract, 402-403, 442-443. 
in tort, 3I7, 322-323, 333-335. 
Connection, Substantial 
of contract, 402-408, 477-478. 
Consideration, 362, 527-528. 
Consular Contracts 
form, 487. 
Contemplation of the Parties, 363, 
437-439· 
INDEX 
Contracts in General 
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"exclusion," I27, I73, 220. 
existence, 68, I24, I27, I45, I67. 
external relations, 8o-85. 
fiction theory, 4, 24-27, 55, 98, 
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manager, authority, I90. 
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treaties, 35-37, 141, 217-220. 
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bona fide, 404-405. 
express, 363, 367, 376-384. 
hypothetical, 363, 367, 431 ff. 
"indicia," 432. 
presumed, 363, 368, 431 ff. 
tacit, 363, 367, 384-387. 
Intentional Acts, Place, 332. 
International Legal Persons, 15-17. 
"International Theory" on Foreign 
Corporation, 127. 
Interpretation of Contracts, 53o-
535· 
Interstate Commerce, 173. 
Irresponsible Persons, Tort, 270, n. 
73, 317. 
Isle of Guernsey, Incorporation, 63. 
Italy. See also Table of Statutes. 
foreign corporations, 51, n. 79, 
72, n. 22, 132, n. 31, 133-134. 
Joint Stock Company, 7, 38, n. 22, 
97, 99, 107, II5, II9, 12o-121. 
Jurisdiction 
corporation matters, 79-81, 87, 
92, 191-194· 
stipulation for, 380, n. 89. 
Juristic Person, 6. 
Jury, 282-283. 
Labor Law, s6o-s6r. 
Latin America 
contracts, 441. 
form, 493-495, sn, n. 109· 
INDEX 
Latin America (continued) 
contracts (continued) 
party autonomy, 37o--373, 40I. 
foreign corporations 
theory, 24-27. 
authorization, J40-J4I, 145-
146, 151, 182-186. 
domestic law applied, 197-200. 
land acquisition, 166. 
Law of Aliens, 18, 106, 130, 173 ff. 
Law Common to the Parties 
in contracts, 432, 440, n. 31. 
in tort, 244-246, 345· 
Law of the Contract, 483-484. 
scope, Chapter 32, 518-548. 
change of, 546-548. 
consent, 51 cr527. 
consideration, 527-528. 
effects, 528 ff. 
interpretation, 53o--535. 
legality, 535-539. 
nature, 528-530. 
nonperformance, 539-545. 
Law of Corporations, 4, 31-67 
as to branches, I8g-Igi, 197-201. 
Law of the Domicil 
of contracting party, 522 and n. 
I g. 
of debtor, 473-474. 
Law of the Flag, 339, 345, 347· 
Law of the Forum 
in contracts, 401, 493, 519, 529· 
exclusive, 401. 
in corporation matters, 73, 100, 
JOg. 
in torts, 237, 278, 297, 322, 350, 
352-353· 
types of organizations unknown 
to the forum, I04-105, 151, 
1 53· 
Law Most Favorable to Contract, 
409, 474-480. 
Law of the Place of Contracting, 
445-462. See also Place of 
Contracting. 
history, 443-445, 448-449. 
countries involved, 445-452. 
criticism, 46o--462. 
for effects of contract, 53 I. 
exclusive, 445, 448. 
for form, 485 ff., 515-516. 
Law of the Place of the Most Im-
portant Acting, 317, 322-323, 
333-335· 
Law of the Place of Performance, 
462-472. 
history, 443-445, 462-463. 
countries involved, 463-464. 
criticism, 469-470, 472. 
exclusive, 37o--371, 463, n. IIg. 
for mode of fulfillment, 464-466. 
Law of the Place of Wrong, Chap-
ters 24-27, 301-335. 
scope, Chapter 25, 255-300. 
Law of the State of Central Office 
corporations, 4, 33, 45· 
change, 5o-55· 
exceptions, 45-49. 
unincorporated organizations, 
Chapter 21, 93-123. 
partnership, I 13. 
Law of the State of Incorporation, 
4, 31-33. 
meaning, 32, 63-65. 
change of, 55· 
exceptions, 45-46. 
Legal Person, 6. 
international, 15-17. 
plurinational, 15-16. 
public, 6, Io--12. 
supranational, I 5. 
Letters 
place of wrong, 318-319, 333· 
Lex Causae. See Form, Law of the 
Contract. 
Lex Loci Contractus. See Law of the 
Place of Contracting. 
Lex Loci Delicti, 229. 
Lex Loci Solutionis. See Law of the 
Place of Performance. 
Liability. 
absolute, 283-284, 310, 328. 
of agents of corporation, 84, 137, 
2II, 213. 
of agents of unincorporated asso-
ciation, 19, 106, n. 53· 
INDEX 
Liability (continued) 
of aircraft, 329. 
of automobile owner, 269 ff. 
of bailor of motor vehicles, 275. 
of broadcaster, 320-322. 
of carrier, 292, 302 f., 3I5, 4I5. 
for compulsory pilot, 242, 276, 
34I, n. 27, 343· 
of co-signer, 530. 
of dog owner, 273, n. 78. 
of directors of corporation, So, 
224. 
of employer, 292-293. 
extent, 289 f. 
exemptions, 293. 
of owner of building, 3I2-3I3. 
of partners, I I 7-I I 8. 
of railway, 283, 290-292, 3IO f., 
3I5, 3I6, 330. 
for risk, 230, 274. 
of shipowner (restrictions) 352. 
of stockholders, So-84, Io9, 224. 
of subscribers of shares, 70-71. 
strict, 329. 
of supplier, 3I9. 
vicarious, 267-276. 
without fault, 229 ff., 26o, 273, 
3IO, 328-330. 
Libel, 240. 
Libre Acces, 20, n. 49· 
Licensing, I 8 r. 
Limited Partnership, 7, 97, I07, 
IIO, II5-II6,496. 
Limited Partnership Association, 7· 
of Michigan, I07. 
Liquor Sales, 562-564, 587-588. 
Litvinoff Agreement, 89. 
Liverpool Cotton Association, 378, 
399· 
Loan, International, 379, 390-39I 
and n. I29, 392-393. 
Loan 
legal structure, 529. 
rate of interest, 408 ff. 
Local Actions, 246. 
Lockout, 3I4. 
Locus Contractus, 444, 461. 
Locus Regit Actum, 447, 485 ff. 
function, 517· 
Lois de Surete et de Police, 252. 
London Corn Trade Association, 
377, 400, 406. 
Lotteries, 573-574. 
Louisiana 
domicil principle abandoned, 
266-267. 
mercantile partnership, 93, n. r. 
Machado v. Fontes, 240-241. 
Marine Insurance, 379, 390, 407, 
n. 6I. 
Maritime Torts, Chapter 27, 336-
354· See also General Mari-
timeLaw. 
Marriage Relations 
and tort, 26 5. 
Master and Servant, 272 ff. 
Materiellrechtliche f/erweisung, 36I, 
39I-392. 
Matrimonial Agency Fee, 400. 
Merchant Quality 
branch, I9I. 
of corporation, 73-74. 
of partnership, I38. 
Messenger, 3I7. 
Mexico. See also Table of Statutes. 
contracts, 494-495. 
foreign corporations, personality, 
I45, n. IOI, I8o, n. 32, I84 
I85, n. 6o. 
oil expropriation, 26. 
Mine Damage, 330-332. 
Misrepresentation, 523 ff. 
Missouri, In re, Case, 397· 
Mistake, 523 ff. 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals 
'on applicable law invoked by 
both parties, 386-387. 
on control theory, 57-59. 
on party autonomy, 369, n. 39· 
on partnership, I05, I23. 
Mixed Types of Organizations, 6, 
9-ro, 93-99. 
Moratory, 545· 
Mortmain, I64-I67. 
Most Favored Nation, 2I8-'2I9. 
INDEX 
Name of Corporation, 72, I82, I88-
I89. 
Nationality 
of corporation, I7-27. 
of partnership, I22-I23. 
Nationality of Origin of Corpora-
tion, 30, 33, n. I I. 
Navigation, Rules, 336 ff., 34I, 351. 
Negligence, Place, 333· 
Neighborhood Relations, 330-332. 
The Netherlands. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
contracts, 446, n. 57, 486, n. 5· 
foreign corporations, 142. 
New York 
liability of foreign corporation 
officers, etc., 224. 
notaries, 509-510. 
restriction on wills, I6S-I66. 
Newspaper, Tort by, 309-321. 
Niederfiillbach Foundation, I3. 
Nonprofit Corporation, 5, 6, q-I 5, 
I36-I37 (recognition), I8I-
I 82 (doing business). 
Normative Conditions 
of incorporation, 69, I25, I28, 
I39· 
Norway. See also Table of Statutes. 
no party autonomy, 373· 
Notarial Documentation, so6-510. 
Notice of Accident, 286-287. 
O.ffentliche Beurkundung, 509. 
O.ffene Handelsgesellschajt, 94, I05. 
Offer, Binding Force, 5I9. 
Omissive Torts, 256, 3I2. 
One-Man Company, 70, n. I3. 
Ordre Public International, Verita-
ble, 549, n: I, 590. 
Organization, Types, Chapter I8, 
3-I?. 
Organs of Corporation, I28, I68-
I69, I7I-I72. 
Ormsby Rule, 63. 
Pan-American Union 
power of attorney, I96, n. 115, 
508, n. 96. 
recognition of corporations, I45-
I46. 
Parol Evidence, 503. 
Partnership 
capacity, I I6-I22. 
to be a party, II9-I22. 
corporate elements, 9, 93--{j9· 
between corporations, I9o, n. 89. 
domicil, 115. 
law applicable, I I 3-I I 5. 
of the seat, I I 3 
scope, II6-I22. 
liability of partners, I I I-I I3, I I7-
II8. 
limited, 7, 107. 
of Cuba, 108. 
of Pennsylvania, 97, 110, 116. 
merchant quality, I38. 
nationality, I22-I23. 
nature, 93-95, 99, I23. 
O.ffene Handelsgesellschajt, 94, 
I05. 
personal law, IOQ-I07, I I I-I I3, 
II6-I22. 
United States, I II-I I3. 
as to branches, I 89. 
recognition, I35, n. 56, I37-I38. 
rights of partners, II8-II9. 
right to be a party, II9-I22. 
Scotch, I I 8. 
societe civile, 93, n. 2, I07. 
societe en nom collectij, 95, I05. 
Party Agreement 
on the applicable law, Chapters 
28, 29. 
for the law of charter state, 45-
46. 
Party Autonomy, Chapters 28 and 
29. See also Agreement of the 
Parties. 
theories, 36o-368, 394 ff. 
on formal requirements, 506. 
present systems, 368-388. 
restrictions, Chapter 29, 394-
429. 
Patent, Violation, 295. 
Penance, 278. 
Personality, Protection, 577-579. 
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Personal Law 
for consent, 522. 
of corporations, Chapters I 9 and 
20, 31-92. 
of partnerships, IOo-107, II I-
II3, II6-I22. 
of quasi corporations (United 
States), I07-III, 113-II4, 
IIS-II6. 
of unincorporated organizations, 
93-122. 
Peru. See also Table of Statutes. 
party autonomy, 372. 
Phillips v. Eyre, 239 ff. 
Phonographic Records, 321. 
Pilot, Compulsory, 242, 276, 341, 
n. 27, 343· 
Place of Business, 174, 176-!78. 
Place of Contracting 
contracting by correspondence, 
453-457. sos. 
court discretion, 459· 
determination, 452-459, sos-
so6. 
Place of Performance 
characterization, 4 7 I -4 72. 
lack of, 470-471. 
several, 466-470. 
Place of Wrong, Chapter 26, 30!-
335· 
theory, 301-311, 328-335. 
acting, 311-320. 
at a distance, 317-323. 
injury, 301-303, 323-328. 
Plaintiff in Torts, 261-263. 
de Plessis-Belliere Case, II, n. 20. 
Plurinational Legal Bodies, 15-16. 
Poisoning, 301, 327. 
Power of Attorney, 196, n. IIS, 
so8, n. 96. 
Powers 
of corporation, 71-74, 149-167. 
domestic standard, I 49- I 57. 
general and special, 157-165. 
Preconstituted Proofs (France), 
502. 
Preparatory Acts, 311,318, 333· 
Presumptions, 283-286. 
Principal and Agent, 270-273. 
Principe de Specialite, 159. 
Pritchard v. Norton, 362, n. 16, 
SIS, 527. 
Privacy, 325. 
Private Law 
subject of conflicts law, 558 f., 
s66-567, 581. 
Private Limited Company (Ge-
sellschaft mit beschrankter 
Hajtung), 8, 105, 496. 
Procedure 
rules of civil procedure, 121. 
and substance, 72-73, I 19, 121, 
147, ISO. 
in torts, 276-286. 
Prohibition (Liquor Sales), 562 f., 
564, s88. 
Prohibitions, Legal, 397-398, 534-
539, ssg-s68. 
sanctions, 559 ff., s88. 
Promoters, 70, 106. 
Proper Law, 363-367. 
Public Law 
distinguished from private law, 
s6o-s61. 
foreign, s6s-s66. 
of the forum, 561-565. 
relation to conflicts law, ssg-
s66, 582. 
Public Legal Persons, 5, 6, II-12. 
Public Policy 
contracts, Chapter 33, 54g-5go. 
defense, attitude of courts, sss-
ss6. 
effect, 583-584. 
employment contract, 579· 
foreign, 584-590. 
formalities, 511-512. 
Harter Act, 421. 
one-man corporation, 70, n. 13. 
private law, 558-568, 582. 
public law, ssg-s66, 582. 
recognition of foreign corpora-
tion, 155-157, 224. 
Soviet nationalization, 8g, 91. 
tort, 240, n. 41, 247, 248-250, 
274· 
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Quasi Corporations, I07-III, II3-
IJ4, II5-II6. 
Railway, Liability, 283, 290-292, 
3I0-3II, 3I5, 3I6, 330. 
crossing, 256, n. 6, 3I3. 
Ralli Case, 538. 
Reciprocity 
permission of business, I87, 2I7, 
2I9. 
recognition of corporation, I38-
I40. 
treaties, I40, 2I9. 
Recognition of Foreign Govern-
ment, 88, 90. 
Recognition of Foreign Organiza-
tions, Chapter 22, I24-I72. 
concept, I3I-I32, I42, I44-
q6, I49 ff. 
authority of agents, I67-I72. 
authorization 
general, I38-I40. 
special, I4o-I41. 
capacity to be a party, I42-I47, 
204-2I 5 (corporation), 86, 89 
(dissolved corporation), 116-
117 (partnership). 
distinguished from permission 
for doing business, I29, I32, 
I44-I45· 
domestic standard, I49-I 57· 
effects, I42-I57· 
minimum, I42-I49· 
foundation, I37, I40. 
nonprofit corporations, I36-I37· 
Pan-American Union, I45-I46. 
partnerships, I35, n. s6, I37-I38. 
powers, 7I-74, I49-I67. 
general and special, I57-I65. 
no more than under domestic 
standard, I49-I 57· 
public policy, I55-I57. 
reciprocity, I38, qi, n. 88, I45, 
n. IOI, I49, n. I22. 
refusal, arbitrary, I4I, n. 88, 
I45, n. IOI, 149, n. I22, 2I7. 
requirements, I32-I4I. 
restrictions on capacity, I64-I67. 
theories, I24-I3o. 
trading associations, I35-I36. 
treaties, I4I. 
ultra vires doctrine, I 58-I6s. 
unconditional, I32-141. 
Reference to Foreign Law 
conditional, 393· 
special, 36o-36I, 388-393. 
Reference to Local Conceptions, 
533-534· 
Regina v. Lesley, 306, 308. 
Registration of Foreign Corpora-
tions, I77, I8o, I86, I94-I96. 
Renvoi 
contract, 387, 480. 
corporation, 50. 
formalities, 5I3. 
Rescission, 542. 
Restatement of the Law of Conflict 
of Laws 
contracts 
form, 485. 
interpretation, 531. 
law of the place of contracting, 
358, 397, n. I7, 448-449, 
451-452. 
law of the place of perform-,._ 
ance, 466. · 
place of contracting, 456-459. 
corporations, etc. 
acts of corporation, I70. 
corporation, 4-6. 
domestic standard, I5I-I52. 
domicil of partnership, I IS. 
law of the state of incorpora-
tion, 32. 
liability of stockholders, 82, n. 
67, 84. 
meeting place, 63. 
mortmain, I66-167. 
unincorporated associations, 4-
torts 
6, 93, Io8, n. 59, II2, n'. So, 
I33, n. 33· 
authorized acts, 257, 306-308. 
defendant out of state, 271. 
place of, 30I-302. 
principle, 229. 
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Restitution, 28I, 541. 
Restraint of Trade in Employ-
ment Contracts, 383, 554, 578, 
n. 97· 
Retaliatory Statutes, I 87. 
Revalorization, 547, 567, n. 46. 
Right to Be a Party 
corporation, 72-73, I42-147. 
partnership, II9-I22. 
unincorporated associations, I I~ 
I22, 147· 
Right to Sue, I42-147, 204-215, 
262-263. 
Russian Corporations, 86, 88-92. 
Sale, Theory of Two Laws, 466-468. 
Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 270-
ff. 
Scotland 
partnership, II 8. 
Seat, 4 and n. 3, 13. 
secondary, 177. 
Security for Costs, 20, n. 49, 23, n. 
6o, I23. 
Seizure 
of goods, 230, 239, n. 35· 
of shares, 51, 76-78. 
Service of Process, I9I-194. 
Shareholder 
liability, 8o-84. 
meetings, 62-63, I27. 
whether a person is a, 523-524. 
Shares 
and certificate, 75-78. 
issue, 190. 
seizure, 76-78. 
subscription, 70-71. 
Shooting Across Border, 301, 307. 
Siege, 4, n. 3, 42, n. 40. 
Siege d'Exploitation, 39· 
Similarity Rule 
corporations, I49-I57. 
tort, 237-244. 
Single Acts of Foreign Corporation, 
I47-I49, 175-I76. 
Smuggling, 585-590. 
Sociedad, 8, IO. 
Societas, 6, 7, 9, 93· 
Societe dnonyme, 8, 138. 
SociEte Civile, 93, n. 2, 107. 
SociEte en Nom Collectij, 95, 105. 
Sodalitates, 127. 
Solemnities of Contract, 506-510. 
Spain. See also Table of Statutes. 
contracts, 446, n. 55· 
foreign corporations, I So. 
Soviet Union. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
commercial agencies, 345, n. 45· 
contracts, 373, 447, n. 6o, 448. 
foreign corporations, 130, I35· 
government recognition, 88. 
nationalization of corporations, 
86, n. 86, 87-92. 
torts, 237, n. 27. 
unenforceability of obligations, 
547 f. 
Special Law (Applicable to Special 
Problems), 360 ff., 388 ff., 484. 
Standard Contract Forms 
on applicable law, 377-384. 
State as Person, 6, IO-I I. 
Statute of Frauds, 498-501, 503. 
Statutes of Limitations, 294-295. 
Stijtung o.ffentlichen Rechts, I2. 
Stock Corporation, 8. 
Stock Corporation en Commandite,8. 
Subcontractor, Rights of, 384. 
Subscription, 7o-7I. 
Substance and Procedure. See Pro-
cedure. 
Substantial Connection of Con-
tract, 402-408, 409, n. 69, 427, 
471-478. 
Succursale, 176. 
Sunday Contracts, 564-565. 
Supplier, 319-320. 
Supranational Legal Bodies, 15. 
Switzerland. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
contracts, 386, 442. 
bilateral, 467, 471. 
validity and effect, 396-397, 
449-450, 529. 
foreign corporations, 142, I79, 
n. 22. 
INDEX 
Taxation, 23, 24, 29, 97, 98, n. 20, 
12J. 
Telephone, Defamation by, JI7-
JI8. 
Territorial Theory of Foreign Cor-
poration, 124-127, 167-172. 
Territorial Waters, Torts in, 342-
346. 
Theory of Control, 22, n. 55,56-62. 
Third Parties, Protection in Deal-
ing with Foreign Organization, 
IIo-I II, 167-170, 224. 
Tochtergesellschajt, 178. 
The Torni Case, 398, 405, n. 53, 
426-427. 
Tort Moral, 278. 
Torts, Part 7, 227-354. 
concept, 229-235. 
acting place, JII-J2J. 
by aircraft, 328, Chapter 27. 
arrest, 230, 239, 308. 
burden of proof, 283-286. 
capacity to commit, 74, 255. 
causation, 257, 260. 
characterization, 232-235. 
concurrence of tort claims, 304-
306. 
with contract, 287-293. 
conflicts principle, 235, (excep-
tions) 244-250. 
contacts, 31 1 ff. 
contributory negligence, 258-259, 
282. 
damages, 276-280, 323-327. 
death of tortfeasor, 286. 
statutes, 261-263, 324. 
deceit, 325-327. 
defamation, 301 ff., 309, 314 ff. 
defendant, proper, 263-265. 
delict, 229 ff. 
detention, 239, n. 37, J06-Jo8. 
and family relations, 265-267. 
fault, 258. 
general principles, 2JJ. 
on high seas, 346-351. 
industrial property, 295-301. 
injury, 323 ff. 
maritime, Chapter 27, 336-354. 
omissive, 256, 312. 
option for plaintiff, 287 ff. 
penal law, 237, 31 I. 
place, Chapter 26, JOI-335· 
plaintiff, proper, 261-263. 
policy of law of, 309-311. 
preparatory acts, 311, 318, 333· 
presumptions, 284-286. 
procedure and substance, 276-
287. 
public policy, 240, n. 41, 247, 
248-250. 
quasi delict, 229. 
restitution, 279-281. 
sanctions, 276-281. 
scope of governing law, Chapter 
25, 255-JOO. 
seizure, 230, 239, 308. 
separate torts, 314· 
service of notice, 286. 
in several states, JI4-317. 
similarity rule, 237-244· 
statutes of limitation, 294-295. 
structure, 328-333· 
unlawful act, 255-257. 
on ungoverned territory, 244. 
vicarious liability, 267-275. 
Trademark, Violation, 295, 296, 
JI I, J22. 
Trading Associations, Recognition, 
IJ5-IJ6. 
Traffic Regulations, 272. 
Tramways d'Alexandrie Case, 54· 
Transfer 
of domicil of corporation, 50-56, 
64. 
of stock, 75· 
Treaties 
doing business, 217-220. 
recognition of organizations, 141. 
seat principle, 35-37. 
smuggling, 590. 
unincorporated organizations, 
10'2-IOJ. 
Trust, 6, IJ. 
charitable, 14. 
common law (business), 97-99, 
107, 108, 109, 110, 11& 
INDEX 
Ultra Vires Doctrine, 154, 158-165. 
Unfair Competition, 246, 295-298, 
313, 315, 335· 
Uniform Partnership Act, 94· 
Unincorporated Business Organiza-
tions, Chapter 21, 93-123. 
branches, 189. 
characterization, Ioo-Ioi, I02-
I07. 
common law trust, 97-99, 109, 
II6. 
conflict with domestic classifica-
tion, 103-107. 
joint stock company, 7, 38, n. 22, 
97-99,107, 115, IIg, I20-I2I. 
law applicable, II3-I I 5. 
scope, II5-I22. 
limited partnership, 7, 97, 108, 
IIO, II6. 
method of construction, 93-99. 
O.ffene Handelsgesellschajt, 94,105. 
partnership, 9, 93-99. See Part-
nership. 
personal law, roo--II5. 
civil law doctrine, IOo--Io7. 
United States, I07-II5. 
SCOpe, IOO, I I 5-122. 
application to branches, 189. 
quasi corporation, I07-III, II3-
I I{, II5-II6. 
right to be a party, I rg-122. 
suability, ng-122. 
trade unions, 121. 
treaties, Io2-1o3. 
trust (common law business), 97-
99, 108. 
types unknown to forum, I04-
105. 
United States. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
acknowledgments, by foreign of-
ficials, 507. 
in the United States, 509-510. 
airplane accidents, 342, 347, n. 
59· 
authority of agent, Igo. 
automobile owner liability, 26g-
274· 
burden of proof, 28 5-286. 
carriers' liability, 292 ff., 415 ff. 
champerty, 576-577. 
choice of law by parties, 357, 
360, 374-376, 401-402. 
contracts, general conflicts rules, 
357-360, 451, 456, 464, 491-
492. 
consent in fact, 525. 
corporation, terminology, 5· 
directors of corporation, 17o--172. 
doing business, 148, I73, 175. 
domestic law, 190. 
domestic standard, I 52-156. 
domestication, I 86. 
domicil, of corporation, 28. 
transfer, 55. 
ofpartnership, 115. 
employers' liability, 292-293. 
evasion, 401, 410, 413. 
family relations, 265-267. 
Harter Act, 383 ff. 
insurance statutes, 412-415. 
intention of the parties, 374-376. 
jurisdiction, 79-80, 192-194. 
law of the state of incorporation, 
31-32. 
license statutes, I 8 I ff. 
noncom pi i ance, 202-2 I 5. 
liquor sales, 562-564, 587-588. 
local actions, 246-247. 
local law, rgo--Igi, Ig8. 
maritime law, 338 ff. 
maritime torts 
damages, 352-353. 
formal requirements, 354, n. 
g6. 
party autonomy, 401-402. 
place of wrong theory, 301-303, 
316, 323-328, 335· 
presumptions, 285-286. 
prohibition of liquor, 562-564, 
587-589, 590. 
public policy, defense of, 555· 
railway liability, 2go--2g2. 
service of process, Igi-Ig2. 
shareholder liability, 81-84. 
Soviet recognition, 88. 
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United States (continued) 
statute of frauds, 498-501. 
Sunday contracts, 564. 
supplier's liability, 319-320. 
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